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This PhD thesis develops and tests a model of bargaining between foreign 
investors and domestic institutions in transition countries. For this purpose this 
research employs a mixed-methods research methodology combining three studies - 
two macro-level quantitative and one micro-level qualitative - examining various 
aspects of the relationships between institutional factors and the quality of inward 
foreign direct investment (iFDI) flows in transition economies (that is, the impact of 
iFDI on the host country institutional environment). Specifically, emphasizing the 
circular nature of the relationship between the applied variables, it attempts, firstly, 
to identify the impact of the institutional environment in post-Soviet and Central and 
Eastern European countries on the quality of FDI inflows, and, secondly, to 
determine whether and how this iFDI affects the quality of the host countries’ 
institutions. The analysis of the presence, size, and direction of the impact of iFDI is 
pursued through the study of foreign investors’ (FIs) nonmarket strategies with a 
special focus on political behavior. 
Despite the growing role of iFDI and of companies with FDI (especially MNEs) 
as one of the most important rent-seeking interest groups in many economies, the 
analysis of the impact of iFDI stocks and flows on the host country’s institutional 
environment has received much less attention than analysis of the impact of host 
country institutions on iFDI and has, moreover, produced mostly mixed results. This 
project is intended to fill this gap and to contribute to theory building on the 
relationships between iFDI quality, foreign investors’ political behavior, various 
aspects of institutional environment (including institutional voids), and institutional 
changes in host countries. It finds evidence for the hypothesis that certain 
combinations of patterns of quality of iFDI and host-country institutional variables 
determine foreign investors’ (FIs) political influence and political behavior and may 
also allow them to pursue their economic goals through manipulation of political 
regimes and, consequently, reshaping of the host country’s institutions in accordance 
with their strategic goals. 
The proposed model was tested quantitatively for a sample of 27 post-Socialist 
countries and qualitatively for the case of Ukraine. The results of all three studies 
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provide evidence in support of this model. In particular, both quantitative panel 
studies provide evidence for the existence of ‘blind bargaining’ - a model depicting 
the cognitive situation of a foreign investor who lacks clarity on the situation he/she 
is in and, as a result is bound to act in conditions of extreme uncertainty due to the 
high degree of non-transparancy and instability of the “rules of the game” at any 
given moment and of their propensity for unpredictable change at any time in the 
future. ‘Blind bargaining’ originates from the specific state and society relationship 
that can be formed in neo-patrimonial host states where economic decisions are often 
not directed towards serving national interests, but towards supporting the personal 
aims of the officials in power. The first quantitative study shows and explains the 
attractiveness of such countries to riskier investors, who prefer relatively weak 
political regimes over stronger ones and who reduce their investment inputs once 
host states become more assertive. This model of relationships leads to the inflow of 
mostly ‘malign’ FDI (that is, iFDI that has a destabilizing impact on institutional 
competencies of recipient countries) into these economies. The second quantitative 
study examines the quality of iFDI flows in 12 post-Soviet states by determining the 
impact of attracted iFDI on local institutions, as measured by country risk indicators 
via a pooled regression model. The latter analysis shows that iFDI has a marginally 
negative effect on some individual country risk measures and a significantly negative 
effect on others, implying that there is a strong case for questioning the existing 
orthodoxy according to which the problems of transition can be overcome via 
increased iFDI.  
Given the complexity and context-specificity of foreign investors’ political 
behavior and its impact on host countries’ institutional capacities, this research 
acknowledges the need for a more targeted analysis at lower levels of aggregation. 
The thesis addresses this through a qualitative analysis of the relationships between 
foreign investors and host states in the context of one country - Ukraine. Interviews 
with company representatives and various experts were conducted to explore how 
changes in foreign investors’ bargaining power and, as a result, in their strategic 




Based on the combination of empirical and theoretical insights described above, a 
‘blind bargaining’ model was developed as a special case of the political bargaining 
model. It provides a comprehensive framework for explaining foreign investor – host 
state bargaining relationships in neopatrimonial transition economies and reveals 
several distinctive characteristics of both parties’ behavior in terms of their goals, 
resources, constraints, the nature of the bargaining process, strategies and outcomes. 
However, it is suggested that further country-specific tests are necessary to test its 
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Concept Definition 
Quality of FDI 
inflows 
General Definition:  
Effects of FDI inflows on the recipient economy. 
Research-specific definition:  
Since the overall goal of this research is the analysis of the 
impact of iFDI flows on host countries’ institutional 
capacities (as one of the most important location-specific 
advantages), the ‘quality’ of FDI is defined as indicating the 
size and direction of the impact of a unit of iFDI on changes 
in the institutional environment, as measured by country risk 
indicators, including overall country risk, political risk, 
economic risk, legal risk, tax risk, operational risk, and 
security risk within the quantitative part of this study and in 
terms of the direction of the impact of foreign investors’ 
political behavior on changes in institutional environment 
within the qualitative part of the project.  
Malign FDI General Definition:  
Lower quality iFDI that has a destabilizing effect on the 
recipient economy, for example, “lower domestic savings 
and investment by extracting rents and siphoning off the 
capital through preferred access to local capital markets and 
local supplies, as well as through the repatriation of profits, 
drive domestic producers out of business, substitute 
imported inputs, produce small labour elites and cause the 
increase of unemployment, prevent beneficial spillovers and 
externalities to host economies”, etc (Moran, 1998: 15-20). 
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Research-specific definition:  
iFDI that has destabilizing impact on institutional 
competencies of recipient countries. 
Benign FDI General Definition:  
Higher quality iFDI that has positive stabilizing effect on the 
recipient economy, for example, “filling the gap between 
savings and investment, as well as between investment and 
foreign exchange, reinvestment in the same or related 
industries, increasing employments”, etc. (Moran, 1998: 15-
20). 
Research-specific definition:  
iFDI that has a stabilizing impact on institutional 
competencies of recipient countries. 
Round-tripping or 
Pseudo-FDI 
iFDI by domestic businessmen who made a decision to go 
abroad and return to their home countries as foreign 
investors to evade taxes and/ or the impact of  regulations, 
capitalizing on institutional differences between their real 
and pseudo home countries. 
Blind bargaining Model depicting the cognitive situation of a foreign investor 
who lacks clarity on the situation he is in and, as a result, is 
bound to act in conditions of extreme uncertainty due to the 
high degree of non-transparency and instability of the "rules 
of the game" at any given moment and of their propensity 
for unpredictable change at any time in the future.   
Neopatrimonial states Regimes possessing the following characteristics: high 
levels of personalization of power in the state, the capture of 
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the state by ruling clans, lack of rule of law, lack of 
distinction between the spheres of economics and politics, a 
disintegration of the state apparatus, the spread of corrupt 
practices in the state bureaucracy, paralyzing impact of state 
intervention in economic life (motivated by the personal 
interests of representatives of state authorities), lack of 
transparency and lack of consistency in all spheres of 
political and economic life (Eisenstadt, 1973; Zon, 2001). 
Original OLI model Static framework which includs three sets of interdependent 
variables: ownership-specific (O), location-specific (L), and 
internalization (I) advantages (OLI advantages) and serves 
to “explain the extent and pattern of international 
production, i.e. production financed by FDI and undertaken 
by MNEs” (Dunning, 2001: 176).  
Adjusted OLI model Dynamic framework which accounts for the changes in OLI 
configurations arising from the modifications of O, L, and I 




Firm-specific (‘competitive’ or ‘monopolistic’) advantages. 
They accommodate both tangible and intangible resources. 
The former include natural endowments, manpower and 
capital, while the latter are composed of technology and 
information, managerial, marketing and entrepreneurial 
skills, organizational systems, incentive structures and 
favored access to intermediate or final goods markets 
(Dunning & Lundan, 2008: 96). 
Location advantages Country-specific advantages which are either not available 
or available only partially and under poor conditions in the 
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firm’s home country. They embrace such immobile, natural 
or created endowments as labor, energy, materials, 
components, semi finished goods, prices, quality, 
productivity, international transport and communication 
costs, investment incentives and disincentives, barriers to 
trade, cultural, social and political differences, spillovers, 
economies of scale, institutional environment and others 
(Dunning, 2000; Dunning & Lundan, 2008: 100-102). 
Internalization 
advantages 
Context-specific configurations of O and L advantages that 
vary across types of value-added activities, firms, industries, 
regions and countries (Dunning, 2001). 
Institutions “Rules of the game in a society or, more formally, the 
humanly devised constraints that structure political, 
economic and social interactions. They consist of formal 
rules (constitutions, statute and common law, and 
regulations), informal rules (conventions, moral rules, and 
social norms), and the enforcement characteristics of each” 
(FDI: 7). 
Institutional voids Situation where some or all of the most important market-
supporting institutions, including property rights, regulatory 
systems, contract-enforcement mechanisms and others, are 
either missing, underdeveloped or inefficient (Doh et. al., 
2014; Khanna & Palepu, 1997; Khanna & Palepu, 2013; 
Palepu & Khanna, 1998; Prokopovych, 2011; Pufffer, 
McCarthy & Boisot, 2010). 
Institutional change Change in the rules, both formal and informal, that govern 
institutions (Inayatullah, 2004). It can result from a 
centralized action, such as bargaining, lobbying or any other 
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political activities, supported by a collective-choice process 
(Kingston & Caballero, 2009).  
Vested interests Rule-making elites represented by merged political, 
economic and criminal powers including state officials, 
political and economic elites, able both to prevent 
institutional change and to successfully advocate the 
emergence and persistence of inefficient institutions 
(Libecap, 1989; Ostrom, 2005).  
Power “Structural element of the relationship within which parties 
act to influence each other” (Bachrach & Lawler, 1981: 45-
46). 
Power as an outcome “Capacity of one actor to do something affecting another, 
which changes the probable pattern of specified future 
events” (Lukes, 1980: 13). 
Power as a potential “Approach assuming the necessity of distinguishing between 
potential and actual, or successful, use of power. From this 
standpoint, power is a resource that may or may not be used, 
and if used may or may not be effective” (Bachrach & 
Lawler, 1981: 45-46). 
Power as a tactical 
action 
“Approach emphasizing the active manipulative quality of 
power relationships and, as a result, assuming potential 
power and stressing the tactical use of the potential rather 
than the specific dimensions that define the potential” 
(Bachrach & Lawler: 1981: 46). 
Political power Ability of an individual, a group, or an institution to shape 
and control the behavior of others through the governance of 
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the public resources distibution and policies implementation 
processes for society. Poitical power consists of two 
components: de jure political power or political institutions 
and de facto political power. The latter is nurtured from two 
sources such as the group’s collective action potential and 
the group’s economic resources (Acemoglu et al., 2004).  
Bargaining power “Concept implying conflict of interests over goals that no 
party can achieve without taking the other into account and, 
thus, establishing that dependence is the defining 
characteristic of bargaining power” (Bachrach & Lawler, 
1981: 79). 
Obsolescing bargain Framework suggesting that the position of MNEs vis-à-vis 
host states can be significantly weakened once the foreign 
company has sunk investments which it cannot easily 
withdraw (Vernon, 1977). 
Political bargaining Model built on the assumption that MNE – state relations 
are repetitive in their nature. In particular, it delineates that 
MNEs need to continually initiate and engage in 
negotiations with host states over different policy issues to 
preserve and even strengthen their competitive positions in 
certain markets. The outcome of each political bargain 
depends on the relative potential and actual power of all 
parties participating in negotiations (Eden, Lenway & 
Schuler, 2004). 
Political behavior “(T)he acquisition, development, securing, and use of power 
in relations to other entities, where power is viewed as the 
capacity of social actors to overcome the resistance of other 
actors” (Boddewyn & Brewer, 1994: 120; Astley & 
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Sacheva, 1984: 90) 
Corporate raiding Illegal seizure of both domestic and foreign companies 
either independently or, most probably, through fostering 
alliances by oligarchs, state officials at all levels and, in 
many cases, criminals (Pojansky, 2014). 
Bridging Strategy assuming firms’ dedication to the unconditional 
compliance with the requirements of its operational 
environment (Meznar & Nigh, 1995). 
Buffering Strategy involving corporate actions on protection of a 
firm’s assets from all range of external pressures and on 
vigorous participation in activities that would lead to the 
improvement of a company’s competitive positioning in the 
respective markets (Hillman, Keim & Schuler, 2004; 





CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background to the research 
This PhD thesis develops and tests a model of bargaining between foreign 
investors and domestic institutions in transition countries. For this purpose this 
research employs a mixed-methods research methodology combining three studies - 
two macro-level quantitative and one micro-level qualitative - examining various 
aspects of the relationships between institutional factors and the quality of inward 
foreign direct investment (iFDI) flows in transition economies (that is, the impact of 
iFDI on the host country institutional environment). Specifically, emphasizing the 
circular nature of the relationship between the applied variables, it attempts, firstly, 
to identify the impact of the institutional environment in post-Soviet and Central and 
Eastern European countries on the quality of FDI inflows, and, secondly, to 
determine whether and how this iFDI affects the quality of the host countries’ 
institutions. The analysis of the presence, size, and direction of the impact of iFDI is 
pursued through the study of foreign investors’ (FIs) nonmarket strategies with a 
special focus on political behavior. 
Despite the growing role of iFDI and of companies with FDI (especially MNEs) 
as one of the most important rent-seeking interest groups in many economies, the 
analysis of the impact of iFDI stocks and flows on the host country’s institutional 
environment has received much less attention than analysis of the impact of host 
country institutions on iFDI and has, moreover, produced mostly mixed results. This 
project is intended to fill this gap and to contribute to theory building on the 
relationships between iFDI quality, foreign investors’ political behavior, various 
aspects of institutional environment (including institutional voids), and institutional 
changes in host countries. In particular, it seeks evidence for the hypothesis that 
certain combinations of patterns of quality of iFDI and host-country institutional 
variables determine foreign investors’ (FIs) political influence and political behavior 
and may also allow them to pursue their economic goals through manipulation of 
political regimes and, consequently, reshaping of the host country’s institutions in 
accordance with their strategic goals. 
36 
 
Interestingly, significant body of research concentrated on the search for 
empirical evidence on the relevance of institutions as determinants of iFDI flows. 
Scholars have been seeking to identify how the changes in the patterns of iFDI flows 
are associated with various institutional aspects. Most of the previous research in this 
domain was quantitative macro-level analysis on the determinants of iFDI flows into 
countries with different levels of development and impact of iFDI on such country 
indicators as economic growth (Akinlo, 2004; Alfaro & Charlton, 2007; Basu & 
Guariglia, 2007; Bengoa & Sanches-Robles, 2003;  Borensztein, De Gregorio & Lee, 
1998; Chowdury & Mavrotas, 2006; Durham, 2004;  Hansen & Rand, 2006;  Lee, 
Baimukhamedova, Akhmetova, 2010; Li & Liu, 2005; Liu, Siler, Wang, & Wei, 
2000; Vu & Noy, 2008), income inequality (Basu & Guariglia, 2007; Bhandari, 
2007; Franco & Gerussi, 2010), spillovers (Alfaro, Chanda, Kalemli-Ozcan & Sayek, 
2004; Cheung & Lin, 2004; Hejazi & Safarian, 1999; Kugler, 2006; Liu, Siler, 
Wang, & Wei, 2000; Smarzynska Javorcik, 2004; Smarzynska Javorcik & 
Spatareanu, 2006; Van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie & Lichtenberg, 2001), and trade 
(Wang, Buckley, Clegg & Kafouros, 2007) among others.  
Only recently, more research effort was focused on the relationships between 
iFDI and institutional environment in host countries (Bevan, Estrin & Meyer, 2004; 
Busse & Hefeker, 2007; Daude & Stein, 2007; Dunning & Lundan, 2008; Mudambi 
& Navarra, 2002). However, only several quantitative research projects examined 
impact of iFDI on host countries’ institutional capacity.  We differentiate two 
categories of research here: studies using iFDI flows and stocks as an aggregate 
measure of the impact of MNEs’ activity and survey-based studies. The former 
category includes research on iFDI impact on host countries’ institutional 
environment measured by risk indicators (Beck & Acc-Nikmehr, 2008), providing 
evidence that iFDI flows have overall destabilizing impact on institutional 
competencies (See Chapter 6); by economic transition indicators (Malesky, 2005; 
Malesky, 2009), demonstrating large positive influence on economic reform in 
transition economies; by corruption perception index (Kwok & Tadesse, 2006; 
Robertson & Watson, 2004), producing contradictory results; and by environmental 
regulations index (Cole, Elliot & Fredriksson, 2006), observing that  the direction of 
FDI effect depends on the degree of corruptibility of local governments. The latter 
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category consist of studies on political influence of foreign firms (Desbordes & 
Vauday, 2007), regulatory advantages of foreign firms (Huang, 2005) based on the 
World Business Environment survey by World Bank and one study on determinants 
of FDI which among other results provides evidence on the impact of FDI on 
standards of governance in transition economies (Hellman, Jones & Kaufmann, 
2002). The latter study is based on joint EBRD and World Bank Business 
Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey.  
Contemporary research also examines various context-specific political activities 
that both domestic companies and foreign investors utilize to influence public policy 
decision-making in a way that would solidify and improve their positioning in the 
markets (Baron, 1995; Baron, 2006; Boddewyn, 1998; Boddewyn & Brewer, 1994; 
Grier, Munger & Roberts, 1991; Griffin, Fleisher, Brenner & Boddewyn, 2001; 
Hillman, Zardkoohi & Bierman, 1999; Lenway & Rehbein, 1991; Meznar & Nigh, 
1995; Pittman, 1998; Rugman & Verbeke, 1998; Schuler, 1996; Schuler, 1999; 
Schuler, Rehbein & Cramer, 2002; Shaffer & Hillman, 2000; Stopford and Strange, 
1991). However, Hillman and Hitt (1999) claim that the research in this field has not 
kept pace with the turn of events in both political and economic environments of 
various countries. Particularly, Vogel (1996) argues that the collapse of the Soviet 
Union followed by a very specific institution-building processes heavily relying on 
the support and participation of various domestic and international, market and 
nonmarket, formal and informal actors, including foreign investors, requires a new 
research effort to focus on better understanding of the role of all of the various types 
of businesses on the elaboration and implementation of public policies (Lawton, 
McGuire & Rajwani, 2013).  
However, it is noteworthy that in spite of the obvious growth in the interest to 
corporate political activity, especially during the last 25 years, as to our knowledge 
(on August, 2014) there was no qualitative research projects examining the quality of 
iFDI in terms of foreign investors’ political behavior and impact on institutional 
environment in post-Soviet transition countries. 
Based on the combination of existing empirical and theoretical insights described 
above, including eclectic paradigm, social conflict view, the new institutional, 
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bargaining power, and corporate political activity theories, this thesis seeks to close 
the research gap and develop a ‘blind bargaining’ model - a model depicting the 
cognitive situation of a foreign investor who lacks clarity on the situation he/she is in 
and, as a result is bound to act in conditions of extreme uncertainty due to the high 
degree of non-transparency and instability of the “rules of the game” at any given 
moment and of their propensity for unpredictable change at any time in the future - 
will be developed as a special case of the political bargaining model. It will provide a 
comprehensive framework for explaining foreign investor – host state bargaining 
relationships in neopatrimonial host states (states where economic decisions are often 
not directed towards serving national interests, but towards supporting the personal 
aims of the officials in power) and, as a result, reveal several distinctive 
characteristics of both parties’ behavior in terms of their goals, resources, constraints, 
the nature of the bargaining process, strategies and outcomes.  
The proposed model questions the dominant orthodoxy of FDI (See Fig. 1.1) 
which suggests that increased foreign investment will, in virtually all instances, 
benefit the recipient nation. This orthodoxy has an extensive academic pedigree 
(Balasubramanyam, Salisu, and Sapsford, 1996; Borensztein, De Gregorio and Lee, 
1998; De Melo, 1999; Dyker, 1999) which loosely underpins a well established 
policy discourse which emphasises ‘the creation of positive investment climates’ and 
the need to ‘create institutions which are complementary to investment’ (Guisinger, 
1985; Mudambi and Navarra, 2002). Implied in this orthodoxy is the assumption 
that, firstly, the failure by certain regions to exhibit sustained growth can be 
attributed to a lack of ability to attract foreign investment, and, secondly, that the 
inability to attract lasting foreign investment, itself, can be attributed to institutional 
deficiencies of the potential recipient country. Applied to former Soviet states, other 
than the Baltics, this narrative typically identifies corruption, lack of legal and 
institutional reforms and insufficient liberalisation as root cause for the insufficiency 
of economic and social development in these countries (Estrin, Hughes and Todd, 
1997; Fabry and Zeghni, 2002; Bevan, Estrin and Meyer, 2004). 
One of the obvious weaknesses of this narrative is that it oversimplifies the 
experiences of different countries within larger regions. Thus, there is significant 
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evidence that, contrary to the assumption that the entire region has been an FDI 
laggard, FDI in former Soviet states has been highly concentrated in a number of 
countries which rank, by international standards, amongst the top FDI recipients 
(Meyer and Pind, 1999). Moreover, there is no consistent evidence that the top FDI 
recipients amongst former Soviet states also rank at the top in terms of social and 
institutional development and/or political stability (Abbott, 2002; Abbott and Beck, 
2003). Lastly, there are some, largely qualitative analyses, which suggest that some 
countries which have been targeted by FDI have in fact experienced a deterioration 
in their institutional capacities (Marriott and Muttitt, 2005). 
To avoid some of the pitfalls discussed above the proposed model will be tested 
quantitatively for a sample of 27 post-Socialist countries and qualitatively at a lower 
level of disaggregation for the case of Ukraine, given the complexity and context-
specificity of foreign investors’ political behavior and its impact on host countries’ 
institutional capacities.  
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Figure 1.1: The relationship between quality of iFDI and institutional 
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1.2 Quality of foreign direct investment: Definition & operationalization 
problems 
1.2.1 Introduction 
The globalization of economic production supported by the continuing 
liberalization of investment policies and trade regimes and increased competition 
among firms is reshaping the international economic landscape (UNCTAD, 2005). 
As a result, even in spite of the dampening effect that global financial and economic 
crisis had on foreign direct investment (FDI) (UNCTAD, 2009) and a significant 
contraction of global FDI flows in 2009 (UNCTAD, 2010), internalization of 
production continued to gain momentum (UNCTAD, 2010). The role of FDI and 
multinational enterprises (MNEs) in the world economy has been persistently 
increasing. Foreign affiliates of MNEs experienced notably smaller decrease in their 
sales and value-added as compared to the world economy (UNCTAD, 2010). Their 
“share in global gross domestic product (GDP) reached an historic high of 11 
percent” in 2009 (UNCTAD, 2010: xviii). 
Consequently, more research efforts aim to attend to the study of different 
aspects of FDI and MNEs activity. It is suggested that the quality of FDI is one of the 
primary issues to be addressed under the circumstances (Kalotay, 2010; Narula & 
Guimon, 2010). The investigation of the impact of FDI on the host economies is 
critical for both academic and policy-making purposes. Even though some countries 
tend to acknowledge the differences in the types of FDI projects in their national 
policies (Alfaro & Charlton, 2007), most of the investment promotion instruments in 
transition and developing countries are currently still considering the increase in the 
volume of inward FDI (iFDI) flows as their major goal, while neglecting the 
importance of the characteristics of the quality of these flows for their economies.  
Narula & Guimon (2010) suggest that the latter should be determined by the host 
state’s development aspirations and strategies. 
1.2.2 Malign vs. Benign FDI 
The principal problem for the analysis of the quality of FDI inflows is its 
definition. The concept of quality is very broad and can be expressed through 
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multiple effects FDI inflows are capable of and expected to transfer to the recipient 
economy. According to Moran (1998: 15-20) among such effects are: 
 
Transfer of capital; transfer of know-how and management; rise of 
efficiency and expansion of output; higher economic growth; balance of 
payments benefits; increase in competition and lower prices; increase in 
entrepreneurial spirit, help in training and education; increase in employment; 
help in infrastructure; improvement of living conditions in developing 
countries; identification, allocation, management and effective use of world 
material and human and financial resources; greater international unity and 
interdependency; ensuring a more equal distribution of income and wealth. 
 
Moreover, recently academics acknowledged less conventional location 
advantages, such as institutions and institutional environment, as one of the most 
important immobile factors of host countries (Bevan, Estrin & Meyer, 2004; Busse & 
Hefeker, 2007; Daude & Stein, 2007; Dunning & Lundan, 2008; Mudambi & 
Navarra, 2002). As a result, academics and policy-makers also assert that FDI 
inflows will contribute both to the rise of the efficiency and improvement of the 
quality of legal, administrative and political systems and to the perfection of markets 
and property rights regulations (Malesky, 2005; Malesky, 2009; Smarzynska 
Javorcik, 2002). 
As a solution for the operationalization problem of this all-embracing concept, 
researchers have chosen to restrict their definition of the quality of FDI to the focus 
of their research project. For example, UNCTAD (2006) define quality FDI in terms 
of its employment, skills enhancement and competitiveness effect on the host 
economy and its economic agents. Other researchers use the quality of FDI to 
indicate the impact of a unit of iFDI on growth (Akinlo, 2004; Alfaro & Charlton, 
2007; Basu & Guariglia, 2007; Bengoa & Sanches-Robles, 2003;  Borensztein, De 
Gregorio & Lee, 1998; Chowdury & Mavrotas, 2006; Durham, 2004;  Hansen & 
Rand, 2006;  Lee, Baimukhamedova, Akhmetova, 2010; Li & Liu, 2005; Vu & Noy, 
2008), income inequality (Basu & Guariglia, 2007; Bhandari, 2007; Franco & 
Gerussi, 2010), spillovers (Alfaro, Chanda, Kalemli-Ozcan & Sayek, 2009; Cheung 
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& Lin, 2004; Hejazi & Safarian, 1999; Kugler, 2006; Liu, Siler, Wang, & Wei, 2000; 
Smarzynska Javorcik, 2004; Smarzynska Javorcik & Spatareanu, 2006; Van 
Pottelsberghe de la Potterie & Lichtenberg, 2001), trade (Wang, Buckley, Clegg & 
Kafouros, 2007) and institutional environment measured by risk indicators (Beck & 
Acc-Nikmehr, 2008), economic transition indicators (Malesky, 2005; Malesky, 
2009), corruption perception index (Kwok & Tadesse, 2006; Robertson & Watson, 
2004), and the environmental regulations index (Cole, Elliot & Fredriksson, 2006) 
among others. 
Since the overall goal of this research is the analysis of the impact of iFDI flows 
on institutional capacities (as one of the most important location-specific advantages) 
of host countries, the ‘quality’ of FDI is defined as indicating the size and direction 
of the impact of a unit of iFDI on institutional environment measured by country risk 
indicators, including overall country risk, political risk, economic risk, legal risk, tax 
risk, operational risk and security risk within the quantitative part of this study and in 
terms of the direction of the impact of foreign investors’ political behavior on 
changes in institutional environment within the qualitative part of the project.  
It is necessary to admit that, contrary to the anticipations of host states that FDI 
will always improve economic welfare, lower quality FDI can have destabilizing 
effect on the recipient economy, such as:  
Instead of filling the gap between savings and investment, MNEs may 
lower domestic savings and investment by extracting rents and siphoning off 
the capital through preferred access to local capital markets and local supplies 
of foreign exchange. Instead of closing the gap between investment and 
foreign exchange, they might drive domestic producers out of business and 
substitute imported inputs. The MNE may reinvest in the same or related 
industries in the host country and extend its market power. The repatriation of 
profits might drain capital from the host country. MNEs’ use of 
“inappropriate” capital intensive technologies may produce small labour elite 
while consigning many workers to the ranks of the unemployed. Their tight 
control over technology, higher management functions and export channels 
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may prevent the beneficial spillovers and externalities hoped for in more 
optimistic scenarios (Moran, 1998: 15-20).  
  
Following Moran (1998) we suggest to label iFDI as ‘malign’ or ‘benign’ 
depending on the direction of their impact on the host country’s institutional 
environment. As a result, if iFDI has a destabilizing impact on institutional 
competencies of host countries, we refer to it as “malign’ iFDI and, if iFDI has a 
stabilizing impact on institutional competencies of recipient countries, we refer to it 
as “benign” iFDI. 
1.3 Research framework and research objectives 
As an alternative to the conventional views on FDI described above, this thesis 
suggests a new model – “blind bargaining” - and examines the possibility that 
foreign investment in former Soviet states has not only failed to produce the expected 
effects, but also may have had a discernibly negative impact on certain regions. The 
latter would include neopatrimonial states and states undergoing periods of radical 
change in institutional environment, or institutional upheaval, characterized by 
extreme uncertainty and ambiguity such as transition economies of the former Soviet 
Union and Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) have been experiencing (Roth & 
Kostova, 2003: 315), which makes them highly dependent on and vulnerable to 
pressures of any entities or groups of entities retaining control over economic 
resources.  This research adopts an integrated approach to the study of different 
aspects of the entire cycle of the relationships between the quality of iFDI and 
institutional environment in transition economies.  
The research framework of this study presented schematically in Figure 1.2 
demonstrates the above described circular relationship between the quality of the 
institutional environment and the quality of iFDI in host countries. Combining the 
OLI paradigm (Dunning, 1980; 2000; 2001) and new institutional economics (North, 
1990; Williamson, 1975; 1985) as a foundation for the theoretical framework, this 
research examines the relationship between institutions as one of the most important 
host country location specific characteristics and the quality of iFDI both 
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quantitatively for the sample of 27 countries and qualitatively for the case of 
Ukraine.  
The first quantitative study shows and explains the attractiveness of such 
countries to riskier investors, who prefer relatively weak political regimes over 
stronger ones and who reduce their investment inputs once host states become more 
assertive. The following hypothesis is tested: 
 Hypothesis 1: The presence of ‘blind bargaining’ in neo-patrimonial post-
Soviet states results in attracting riskier lower quality iFDI. 
This chapter argues that this model of relationships leads to the inflow of mostly 
‘malign’ FDI (that is, iFDI that has a destabilizing impact on institutional 
competencies of recipient countries) into these economies.  
The second quantitative study examines the quality of iFDI flows and stocks by 
determining the impact of attracted iFDI on local institutions, as measured by 
country risk indicators. The following hypothesis is tested: 
 Hypothesis 2: The host countries’ risks increase (decrease) with the 
growth of lower quality ‘malign’ (better quality ‘benign’) iFDI flows. 
This analysis provides evidence that iFDI has a negative effect on some 
individual country risk measures, implying that there is a strong case for questioning 
the existing orthodoxy according to which the problems of transition can be 
overcome via increased iFDI.  
The qualitative part of this research explores the relationships between iFDI and 
the institutional environment of one country – Ukraine – with a particular focus on 
the iterative political bargaining that occurs amongst the relevant actors. The 
following questions are explored with a view to establishing which types of foreign 
investors actually have the leverage to affect the host country institutional 
environment and what resources they are able to mobilize for this purpose: 
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 Question 1: Does the newly developed blind bargaining model apply to 
companies with FDI in Ukraine? Does its relevance vary for different 
groups of companies with FDI? How? 
 Question 2: How do the choices of companies with FDI regarding 
political strategies depend on their characteristics? 
 Question 3: Does the level of political activity and pro-activeness vary 
between different groups of companies with FDI? If so, how? 
 Question 4: How successful and efficient are different types of companies 
with FDI in their efforts to influence institutional changes? Why? 
Here it is argued that the outcome of such bargains is dependent on and 
determined by foreign investors’ bargaining power. The latter is analyzed drawing on 
the theories of power (Bachrach & Baratz, 1970; Dahl, 1957; Lukes, 1980), 
bargaining power (Bacharach & Lawler, 1981), political bargaining model (Eden et 
al., 2004) (including obsolescing bargain [Vernon, 1971; 1977; Stopford & Strange, 
1991; Stopford, Strange & Henley, 1991], political bargaining [Eden, Lenway & 
Schuler, 2004] and blind bargaining [Acc-Nikmehr & Beck, 2005] as a special cases) 
and social conflict view of institutional differences (Acemoglu et al., 2004; Arrow, 
1951; Knight, 1992; Olson, 1965; Stigler, 1975). 
As a result, certain combinations of patterns of quality of iFDI and host-country 
institutional variables determine the content of bargaining between foreign investors 
and host states, as well as foreign investors’ political influence and political 
behavior, and allow foreign investors (particularly the largest and most powerful 
ones) to pursue their economic goals through manipulation of political regimes by 
the means of various corporate political strategies including such tactics as lobbying, 
corruption (Henisz & Zelner, 2005; Mudambi & Navarra, 2002), involvement in 
policy-learning, policy-making processes and international diplomacy (Welch & 
Wilkinson, 2002), public and government relationships, relationships with mass 
media and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), participation in firms’ alliances 
and associations (Boddewyn, 1988), organizing investors’ coalitions and building 
constituencies (Lord, 2003). All of this amounts to a reshaping of the host country’s 
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institutions in accordance with the foreign investors’ strategic goals, to the extent that 
their de facto political power allows. 
Overall, it is argued that not only do host country location-specific advantages, 
particularly institutions, determine the quality of FDI inflows, but also that iFDI, 
through the political behavior of the investors, influences the patterns of changes in 
the institutional environment of this host country. Political bargaining processes and 
outcomes are contingent on the institutional characteristics, capabilities and goals of 
host countries (Eden et al., 2004) and on the relevant bargaining power and goals of 
foreign investors. The worse the initial conditions and the weaker the host country 
institutions the lower the quality of the iFDI enters the country: it will either fail to 
contribute to the development of the institutional environment or even cause negative 
changes.  
In this context, the specific objectives of this research project are to examine all 
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1.4 Research approach 
 
This study adopts a mixed methods research approach to investigate different aspect 
of iFDI quality in terms of the relationships between various types of foreign 
investors and institutional environment in post-Soviet transition countries. This 
research is based on a critical realism paradigm (Archer, Bhaskar, Collier, Lawson & 
Norrie, 1998; Bhaskar, 1978, 1989, 2011; Campbell, 1974, 1988; Cook & Campbell, 
1979; Manicas, 2006; Sayer, 1992, 2000) thus aiming at avoiding the problems of 
objectivity by separating the transitive and intransitive objects of science and the 
tools for explaining reality itself. It does not reject the interpretivist position that 
natural and social phenomena are fundamentally different (Blaikie, 1995) and see the 
world as having dual actuality. One of the most distinctive and important features of 
realism, especially in the context of this research, is methodological pluralism 
(Olsen, 2004; Sayer, 2000). It predicates that realists allow the use of different 
methods and techniques, including both qualitative and quantitative, for the study of 
the same social phenomenon and its various characteristics (Carter, 2003; 
Danermark; 2002; Olsen, 2004; Sayer, 2000). 
 
Through a process of retroduction this research inquires into real social structures 
and mechanisms searching for and suggesting new connections - antecedents which 
are presumed to cause the observable phenomenon and its changes (Blaikie, 1995; 
Olsen, 2004). Moreover, retroductive logic is also appropriate for both qualitative 
and quantitative methodologies (Olsen, 2004). 
 
This study consists of three parts: two quantitative and one qualitative. The 
former two parts utilize econometric techniques for the analysis including 
conventional ordinary least squares (OLS), least squares dummy variables (LSDV) 
and general least squares estimator (GLSE) regression models. The latter one relies 
on the semi-structured interviews method to analyze complex multiple links and 
relationships in which foreign investors engage for the purpose of aligning the host 
country’s institutional environment with their strategic goals. Overall fifty interviews 
were conducted including twenty nine confidential interviews with CEOs, directors, 
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or managers of relevant departments within the companies with FDI and twenty one 
auxiliary interviews with various experts. 
 
This research applies a combination of directed and conventional approaches to 
content analysis (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). Thus, only several principal categories 
are predetermined and most categories, as well as subcategories and codes, are 
derived directly from the data as a result of multiple in-depth reviews of interviews’ 
records. 
 
1.4 Structure of the thesis 
This thesis consists of nine chapters. Chapter one introduces the background of 
this research, informs about relevant literature, summarizes available theoretical and 
practical evidence on quality of iFDI, focusing on the development of its definition 
and relevant operationalization problems, outlines the research framework and 
research approach, provides a list of the research hypothesis for the quantitative parts 
and research questions for the qualitative part of the project, and, finally, reviews the 
structure of the thesis. 
Chapter two includes a review of an international business, management and 
political science literature required for the comprehensive analysis of the quality of 
iFDI and bargaining relationships between foreign investors and host states, their 
political behavior and impact on institutional change in post-Soviet transition 
countries. It summarizes available theoretical and practical evidence on eclectic 
paradigm, institutions, institutional change, and social conflict view; bargaining 
power with special attention to existing obsolescing and political bargain models for 
developing a new ‘blind bargaining’ model as a special case of political bargain 
model for neo-patrimonial transition states; corporate political activity.  
Chapter three offers the justification of the choice of mixed methods research 
approach, critical realism paradigm, retroductive strategy and methods, including 
econometric OLS, LSDV and GLSE models in case of quantitative parts and semi-
structured interviews in case of qualitative part of the analysis. Detailed discussion of 
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sampling design, researchers’ performance, triangulation and data analysis 
procedures conclude this chapter.  
Chapter four provides a brief description of iFDI distribution patterns in 
transition economies and of Ukrainian geopolitics and economy. The discussion of 
the both transition countries’ and Ukraine’s major characteristics, including strengths 
and weaknesses as a potential investment destination, with a special focus on 
imperfections of institutional environment, helps to understand and justify the choice 
of the former as a case for the quantitative research and the latter as a case for the 
qualitative research.  
Chapter five is based on the author’s publication “Blind bargaining and the 
effects of foreign direct investment on recipient states: The case of post-Soviet and 
Eastern European countries”. It is a quantitative analysis examining the relationships 
between iFDI and institutional capacities in 28 transition economies, including 
Community of Independent States (CIS), South Eastern European (SEE) and Central 
Eastern European (CEE) countries. The results provide evidence of the negative 
impact on indicators of stability and policy consistency, such as economic risks, on 
the host countries ability to attract quality FDI inflows. 
Chapter six is based on the author’s publication “Foreign direct investment and 
country risk: Is there evidence of ‘malign’ investment in former Soviet states”. It is a 
quantitative analysis of the ‘quality’ of inward FDI in transition countries in terms of 
its impact on institutional environment measured by country risk. It examines the 
impact of FDI on a number of country risk indicators via a pooled regression model 
in twelve post-Soviet states and finds either a marginally negative effect on 
individual country risk measures such as in the case of ‘Overall Country Risk’, or 
significantly negative effects as in the case of ‘Economic Risk’ and ‘Legal Risk’. 
Chapter seven presents the results of the qualitative part of this study based on 
the semi-structured interviews analysis. The findings are organized in line with the 
themes pursued by four research questions. The first theme includes all the evidence 
related to the bargaining power, quality of iFDI and institutional environment in 
Ukraine, and changes in foreign investors - host state relationships. The second 
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theme focuses on the analysis of the patterns of foreign investors’ political behavior 
and all related issues such as relationships between foreign investors’ characteristics 
and a choice of corporate political strategies, level of pro-activity, modes of 
participation and effectiveness of their actions. The third theme provides the 
assessment of efficiency of foreign investors’ attempts in protecting their interests in 
Ukraine. It also summarizes the interviewees’ feedback on and recommendations on 
the potential actions for securing the improvement of the quality of iFDI and 
institutional environment in the country. 
Chapter eight answers to the research questions by discussing the findings of all 
three parts in relation to each other within the framework of the entire research 
project in the context of the research objectives, hypothesis and questions. It draws 
on the relevant theory discussed in the literature review and research framework to 
analyze the findings and identify contributions to the literature.   
Chapter nine summarizes the implications of this study for the literature, business 
practice, education and public policy. Finally, the thesis concludes with the review of 
limitations of this project and directions for the future research. 
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CHAPTER TWO: QUALITY OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, 
INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND BARGAINING POWER  
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter builds on a comprehensive review of existing international business, 
political science, economics, and sociology literature instrumental in answering 
research questions posed within this study and developing a ‘blind bargaining’ 
model. Thus, to test the hypothesis posed by two macro-level quantitative projects, 
suggesting that, firstly, the presence of ‘blind bargaining’ attracts riskier investors 
who prefer relatively weak political regimes and who reduce their investment inputs 
once host states become more assertive; and, secondly, iFDI in former Soviet states 
has not only failed to generate the expected positive institutional transformation 
effects, but rather had discernibly negative impact on certain regions; as well as to 
built on the results of both of the above and of a more detailed qualitative study on 
the foreign investors impact on institutional environment to develop a blind 
bargaining model, this literature review combines multiple theories, including the 
analysis of eclectic paradigm, institutional, FDI, trade, and development theories, the 
evolution of the bargaining theory, bargaining strategies, and foreign investors’ 
political behaviour to meet the explanatory needs of this research project. It also 
explores the existing theoretical knowledge on corporate political activity. In this 
light, the nature of foreign investors - host state relationships is analysed in terms of 
iFDI quality and its impact on host countries’ institutional environment taking into 
account changes in foreign investors’ bargaining power and in foreign investors’ 
political behaviour. 
2.2 Conventional views on FDI, trade, and development 
Since the 1970s, much of the literature on economic growth has focused on the 
question as to why the ‘West’ has been able to accumulate significant amounts of 
wealth while other regions of the world suffer from comparable poverty (Lucas, 
1988). Up until the mid 1990s this issue was widely disputed, not least on account of 
the different disciplinary approaches which contributed to this debate. However, 
partly due to the influence of the World Bank, International Monetary Fund and 
54 
 
World Trade Organization, a new consensus formed in the 1990s which emphasized 
trade as a principal source of wealth, and argued that the economies of wealthy 
nations could be distinguished from poorer ones primarily on account of their greater 
participation in world trade. Implicit in this new orthodox was a barely hidden policy 
agenda which advocated, for various reasons, the lifting of trade barriers and the 
expansion of global trade. Academically the new orthodoxy was underpinned most 
eloquently by the works of Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warners, whose 1995 
Brookings Paper Economic Reform and the Process of Global Integration, stated 
categorically that “… Countries that are open to trade … experience unconditional 
convergence to the income levels of rich countries”. Apart from underpinning Sachs’ 
unquestionably disastrous role in advising the collapsing Soviet Union on matters of 
economic restructuring, this view formed the groundwork for a host of policy 
initiatives which advocated the integration of transition and developed countries in 
the world economy as a means of combating poverty. 
While political support for this orthodoxy has been strong, it has never been fully 
accepted amongst mainstream economists. Thus Rodrik’s (2003) review of the 
literature on gains from foreign trade concluded that the evidence was clear that 
“trade yields relatively small income gains which do not translate into persistently 
higher growth”. In as far as evidence for the positive effects of participation in trade 
and foreign investment was concerned, economists found that those directly 
employed by foreign companies experienced some, albeit fairly limited, welfare 
benefits. For instance, Aitkin, Harrison and Lipsey (1996) noted that foreign firms 
operating in developing countries tended to pay higher wages than indigenous firms; 
which they attributed to the possible application of superior technology. Similarly, 
Budd, Konings and Slaughter’s (2004) investigation of multinational firms, led them 
to conclude that these firms engaged in patterns of rent sharing where the greater 
profitability of the parent company gave rise to higher wages. However, another 
study by Konings (2004) concluded that the employment effects of FDI itself were 
generally limited, primarily because employment relocation was mainly taking place 
between trans-national company parents which were located in similar, high-wage, 
countries. A study by Pavlinek (2002) on acquisitions and joint venture agreement in 
Central Europe was even more pessimistic in that it concluded that these activities 
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did not result in improvements in employment conditions, but rather in the 
introduction of more effective managerial control and measures to enhance labor 
discipline (see also Woolfson and Beck; 2004). 
While many of employment and wage effects of FDI suggest caution with regard 
to Sachs’ proposition, it is on the level of aggregate data that the pro-trade/foreign 
investment hypothesis appears to suffer its greatest weaknesses. Although there is 
evidence of a long term, albeit inconsistent, growth in trade volumes over at least the 
last three decades, most historical studies of growth across regions find no evidence 
of an ‘unconditional narrowing’ of global income differentials. As one of the most 
comprehensive and thorough studies of long-term world income distribution, 
Maddisons’s (2001) book The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective, instead 
strikingly observes an increase in inequality, in which the positions of ‘Eastern 
Europe and the former USSR’ and ‘Africa’ have markedly deteriorated (see Table 
6.1). 
Although Maddison’s classification of ‘US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand’ 
into one group is perhaps somewhat counter-intuitive, his aggregate data permit 
some useful comparisons (see also Berger, 2006 who discusses this data in some 
detail). Particularly interesting, in the light of the claim of ‘unconditional 
convergence’ are comparisons between the richest group (1) including the of ‘US, 
Canada, Australia and New Zealand’ with the three non-Western groups ‘Asia’ (2), 
‘Eastern Europe and former USSR’ (2) and ‘Africa’ (3). Of these three groups only 
‘Asia’ (2) experienced a significant reduction in income inequality from 14.5 to 1, to 
a still sizable 8.9 to 1 as compared to the richest group from the period from 1950 to 
1998. ‘Eastern Europe and the former USSR’ (2), by contrast experienced an initial 
narrowing of its income differential to group (1) from 3.6 to 1, to 2.8 to 1 during the 
period from 1950 to 1973. From 1973 to 1998, however, the income differential of 
the ‘Eastern Europe and former USSR’ (2) group relative to the richest group more 
than doubled from 2.8 to 1 in 1973 to 6.0 to 1 in 1998. Although it can be reliably 
argued that ‘Asia’ experienced a massive expansion of trade during this period, the 
pro-trade argument breaks down when we consider that the ‘Eastern Europe and 
former USSR’ and ‘Africa’ groups also experienced increased trade and integration 
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in the world economy. On the basis of aggregate data, then, there is not only 
evidence of a recent increase global polarization, but also of trade having a 
polarizing effect on at least two regions. 
That this widening of income differential is not merely a matter of academic 
debate and economic data is perhaps best illustrated by linking this analysis to the, by 
now, well known phenomenon of the Russian mortality crisis. This data is 
reproduced in Table 6.2, not so much to illustrate the shocking decline of life 
expectancy among Russian males and the still quite pronounced decline among 
female which had occurred by 1994, but to point to the lesser known fact that the 
situation had not improved significantly by 2000. 
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Table 2.1. Interregional spread of per capita GDP, USD, PPP 
  1950 1973 1998 
Western Europe  4,594 11,534 17,921  
US, Canada, Australia, NZ  (1)  9,288  16,172  26,146  
Japan  1,926 11,439 20,413  
Asia (excl Japan)  (2)  635  1,231  2,936  
Latin America   2,554 4,531  5,795  
Eastern Europe and former USSR  (3)  2,601 5,729  4,354  
Africa  (4)  852  1,365  1,368  
World wide average   2,114 4,104  5,709  
Ratio (1) to (2) Asia   14.5:1 13.1:1  8.9:1  
Ratio (1) to (3) EE and USSR   3.6:1  2.8:1  6.0:1  
Ratio (1) to (4) Africa   10.9:1 11.8:1 19.1:1  
Adapted from Maddison, 2001: 126. 
Table 2.2. Life expectancy in Russia and other countries 
Country Year Life expectancy at birth 
Males  Females 
Russia 1991 63.5 74.3  
 1992 62.0 73.8 
 1993  58.9 71.9  
 1994  57.6  71.2 
 1995 58.3 71.7  
 1996 59.8 72.5  
 1997 60.8 72.9  
 1998 61.3 72.6  
 1999 59.9 72.4  
 2000  58.8  71.7  
India 1994-1997 62.4 63.4  
China 1994-1997 69.0 73.0  
US 1994-1997 73.6 79.4  
Source Goskomstat, WHO. 
Adapted from Gavrilova, Semyonova & Evudkushkina, 2002: 20. 
While the simultaneous occurrence of increased income inequality of the 
‘Eastern Europe and the former USSR’ with the Russian mortality crisis is at least 
suggestive of a link, it would, of course, be difficult to draw direct causal 
connections. What is worth pointing out, however, is that there are several analyses 
which illustrate a close connection between the worsening economic position of the 
region post 1990 and indicators of well–being. One particularly striking study, 
conducted by Mesle and Vallin (2002), for instance, illustrates that, whereas in 1965 
a ranking of male life expectancy included a mix of western and eastern nations, by 
1995 a clear dichotomy had occurred in which the top portion of the table was 
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occupied exclusively by western nations, while the bottom was occupied by eastern 
ones (see Figure 6.1). 
Figure 2.1. Dendrograms resulting from the hierarchical analysis of male 
age-specific death probabilities in 28 European countries, in 1965 and 
1995 
 
Source: Mesle and Vallin, 2002. 
 
Taking into account these, and other, sources of evidence it is perhaps no 
overstatement to argue that the recent several decades of trade liberalization have 
brought few tangible benefits to Eastern Europe and Russia as a region. What is more 
difficult to answer is the question as to whether trade liberalization itself and growth 
of FDI inflows has damaged the region, and, if yes, by what means. To answer these 
questions, the following sections will, firstly, identify and justify the most 
appropriate theoretical frameworks for analyzing such complex phenomenon, 
including eclectic paradigm and neo-institutional theories. The latter will be 
reviewed together with some of their more radical alternatives which will help better 
contextualizing and understanding various aspects of the studied phenomenon. 
Secondly, an analysis bargaining power, various bargaining models, and political 
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strategies will be implemented to determine all potential loopholes and tools 
available for foreign investors’ for achieving their business objectives. 
2.3 Eclectic paradigm 
This part of the literature review includes a revision of the evolution of 
Dunning’s eclectic paradigm (Dunning, 1980; Dunning, 2000; Dunning, 2001) and a 
validation of its choice as a theoretical framework and an instrument for the analysis 
of such complex phenomenon as the relationship between different components of 
institutional environment (as critical host country location-specific advantages) and 
FDI inflows. Special attention is also given to the examination of the investment 
development path (IDP) as a tool helping to account for the heterogeneity of FDI in 
terms of its impact on host country’s development considering institutional inertia 
and path-dependent nature of policies in these countries (Narula & Guimon, 2010; 
Boudier-Bensebaa, 2008). 
2.3.1 Introduction 
The globalization of economic production supported by the continuing 
liberalization of investment policies and trade regimes and increased competition 
among firms is reshaping the international economic landscape (INCTAD, 2005). 
Both the size and the role of Multinational Enterprises
1
 (MNEs) in the world 
economy have continued to grow. The number of MNEs in the world had risen from 
an estimated 37,000 (with approximately 170,000 foreign affiliates) in the beginning 
of the 1990s to approximately some 70,000 (with approximately 690,000 affiliates) 
in 2004. Almost a half of all MNEs affiliates are now located in developing countries 
(UNCTAD, 2005). As a result, the nature of MNEs is becoming extremely diverse 
and complex.  
                                                          
1 “A Multinational Enterprise (MNE) is an enterprise that engages in foreign direct investment (FDI) 
and owns or, in some way, controls value-added activities in more than one country” (Dunning & 
Lundan, 2008:3). “ An MNE qua MNE has, therefore, two distinctive features. First, it accesses, 
organizes and coordinates multiple value-added activities across national boundaries and, second, it 
internalizes at least some of the cross-border markets for the intermediate products arising from these 
activities. No other institution engages in both cross-border production and transactions” (Dunning & 
Lundan, 2008: 6).  
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In the light of these changes in the global economic scenario and the increasing 
importance of the role of the study of the MNEs phenomenon remains one of the 
major focuses in international economics and business research. Among the leading 
economic and behavioral explanations of the existence and growth of MNEs and of 
their foreign value-added activities are: Hymer’s industrial organization theory; 
Vernon’s product cycle theory; multinationality, organizational and risk 
diversification theories; capital imperfections theory; follow my leader, tit for tat 
theory; resource based theory; evolutionary theory; organizational (management 
related) theories, traditional location theories; agglomeration theories; exchange rate 
theories, etc. (Dunning, 2000; Dunning & Lundan, 2008; Tolentino, 2001). Most of 
these theories were using different units of analysis and were trying to answer 
different questions. None of them was trying to explain all MNEs activities (Dunning 
& Lundan, 2008). 
Only three theories were making an attempt to offer more general explanations of 
the MNEs foreign value-added activities: internationalization theory, the eclectic 
paradigm of international production and the macroeconomic theory of foreign direct 
investment
2
 (FDI) (Dunning & Lundan, 2008). However, it is “Dunning’s approach 
to the complex phenomenon of the MNE that has proved robust and, over time, has 
become one of the most influential streams of thought in the international business 
literature” (Buckely & Nashai, 2009: 58). It should be admitted that, in spite of 
numerous criticisms (Buckley & Hashai, 2009; Cantwell & Narulla, 2001; Guisinger, 
2001; Itaki, 1991; Tolentino, 2001), the reconsidered and adjusted eclectic paradigm 
retains its position as a dominant analytical framework for examining context 
specific  and operationally testable economic theories (each of which seeks to 
explain a particular component of the internalization process) of foreign direct 
investment and international production (Dunning, 2000; Dunning, 2001, Dunning & 
Wymbs, 2001). 
                                                          
2  “Traditionally, the territorial expansion of a firm’s production outside its national boundaries has 
been achieved by the act of a foreign direct investment” (Dunning & Lundan, 2008: 7). The latter 
“involves the transfer of package of assets or intermediate products, which includes financial capital, 
management and organizational expertise, technology, entrepreneurship, incentive structures, values 




2.3.2 The evolution of the eclectic paradigm 
What are the qualities that make the eclectic paradigm so unique and sustainable? 
The main distinction between the eclectic paradigm and other theories seeking to 
explain MNEs activities and behavior is that “it does not purport to be a theory of 
MNE per se” (Dunning & Lundan, 2008: 95). It is more holistic. Moreover, Dunning 
suggests that it “may be considered as an ‘envelope’ of complementary and context-
specific economic and business theories” (Dunning, 2001, Dunning, 2008: 108). 
Consequently, he states that “the purpose of the eclectic paradigm is not to offer a 
full explanation of all kinds of international production but rather to point to a 
methodology and to a generic set of variables which contain the ingredients 
necessary for any satisfactory explanation of particular types of foreign value-added 
activity” (Dunning, 2001: 177).  
Interesting is the fact that this same holistic nature is to be blamed for the 
successes and failures of the explanatory powers of the paradigm. As Dunning 
himself acknowledges, on one hand, the general nature of the paradigm may limit its 
power to explain certain patterns of MNEs behavior and their choices for 
international production (Dunning, 2001; Stoyan & Filippaios, 2008). On the other 
hand, it is both the span and the flexibility of its general framework that allow the 
eclectic paradigm (if it is applied to a predefined specific context) to successfully 
accommodate certain criticisms and incorporate new developments in the global 
economy, thus preserving and advancing its potential as a valuable tool for 
explaining and “determining the extent and pattern of both foreign owned production 
undertaken by a country’s own enterprise, and that of domestic production owned or 
controlled by foreign enterprises” (Dunning & Lundan, 2008: 95).  
2.3.3 The original static OLI model  
Originally the eclectic paradigm was formulated as a static framework which 
included three sets of interdependent variables, namely: ownership-specific (O), 
location-specific (L), and internalization (I) advantages (OLI advantages) and had an 
objective to “explain the extent and pattern of international production, i.e. 
production financed by FDI and undertaken by MNEs” (Dunning, 2001: 176).  
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Ownership advantages are firm-specific (‘competitive’ or ‘monopolistic’) 
advantages. They accommodate both tangible and intangible resources. The former 
include natural endowments, manpower and capital, while the latter are composed of 
technology and information, managerial, marketing and entrepreneurial skills, 
organizational systems, incentive structures and favored access to intermediate or 
final goods markets (Dunnign & Lundan, 2008: 96). Initially O advantages were 
divided into two sub-categories, namely: asset-specific ownership advantages (Oa) 
embracing most of the above mentioned firm- and environment-specific tangible and 
intangible resources and transaction cost-minimizing advantages (Ot) shaped by the 
opportunities arising from the multinationality and privileges of common governance 
(Dunning, 2000; Dunning, 2001; Dunning and Lundan, 2008).  
Location advantages are country-specific advantages which are either not 
available or available partially and on the worst conditions in the firm’s home 
country. They embrace such immobile, natural or created endowments as labor, 
energy, materials, components, semi finished goods, prices, quality, productivity, 
international transport and communication costs, investment incentives and 
disincentives, barriers to trade, cultural, social and political differences, spillovers, 
economies of scale, institutional environment and others (Dunning, 2000; Dunning & 
Lundan, 2008: 100-102). 
Internalization advantages are the result of the assessment of the value added by a 
certain configuration of O and L advantages. These configurations are context-
specific and vary across types of value-added activities, firms, industries, regions and 
countries (Dunning, 2001). Such exhaustive evaluation enables firms to make 
cognizant internalization decisions.  
So “the generalized predictions of the eclectic paradigm are straightforward. At 
any given moment of time, the more a country’s enterprises - relative to those of 
another – possess desirable O advantages, the greater the incentive they have to 
internalize rather than externalize their use, the more they find it in their interest to 
access and exploit them in a foreign location, than the more they are likely to engage 
in outbound FDI” (Dunning & Lundan, 2008: 100). 
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2.3.4 Adjusted OLI model  
2.3.4.1 Dynamic OLI model  
The eclectic paradigm was facing different criticisms. While most of these 
critical attacks addressed its general nature (Dunning, 2001; Dunning & Lundan, 
2008; Itaki, 1991) some of them, on the contrary, found that the OLI framework was 
comparatively static and lacking dynamism. Moreover, it was indicated that the 
paradigm did not account for the changes in OLI configurations arising from the 
modifications of O, L, and I components caused by their interrelationships (Dunning 
& Lundan, 2008).   
Consequently Dunning added a dynamic dimension to his paradigm. He specified  
that “changes in the outward or inward direct investment position of a particular 
country can be explained in terms of changes in the O advantages of its enterprises 
relative to those of other nations, changes in its L assets relative to those of other 
countries, changes in the extent to which firms perceive that these assets (and any 
other it may acquire) are best organized internally rather than by the market, and 
changes in the strategy of firms which may affect their reaction to any given OLI 
configuration”  ( Dunning & Lundan, 2008: 100). 
2.3.4.2 Institutional advantages 
Acknowledgement of the growing influence of institutional elements caused 
another adjustment within the OLI framework.  Dunning admits that in the course of 
their activity MNEs create and transfer not only hard but also soft technology, such 
as codes of conduct, norms, corporate culture, organizational regimes, incentive 
systems, etc. The latter may induce modifications in OLI configurations and affect 
the host country in many different ways as a result of their interaction with its 
environment (Dunning & Lundan, 2008). To account for all these changes Dunning 
follows the North’s analysis of institutions and extracts institutional assets (Oi) 
element out of the asset specific (Oa) component of ownership advantages. 
To justify this adjustment Dunning explains that some of formal and informal 
institutional effects are reflected in firm’s corporate culture and were accounted for 
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by the Oa. However, there are others which are a reflection of external norms and 
values. These institutional elements are shaped by human environment in which 
firms operate (Dunning & Lundan, 2008). As in the case of other OLI components, 
the composition and strength of the Oi advantages is highly contextual (Dunning & 
Lundan, 2008). This addition of a new unit of analysis significantly contributes to the 
advancement of the explanatory powers of the eclectic paradigm. 
2.3.5 Exploratory applications of OLI model   
Plentiful research provides evidence in support of the eclectic paradigm.  It has 
been one of the most efficient instruments for explaining different aspects of MNEs 
behavior. The largest part of this research explored applicability of the eclectic 
paradigm in terms of its capability to explain MNEs internalization decisions and 
choices of entry modes into foreign markets. Tests were conducted for small- and 
medium-sized as well as large firms representing different industries and various 
home and host countries. 
Clear and detailed classification of ownership, location and internalization 
advantages, which allowed determining the original OLI configuration specific for 
any particular firm at any moment in time, provided MNEs with enough information 
for making decisions regarding externalization (export, licensing) or internalization 
(joint ventures, wholly owned enterprises) of their production. MNEs decisions on 
whether to engage in FDI or not are also confined by their strategic agenda. In other 
words, different entry-modes are going to be performed by firms pursuing different 
strategies, such as: natural resource seeking, market seeking, efficiency seeking 
(process or product) or strategic asset seeking strategies. So, all in all, MNEs 
decisions to engage in FDI and their consequent patterns of behavior in a host 
country will be determined by their unique OLI configuration, their underlying 
management and organizational strategies, and the economic, institutional and 
cultural specific characteristics of their host and home countries (Dunning & Lundan, 
2008). Possession of such context-specific knowledge allows developing 
operationally-testable theories for each individual MNE or country decision-making 
case (Dunning, 2000).  
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2.3.6 Conclusion on OLI model 
The analysis of the evolution and explorative applications of the eclectic 
paradigm provides clear and strong evidence that this general framework is one of 
the best contemporary instruments that allows explaining the levels and patterns of 
foreign value-added activities of both firms and home and host countries. Plentiful 
research evidence demonstrated the high efficiency of the application of exclusive 
(for certain firm and host/ home country combinations) OLI configurations for 
explaining MNEs behavior. As a result of its holistic nature and flexibility the 
eclectic paradigm was successfully extended and adopted necessary adjustments for 
multiple technological, economic, socio-cultural, institutional and other changes and 
developments in both market and non-market environments. Thus, we assert that not 
only can OLI framework be used to select and explain various market strategic 
preferences such as, for example, choice of particular entry modes by MNEs’ 
managers in their internalization decisions, prediction of competitors’ entry mode 
strategies and development of innovative more efficient counter-strategies (Brouthers 
et al., 1999), but also to examine foreign investors’ non-market strategic options, 
particularly their political behavior and its impact on institutional changes in host 
countries determined by their bargaining power.  
2.4 Institutions 
2.4.1 Introduction 
The neo-institutionalism theoretical framework (Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Robinson 2004; Dunning & Lundan, 2008; EBRD, 2009; Hall & Soskice, 2001; 
Henisz, 2000; Henisz & Zelner, 2005; North, 1989; North, 1990; North, 1995; North, 
2003; Persson, & Sjostedt, 2009; Rodrik, 2002; Rodrik, Subramanian, & Trebbi, 
2002) focuses on the study of institutions and institutional environment as critical 
instruments for the revelation and explanation of the variations in FDI patterns across 
different countries (Bevan, Estrin & Meyer, 2004; Busse & Hefeker, 2007; Daude & 
Stein, 2007; Dunning & Lundan, 2008), since institutions (particularly legal, political 
and administrative systems) are recognized as major immobile factors in a globalized 
market (Mudambi & Navarra, 2002). It is emphasized that the institutional diversity 
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and multiple potential institutional possibilities resulting from differences with 
regard to the choice of certain institutions and their combinations can be restricted by 
path dependency and embeddedness in cultural heritage of these institutions (North, 
2003; Wise & Brown, 1998) as well as by characteristics, such as liberal, coordinated 
or transitional state of the market economies (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Roth & 
Kostova, 2003), and, the most important for this research project, by political power 
(Acemoglu et al., 2004). As a result, the main objective here is to establish 
theoretical relationship between iFDI impact, the choices of institutional 
arrangements and the quality of institutions in the host countries.  
What are the major catalysts and obstructs of economic development and 
growth? This is one of the most important, complex and controversial questions of 
the contemporary world. Researchers agree that it is a combination of multiple 
factors (such as geography, culture, different paths of factor accumulations, etc.) that 
determines the direction and pace of a particular country’s development. However, 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2004) argue that, in spite of a certain success in 
clarification of the development mechanisms, previous research failed to provide a 
fundamental explanation for economic growth. Following the North and Thomas’s 
view there is a growing consensus among academics that differences in institutions 
and in their quality are the central and fundamental determinants of comparative 
growth (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2004; Dunning & Lundan, 2008; EBRD, 
2009; Hall & Soskice, 2001; Henisz, 2000; Henisz & Zelner, 2005; North, 1989; 
Persson, & Sjostedt, 2009; Rodrik, 2002; Rodrik, Subramanian, & Trebbi, 2002). 
As a result, the study of institutions and institutional environment is critical for 
the revelation and explanation of the variations in economic development of different 
countries, in general, and especially in case of developing and transition countries 
seeking to improve their performance, in particular. Moreover, Roth & Kostova 
(2003) emphasize that understanding institutions is even more crucial in periods of 
radical change in institutional environment, or institutional upheaval, which are 
characterized by extreme uncertainty and ambiguity. Scholars acknowledge that 
transition economies of the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe 
(CEE) are experiencing institutional upheaval accompanied not only by the downfall 
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of the political system, laws, regulations and financial markets, but also by the 
destruction of “the underlying assumptions about the purpose of economic activity” 
(Roth & Kostova, 2003: 315).  
In this light, an analysis of the institutional environment and determinants of the 
institutional quality in transition countries, in particular in Ukraine, is an imperative 
step for the identification of the main sources of the country’s failure to achieve 
sustainable economic growth and for the explanation why the Ukrainian state ended 
up with bad institutions which do not maximize aggregate welfare.  
2.4.2 Institutions – definition and classifications 
“Institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, the humanly 
devised constraints that structure political, economic and social interactions. They 
consist of formal rules (constitutions, statute and common law, and regulations), 
informal rules (conventions, moral rules, and social norms), and the enforcement 
characteristics of each” (FDI: 7). The main objective of their existence is a reduction 
of uncertainty in the world of growing impersonal exchange and increasing 
specialized interdependence (North, 1989; North, 1991; North 2003). 
Institutional environment of any society is generally described as consisting of 
three general categories of institutions: political (constitutions, laws, forms of 
government, the extent of constraints on politicians and elites), economic (the 
structure of property rights, the presence and perfection of markets) and social 
(marriage, education, religion) (Acemoglu et al., 2004). However, different 
classifications of institutions are also applied by some researchers.  
Thus, Rodrik (1999), in turn, builds his institutional analysis based on the 
classification of the same institutions according to their functional relations with the 
markets. He distinguishes market-supporting and non-market institutions. The latter 
are the institutions that perform regulatory, stabilizing and legitimizing functions, 
and which, in a pursuit of larger goals, such as social stability and cohesiveness, may 
place certain restrictions on the markets or even sometimes produce socially 
undesirable outcomes, for example corruption. Market supporting institutions are 
divided into five types: property rights, regulatory institutions, institutions for 
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macroeconomic stabilization, institutions for social insurance and institutions of 
conflict management (including political institutions). 
Property rights are one of the most important determinants of the economic 
growth (Acemoglu et al., 2004; Henisz, 2000; North, 1991; Rodrik, 1999). However, 
Rodrik (1999) argues that presence of formal property rights is though necessary but 
not sufficient condition for the creation of an attractive economic environment. They 
require a companionship of strong and efficient control rights embracing a 
combination of legislation, private enforcement and customs and traditions. A good 
example for the validity of this argument is Russia’s failure to create an attractive 
investment climate in spite of its clearly defined shareholders rights versus China’s 
success to do so without a clear definition of property rights. 
 Further Rodrik (1999) reasons that, as a result of the markets’ failures, market 
economies are governed by the multiple regulatory institutions, including institutions 
controlling conduct in goods, services, labor, asset and financial markets. He also 
suggests that fiscal and monetary institutions are required for ensuring 
macroeconomic stabilization of the economies. Social security, unemployment 
compensation, public works, public ownership, deposit insurance and unions’ 
legislation are some of the institutions for social insurance. The last but not the least 
type of market supporting institutions, according to Rodrik (1999), is the institutions 
of conflict management including the rule of law, a high-quality judiciary, 
representative political institutions, free elections, independent trade unions, social 
partnerships, institutionalized representation of minority groups and others. These 
institutions “tend to increase the incentives for social groups to cooperate by 
reducing the payoff to socially uncooperative strategies” (Rodrik, 1999: 13). 
These differences in the approaches with regard to the choice of certain 
institutions and their combinations, attest to the institutional diversity, and, as a 
result, demonstrate that multiple potential institutional possibilities can still be 
identified.  Nonetheless, some researchers emphasize that societies are limited in 
their ability to change their sets of institutions because the latter are path dependent, 
or deeply embedded in the cultural heritage of these societies (North, 2003; Wise & 
Brown, 1998). However, the validity of the latter argument was challenged by the 
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empirical evidence, as in the case of South and North Korea, demonstrating that 
countries with absolutely identical characteristics, including cultural heritage, can 
adopt contrasting sets of institutions and choose completely opposite paths of their 
development (Acemoglu et al., 2004). Scientists suggest that the choices of 
institutional arrangements and the quality of institutions in countries are also 
restricted by certain characteristics, such as liberal, coordinated or transitional state 
of the market economies (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Roth & Kostova, 2003), and 
political power (Acemoglu et al., 2004). 
Thus, the quality and choice of certain sets of institutions differs across countries. 
Acemoglu et al (2004) indicate that current research distinguishes four main 
approaches with regard to the institutional differences:  
- the efficient institutions or the political Coase theorem view claiming that 
societies will choose socially efficient economic institutions; 
- the ideology view identifying ideological differences as a main cause of 
differences in economic institutions across countries; 
- the incidental institutions view declaring that institutions are the choices 
determined by economic reasoning based on the calculations of their social 
costs and benefits; 
- the social conflict view averring that both economic and political institutions 
in most of the cases are not the choices of the whole society for its benefits 
but of the controlling political power at the time.  
We argue that the social conflict view provides the most appropriate framework 
for the analysis of the relationships between foreign investors and institutional 
environment in transition countries such as Ukraine.  
2.4.3 The social conflict view 
Economic institutions are crucial in shaping the economic performance of the 
society. North emphasizes that the choice and quality of economic institutions is 
determined by political institutions (North, 2003). Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson 
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(2004) following North, in accordance with the social conflict view of the 
institutions, elaborate that economic institutions condition the economic performance 
of the economy and determine the array of economic outcomes, including the 
distribution of resources in the future. Nevertheless, they emphasize that since the 
prosperity of different groups and individuals differs depending on the set of 
economic institutions performing the distribution of the resources, there will 
typically be a conflict over the choices of these institutions. The preferred set of 
economic institutions will be secured by the groups with the prevailing political 
power. 
Political power is defined as consisting of two components: de jure political 
power or political institutions and de facto political power. The latter is nurtured 
from two sources such as the group’s collective action potential and the group’s 
economic resources (Acemoglu et al., 2004). As a result, the winner will be the 
group outperforming the rest of the society along both dimensions of the political 
power. 
The legitimate question to ask here is “why do the groups with conflicting 
interests not agree on the set of economic institutions that maximizes the aggregate 
growth?” (Acemoglu et al., 2004: 3) and instead irrationally opt for the set of 
institutions leading to economic inefficiencies and sometimes even poverty 
(Acemoglu et al., 2004). The answer is “commitment problems inherent in the use of 
political power. Individuals who have political power cannot commit not to use it in 
their best interests” (Acemoglu et al., 2004: 3-4).  Moreover, it is also induced by a 
threat to become economic and/or political losers, loose power without compensation 
(Acemoglu et al., 2004; Acemoglu, 2006; Persson, & Sjostedt, 2009). As a result, 
groups possessing both de jure and de facto political power “affect the choice of 
economic institutions and influence the future evolution of political institutions” 
(Acemoglu et al., 2004: 6) in a ways that furthermore strengthen their political 
positions and improve their economic welfare (Acemoglu et al., 2004).   
Academics agree that politically powerful groups will opt for the good 
institutions maximizing aggregate welfare in cases when the cost of not adopting 
such institutions is higher than the cost of adopting the institutions improving only 
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their welfare (Acemoglu, 2006; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006; Persson, & Sjostedt, 
2009). Good economic institutions “providing security of property rights and 
relatively equal access to economic resources to a broad cross-section of society” are 
also anticipated to arise “when political power is in hands of a relatively broad group 
with significant investment opportunities” and when power holders can obtain only 
limited rents from the rest of the society (Acemoglu et al., 2004: 9-10).  Moreover, 
the imposition of checks and balances on politically powerful policy-makers will 
reduce policy volatility and, as a result, also contribute to the improvement of the 
economic institutions and stimulate economic growth (Acemoglu et al., 2004; 
Henisz, 2004).  
Social conflict view provides an ideal framework for explaining the persistence 
of institutional voids and inefficient exploitation of institutional change in transition 
economies. 
2.4.4 Institutional voids and institutional change 
2.4.4.1 Institutional voids 
Palepu & Khanna (1998) argue that it is the quality of institutional infrastructure 
that contributes to the success of developed and to the failure of developing, 
emerging and transition economies in providing secure and transparent business 
environment characterized by efficiently functioning markets. The authors emphasize 
that unfortunately very often governments in transition and emerging economies 
focus on the development and advancement of physical infrastructure consciously or 
unconsciously leaving the problem of the lack and underdevelopment of formal 
institutions unattended (Palepu & Khanna, 1998; Khanna & Palepu, 2013). Scholars 
use the term ‘institutional voids’ to define the situation when some or all of the most 
important market-supporting institutions, including property rights, regulatory 
systems, contract-enforcement mechanisms and others, are either missing, 
underdeveloped or inefficient (Doh et. al., 2014; Khanna & Palepu, 1997; Khanna & 




Social conflict view framework (Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson, 2004) 
provides a solid foundation for explaining why institutional voids and or inefficient 
formal institutions persist in transition countries. In post-Soviet states, particularly 
Ukraine, vested interests, represented by merged political, economic and criminal 
powers including state officials, political and economic elites, opt for preserving 
inefficient formal institutional structure. It is noteworthy that in this case failure to 
create functional institutional environment is not a result of misguided government 
policies (Palepu & Khanna, 1998). It is rather a barrier created by a deliberate effort 
of the vested interests (Khanna & Palepu, 2013) to preserve and increase their 
economic and political power (Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson, 2004).  Pursuit of 
such self-centered goals culminates in a development of various government 
strategies which, even if efficient, are undermined by a destructive behavior of state 
officials.  The fear of the latter to lose their power without compensation (Acemoglu, 
Johnson & Robinson, 2004) leads them to establishing a governed by corruption 
parallel informal institutional structure feeling all the artificially created and nurtured 
voids in formal institutions. 
Thus, this new alternative informal institutional arrangement either completely 
prevents or minimizes chances for any centralized, group and/or individual effort to 
influence efficient institutional change in transition post-Soviet states. However, the 
analysis of the relationships between institutional voids and institutional change 
(Doh et al., 2014) and the assessment of a possible impact of various stakeholders on 
institutional change requires better conceptual understanding of this process. 
2.4.4.2 Institutional change 
Kingston & Caballero (2009) distinguish two basic approaches to classification 
of institutional change theories even though both of them acknowledge exogenous 
parameter change as a key catalyst of institutional change. The first approach 
incorporates theories based on unintentional evolutionary and the second on design-
based views. The latter most vividly provides further justification of artificially 
maintained institutional voids hypothesis. 
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Design-based approach combines collective-choice theories of institutional 
change. According to the theories within this category, institutional change is a result 
of a centralized action, such as bargaining, lobbying or any other political activities, 
supported by a collective-choice process (Kingston & Caballero, 2009). In parallel 
with a social conflict view (Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson, 2004) Libecap (1989) 
argues that the ability of any group to react to exogenous parameters shift by 
promoting institutional change is dependent on and restricted by the interests of a 
powerful groups with vested interests representing a rule-making elite. Moreover, 
both Libecap (1989) and Ostrom (2005) further indicate that powerful groups will 
not only be able to prevent institutional change but also to successfully advocate the 
emergence and persistence of inefficient institutions.  
Libecap (1989) views institutional change as a path-dependent process which is 
constrained by a framework of responses determined by previous political 
agreements, political bargaining process and a set of current available alternatives of 
institutional arrangements. Moreover, he admits that dominated by step-by-step 
modifications the process of institutional changes has an incremental nature. 
Ostrom (2005), based on her multi-layer nested hierarchy of rules approach 
identifying operational, collective-choice, constitutional and meta constitutional 
rules, explains that the decision on implementation of the institutional change will be 
issued by the decision-makers aligning the higher level rules along with their 
interests. This researcher also acknowledges the role of bounded rationality in 
effecting the institutional change. 
Kingston & Caballero (2009) point out that institutional economists insist that the 
judiciary should be responsible for controlling institutional changes by approving it 
in courts or by issuing legislation. However, if the judiciary is an inefficient and 
faulted institution itself, as it is in case of transition economies, this process of 
artificial institutional selection is doomed to failure from the outset. Similar outcome 
is expected in case of theories investing all decision-making power into political 
actors who they define as autonomous rulers, such as North (1981) predatory ruler 
model (Kingston & Caballero, 2009). 
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The second approach integrates evolutionary theories of institutional change 
(Ayres, 1944; Hayek, 1973; Knight, 1995; Levi, 1990; Sugden, 1989; Veblen, 1899; 
Yong, 1996). Kingston & Caballero (2009) specify that the main difference between 
the two categories is the selection process of institutional differences. In the case of 
evolutionary theories there is not centralized institutional selection mechanism, for 
example, such as legislation. Here all institutional selections are decentralized, even 
though sometimes deliberately generated, and are outcomes of uncoordinated 
options.  
Some theories belonging to this category consider institutional change as a 
secondary issue (Kingston & Caballero, 2009). For example, Kingston & Caballero 
(2009) argue that transaction cost economics (TCE) is based on the assumption that 
the goals of transaction costs minimization automatically leads to the emergence and 
adoption of the most efficient set of institutions. As a result, this approach fails to 
explain the institutional differences and persistence of inefficient institutions in 
societies with similar characteristics (Kingston & Caballero, 2009).  
Similarly, Hayek (1973) argues that inefficient institutions will be ousted by 
evolutionary pressure. In his view institutions are the result of the social groups’ 
selections. The latter are determined by the rules of conduct developed through 
generations based on deliberate effort and constituting a part of an overall 
‘spontaneous order’.  He also insists that “the rules that emerge spontaneously are 
necessarily efficient” (Kingston & Caballero, 2009: 172). 
Levi (1990) demonstrates that decentralized actions of independent individuals 
could lead to decentralized collective actions of, for example, disadvantages groups, 
and attempts to force institutional changes by withdrawing their support for certain 
institutions.  
Evolutionary institutional approach rests on an assumption that institutional 
change is path-dependent. However, in contrast to the design-based theories, 
evolutionists claim that institutions and institutional structures change under the 
pressure of changing circumstances or shifts in exogenous parameters which are not 
caused and controlled by any systemic pressure such as legislation or political 
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activity. Here, the key impetus for all institutional changes is uncoordinated 
responses to changes in characteristics of various elements constituting this 
institutional environment, for example, such as population, social and physical and 
technologies (Ayres, 1944; Hodgson, 2004; Kingston & Caballero, 2009; Nelson, 
2005). 
Merging of the two above discussed approaches poses a question regarding the 
relationships between formal and informal institutions (Kingston & Caballero, 2009). 
North (1990) considers informal institutions to be a very important element of the 
overall institutional structure but sees changes in them as a follow up of 
modifications in formal rules. Roland (2004) suggests the opposite way causation in 
this relationships, while Ruttan (2006) demonstrates that all elements of physical and 
institutional infrastructures mutually affect each other.  
This literature analysis shows, that so far research on institutional voids, 
institutional changes and relationships between formal and informal institutions has 
produced mixed and inconsistent results. It proves that further context-specific 
research is required to identify patterns of the above discussed relationships specific 
to singular countries or certain groups of countries, such as transition states. 
2.4.5 Neo-institutional vs. alternative models of trade, FDI, and development 
2.4.5.1 Neo--institutional models of trade, FDI, and development 
The analysis of institutional theories provided above confirms that contemporary 
theoretical approaches to the impact of trade and investment on development no 
longer take an unambiguously positive role of trade and investment for granted. In 
particular, there is now a broader acknowledgement of the fact that institutional 
structures mediate the impact of trade and investment. However, within this literature 
a number of micro-narratives continue to suggest that trade and investment are linked 
to increased growth and prosperity, even to the extent of having a ‘unambiguously’ 
positive impact on existing institutional structures. Specifically, the literature 
continues to recognize three mechanisms which allegedly create benefits from trade 
and investment. These include, firstly, strategic modernization which describes a 
process where the recipient country gains access to the know-how and finance 
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necessary to update equipment and bring about strategic restructuring together with 
an imposition of efficient corporate governance (Blanchard, 1997). Secondly, trade 
and investment are expected to create positive externalities which extend to a process 
where the introduction of new products and processes by foreign firms creates 
spillovers for the domestic economy (Teece, 1977). Lastly, and perhaps most 
controversially, increased trade and investment are expected to result in hardening 
budget constraints, where foreign participation in firms reduces financial links of 
local firms with government organizations, allowing central government to impose 
harder budget constraints and improve performance (Dewartipont and Maskin, 1995; 
Roland 2000). 
At their core, neo-institutionalist narratives on trade and economic growth 
suggest that the integration of an economy into the work market cannot alone explain 
growth. Rather, growth is, apart from obvious factor endowments, dependent on the 
interaction of three factors, namely; i) participation in trade, ii) institutional 
development and iii) existing productive capacity (Rodrik, 2003). According to 
Rodrik, the income level of a country is dependent on its factor endowments which, 
in turn, are determined by the availability of physical and human capital. However, 
the effect of these factor endowments is mediated by economies’ levels of 
productivity. In other words, economies with similar levels of physical and human 
capital can differ significantly in terms of their wealth and growth potential on 
account of different levels of productivity. In Rodrik’s model (see Figure 6.2) factor 
endowments and productivity are ‘endogenous.’ The elements which establish these 
endogenous levels of factor endowments and productivity include trade and 
institutions, which Rodrik describes as being ‘partly endogenous.’ In other words, 
the positive effect which trade is likely to have on an economy depends in part on the 
absorptive capacity of institutions, with institutions having a more pronounced 
influence on income levels than trade (see also Rodrik, Subramian and Trebbi, 2001). 
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Figure 2.2. Rodrik’s model of income generation 
 
Source: Rodrik (2003). 
 
Ultimately, therefore, the principal source of wealth for an economy is its 
productivity, albeit that improvements in a country’s trade position can lead to 
improvements in its institutional make-up, which, in turn, positive affect the crucial 
parameter of productivity. Lastly, both trade and factor endowments are affected by a 
country’s geography which, as exogenous factor, can play a key role in shaping a 
national economy’s competitive position. 
 In terms of its policy implications Rodrik’s model represents a limited, but not 
insignificant, deviation from Sach’s orthodoxy on at least two counts. Firstly, it 
suggest that trade is not sufficient to initiate growth through productivity 
enhancement, if institutional structures are deficient. Secondly, is an implicit 
assumption that trade and foreign investment are likely to have a impact on both 
institutional developments and only indirectly on productive capacity (see plus signs 
in Figure 6.2). 
While Rodrik’s model and similar neo-institutionalist narratives on income and 
growth have their appeal, particularly when compared with earlier uncritical 
assumptions with regard to the benefits of international trade, they have struggled to 
find convincing empirical support. Rodrik’s own (2003) work entitled The Search for 
Prosperity purports to include case studies in support of the model’s core 
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assumptions. Accordingly, the book includes fourteen country studies which are 
meant to illustrate how the interaction of institutions and trade either created, or 
failed to create, prosperity. Interestingly, none of these country examples include a 
post-Soviet country. Examples of a successful translation of trade into wealth include 
Australia, India, Botswana, Vietnam, Mauritius, Venezuela, Poland, China and 
Mexico. Examples of largely unsuccessful absorption of trade include the 
Philippines, Indonesia, Romania and Bolivia, with Pakistan representing an 
‘undecided’. While it is futile to unpick these arguments at any length, it is probably 
worth mentioning that Botswana’s economy recently faced a near complete collapse, 
triggered partly by its close economic ties with Zimbabwe. Similarly, Venezuela, 
despite its oil wealth underwent a major economic crisis in mid 2000 which brought 
a socialist government to power. The Philippines, Indonesia and Romania, rather 
than being condemned to hopeless underperformance, meanwhile, appear to 
experience moderate economic growth. 
The fact that applications of neo-institutionalist models of growth do not perform 
unambiguously well when applied to concrete case studies, needless to say, does not 
necessarily discredit this intellectual enterprise. What is perhaps more troubling are 
other issues which include the fact that, as a theory, Rodrik’s model is potentially 
over determined. In other words, it offers an opportunity to explain the absence or 
presence of trade-induced growth on the basis of institutional weaknesses, while 
institutional stagnation or development, in turn, can be linked to the presence of 
absence of trade. This offers the very real possibility that virtually any event or 
development with regard to a country’s economic fate can be explained on the basis 
of at least some of the elements of the model. Perhaps even more troublesome, is the 
fact that the model ignores a significant intellectual tradition which views, and has 
viewed, trade as a potentially detrimental force in as far as the institutional, social 
and political development of developing and transition nations is concerned. 
2.4.5.2 Alternative model of trade, FDI, and development 
 Alternative literature voices concerns over the impact of trade and investment on 
lesser developed economies in connection with the, largely continental, imperialism 
debate of the early 20
th
 century. At the time an intense debate took place among 
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leftist intellectuals who examined the instability of contemporary advanced capitalist 
systems and highlighted the economic role of colonialism and imperial expansionism 
as practiced by the main European powers and the US (see e.g., Luxemburg’s The 
Accumulation of Capital, originally published in 1913 and Bukharin’s Imperialism 
and the World Economy, originally published in 1916). Bukharin’s work in particular 
hypothesized that export of capital by heavily industrialized nations would lead to 
the subjugation of the economic interests of the recipient country. In chapter seven of 
his Imperialism and the World Economy, Bukharin stated:  
Looked upon from the point of view of the spreading of the 
organizational forms of modern capital, capital export is nothing but a seizure 
and a monopolization of new spheres of capital investment by the monopoly 
enterprises of a great nation or - taking the process as a whole - by the 
organized "national" industry, by "national" finance capital. Capital export is 
the most convenient method for the economic policy of finance groups; it 
subjugates new territories with the greatest ease. 
In the 1970s a number of researchers attempted to re-examine earlier notions of 
imperialism within a structuralist context, with a view toward explaining the 
persistence of underdevelopment within certain regions. In his, at the time, widely 
read paper A Structural Theory of Imperialism, Galtung (1971) proposed a concept of 
‘core and periphery’ in which Core, or industrialized, nations established core areas 
within the Periphery, or developing nations, in order to facilitate trade. According to 
Galtung, this core and periphery system superficially benefited both Core and 
Periphery nations, while, at a deeper level, sustaining a type of unequal trade and 
exchange which Galtung described as imperialism or structural violence. Specifically 
Galtung (1971: 81) noted that: 
Imperialism will be conceived as a dominance relation between collectives—
particularly between nations. It is a sophisticated type of dominance relation 
which cuts across nations, basing itself on a bridgehead which the center of the 
Center [sic] nation establishes in the center of the Periphery [sic] nation, for the 
benefit of both. … Briefly stated, imperialism is a system that splits up 
collectives and relates some of the parts to each in relations of harmony of 
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interests, and other parts in relations of disharmony of interest, or conflict of 
interest. 
While Galtung’s analysis was primarily concerned with the role Western 
economic activity played in fermenting conflict within periphery nations, he 
attributed a crucial role to trade and foreign investment in supporting institutional 
structures which cemented existing relationships of exploitation and contributed to 
political instability. 
Galtung’s core and periphery theory was further developed by Wallerstein’s 
(1979) who introduced the concept of the ‘semi-peripheral state’. According to 
Wallerstein, semi-peripheral states played a key role in the capitalist system, on 
account of their ability to absorb products of richer nations. However, Wallerstein 
argued, there was no guarantee for the future prosperity of the nations and no 
evidence that these nations would benefit from a future expansion of trade. In his 
chapter Dependence within and Interdependent World (1979: 71), Wallerstein 
specifically argued: 
In a system of unequal exchange, the semiperipheral country stands 
between in terms of the kinds of products it exports and in terms of the wage 
levels and profit margins it knows. Furthermore, it trades or seeks trade in 
both directions, in one mode with the periphery and in the opposite with the 
core. Whereas at any given moment, the more balanced trade a core country 
or a peripheral country can engage in, the better off it is in absolute terms, it 
is often in the interest of the semiperipheral country to reduce external trade, 
even if balanced, since one of the major ways in which the aggregate profit 
margin can be increased is to capture an increasingly large portion of the 
home market for its home products (emphasis in the original). 
Wallerstein was not only reluctant to accept the assumption that foreign 
investment and trade will have a positive effects on the recipient economy, but went 
as far as to argue that foreign investment which was led primarily by the needs of the 
developed country was destined to be detrimental to the recipient economy. 
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While the structuralist analysis of inequality has ceased to attract the attention of 
mainstream scholarship on development, a series of more recent papers have 
borrowed heavily from some of the core notions of this literature. A striking example 
of this is the work of Moran whose notion of benign and malign foreign investment 
relies heavily on earlier ideas about the potentially undesirable effect on 
unconstrained trade. In his book FDI and Development: A New Policy Agenda for 
Developing Countries and Economies in Transition, Moran (1998: 20) argues that: 
Instead of filling the gap between savings and investment, Multinational 
Enterprises (MNEs) may lower domestic savings and investment by 
extracting rents and siphoning off the capital through preferred access to local 
capital markets and local supplies of foreign exchange. Instead of closing the 
gap between investment and foreign exchange, they might drive domestic 
producers out of business and substitute imported inputs. The MNE may 
reinvest in the same or related industries in the host country and extend its 
market power. The repatriation of profits might drain capital from the host 
country. MNEs’ use of “inappropriate” capital intensive technologies may 
produce small labour elites while consigning many workers to the ranks of 
the unemployed. Their tight control over technology, higher management 
functions and export channels may prevent the beneficial spillovers and 
externalities hoped for in more optimistic scenarios. 
Implicit in Moran’s analysis is the assumption that, rather than contributing to 
institutional development and productivity, certain types of FDI have the potential to 
undermine existing institutional growth trajectories and, in so doing, forestall future 
economic growth and development. 
Although analyses of the type presented by Moran still represents a minority 
view amongst development economists, it is interesting to note that even some 
researchers involved in contemporary international policy making have started to 
adopt a critical perspective on the institutional impact of foreign investment. One 
example of this are the economists Hausmann and Fernandez-Arias (2000) who 
presented a paper to the Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors, Inter-American 
Development Bank and Inter-American Investment Corporation which noted that 
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“the view that capital inflows tend to take the form of FDI – share of FDI in total 
liabilities tends to be higher – in countries that are safer, more promising and with 
better institutions and policies was misleading”. Specifically Hausmann and 
Fernandez-Arias found that, while some capital flows tended to target countries that 
were safer, more developed, more open, more stable and had better and advanced 
institutions and financial markets, the share of FDI in total capital flows to these 
countries tended to be lower that to less stable regions. This analysis not only 
suggested that FDI often targeted countries that were riskier, poorer, more volatile 
and more closed, but also that foreign investment quite possibly contributed to 
regional instability. 
Collectively these alternative approaches to foreign investment suggest a model 
of trade, investment, and development which differs radically in its outcomes from 
the neo-institutionalist paradigm. Applying the notion of malign investment to 
Rodrik’s framework, it can be argued that certain types of investment (here denoted 
as mFDI for malign FDI) can weaken existing institutions, while being themselves 
attracted to institutionally weaker environments. This potentially vicious cycle of 
institutional erosion and malign FDI inflows, in turn, is likely to adversely affect the 
domestic productive capacity of the recipient country productivity and, ultimately, its 
wealth (see Figure 2.3). 
While there is no conclusive empirical study which documents the institution-
eroding effects of malign investment, there is ample anecdotal evidence on how 
developing and transition countries suffered from institutional disintegration and 
political instability as a consequence of FDI (see, e.g., Marriott and Muttitt, 2005). 
This pattern appears to be particularly pronounced where these investments centre on 
primary and/or extractive industries at the costs of the recipient country’s secondary 
and tertiary sectors.  
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Figure 2.3. Malign investment and the erosion of domestic capacities 
 
 
An industry and foreign investor type specific analysis is required to provide a 
more substantial and consistent evidence and support for the suggested model. Thus, 
the remaining sections of this chapter will, firstly, examine the existing bargaining 
models and develop a new ‘blind bargaining’ model of bargaining relationships 
between host states and foreign investors. Secondly, it will review the key 
characteristics of all potential strategic tools that foreign investors can apply for 
protecting their interests and initiating pursued changes in institutional environment 
of recipient states. 
2.5 Bargaining models and strategies 
2.5.1 Vanishing of ‘obsolescing bargain’  
The ability of transition host states to protect themselves against the inflow of 
‘malign FDI’ and their aptitude in securing the inflow of ‘benign FDI’ can be 
significantly reduced  not only by levels of political instability, but also by shifts in 
bargaining power between host states and MNEs. 
While Vernon (1977) and Moran (1974), referring to ‘obsolescing bargain’, 
assumed that the position of MNEs vis-à-vis states can be significantly weakened 
once the foreign company has sunk investments which it cannot easily withdraw, 
Vernon acknowledges that the assumption that national leaders gained greater 
bargaining power as a result of growing competition between the firms was false. 
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This has led him to suggest that “overall, the role of multinational enterprises as a 
class has been growing, not declining” (Vernon, 1971: 194). Similarly, Stopford and 
Strange (1991: 215) came to the conclusion that “governments, as a group, have 
indeed lost their bargaining power to MNEs as the possibilities for their collective 
action have diminished”. They have suggested that “intensifying competition among 
states seems to have been a more important force for weakening their bargaining 
power, than have changes in global competition among firms” (Stopford & Strange, 
1991: 215). They have further argued that while “governments can maintain 
considerable power in their dealings with any one foreign firm” (Stopford & Strange, 
1991: 215), the competition for world market shares is likely to undermine their 
position (Stopford & Strange, 1991: 215). 
Recent research has suggested that bargaining no longer defines the MNE-host 
relationship, and that bargaining irrelevance is reflected in a shift from a conflictive 
relationship to a more co-operative one (Haslam, 2004: 2). According to this 
research, these movements can be explained by changes in the strategy of both MNE 
and governments which conditionally define an end to the era of ‘massive 
expropriation’ (Haslam, 2004: 3). Luo (2003:1) suggests that:  
(I)n the beginning of the twenty first century, the nature of the relationship 
between multinational corporations (MNC) and host governments could be 
best described as coopetition that is a situation, where cooperation and 
competition simultaneously function in increasingly interdependent MNC-
government relations (MGR). In this context, cooperation reflects the 
elements of mutual accommodation and collaboration, where joint payoffs 
and goal accomplishment are sought by all parties based on their 
interdependent activities or resources. Competition reflects the elements of 
bargaining where private gains are sought at the expense of the other party’s 
interests. 
 Extending this argument further, Ramamurti (2001: 23) argues that “in the last 
decade relations between MNEs and host governments in developing countries 
changed from being predominantly adversarial and confrontational to being non-
adversarial and cooperative”. In addition, it has been argued that the regulative 
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authority of international institutions and the growth in variability of international 
instruments regulating relations between MNEs and host states is reducing the 
relevance of ‘obsolescing bargain’ (Jensen e al., 2012).  
Starting from the late 1990s – beginning 2000s International Investment 
Agreements (IIAs) (bilateral, regional and multilateral) have been amongst the most 
popular international regulative instruments. IIAs have been created in order to help 
host countries attract FDI by ensuring more transparent, stable and predictable 
regulatory framework for FDI within these states and to protect foreign investors’ 
interests. Bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and double taxation treaties (DTTs) 
became some of the most important instruments at the bilateral level to protect 
investors already by the beginning of the 2000s (UNCTAD, 2003). In 2002 alone, 82 
BITs were concluded by 76 countries and 68 DTTs by 64 countries (UNCTAD, 
2003).  Overall, by the end of 2002, 2181 BITs and 2256 DTTs were signed 
worldwide, out of which more than 700 BITs and 600 DTTs were concluded by CEE 
since the early 1990s. BITs and DTTs cover an estimated 22% and 57% of the FDI 
stock in developing and CEE countries and 7% and 87% of the world FDI stock, 
correspondingly (UNCTAD, 2003). Russia alone signed 54 intergovernmental 
agreements on promotion and mutual protection of investments with foreign 
countries and 80 intergovernmental agreements on avoiding double taxation 
(Yacheistova, 2001). 
Haslam (2004) argues that, in the current neoliberal epoch, the scope for 
bargaining between states and MNEs has become very limited since attempts to 
extract more surplus from foreign firms can result in the deterioration of the host 
country’s reputation as a good investment climate. He also provides an example, 
where, contrary to the expectations of obsolescing bargaining, Chilean and 
Argentinean state agencies refused to renegotiate existing arrangements for the sake 
of preserving their reputation as safe investment environments (Haslam, 2004).  
Most contemporary research argues that ‘obsolescing bargain’ has become 
irrelevant primarily due to the necessity of the states to create a comparatively 
advantageous investment climate under conditions of growing competition. In this 
context, it is usually assumed that the interests of the state, national goals, and state 
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representatives or officials responsible for making decisions coincide. In doing so, 
much of this research ignores the possibility of a divergence of national goals and the 
interests pursued by government officials. However, evidence exist that, in certain 
countries, state officials are directed not by national interests but rather by the private 
motives of personal gain. Therefore, the nature of their decision-making cannot 
effectively underpin their country’s reputation but rather increases uncertainty. 
2.5.2 Political bargaining 
Eden, Lenway & Schuler (2004) suggested that obsolescing bargain model 
remains an important component in the study of MNE – state relationships. These 
scholars argued that removing focus from ‘obsolescing’ and placing it onto 
‘bargaining’ element of the model led them to the development of a more 
conceptually advanced political bargaining model which is built on an assumption 
that MNEs – state relations are repetitive in their nature. The authors emphasize that 
to preserve and even strengthen their competitive positions in certain markets MNEs 
need to continually initiate and engage in negotiations with host states over different 
policy issues (Eden, Lenway & Schuler, 2004).  
The outcome of each political bargain depends on the relative potential and 
actual power of all parties participating in negotiations (Eden, Lenway & Schuler, 
2004). The deviation between the potential and actual powers is determined by 
several categories of factors identified in obsolescing bargaining model including 
relative goals, resources and constraints of bargaining actors (Brewer, 1992; Eden, 
Lenway & Schuler, 2004; Grosse, 1996; Grosse & Behrman, 1992; Kobrin, 1987; 
Moran, 1985; Vachani, 1995; Vernon, 1971; Vernon, 1977) and “the ability of either 
party to limit the behavior of the other party directly through economic and political 
coercion” (Eden, Lenway & Schuler, 2004: 17). Political bargaining model adopts 
the aforementioned factors with adjustments built upon the insights from the 
international business and strategic management literature on liability of foreignness 
and legitimacy (Boddewyn & Brewer, 1994; Jones, 1985; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; 
Wood, 1991), transaction cost economics (Argyres & Liebeskind, 1999; Dean et al., 
1998; Getz; 1997; Littlejohn, 1986; Lord, 2000; Stratmann, 1991; Wexler, 1982; 
87 
 
Williamson, 1985) and the resource based view (Barney, 1991; Miller & Shamsey, 
1996; Teece, Pisano & Shuen, 1997). 
Embracing new theoretical approaches allows Eden, Lenway & Schuler (2004) to 
identify several new aspects within each category of core components not accounted 
for in obsolescing bargaining model. Thus, they show that recent developments in 
international business, such as emerging market firms (EMFs), causes the 
evolvement of two new nontraditional FDI market entry motives: knowledge-
exploitation and knowledge-seeking. Further, the scholars draw our attention to the 
value of organizational legitimacy in reinforcing MNEs’ potential bargaining power 
(Eden, Lenway & Schuler, 2004). 
Another very important advantage of political bargaining model is expanded 
coverage of host countries. Whereas obsolescing bargain model examined only the 
MNE - developing country relationships and relative goals, political bargaining 
model does not have country wise restrictions. Moreover, its authors admit the need 
for the development of custom made models for four distinct groups of countries, 
including developed, emerging, transition and developing economies. It would allow 
accounting for and assessing the impact of the differences in goals, capabilities and 
institutional environment on the quality of MNE – host state relationships and 
outcomes of their bargaining (Eden, Lenway & Schuler, 2004). 
Both individual and collective potential bargaining power of MNEs versus host 
states is also highly dependent on the MNEs’ ability to manipulate their tacit and 
relational resources within a host-country specific regulatory environment and on the 
contextual complementarily of both parties’ resources (Eden, Lenway & Schuler, 
2004; Luo, 2001). Political bargaining model also extends the list of traditional 
external and internal political and economic constraints acknowledged by 
obsolescing bargain model by pointing out to the role of supranational institutions in 
constraining host states’ decision-making alternatives (Eden, Lenway & Schuler, 
2004; Ramamurti, 2001). 
Overall, political bargaining model is an excellent theoretical platform for a 
development of special cases, such as obsolescing bargain model, for further 
comprehensive country-specific analysis of different foreign investor – host state 
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bargaining relations, in general, and foreign investors’ political behavior, in 
particular. 
2.5.3 ‘Blind bargaining’  
While existing bargaining models provide a reasonable description of the nature 
of bargaining in MNE-host state bargaining relations, none of them captures the 
specific characteristics of bargaining in neo-patrimonial post-Soviet transition states. 
This research suggests that these characteristics as a special case of political 
bargaining model in neo-patrimonial transition countries can be summarized under 
the term ‘blind bargaining’.  
‘Blind bargaining’ is a model depicting the cognitive situation of a foreign 
investor who is lacking the clarity on the situation he is in and, as a result, bound to 
act in conditions of extreme uncertainty due to the high degree of intransparency and 
instability of the "rules of the game" at any given moment and of their propensity for 
unpredictable change at any time in the future.  It describes the relationships between 
foreign investors and recipient states with regard to their ability to attract ‘benign 
FDI’ for the states where “the specific model of interaction between state and society 
blocking social and economic development of this state” (Zon, 2001: 72) exists. So, 
‘blind bargain’ occurs where a “patrimonial and predatory state”
 
(Zon, 2001: 71) has 
developed, such as is the case in Ukraine, in other post-Soviet states and in states 
with analogous characteristics and behavioral patterns. It relates specifically to the 
“deficiencies of these paralyzing states” (Zon, 2001: 71) and helps explain 
inconsistencies in the bargaining behavior of these states and their inability to attract 
quality FDI inflows. 
‘Blind bargaining’ is rooted in the heterogeneity of bargaining interests of 
government actors in neo-patrimonial states and the incentive incompatibilities faced 
by officials.  Neo-patrimonial states, in this context, can be defined as regimes, 
possessing the following characteristics: high levels of personalization of power in 
the state, the capture of the state by ruling clans, lack of rule of law, lack of 
distinction between the spheres of economics and politics, a disintegration of the 
state apparatus, the spread of corrupt practices in the state bureaucracy, paralyzing 
impact of state intervention in economic life (motivated by the personal interests of 
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representatives of state authorities), lack of transparency and lack of consistency in 
all spheres of political and economic life (Eisenstadt, 1973; Zon, 2001). 
‘Blind bargaining’ reflects both the presence of a latent conflict between national 
and personal interests of state representatives and the inability of the existing 
political system to sanction individual self-enrichment. As a consequence of this 
situation, the decisions of neo-patrimonial host states are often directed not towards 
serving national interests, but towards supporting personal aims of the officials in 
power. This leads to bargains with these states being less stable and more 
unpredictable than in states which are characterized by conventional patterns of 
economic instability such as, for instance, lack of currency convertibility.  
One of the primary implications of ‘blind bargaining’ is the absence of any 
distinction between spheres of economy and politics. Moreover, there is a 
subordination of state politics to the personal economic interests of the ruling elite. 
In many post-Soviet states, the rule of political-economic clans is omnipresent 
and it even showing ‘dynastic’ tendencies. In October, 2003, for instance, for the first 
time, the rule of a post-Soviet state was passed from father to son as a result of 
Azerbaijan’s “democratic” presidential elections. In Kazakhstan, President Nursultan 
Nazarbayev’s eldest daughter, the country’s biggest media baron, is creating a new 
political party and is believed to be groomed for the succession of her farther. There 
is also an assumption that the head of the major business empire in Uzbekistan, the 
daughter of the President Islam Karimov would replace her farther if he was forced 
to step down. Turkmenistan’s President, Saparmurat Niyazov, is president for life. At 
least half of the former Soviet Republics can be considered as being predominantly 
governed by authoritarian rule.  
Relatives of presidents are often the biggest businessmen of their countries, 
possessing massive economic power. The daughter of the former Ukrainian 
President, Leonid Kuchma, is married to one of the country’s oligarchs, a steel and 
media magnate. The sons of the recent president of Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovich, and 
of Moldova and sons of the both previous presidents of this country are all powerful 
business tycoons. Former Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze’s nephews and 
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son-in-law are among the leaders of the country’s biggest business clans (BBC 
News, 2003).  
The presidents of Ukraine and Belarus attempted to introduce constitutional 
changes to satisfy their wish to seek another presidential term. Lacking judiciary 
independency the Ukrainian Constitutional Court ruled that Kuchma could stand for 
another term. In many post-Soviet Republics the body of law that exists on paper is 
often arbitrarily interpreted and enforced so as to serve the personal goals of the elite. 
Moreover, laws are sometimes applied retroactively (WMRC, 2004). 
In Azerbaijan, for instance, President Aliyev is ultimately the sole guarantor of 
foreign investors' interests in a highly unstable socio-political situation. In late 2002, 
investors filed a US$300m lawsuit against the president, his son and the former head 
of the country's privatization commission, over the aborted privatization of state oil 
company SOCAR (WMRC, 2004). 
Regulatory uncertainty, the burden of bureaucracy and corruption are primary 
characteristics of the post-Soviet investment environment. According to 
Transparency International, post-Soviet states ranked among the most corrupt in the 
world. Interestingly all post-Soviet states were downgraded as a result of growing 
corruption during the years of transition. In 2003, for instance, Ukraine, Moldova 






, respectively (out of 133 countries), 






 places respectively (out of 99 
countries). Amongst the Central European post-Soviet countries Belarus was the 
most successful in reducing corruption and ranked 53
rd 
(out of 133) in 2003. 
Performing even worse the Central Asian countries were ranked in the following 
sequence in 2003: Armenia – 78
th
, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan – 100
th
, Kyrgyzstan – 
118
th
, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Tajikistan – 124
th
, having being ranked between 80-
90
th
 in 1999 (Transparency International, 2004).  
Regarding post-Soviet countries, the World Market Research Centre (WMRC) 
concluded that “flux in the regulatory environment and the overblown importance of 
bureaucracy have fuelled a high degree of corruption at different levels of the 
system” (WMRC, 2004: 45). Further to this it was noted that “many officials, both at 
different levels of government and at the enterprise level, have vested interests in the 
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status quo and see foreign firms as a threat and regional power groups use their 
influence in state agencies in order to secure as many economic benefits as possible” 
(WMRC, 2004: 45). The report concludes that “in the absence of transparent system, 
the ability to lobby and use a network contacts has become a valued commodity” 
(WMRC, 2004: 45). 
Licensing requirements are vivid examples of flourishing corrupt practices and 
the maintenance of vested interests. In many sectors, such as transport and energy 
generation and distribution, the respective ministries are responsible for issuing 
licenses to private investors while at the same time enjoying direct commercial 
interests in these sectors
 
(WMRC, 2004). The presence of powerful interest groups 
and the importance of contacts create opportunities for corruption and misuse of 
business relationships. More importantly there is a possibility that bargaining 
outcomes may come up for re-examination if contacts are dismissed or replaced at 
their post (WMRC, 2004). 
Government attempts to fight corruption had, in many cases, more to do with 
politics and public image than with effective crusade for transparency (WMRC, 
2004). Moreover, the lack of regulation and the over reliance on personal links 
combine to create opportunities for organized crime, which itself has become major 
concern to foreign investors 
 
(WMRC, 2004).  
‘Blind bargaining’, as a concept of bargaining, is characterised by multiple layers 
of risk creating institutional and structural factors which jointly explain the lack of 
attractiveness of neo-patrimonial states to foreign investors. Additionally, the 
concept helps explain why post-Soviet neo-patrimonial countries serve mostly as a 
target of riskier and lower quality, earlier referred as ‘malign FDI’, which focuses on 
the exploitation of markets and resources. 
Corporate raiding and round-tripping or pseudo-iFDI are two of the most 
important strategies nourishing ‘blind bargaining’ model of relationships between 
foreign investors and a state in post-Soviet transition economies. 
The following analysis of both of the above mentioned strategies further 
contributes to the attempts on identifying various triggers and explaining their impact 
on the quality of FDI inflows, process of institutional change and patterns of 
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interactions between formal and informal institutions in transition economies. 
Moreover, it also provides evidence supporting the based on the social conflict view 
hypothesis of deliberate effort by powerful elites to fail the development of efficient 
formal institutional infrastructure in post-Soviet countries, particularly Russia and 
Ukraine. 
2.5.4 Corporate raiding in transition economies 
2.5.4.1 Definition 
Corporate raiding has been gaining momentum over the years of transition in 
post-Soviet countries, especially in Russia and Ukraine. Fundamental systemic 
weaknesses create multiple incentives for oligarchs, state officials at all levels and, in 
many cases, criminals to seek for opportunities of corrupt enrichment and 
augmenting their asset bases through illegal seizure of both domestic and foreign 
companies either independently or, most probably, through fostering alliances 
(Pojansky, 2014).  
In spite of the growing attention to the raiding problem, the phenomenon still 
remains highly under researched and poorly understood (Osipyan, 2010; Pojansky, 
2013; Pojansky, 2014; Zimmerer & Khmara, 2012). Partially it can be explained by 
its contextual nature and complexity (Firestone, 2008; Pojansky, 2014). As a result, 
scholars propose different country-specific explanatory descriptions and definitions 
of raiding. Firestone (2008: 1207), focusing on Russia, characterizes corporate 
raiding as: 
acts designed to give a legitimate appearance to the illegal (accomplished 
through illegal means) transfer to the actor or a third party of property rights, 
rights to the results of intellectual activity and equal rights to 
individualization (of intellectual rights) as well as the illegal acquisition of 
the rights to carry out managerial functions in a commercial or in a 
commercial or other organization. 
Researchers who chose Ukraine as the site for their study of raiding problem 
identify “illegal and corrupt manipulation of Ukraine’s patchy legislation and 
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ramshackle institutions” (Stack, 2010: 3) as the most important instruments for 
transferring property rights to the assets in question. Pojansky (2014) elaborates that 
highly underdeveloped Ukrainian institutional environment characterized by 
presence of various institutional voids allows raiders to exploit the existing legal, 
administrative and regulatory tools in undertaking their illegal activities. 
The evolvement of country-specific features of raiding modes can be explained 
by the differences in operational relationships between formal and informal 
institutional elements (Pojansky, 2014). Comparing Sakwa’s Russian ‘dual state’ 
approach and Hanson’s view of Ukrainian raiding enabling mechanism, Pojansky 
(2014) illustrates that distinctions are caused by parallel, in the former case, and 
combinatory, in the latter case, use of  formal and informal power mechanisms. 
However, in spite of the above differences, omnipresent corruption and institutional 
deficiency and desire to gain more economic and, consequently, political power 
remain the main sources and driving force for raiding, respectively. 
2.5.4.2 Evolution 
Scholars and experts distinguish three phases and respective types of raiding, 
namely black, gray, and white (Gabor & Khmara, 2012; Osipyan, 2010; Pojansky, 
2013; Pojansky, 2014), which can be identified with the evolutionary phases in the 
emergence and consolidation of the economic and, consequently, political elites in 
transition countries, particularly in the case of Ukraine.  
The first black or ‘bandit’ phase of raiding started in 1991 after the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union. Inception of privatization within the settings of institutional 
upheaval generated incentives for the formation of criminal groups which targeted 
both small newly privatized and large state enterprises. Using criminal methods 
‘black raiders’ seized and, in many cases, plundered and sold all the assets of the 
attacked company (Gabor & Khmara, 2012; Osipyan, 2010; Pojansky, 2013; 
Pojansky, 2014). 
By the end of 1990s – beginning of 2000s raiding evolved to the next ‘gray’ stage 
recognized as phase of initiation and establishment of the most oligarchs’ vertical 
monopolies. At this point various state officials, Soviet era ‘red directors’ and 
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prosperous representatives of a newly formed businessmen class, or even anonymous 
parties commenced their pursuit for economic resources) moving away from criminal 
to much more sophisticated methods. Thus, to achieve their goals these 
representatives of a newly forming economic power elite acquired the services of 
various state ministries and private middlemen as well as illegally obtained court 
orders and forged shareholders decisions (Gabor & Khmara, 2012; Osipyan, 2010; 
Pojansky, 2013; Pojansky, 2014). 
This period is also characterized by the transition from a criminal ‘krysha’, 
informal criminal protection institution, to a political ‘krysha’, new qualitatively 
different much more advanced and sophisticated informal protection mechanism.  
The last ‘white’ raiding period started with inauguration of a new president in 
2010 in Ukraine. Further redistribution of economic resources in a country is 
performed by a smaller group of powerful businessmen and state officials leading to 
a higher consolidation of political power around Presidential Administration in case 
of Ukraine (Gabor & Khmara, 2012; Osipyan, 2010; Pojansky, 2013; Pojansky, 
2014). The latter is a group outperforming the rest of the society along both 
dimensions of political power: de jure and de facto.  
2.5.4.3 Raiding methods 
Pojansky (2013; 2014) suggests that a very broad specter of raiding instruments 
nourished on deficiencies of institutional environment in transition economies, in 
general, and Ukraine, in particular, can be best represented through the classification 
of the most popular methods, including: 
- forced bankruptcy or business crises; 
- corporate or minority shareholder attacks; 
- civil litigation; 
- extortion. 
In cases of forced bankruptcy or business crises raiding agents exploiting various 
formal and informal institutions artificially generate situations leading to the 
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weakening of the targeted companies’ financial positions. As a result, financially 
drained companies lose their assets (Pojansky 2013; Pojansky, 2014). 
Corporate or minority shareholder attacks also have a very elaborate program of 
actions. Firstly, raiding groups gather intelligence on a targeted company. Secondly, 
they acquire a small share of company stocks and file a lawsuit against it with a court 
in a remote location. Further, they either employ criminal groups representing 
themselves as security companies or bribe law enforcement agencies to seizure the 
control over the raided company (Pojansky, 2013; Pojansky, 2014). 
The last but not the least is civil litigation and extortion. The former is thriving 
due to highly corrupt judicial and law enforcement authorities, while the latter 
implies primarily reliance on the regulatory authorities’ support (Pojansky, 2013; 
Pojansky, 2014).  Experts assume that extortion is the most open and direct way of 
raiding. Business owners are straightforwardly contacted by their intruders and 
warned about the consequence of their refusal to give up their businesses. In cases of 
owners’ resistance their companies become a target of a multifaceted administrative 
pressure taking forms of never-ending fines, inspections, obstructions in issuance and 
renewal of licenses and permits, criminal cases, physical threats, etc. (Pojansky, 
2013; Pojansky, 2014).    
The immunity of businesses to raiding attacks can only be secured by their 
impeccable operational conduct and flawless reputations. This requirement is 
practically unattainable in realities of post-Soviet transition. Any minor innocuous 
misconduct becomes an invincible weapon in hands of offenders capitalizing on the 
deficiencies of institutional environment in transition countries, particularly selective 
law enforcement (Pojansky, 2013; Pojansky, 2014).  
Growing economic and political power of relatively small condensed group of 
oligarchs and elite state officials, omnipresent corruption ensuing lack of all levels 
state officials’ commitment to national interests and instead their commitment to 
promoting economically inefficient institutions, lack of control over local and 
regional institutions are just a few of the major factors inducing changes in 
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redistribution of power between multiple individual and collective economic and 
political actors, including foreign investors. 
2.5.5 Round-tripping or pseudo-FDI 
Round-tripping or pseudo-FDI is iFDI by domestic businessmen who made a 
decision to go abroad and return to their home countries as foreign investors for 
escaping regulations, particularly avoiding pressure and protecting from their real 
home countries’ institutional imperfections and voids, capitalizing on institutional 
differences between their real and pseudo home countries, obtaining value added 
services, etc... Considering its share in transition and emerging economies, it 
becomes extremely important for the study of iFDI quality and its impact on 
institutional changes to acknowledge the crucial role of round-tripping or pseudo-
FDI as one of the ‘foreign’ investors’ strategic behavior in this set of countries. 
However, most of the existing quantitative studies examining the impact of iFDI on 
host countries do not distinguish between pseudo-FDI and real iFDI. Some of the 
most important objective reasons for such lack of accountability for pseudo-FDI are 
scarcity of accurate verifiable information on genuine identity of foreign investors 
from tax havens and offshore financial centers (OFCs), such as Cyprus, the British 
Virgin Islands and others, and resulting measurement problems. Xiao (2004) 
suggests the absence of conceptually clear definition of round-tripping FDI is the 
main reason and explanation for an existing methodological void resulting in the 
problems with getting reliable estimates of the volumes of round-tripping FDI in any 
country. 
Most of the literature on round-tripping FDI focuses on the incentives and 
determinants of outward FDI (oFDI).  Xiao (2004) distinguishes two fundamental 
types of round-tripping FDI. He refers to the first type of this kind of investment as 
“round tripping for escaping regulations” and to the second one as “round tripping 
for value added services”. In the latter case he compares the value adding process of 
round tripping FDI with one that financial sector follows in real economy. In the 
former case FDI is driven by the desire of pseudo foreign investors to avoid the 
pressure of and protect from their home countries’ institutional imperfections and 
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voids. However, he fails to point out to this class of investors’ ability to capitalize on 
institutional differences between their real and pseudo home countries.  
Other researchers within this domain clearly distinguish between these two 
directions of the institutional environment’s impact on domestic investors’ decision 
to go abroad and return to their home countries as foreign investors. First of all, they 
suggest that pseudo investors are motivated by institutional support in the form of 
new government policies encouraging investing abroad. Such policies can include 
government guaranties of privileged access to raw materials and financing in China 
(Buckley et al., 2007), government encouragement of domestic companies’ pursuit 
of competitive advantages by acquiring new advanced technologies, managerial 
capabilities and other needed resources in China (Buckley et al., 2007; Luo et al., 
2010) and in Russia (Settles, 2008). 
Second of all, like Xiao (2004), they emphasize the role of institutional 
constraints in discouraging local entrepreneurs to invest in the status of domestic 
investors. Among the main institutional deficiencies they name institutional arbitrage 
defined as a “gap between the firm’s needs and institutional environment” (Witt & 
Lewin, 2007: 10) caused by the desire to avoid high taxes (Gordon & Hines, 2002; 
Vernon, 1998), economic risk, political instability, policy uncertainty (Le & Zak, 
2006), corruption, regulatory uncertainty, lack of property rights protection, and 
government interference (Ledyaeva, Karhunen & Whalley, 2013; Luo et al., 2010; 
Settles, 2008; Witt & Lewin, 2007).  
Scholars identified several additional important country-specific incentives for 
round-tripping FDI in case of Russia Loungani & Mauro (2001) point to the unstable 
and unpredictable political situation, macroeconomic instability, a confiscatory tax 
system, as insolvent banking system. All of the above listed factors lead create an 
environment where businessmen are afraid of exposure of the information on their 
business projects. As a result they opt for round-tripping their investments which 
would, firstly, guarantee the secrecy of investors’ identity, secondly, increase the 
security of their investment and, thirdly,  
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Moreover, Ledyaeva, Karhunen & Whalley (2013) recognize corruption money 
laundering as one of the largest sources of capital flight from Russia. Relying on a 
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) report (2011) they suggest that Russian corrupt 
public officials are relying on various round-tripping schemes for legalizing their 
proceeds from corruption. This assumption is supported by the several other in-depth 
analyses of corrupt capital flows in Russia (Perez, Brada & Drabek, 2012; Shelly, 
2003; Simpson, 2005).  
A relevant question to ask here is: “Why do businessmen seeking to avoid 
imperfections of their home countries institutional environment, particularly 
transition economies, choose to return to their home countries rather than to invest in 
other markets characterized by lower risk and better quality institutions?” Scholars 
suggest that returning as foreign investors domestic businessmen are capitalizing on 
exploiting the institutional differences between two countries. This situation is 
defined as institutional arbitrage (Boisot & Meyer, 2008; Gaur & Lu, 2007; Huang, 
2003; Ledyaeva, Karhunen & Whalley, 2013). Thus, the status of a foreign investor 
generates several essential advantages for pseudo-investors. It increases their 
bargaining power (Boisot & Meyer, 2008) and puts them in a superior competitive 
position with regard to both domestic and genuine foreign investors since they can 
exploit on their privileges of foreign investor’s status and local experience and 
knowledge (Ledyaeva, Karhunen & Whalley, 2013). As foreign investors they enjoy 
an access to additional resources such as foreign banking and financial expertise 
(Ledyaeva, Karhunen & Whalley, 2013; Sutherland et al., 2012), superior 
organization capabilities and higher security of their assets (Ledyaeva, Karhunen & 
Whalley, 2013). As local businessmen they successfully avoid the liability of 
foreignness problem since they possess all required intangible assets including, for 
example, expertise in all aspects of local business practices and established 
relationship-based networks (Ledyaeva, Karhunen & Whalley, 2013; Zaheer, 1995).  
It is noteworthy that all of the above discussed characteristics of round-tripping 
FDI in Russia are intrinsic to other post-Soviet countries. However, further research 
effort focusing on the study of various aspects of pseudo-foreign investors’ behavior 
in transition countries is required to find evidence and support for existing theoretical 
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assumptions and identify new important elements of this phenomenon in different 
contexts. 
Overall, very little academic effort has been devoted to the study of round-
tripping FDI in emerging and transition economies to date. Moreover, the largest 
share of theoretical inquiries focused on China (Boisot & Meyer, 2008; Fung, Yau & 
Zhang, 2011; Morck, Yeung & Zhao, 2008; Sutherland et al., 2010; Xiao, 2004) and 
Russia (Abalkin & Whalley, 1999; Buiter & Szegvari, 2002; Ledyaeva, Karhunen & 
Whalley, 2013; Loungani & Mauro, 2001; Mulino, 2002). Only one study on 
regional characteristics and effects of FDI in Ukraine by Kokko and Kravtsova 
(2012) indirectly superficially refers to the possible absence of impact of round-
tripping FDI on knowledge and technology spillovers and resulting changes in 
productivity and efficiency of domestic local firms. The authors particularly 
emphasize that round-tripping FDI is a virtually unexplored phenomenon and 
accounting for the role of pseudo-FDI and/or even the study of the relationship 
between pseudo-FDI and host countries’ formal and informal institutional 
environment is crucial for the advancement of a suggested ‘blind bargaining’ model 
and of our knowledge on both extent and directions of real versus pseudo foreign 
investors’ impact on all aspects of development in transition countries. 
The qualitative part of this research attempts to, at least partially, close this 
research gap and provide an initial insight into the role of pseudo-iFDI in reshaping 
institutional environment and the impact of pseudo-iFDI on the quality of 
institutional environment in Ukraine.  
2.6 Foreign investors’ political behavior 
2.6.1 Evolution of research on corporate political activity  
The expansion of both corporate political activity and research on corporate 
political behavior gained momentum in the beginning of the 1960. Initially scholars 
in political science, political economy and sociology examined business-government 
relations in terms of distribution of power and policy outcomes (Buchanan & 
Tullock, 1962; Dahl; 1959; Epstein, 1969; Lowi, 1969; Olson, 1965; Stigler, 1971). 
Consequently, the fast growth followed by the emergence of new forms of corporate 
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political activity resulted in an increased interest of management and other scholars 
in the subject of business-government relations, in particular (Baron, 2006; Grier, 
Munger & Roberts, 1991; Griffin, Fleisher, Brenner & Boddewyn, 2001; Lenway & 
Rehbein, 1991; Meznar & Nigh, 1995; Pittman, 1998; Rugman & Verbeke, 1998; 
Stopford and Strange, 1991), and corporate political behavior, in general (Baron, 
1995; Baron, 2006; Boddewyn, 1998; Boddewyn & Brewer, 1994; Hillman, 
Zardkoohi & Bierman, 1999; Schuler, 1996; Schuler, 1999; Schuler, Rehbein & 
Cramer, 2002; Shaffer & Hillman, 2000). 
Boddewyn & Brewer (1994: 120) and Astley & Sacheva (1984: 90) define 
political behavior as “the acquisition, development, securing, and use of power in 
relations to other entities, where power is viewed as the capacity of social actors to 
overcome the resistance of other actors”. As a result, some scholars divide the 
participants of the political bargaining process into two groups such as demanders, 
including businesses, interest groups, individual citizens and /or public opinion, and 
suppliers representing nonmarket environment and including other entities or 
governments and actors or political decision-makers (Baron, 1995; Boddewyn & 
Brewer, 1994; Schuler et al., 2002; Hillman & Keim, 1995).  
Overall, relying on the assessment of four basic characteristics of nonmarket 
environment such as issues, interests, institutions and information (Baron, 2006) 
firms determine a range of political actions and strategies leading to compliance, 
evasion, negotiation, cooperation, coalition building and co-optation behaviors 
(Boddewyn & Brewer, 1994; Oliver, 1991).  
Hillman & Hitt (2004), in their first of the two available to date fundamental 
attempts to systematize the existing body of literature on corporate political activity, 
classify this research by four categories of antecedents of corporate political activity 
including firm, industry, issue and institutional factors.  
Lawton, McGuire & Rajwani (2013), in their most recent systemic analysis of 
literature on corporate political activity, develop a framework consisting of three 
domains within which corporate political activity has been viewed through the lenses 
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of stakeholder, resource dependency, resource based view, institutional and 
collective action theories (Lawton, McGuire & Rajwani, 2013).  
The first domain explores the resources and capabilities focus based on the 
resource based view (RBV) and organizational capability theories (OCT) (Bonardi, 
Holburn & Vanden Bergh, 2006; Capron & Chatain, 2008; Dahan, 2005b; Frynas, 
Mellahi & Pigman, 2006; McWilliams, Van Fleet & Cory, 2002; Oliver & 
Holzinger; 2008; Woll, 2007) and provides valuable insight into mechanisms of 
integration, reconfiguration and deployment of multiple combinations of various 
types of resources, including political resources, in different non-market 
environments (Dahan, 2005a,b; Lawton, McGuire & Rajwani, 2013).   
The second domain reviews the research employing institutional perspectives for 
the analysis of complex relationships between different institutional arrangements, 
businesses and governments at the country-level (Boddewyn & Doh, 2011; Deileman 
& Boddewyn, 2012; Deileman & Sachs, 2008; Jackson & Deeg, 2008; Khana & 
palepu, 2005;  Peng, 2003) and firms’ abilities to adapt to changes in nonmarket 
environment at the firm-level (Deng et al., 2010; Robertson et al.,2007; Shaffer et al., 
2007; Sun et al., 2010; Tian et al., 2007; Venard, 2009; Zhang & Liu, 2010). One of 
the most important challenges within this domain is “to understand non-market 
activity in emerging economies, thus moving beyond the institutional voids 
perspective outlined by Khanna and Palepu (2005)” (Lawton, McGuire & Rajwani, 
2013: 14).   
The third domain, which can be qualified as a constituent of the second domain, 
focuses on the analysis of the impact of certain characteristics of political 
environment on the corporate political activity. In particular, Lawton, McGuire & 
Rajwani (2013: 9) conclude that this group of studies shows that certainty of political 
processes is determined by the quality of regulations, political risks and types of 
political systems. However, they emphasize that the largest share of these studies 
examines the ‘hard’ features of institutions, including construction, norms, formal 
rules and enforcement, devoting much less attention to the ‘soft’ aspects of 
institutions, including country culture, uncertainty and history (Baron, 1997; 
Blumentritt & Nigh, 2002; Delios & Henisz, 2003; Frynas & Mellahi, 2003; Hillman 
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& Hitt, 1999; Hillman, Zardkoohi & Bierman, 1999; Shaffer, Quasney & Grimm, 
2000). Moreover, the authors point out that within the context of transactional 
approach scholars focus on the negative aspects of uncertainty failing to 
acknowledge the potential of positive perceptions of uncertainty for increasing the 
efficiency of corporate political activity in different markets.  The primary challenge 
for the researchers within this domain is to develop a reliable and meaningful 
measure of political outcomes (Lawton, McGuire & Rajwani, 2013). 
It is obvious that the interest to corporate political activity has grown 
dramatically, especially during the last 25 years. However, Hillman and Hitt (1999) 
claim that the research in this field has not kept pace with the turn of events in both 
political and economic environments of various countries. For example, qualitatively 
new institutional setting such as the ones developed in the state capitalist economies 
of China and the Gulf States caused significant changes in the business-government 
relations in these countries (Lawton, McGuire & Rajwani, 2013). Moreover, Vogel 
(1996) argues that the collapse of the Soviet Union followed by a very specific 
institution-building processes heavily relying on the support and participation of 
various domestic and international, market and nonmarket, formal and informal 
actors, including foreign investors, requires a new research effort to focus on better 
understanding of the role of all of the various types of businesses on the elaboration 
and implementation of public policies (Lawton, McGuire & Rajwani, 2013). 
Qualitative analysis of business-government relations within the context of each 
country, and even industry, would be the best approach for exploring this kind of 
relationships.  
2.6.2 Classification of corporate political activities 
Contemporary research examines various context-specific political activities that 
both domestic companies and foreign investors utilize to influence public policy 
decision-making in a way that would solidify and improve their positioning in 
markets of their businesses’ operations. The degree of a company’s involvement in a 
public decision-making and its political pro-activeness as well as the choice of 
particular political strategies and tactics is determined by numerous combinations of 
various company and host-country specific characteristics. 
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Research on the political activities of MNEs in developed countries identifies and 
provides analysis and evidence on the use of the following most popular political 
tactics: lobbying, including direct and grassroots lobbying and coalition building, 
constituency building, advocacy advertizing, reporting research or public polls 
results, personal services, election funding and some others (Baron, 1993; Baron, 
2006; Getz, 1993; Keim & Zeitaml, 1986). However, scholars focusing on the study 
of political activities of businesses in emerging, developing and transition economies 
argue that corruption, cronyism and extensive use of connections should be also 
classified as political strategies (Lawton, McGuire, Rajwani, 2012). 
Hillmann & Hitt (1999) suggest a very comprehensive classification of these 
tactics according to several different characteristics. Firstly, the authors recommend 
establishing the nature of corporate political activity in terms of its persistence in 
time. Particularly, they propose to distinguish between transactional, short-tem issue-
based, and relational, long-term, approaches in corporate political behavior. 
Secondly, they also emphasize the value of establishing the level of company’s 
participation in political activities. A company’s choice of pursuing its political 
interests either individually or collectively will depend on combinations of company 
ownership-specific and host-country location-specific characteristics and the nature 
of the disputed or proposed issues. Moreover, both of the participation techniques 
will be associated with specific residual business community reactions, such as, for 
example, free-riding problem in case of collective action approach (Olson, 1965). 
Finally, based on the type of resources companies utilize for attaining their desired 
projected issue outcomes, scholars divide all known political tactics into three groups 
of political strategic actions, namely information, financial incentive, and 
constituency building strategies (Hillmann & Hitt, 1999). It is noteworthy that 
companies, to increase the efficiency of their corporate political activity, usually use 
simultaneously all of the abovementioned strategies and tactics in various 






2.6.2.1 Information strategy 
Information strategy builds upon a direct corporate communication of relevant 
information to political decision-makers with the purpose of promoting more 
attractive policy outcomes (Hillman & Hitt, 1999). Hillman & Hitt (1999: 834 - 835) 
suggest that information strategies should include the following political tactics: 
- direct lobbying by both internal and external professionals and executives; 
- initiating company and/or think tank led research projects and reporting 
research results; 
- testifying as expert witnesses in hearings and/ before other government 
bodies; 
- providing decision makers with position papers and/or technical reports. 
i. Direct lobbying 
Lobbying is the most popular and widely used corporate political strategy. 
Scholars distinguish three main forms of lobbying including direct lobbying, 
grassroots lobbying, and coalition lobbying. The latter two are forms of indirect 
lobbying and belong to and will be reviewed in the constituency building strategy 
section  The choice of a specific lobbying mode depends on the unique combinations 
of such factors as company-specific and country-specific characteristics and the 
nature of the issue and competition (Hillman, Keim & Schuler, 2004). In most cases 
foreign investors prefer not to rely on any individual form of lobbying and employ 
several lobbying techniques simultaneously. 
Direct lobbying, due to its nature, is the most frequently adopted approach to 
protecting and promoting corporate interests. In this case individual lobbyists, 
including company representatives or executives and hired lobbyists, personally 
contact state officials through formal and informal meeting, phone conversations to 
advocate changes which would ensure improving their company’s competitive 
positioning in the market (Johnson, 1992; Katzenstein, 1985; Murtha & Lenway, 
1994a). Researchers provide evidence of the growing popularity of direct lobbying 
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(Lord, 2000b; Coen, 1999) even in spite of the fact that it is considered to be one of 
the most time- and resource-consuming practices of this sort (Schlozman & Tierney, 
1986). 
Analysis of lobbying activities shows that direct lobbying produces better results 
than any other kind of political activity in terms of an increased control over the 
lobbying process, firstly, because direct communication is a guarantor of a lobbyist’s 
message and a targeted policy-maker’s feedback delivery as well as more general 
information exchange between the advocainvolved parties; and secondly, because it 
supports initiation and sustenance of lobbyists – political decision-makers relations 
(Mack, 1989; Sachs, Cantor & Neale, 1986). However, the degree of a lobbyist’s 
success is highly dependent on such lobbyist’s qualities as communication skills, 
personal integrity, political ethics and professional competence (Mack, 1989). 
ii. Researching, testifying and reporting 
Political decision-makers, particularly legislators, on a daily basis confront a very 
broad range of policy issues requiring a comprehensive knowledge of the relevant 
operational field. Unfortunately, in most cases state authorities do not have sufficient 
resources and cannot ensure a provision of an adequate knowledge base for their 
employees to be able to make informed decisions. Businesses take advantage of such 
opportunities by offering various state officials and legislators their expertise and 
filling out the existing knowledge gaps (Buchanan & Tullock, 1962; Lord, 2000a). 
For this purpose companies initiate their own and/or think tanks led research projects 
and consequently report the results of their analysis to the relevant governmental 
bodies. Emphasizing their command of various operational problems businesses also 
acquire a right to provide decision makers with position papers and/or technical 
reports and to testify as expert witnesses in hearings and/or before other government 
bodies (Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Schuler, 1996; Rehbein & Schuler, 1999).  
Petitions are another very efficient instrument for addressing various existing 
and/or prospective problems which companies face as a result of changes in 
government regulations. Depending on the nature of the issues companies choose to 
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communicate their concerns to the policy-makers either individually or collectively 
(Schuler, 1996; Rehbein & Schuler, 1999).  
2.6.2.2 Constituency building 
Constituency building is an indirect strategy aiming at altering various public 
policies. Instead of interacting with decision makers directly corporations using this 
political strategy are seeking for the support of individual stakeholders, both related 
and unrelated to the firm, representing such overlapping categories as citizens, 
voters, employees, members of labor unions, customers, suppliers, retirees, students, 
etc. Companies develop custom made constituency programs targeting at mobilizing, 
educating and stimulating active reactions of specific groups of individuals sensitive 
to certain policy issues having a potential of threatening their future prosperity in any 
ways.  (Baysinger, Keim & Zeithaml, 1985; Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Keim, Zeithaml 
& Baysinger, 1984; Lord, 2000) Emerged, as a result of exposure to various 
economic and political educational programs, corporate press conferences on various 
policy issues and advertizing of particular policy positions by participating 
companies, active constituency groups intervene the public policy decision-making 
process by articulating their collective opinions via various means of civil and 
political communication (Hillman & Hitt; 1999; Keim & Zeithaml, 1986). 
i. Indirect lobbying: grassroots mobilization 
Grassroots mobilization is a fast developing form of indirect lobbying relying on 
the progress in communication technologies not supported by the relevant adequate 
rules and regulations (Sachs, Cantor & Neale, 1986; Wilcox et al., 2003). It is a 
group level activity in which groups generate public pressure on various state 
officials, predominantly legislators, to promote their specific interests (Sholzman & 
Tierney, 1886; Wilcox et al., 2003). For this purpose groups employ both direct and 
indirect techniques such as advocacy writing, phone calls and letter writing 





ii. Indirect lobbying: coalition building 
Coalition building is a form of indirect lobbying based on the use of collective 
power. In pursuit of their goals companies join either temporary issue-based interest 
groups or longer-term alliances such as trade and/or business associations, industrial 
organizations, chambers of commerce and others (Getz, 1997; Keim & Zeithaml, 
1986). Interests groups join together to increase their resources and, as a result, 
bargaining power through collective actions. However, the main problem with this 
form of political activity is that the end product of collective action is not always a 
collective benefit. In many cases only certain coalition members would individually 
enjoy the outcome of such political bargaining (Getz, 1997). Similar to grassroots 
lobbying, coalitions utilize various combinations of all available types of political 
activities.  
iii. Advocacy advertizing and other 
Advocacy advertizing is another indirect approach to aligning public opinion 
with corporate interests which would lead to the reshaping of targeted public policies 
and/or institutions.  For this purposes companies rely on various media outlets such 
as, for example, various video and audio programs, publications and advertisements 
(Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Keim & Zeithaml, 1986; Keim, Zeitmal & Baysinger, 1984; 
Sethi, 1979; Sethi, 1987). All materials used for a delivery of a certain message to 
public can be tailored to specific characteristics of any targeted audiences. 
Availability and access to numerous sources of information such as, for example 
statistical and/or survey databases, significantly facilitates the process of advocacy 
advertizing (Mack, 2001). However, some scholars argue that it is important to 
ensure that the sources are credible and provide accurate information. Moreover, any 
communication with the public should be non-coercive (Kein & Zeithaml, 1981). 
Other tactics within the constituency building strategy include public relations, 
press conferences and political education programs (Hillman & Hitt, 1999). 
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2.6.2.3 Financial incentive strategy 
Financial incentive strategy uses various financial inducements to bring about 
changes in public policy. Company representatives directly contact political 
decision-makers offering a wide specter of financial inducements for aligning public 
policies with private company interests (Hillman & Hitt, 1999). Hillman & Hitt 
(1999: 834 - 835) composed the following list of financial incentive tactics: 
- financial support including  direct contributions either to a political leader or 
political party; 
- honoraria for speaking; 
- paid travel expenses; 
- personal services. 
i. Election funding 
Funding either individual political decision maker or political party has a very 
long history and tradition in Western democracies. For example, in the USA political 
action committees (PAC) are the main channels for companies’ investments into the 
future political support of their interests. In Europe corporate prosperity is secured 
through election funding by trade and industrial associations (Baron, 2006). Baron 
(2006) identifies three primary interdependent goals for election funding. The first 
target is to increase the probability of electing a candidate approved by a company, 
the second – to ensure continuous access to and preferential treatment by incumbents 
at any point in time, and the third – to control lawmaking process and voting. 
ii. Personal services and other 
Personal services is a very efficient and, as a result, popular form of corporate 
political behavior. Delegating firm representatives for a work in official political 
positions or influential non-governmental organizations and employing current or 
former state officials   or decision-makers relatives can be extremely beneficial for 
the company (Hillman & Hitt, 1999).  
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Inviting political decision makers as guest speakers for various social or 
educational events and paying inflated honoraria for their participation as well as 
paying their various travel expenses are several other ways to solicit their political 
support which ensures strengthening of a company’s competitive positioning in the 
host market (Hillman & Hitt, 1999). 
 
iii. Corruption, cronyism and extensive use of connections  
Research on corporate political activity in developed countries does not consider 
corruption as a manifestation of one of the forms of corporate political activity. 
However, recently, scholars focusing on the study of corporate behavior in countries 
with underdeveloped institutional systems suggested recognizing corruption as one 
of the corporate political tactics. Venard (2009) and Collins, Ulluenbruck & 
Rodriguez (2009) provide evidence that in Russia, India and other transition and 
emerging economies corruption is a natural response to the growing competitive 
pressure which is supported and nourished by institutional weaknesses and failures 
(Lawton, McGuire, Rajwani, 2012). 
Lawton, McGuire, Rajwani (2012), based on the Khatri, Tsang & Begley’s 
(2006) analysis, also argue that institutional voids, especially in collectivist and 
hierarchical societies, create incentives for consistent expansion of informal 
networks and other forms of informal relationships, such as cronyisms, political party 
affiliation, familial ties and others. Such institutional environment, characterized by 
prevalence of informal institutional structures, makes use of the most of the corporate 
political tactics irrelevant and leaves businesses with no other choice but to accept 
the informal rules and adopt tactics which can help facilitating the achievement of 
desired outcomes. 
2.6.3 Proactive and reactive corporate political behavior 
A very important characteristic of corporate political behavior is also the nature 
of a firm’s interaction with host-country intuitional environment. Different scholars 
propose a number of closely related classifications of the above characteristic. 
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Hillman, Keim & Schuler (2004) suggest that even though above discussed 
classifications of corporate political activity by approach, participation level and 
strategy are vital for the analysis of corporate political behavior, the latter would not 
be complete without knowledge on the pro-activity or reactivity of firm’s political 
actions.  
Oliver & Holzinger (2008) classify pro-active and reactive strategies as 
influence-oriented and compliance-oriented categories, respectively. Moreover, they 
further divide them into two subtypes such as proactive and defensive strategies in 
the first case and reactive and anticipatory strategies in the second case (Oliver & 
Holzinger, 2008). 
Meznar & Nigh (1995) and Blummentritt (2003) identify bridging as reactive and 
buffering as proactive manifestations of corporate political behavior and emphasize 
that these approaches to handling the relationships with state institutions are not 
mutually exclusive. 
2.6.3.1 Bridging 
Bridging strategy assumes firms’ dedication to the unconditional compliance 
with the requirements of its operational environment (Meznar & Nigh, 1995). To 
succeed companies continuously monitor and actively adopt all the developments in 
the regulatory, socio-economic and political institutional contexts in a host country 
(Hillman, Keim & Schuler, 2004; Meznar & Nigh, 1995). Hillman, Keim & Schuler 
(2004: 844) compare bridging to Weidenbaum’s (1980) “passive reaction” and 
“positive anticipation” types and Boddewyn & Brewer’s (1994) “non-bargaining” 
behavior. 
2.6.3.2 Buffering 
Buffering strategy involves corporate actions on protection of a firm’s assets from all 
range of external pressures and on vigorous participation in activities which would 
lead to the improvement of a company’s competitive positioning in the respective 
markets. To meet their buffering goals on resisting, controlling and/or promoting 
environmental changes, companies apply all available political strategies and tactics, 
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such as informative, constituency building and financial, at all level of participation, 
namely individual and collective (Hillman, Keim & Schuler, 2004; Meznar & Nigh, 
1995).  
2.6.3 Effectiveness of corporate political activity 
The effectiveness of corporate political activity depends on the firm’s ability to 
identify the best performance-enhancing combinations of the most potent individual 
political strategies. The effectiveness of the latter, in turn, is defined as a strategy that 
advances firm’s performance and strengthens its competitive advantage to the extent 
required to meet the firm’s objectives (Oliver & Holzinger, 2008).  
Baysinger (1984) suggested that the effectiveness of a corporate political strategy 
is determined by the three types of issues pertinent to management, defense and 
maintenance domains. Thus effectiveness depends on the availability of issues that, 
firstly, allow a firm to pursue its goals at the expense of other businesses or society 
as a whole, secondly, threaten the legitimacy and thirdly, ability to pursue and meet 
organizational objectives. 
Keim & Baysinger (1988) draw a parallel between the development of 
businesses’ market, such as product, and nonmarket, particularly political, strategies. 
The choice of activities within both of the domains adjusted by their integrative 
effect depends on the firm’s access to both internal and external environment 
resources. As a result, product and political strategies focus on the attainment of 
specific to their sphere of expertise goals, such as higher economic profits and 
desirable policy outcomes, respectively, in a pursuit of the overall organizational 
objective to maximize its competitive advantage. 
Moreover, Keim & Baysinger (1988) suggest that the effectiveness of any 
corporate political strategy depends on such factors as potential value, ease of 
imitability and organizational support. Potential value refers to the ability of 
employees, responsible for the company’s political affairs domain, to recognize 
arising political issues the proper management of which could enhance the 
organizational ability to effectively influence political decision makers. Ease of 
imitability indicates the probability of imitating a firm’s political strategy by other 
112 
 
firms. The nature of organizational support is determined by available resources, 
supportive management, and suitable organizational structures assigned for 
elaborating political tactics and strategies. 
Kudina & Collinson (2009) base their analysis of the effectiveness of corporate 
political strategies in one of the transition countries, China, on the belief that firms as 
rational agents would not employ any corporate political strategy without 
anticipating its positive effect on corporate performance. 
Oliver & Holzinger (2008: 514) claim that the effectiveness of political strategies 
is “a function of firms’ internally and externally oriented dynamic capabilities which 
are grounded in knowledge and influence acquisition and use, and that their 
effectiveness will vary with the rate of environmental change”. Moreover, the 
authors suggest that increasing effectiveness of political strategies is possible to 
achieve by combining various dynamic political strategies. Such strategic synergies 
cause the decrease in the probability of imitating them and lay a solid foundation for 
a growth of flexibility with which firms adapt to any modifications and fluctuations 
in the political environment. 
2.7 Summary and research questions 
The review of the previous theoretical and empirical multidisciplinary research 
effort provides evidence that existing literature is lacking a comprehensive 
theoretical framework for analyzing the quality of iFDI and relationships between 
foreign investors and institutions in transition countries. Reconciling theoretical 
insights from international business, political science, economics, and sociology, 
including eclectic paradigm, neo-institutionalism, particularly social conflict view, 
bargaining models, political strategies, and behaviors under the conditions of neo-
patrimonialism, this study fills this gap by developing a new alternative ‘blind 
bargaining’ model for explaining the foreign investment patterns and the variations 
in impact of different foreign investors on institutional structures in neo-patrimonial 
host countries.   
Firstly, eclectic or ownership-location-internationalization paradigm, neo-
institutional, neo-patrimonial, both conventional and alternative FDI, trade, 
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development and bargaining theories are integrated to develop a ‘blind bargaining’ 
model explaining the relationship between host country- and ownership- or investor-
specific characteristics in neo-patrimonial transition states. It is argued that less 
stable states with underdeveloped or missing institutional structures attract ‘malign’ 
iFDI flows that are interested in exploiting existing institutional weaknesses and 
voids. The following research hypothesis is suggested: 
Hypothesis 1: The presence of ‘blind bargaining’ in neo-patrimonial post-Soviet 
states results in attracting riskier lower quality iFDI. 
Secondly, an analysis of the institution-eroding effect of ‘malign’ iFDI in 
transition states is proposed by applying the notion of ‘malign’ iFDI to the neo-
institutional Rodrick’s framework of FDI, trade, and development (Rodrick, 2003; 
Rodrick, Subramian, & Trebbi, 2001) and combining it with a newly developed 
‘blind bargaining’ model. It is argued that political bargaining process and outcomes 
are contingent on institutional characteristics, capabilities and goals of host countries 
(Eden et al., 2004) and relevant bargaining power and goals of foreign investors. The 
worse the initial conditions and the weaker the host country institutions the lower 
quality iFDI enters the country which either do not contribute to the development of 
institutional environment or even cause negative changes. As a result, the following 
hypothesis is proposed: 
Hypothesis 2: The host countries’ risks increase (decrease) with the growth of 
lower quality ‘malign’ (better quality ‘benign’) iFDI flows. 
Finally, acknowledging the limited nature of the macroeconomic results due to 
their lack of capacity to account for regional and foreign investors’ diversity, this 
thesis proposes a more focused micro-level study of foreign investors’ behavior and 
performance in one country. An in-depth qualitative analysis of foreign investors’ 
political behavior in Ukraine allows addressing multiple generalizability and 
diversity issues identified at the macroeconomic phases of this research project. 
Thus, accounting for location- or recipient country-specific and ownership- or 
foreign investor-specific characteristics, this part of the thesis, initially, examines if a 
newly developed ‘blind bargaining’ model applies to different types of companies 
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with FDI in Ukraine. Subsequently, combining the adopted theoretical frameworks 
with corporate political activity research, a ‘blind bargaining’ model is further 
revised and advanced building on the analysis of various groups of  foreign 
investors’ political behavior in their respective impact on institutional changes in the 
host country. In this context, the following research questions are suggested: 
Research question 1: Do any of the existing bargaining models (obsolescing 
bargain, political bargaining and or newly developed blind bargaining model) apply 
to companies with FDI in Ukraine? Does their relevance vary for different groups of 
companies with FDI? How? 
Research question 2: How do the choices of companies with FDI regarding 
political strategies depend on their characteristics? 
Research question 3: Does the level of political activity and pro-activeness vary 
between different groups of companies with FDI? If so, how? 
Research question 4: How successful and efficient are different types of 






CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction 
Research methodology is an overall strategy constituting a constructive 
framework adopted by a scholar for answering postulated research questions 
(Howell, 2013). Based on a comprehensive theoretical inquiry it justifies the choices 
of research approaches, methods, techniques and their combinations for the 
fulfillment of the research task (Goddard & Melville, 2004; Howell, 2013). It is 
noteworthy that the final decisions on the use of specific methodological elements 
depend on the nature of the studied phenomenon and research questions.  
This research aims at providing a comprehensive analysis of different aspects of 
iFDI quality in post-Soviet transition countries. The accomplishment of this mission 
requires employing mixed method research methodology. While the first two parts of 
this project adopt a macro-level quantitative approach to analyze two different 
aspects of the quality of iFDI in post-soviet transition countries, such as the 
relationships between iFDI quality and host country institutional environment in the 
context of ‘blind bargaining’ model, in the first case, and an impact of iFDI on 
institutional capacities in transition countries, in the second case, the third section 
addresses the gap in micro-level research on the political behavior of MNCs and 
other companies with FDI (referred to hereinafter as foreign investors or companies 
with FDI), their relationships with state institutions, and their impact on the changes 
in institutional environment within the context of one country. Here, emphasizing the 
complexity and context-specific nature of the phenomenon of foreign investors’ 
political behavior and their impact on host country’s institutional environment, in 
particular, and relationships with host state institutions, in general, this research 
acknowledges the need for more targeted qualitative analysis at higher levels of 
disaggregation.  
That is why the third part of this thesis is a comprehensive study of different 
aspects of foreign investors’ political behavior in the context of one country - 
Ukraine. Specifically, it is the first qualitative study (to our knowledge as of 
04/01/2013) which explores the complexity of relationships between host country 
institutions and foreign investors as well as the impact of the latter on the changes in 
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the host country institutional environment in post-Soviet and Central and Eastern 
European countries, particularly Ukraine.  
This mixed methods analysis adopts the scientific realist stance recently 
suggested by Pawson & Tilly (1997) which admits the importance of social contexts 
and, as a result, builds upon the combination of elements of both Bhaskar’s 
structuralist or transcendental (1979) and Harre’s constructivist (1971) versions of 
realism (Blackie, 2001).  A retroductive research strategy (Bhaskar, 1979; Blakie, 
1995; Blakie 2001; Harre, 1971; Pawson & Tilly, 1997) is most pertinent for the 
inquiry into the complexity of the examined phenomenon. Moreover, the exhaustive 
explanation, evaluation and assessment of impacts of the latter (Blackie, 2001) would 
require application of exploratory, descriptive and explanatory strategies (Blackie, 
2001; Easterby-Smith et al., 1991) and acknowledgement of subjectivity in the 
perceptions of continuously changing processes of social interactions (Littlejohn, 
2000). Semi-structured interviews allow us to account for the complexity and 
versatility of multiple links and relationships in which foreign investors and their 
representatives engage for the purpose of aligning the host country’s institutional 
environment with their strategic goals.  
The qualitative analysis focuses on the study of foreign investors’ political 
behavior as determined by the quality of iFDI manifested through these companies’ 
corporate governance practices. As a result, we explore major areas of the social, 
economic and political interests, political influence and relative bargaining power of 
foreign investors as one of the major rent-seeking interest groups and holders of de 
facto political power, in order to estimate their impact on the transformation of the 
institutional environment in Ukraine. 
This chapter is organized as follows. Firstly, section 4.2 outlines and justifies the 
relevance of mixed methods research methodology for this research. Sections 4.3 and 
4.4 discuss characteristics of quantitative and qualitative research methodologies, 
respectively. Sections 4.5 and 4.6 overview the research philosophy, paradigm and 
strategy to substantiate the appropriateness and advantages of the selected research 
methodology. Section 4.7 reviews the models adopted for the quantitative analysis. 
Finally, section 4.7 consists of the qualitative research design review, including a 
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detailed discussion of the research method, data collection and data analysis 
procedures.  
3.2 Mixed methods research 
3.2.1 Objectives and advantages 
Mixed methods research is distinguished from quantitative and qualitative 
purists’ research paradigms by its methodological pluralism (Johnson & 
Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2005). While quantitative and 
qualitative purists deny the compatibility of their respective research paradigms 
stating that even the methods employed within each of their domains cannot and 
should not be mixed, mixed methods research acknowledges the value and 
usefulness of both of these approaches (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004).  
As a result, the main objective of the mixed methods mode of inquiry is “not to 
replace either of these approaches but rather to draw from the strengths and minimize 
the weaknesses of both in single research studies and across studies” (Johnson & 
Onwuegbuzie, 2004: 14-15). Scholars argue that pragmatic researchers open to 
adopting multiple methodologies within the same research framework are not only 
more likely to be able to address all the problematic issues and biases specific for any 
singular research approach arising in the process of answering research questions but 
also add more complete knowledge due to their broader range of options in selecting 
the most appropriate and efficient combinations of methods (Johnson & 
Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Onwuegbuzie & Leech; 2005).  
Other advantages of employing mixed research methodology that arise from the 
complementary use of quantitative and qualitative research methods include: 
- better explanatory power;  
- increased reliability due to arising opportunities to neutralize the weakness of 
one method by capitalizing on the strengths of another method;  
- ability to obtain stronger evidence for supporting the findings; 
- increased generalizability of the findings; 
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- ability to indentify blind spots, both terms of further inquiries and 
understanding, inaccessible to the eye using mono-methodology; 
- ability to expand the range of research questions (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 
2004). 
3.2.2 Disadvantages and weaknesses 
As any other research methodology the implementation of mixed method 
research approach also has its disadvantages and weaknesses. Firstly, from the 
feasibility perspective, both its critics and proponents emphasize that, in general, it is 
a very demanding task for a single researcher to apply different research approaches 
within the same research project simultaneously. A researcher needs to gain an 
expertise in multiple research methods which increases the amount of time required 
for the completion of such project and also raises the expenses. Overall, specialists 
argue that mixed method projects are a more feasible task for a research team. 
Secondly, from the conceptual perspective, experts speculate that numerous 
theoretical and analytical details still require careful consideration. For example, 
researchers still need to resolve problems intrinsic to and accompanying the process 
of mixing qualitative and quantitative paradigms, find the most appropriate and 
efficient ways for qualitative analysis of quantitative data and for interpreting 
conflicting results (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004). 
Green, Caracelli & Graham (1989) identify five major rationales for undertaking 
mixed methods research. The first purpose for combining qualitative and quantitative 
approaches is triangulation. In other words, multiple methods are employed for 
examining the same phenomenon to test the convergence and corroboration of 
findings. Also, application of this research approach can be driven by a pursuit of 
complementarity. In this case different research paradigms help to add more details, 
illustrate and clarify their outputs. Initiation rationale is seeking to identify vague, 
inconsistent and conflictive issues and, based on this information, introduce relevant 
changes to the research question. The goal of development rationale is to 
communicate the evidence obtained by one method to the other one. Finally, 
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expansion rationale broadens research perspectives by utilizing various methods for 
different elements of the research project. 
3.2.3 Types of research approaches 
Scholars distinguish several types of mixed method research approaches. In 
addition to the rationale, the choice of these types in each particular case depends on 
four factors including theoretical perspective adopted by the author of the project – 
explicit or implicit, priority of research strategy – equal, qualitative or quantitative, 
sequence of data collection implementation – qualitative, quantitative or no 
sequence, and the point at which the data are integrated – at at data collection, data 
analysis, data interpretation stages or with some combinations (Terrell, 2011). 
Based on the factors listed above the following major mixed method research 
approaches can be distinguished: 
1. sequential strategy: 
 explanatory – qualitative analysis is applied to provide a more 
detailed explanation of the quantitative results; 
 exploratory – quantitatively testing various elements and generalizing 
qualitative findings; 
 transformative – varies aligning with a theoretical perspective. 
2. concurrent strategy: 
 triangulation – pursues confirmation, corroboration or cross-validation 
of findings; 
 nested – two various data collection methods are embedded within 
each other for achieving a better understanding of the studied 
phenomenon; 




Based on the above analysis and classification of the mixed method research 
methodology this research adopts a concurrent triangulation strategy (Terrell, 2011), 
which involves three data collection stages: two quantitative and one qualitative (see 
Fig. 3.1). All of these strategies are given equal priority. The integration of the 
findings is taking place at the data interpretation stage of the research project. The 
main goals for employing concurrent triangulation strategy was to confirm, 
complement, corroborate and cross-validate the results from three parts of the 
research project examining different aspects of the same phenomenon. 










                   Comparison, integration, and cross-validation of data results 
*Adopted from Terrell (2011: 267). 
3.3 Research paradigm  
According to Blaikie (1995: 131) “scientific research is about answering 
questions by means of controlled inquiry”. These questions can be categorized as 
follow: firstly, ‘what’ questions focusing on the description of the subject matter; 
secondly, ‘why’ questions inquiring into the reasons and seeking for an explanation 














relationships between the phenomenon under investigation (Blaikie, 1995). The 
study of any phenomenon with the intent to answer any set of such specific questions 
can be conducted in multiple ways. The choice of appropriate research approaches 
and methods will be guided by a belief system or research paradigm built upon the 
ontological, epistemological and methodological dimensions of the researcher’s view 
on knowledge (Guba, 1990). 
As a result, the cornerstone of any research project and the most fundamental 
point in question for a researcher are the decisions on the ways of approaching, 
epitomizing, elucidating and interceding the studied phenomenon (Blaikie, 1995). 
Several major approaches to social enquiry are distinguished by the contemporary 
science. Whether the methods of the natural sciences can be applied to the social 
science is the main question that divides philosophers into different groups 
representing varying views in regard to this inquiry (Blaikie, 1995). As a result of 
debating on this problem the following ontological responses were distinguished:  
 classical responses: positivism, negativism, historicism, critical rationalism, 
classical hermeneutics, interpretivism; 
 contemporary responses: critical theories, realism, contemporary 
hermeneutics, structuration theory, feminism (Baikie, 1995).  
This research adopts an epistemological stance of critical realism (Archer, 
Bhaskar, Collier, Lawson & Norrie, 1998; Bhaskar, 1978, 1989, 2011; Campbell, 
1974, 1988; Cook & Campbell, 1979; Manicas, 2006; Sayer, 1992, 2000). While 
positivism and critical rationalism adopt a correspondence theory of truth, according 
to which objectivity is achieved by the use of logical (deductive) reasoning to 
criticize false or bad theories, hermeneutics and interpretivism reject the existence of 
any objectively valid interpretation and claim that all that is possible is culturally and 
historically situated accounts leading to an unlimited number of interpretations. In 
contrast to both of these ontological positions, realism makes an attempt to avoid the 
problems of objectivity by separating the transitive and intransitive objects of science 
and the tools for explaining reality itself. Realism does not reject the interpretivist 
position that natural and social phenomena are fundamentally different (Blaikie, 
1995). Realists see the world, in general, and social objects, in particular, have dual 
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actuality. On one hand, like constructivists, realists see social phenomenon as being 
perceived through the lens of researcher’s subjective views, judgements and 
standpoints (Flick et al., 2004; Olsen, 2004). However, on the other hand, they 
accept that the existence of this world and any social objects or phenomena is also 
independent of any subjective constructs or experiences (Blaikie, 1995; Olsen, 2004; 
Sayer, 2000). 
One of the most distinctive and important features of realism is methodological 
pluralism (Olsen, 2004; Sayer, 2000). It predicates that realists allow the use of 
different methods and techniques, including both qualitative and quantitative, for the 
study of the same social phenomenon and its various characteristics (Carter, 2003; 
Danermark; 2002; Olsen, 2004; Sayer, 2000). Moreover, they encourage the search 
for, and development of, subject-specific methods (Blaikie, 1995).  
3.4 Research strategy  
The critical realist position adopted in this research critical realism position 
informs the choice of research strategy for this research project.  
There are four research strategies that are associated with the discussed above 
approaches to social inquiry, namely: inductive, deductive, retroductive, and 
abductive. All of these research strategies are distinct in terms of the starting point 
and analytical structure of the research (Blaikie, 1995). Realists find both inductive 
and deductive research strategies insufficient and inadequate for meeting their 
purposes (Blaikie, 1995; Olsen, 2004). They claim that validity of findings obtained 
through a descriptive induction is questionable and the causality of relations cannot 
be established, while also rejecting deduction based on the fundamental criticism of 
the hypothesis-testing method (Blaikie, 1995; Olsen, 2004). 
By contrast, retroduction and abduction are acknowledged as the most 
appropriate research strategies by realists (Blaikie, 1995). Abduction is an analytical 
instrument employed in cases when the researcher is seeking to discern the inner 
knowledge and understand the inner traits of experiences related to the phenomenon 
under investigation (Olsen, 2004; Danermark, 2002). As a result, it does not possess 
the analytical apparatus which would allow the inquiry into macro-level topics 
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(Olsen, 2004).  Consequently, it appears to be the research technique least 
compatible with quantitative research methods (Olsen, 2004).  
Retroduction appears to be the most appropriate research strategy for the study of 
phenomenon as elusive to measurement and possibly even precise definition as 
institutional quality, relationships, power, and status, in general, and changes in 
institutional quality and in power relationships between host state institutions and 
companies with foreign direct investment, in particular (Olsen, 2004). According to 
Sayer (1992: 107) retroduction is “a mode of inference in which events are explained 
by postulating (and identifying) mechanisms which are capable of producing them”. 
Thus, retroduction inquires into real social structures and mechanisms searching for 
and suggesting new connections - antecedents which are presumed to cause the 
observable phenomenon and its changes (Blaikie, 1995; Olsen, 2004). Moreover, 
retroductive logic is appropriate for both qualitative and quantitative methodologies 
(Olsen, 2004).  
This qualitative analysis adopts critical realists’ position and is embedded into 
interpretative or constructivist paradigm acknowledging relativism and admitting the 
subjectivity in perceptions of continuously changing processes of social interactions 
(Littlejohn, 2000). A retroductive research strategy is most pertinent for the inquiry 
into the complexity of the examined phenomenon. The exhaustive apprehension of 
the latter requires application of exploratory, descriptive and explanatory strategies 
(Easterby-Smith et al., 1991).  
We now proceed to present the research design that has been selected in view of 
the critical realist retroductionist approach outlined above. However, it must be also 
noted that the choice of the appropriate research methods has also been guided by the 
difficult multidisciplinary nature of the tested research hypothesis and explored 
research questions.  
3.5 Overall research design 
This thesis includes three studies (Figure 3.2) serving the overall aims of this 
PhD project on developing and testing a model of bargaining determining the quality 
of FDI inflows, relationships between foreign investors and institutions, and the role 
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of foreign investors in institutional changes in neo-patrimonial transition countries. 
Each of these sub-studies analyzes and tests specific aspects of the proposed model at 
different levels of disaggregation. 
The first quantitative study introduces a ‘blind bargaining’ model and suggests 
that the presence of  ‘blind bargaining’ in neo-patrimonial post-Soviet states results 
in attracting riskier lower quality iFDI. Initially, the hypothesis is tested using 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Least Squares Dummy Variables (LSDV), and 
Generalized Least Squares Estimates (GLSE) techniques for an entire group of 27 
transition countries representing Central and Eastern European and post-Soviet 
regions, including post-Soviet states, the Baltic states, Central and Eastern European 
accession and non-accession countries for the five year period, 1997-2002. However, 
due to a high degree of the sample heterogeneity in terms of, firstly, the quality of 
recipient countries’ institutional environment, and, secondly, other geographic,  
historic, resource endowments, macro-economic and other characteristics, the sample 
was divided into smaller more homogenous regional clusters and the analysis was 
undertaken for the following groups of countries: 
1. all post-Soviet states except the Baltic states; 
2. Central European accession and non-accession countries and the Baltic states; 
3. Central European post-Soviet states including Belarus, Moldova, Russia and 
Ukraine; 
4. Central Asian States. 
The results of this analysis confirm that ‘blind bargaining’ in neo-patrimonial 
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Question 1: Does the newly developed 
blind bargaining model apply to 
companies with FDI in Ukraine? Does 
its relevance vary for different groups 
of companies with FDI? How? 
Question 2: How do the choices of 
companies with FDI regarding 
political strategies depend on their 
characteristics? 
Question 3: Does the level of political 
activity and pro-activeness vary 
between different groups of companies 
with FDI? If so, how? 
Question 4: How successful and 
efficient are different types of 
companies with FDI in their efforts to 

























Based on the above results, the second quantitative study proposes an analysis of 
the reverse relationships between institutions and FIs for a sample of twelve post-
Soviet neo-patrimonial recipient states with the strongest indications of ‘blind 
bargaining’ and ‘malign’ iFDI, namely the Central and Eastern European States of 
Belarus, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine, and the Caucasus and Central Asian 
Republics of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. It is suggested that the host countries’ risks increase 
(decrease) with the growth of lower quality ‘malign’ (better quality ‘benign’) iFDI. 
As in the case of the first quantitative study, this hypothesis is tested using OLS, 
LSDV, and GLSE techniques for the nine years period, 1997-2005. The results of 
this analysis confirm that foreign investment may have had negative effects on 
institutional capacities the region. However, the generalizability of these findings is 
questioned due to a limited time frame and variations in investment patterns within 
these regions. 
The qualitative study is initiated as a response to the above concerns on the 
validity and generalizability of quantitative findings. As a result, the qualitative 
investigation of interactions between FIs and institutional environment in one of the 
post-Soviet neo-patrimonial transition countries included in the samples from 
previous studies, particularly Ukraine, is proposed for testing the model at a higher 
level of disaggregation to address all issues mentioned above and answer additional 
questions on  political activity and strategies of different types of FIs in the country. 
A number of research questions is proposed to identify the applicability of a newly-
developed ‘blind bargaining’ model, as well as the role and various technical and 
behavioral characteristics of FIs in shaping institutional environment in Ukraine. 
Firstly, the study explores if the newly developed ‘blind bargaining’ model apply to 
companies with FDI in Ukraine as well as whether and how its relevance varies for 
different groups of companies with FDI. Further, this research inspects if the choices 
of companies with FDI regarding political strategies depend on their characteristics 
as well as whether and how the latter affect their level of political activity and pro-
activeness. Finally, the last section of this part of the thesis examines how successful 
and efficient are different types of companies with FDI in their efforts to influence 
institutional changes and what are the main sources for any variations in such impact. 
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Overall, even though each individual study independently contributes to 
developing and testing a model of bargaining between foreign investors and 
institutions in neo-patrimonial transition countries, their combination is employed for 
satisfying triangulation requirements and helping to assure confirmation, 
corroboration and cross-validation of findings (Terrell, 2011). The following sections 
of this chapter will review in more details various methodological characteristics of 
all three studies.  
3.6 Quantitative research design  
3.6.1 Introduction 
Quantitative research approach is based on a systemic empirical analysis of a 
quantifiable data to explain a particular observable phenomenon (Given, 2008; 
Howell, 2013). Its main objective usually is to develop models and/or theories and/or 
propose hypothesis which would serve as a framework for establishing relationships 
between a dependent and various independent variables describing a particular event 
or characteristic of the phenomenon (Given, 2008).   
This approach is commonly associated with the positivist philosophy comparing 
a social observation with physical phenomenon and claiming the objectivity of social 
science inquiry which allows achieving time- and context-free generalizations 
(Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Nagel, 1996). Thus, the main goals of quantitative 
purists are to “eliminate bias, remain emotionally detached and uninvolved with the 
objects of study, and test or empirically justify their stated hypothesis” (Johnson & 
Onwuegbuzie, 2004: 14) 
The quality of data, dependant on the data measurement problems, is one of the 
fundamental characteristics for determining the reliability of this type of research. As 
a result, the main advantage and disadvantage of this type of research is the ability to 
collect data from large samples and/or to access large databases which allows 
generalizing the results from a sample to the entire population. However, in doing so 
the researcher should take into account possible measuring problems (such as in case 
of analysis of FDI, for example, failure to distinguish between real and pseudo-FDI, 
account for reinvestment of profits, differences in measurement approaches between 
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different countries, etc.), which could negatively impact or question the reliability 
and generalizability of research results (Black, 1999).  
3.6.2 Models 
3.6.2.1 Panel data 
The dataset characteristics are the starting point for a choice of specific statistical 
techniques in undertaking a quantitative analysis. Panel, longitudinal cross-section or 
time-series dataset is pertinent to macroeconomic studies. Such dataset includes a 
series of countries or regions specific variables recorded over a certain period of 
time. Depending on data availability researchers distinguish balanced and 
unbalanced panel dataset. The former refers to the ideal cases when datasets contain 
data for all elements and years of the analysis, while the latter is characterized by 
some missing data. As any other item of statistical or econometric analysis, using 
panel data has its advantages and disadvantages. The most important strength of 
panel data is its ability to account for individual heterogeneity or control for variables 
that either cannot be observed or measured, such as cultural elements, or variables 
that change over time but not across countries, such as policies and regulations. The 
most important weaknesses of panel data include data collection problems and cross-
country dependency or correlation between countries (Baltagi, 2008; Greene, 2008; 
Stimson, 1985; Torres-Reyna, 2007). 
3.6.2.2 Ordinary Least Squares model 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model is a basic and one of the most often used 
tools for the panel data analysis (Stimson, 1985). However, despite its popularity, it 
has multiple limitations and should be used with caution based on the results of 
appropriate diagnostic techniques. Firstly, standard OLS model has a single intercept 
and coefficient estimated for independent variables (see Equation 1). 
Yit  = α + βXit + εit                                                                                                                                     (Eq. 1) 
where  
i (i=1…n) is the entity/ country subscript; 
t is the time subscript; 
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Yit is the dependent variable (DV) for the analysis; 
Xit is an independent variable (IV) for the analysis 
α is an intercept for all entities 
β is constant or unknown parameter to be estimated for IVs; 
εit is the error term. 
Such model is recommended to apply in cases of homogenous units’ analysis 
featuring low levels of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation (Stimson, 1985). Thus, 
treating any cross-entity data as homogenous will lead to an unobserved 
heterogeneity bias since this OLS does not produce unit-specific measures of 
heteroscedasticity (Chen, 2008; Stimson, 1985). Since the main unit of the analysis 
performed in both quantitative parts of this research projects, the quality of 
institutions, is a very country-specific and path-dependent characteristic which will 
vary significantly between the sample countries depending on their cultural, political, 
ethnical and other aspects of their historical heritage, an augmented model 
establishing an intercept term α for each country i is suggested (see Equation 2). 
Yit = αi + βXit + εit                                                                                                                                  (Eq. 2) 
where  
αi = τ + vi                                                                                                                                                                     (Eq. 3) 
τ is a constant element of the intercept and thus remains the same for all sample 
countries, 
vi is a variable part of the intercept and changes for every country in the sample. 
The presence of multiple regressors determined the need for the final adjustments 
of the model (see Equation 4).  
Yit  = αi + ΣβkXit + εit                                                                                                                                   (Eq. 4) 
where 
k (k=1, .... K) is a variable/regressor subscript. 
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Overall, the existing research on OLS suggest that, due to the weaknesses 
discussed above, the genuineness of the results produced by this model cannot be 
confirmed without applying other statistical tools (Greene, 2008; Stimson, 1985). 
3.6.2.3 Least Squares Dummy Variables model 
The Least Squares Dummy Variables (LSDV) model is one of the techniques that 
can be applied for removing such sources of OLS bias as between-unit and / or 
between-time-point variances (Stimson, 1985). The latter can be achieved by adding 
dummy variables (See Equation 5). 
Yit  = ΣβrXrit + εit                                                                                                                                   (Eq. 5) 
where 
i (i = 1…n) is the entity/ country subscript; 
t (t = 1, 2, …., T) is the time subscript; 
Yit is the dependent variable (DV) for the analysis; 
Xrit are the r covariates 
βr are constants or unknown parameters to be estimated for covariates; 
εit is the error term determined as follows: 
εit = αi + τt + µit                                                                                                                                             (Eq. 6) 
αi  are fixed unit-specific effects; 
τt are time-specific effects; 
µit are effects specific to both time and unit. 
Assuming that there are no additional time-specific effects, except for those 
included in the model, the main goals of this model is to remove the unit-specific or 
sample countries – specific error in case of this research project. The latter can be 
achieved by determining the fixed effects for each country (Stimson, 1985; Wallace 
& Hussain, 1969). Controlling for both country- and time-specific effects 
simultaneously is not recommended for two reasons. Firstly, it will result in a 
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significant loss of degrees of freedom. Secondly, it may cause collinearity problems 
between dummy and explanatory variables (Stimson, 1965).  
3.6.2.4 General Least Squares Errors model 
General Least Squares Errors (GLSE) model addresses the coefficients interpretation 
problem associated with fixed time effects in LSDV model. Here, it is suggested to 
view the fixed estimated dummy coefficients as random variables, which allows 
avoiding the explanatory limitations of fixed constants’ individual effects due to a 
shift in interest towards the distribution parameters of random variables such as mean 
and variance (Stimson, 1985).  
Yit  = ΣβrXrit + εit                                                                                                                                   (Eq. 5) 
where 
i (i = 1…n) is the entity/ country subscript; 
t (t = 1, 2, …., T) is the time subscript; 
Yit is the dependent variable (DV) for the analysis; 
Xrit are the r covariates 
βr are constants or unknown parameters to be estimated for covariates; 
εit is the error term determined as follows: 
εit = αt + τt + µit                                                                                                                                              (Eq. 6) 
αt  are random variables; 
τt are time-specific effects; 
µit are effects specific to both time and unit. 
3.6.3 Quantitative study 1: ‘Blind bargaining’ and the quality of iFDI 
3.6.3.1 Introduction 
The first quantitative study introduces a model of bargaining between foreign 
investors and institutions in transition countries instrumental for determining the 
quality of iFDI in transition countries.  It is argued that the neo-patrimonial nature of 
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rule in some states, in particular post-Soviet, stipulates the presence of a ‘blind 
bargaining’ element in the relationships between MNEs and these states. ‘Blind 
bargaining’, reflecting latent conflict between genuine economic goals and the 
private interests of the state ruling elite, creates high levels of uncertainty and 
instability with regard to bargaining outcomes. The higher levels of uncertainty and 
unpredictability which result from the personalization of power and decision–making 
in these states, in turn, are likely to encourage MNEs to either disengage themselves 
from the respective territory, or to seek conditions which are excessively biased in 
their favor.  
‘Blind bargaining’ can be considered as one of the explanations for the failure of 
post-Soviet states in attracting good quality or ‘benign FDI’. Following Hausmann 
and Fernandez-Arias (2000) and Elo (2003) it can be argued that the risky investment 
profile of these countries is likely to lead to a situation where a greater share of FDI 
is ‘malign’. This means that investment either does not contribute to the host states’ 
growth, or even influences negatively the overall development of the host state.  
It is argued that the presence of ‘blind bargaining’ in neo-patrimonial post-
Soviet states results in attracting riskier lower quality FDI. The ‘quality’ of FDI is 
defined as indicating the size and direction of the impact of a unit of iFDI flows on 
changes in institutional environment measured by host country risk indicators, 
including overall country risk, political risk, economic risk, legal risk, tax risk, 
operational risk, and security risk.  
To test the hypothesis the relationships between iFDI flows and host country 
risk indicators will be analyzed for the sample of 27 transition countries, including 
Central and Eastern European and post-Soviet countries for the five year period 
between 1997 and 2002.  However, it is also suggested that the heterogeneity of 
institutional environment and other region- and nation-specific features in recipient 
countries may infringe the quality of results produced as a result of the regression 
analysis. That is why the sample is further divided into several smaller groups based 
on the combination of states’ regional, geographic, historic, ethnographic, 
institutional, resource endowment, and macro-economic characteristics. Overall, the 
test is conducted for the following five different groupings of countries: 
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1. all CEE including post-Soviet states, the Baltic states, Central European 
accession and non-accession countries; 
2. all post-Soviet states except the Baltic states; 
3. Central and Eastern European accession and non-accession countries and the 
Baltic states; 
4. Central European post-Soviet states including Belarus, Moldova, Russia and 
Ukraine; 
5. Caucasus and Central Asian states. 
The Baltic states are excluded from the group of post-Soviet countries and 
included in the group of Central and Eastern European accession and non-accession 
states based on their stronger institutional and economic performance, as well as their 
historically stronger ties and national identity feelings of belonging with the 
European region. The post-Soviet states group is further divided into two smaller 
groups – four Central European post-Soviet states (Belarus, Moldova, Russia and 
Ukraine) and eight Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia) and Central Asian 
(Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) states - by 
regional, ethnographic, and resource-endowments characteristics.  
This classification allows identifying potential additional sources affecting the 
quality of iFDI flows in specific more homogenous groups of countries and, as a 
result, contributes to increasing the purity and predictive capacity of research 
findings. Thus, it is argued, that despite the smaller size of the sample, the results can 
provide a clearer picture of the relationships between the iFDI inflows and the 
quality of institutional environment in transition states and provide evidence for a 
‘blind bargaining’ model in neo-patrimonial states. 
3.6.3.2 Variables and measurements 
i. Dependent variable  
The volumes of iFDI flows as a percentage of GDP in 27 transition economies 
for the 5 years period between 1998 and 2002 is used as the dependent variable for 
testing the hypothesis on the relationship between the quality of iFDI flows and 
institutional environment in the sample countries. The choice of iFDI flows, as 
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opposed to iFDI stocks, as a dependent variable is determined by the ability of the 
former to capture the political-economic effect (Cole, Elliott & Fredriksson, 2006; 
Malesky, 2009) of the interactions between the host country’s institutions and the 
quality of new investment flows. The dependant variable was calculated using the 
UNCTAD data for both iFDI flows and GDP in all countries included in the analysis. 
Even though the academics question the accuracy of both measuring and reporting 
FDI flows and stocks, the uniformity of the data source helps, at least partially, 
addressing and resolving this issue. 
ii. Independent variable  
Measuring the quality of institutional environment in a country is an extremely 
challenging task due to a highly complex nature of the phenomenon. Academics 
continuously debate the relevance (Buckely, et. al., 2007; Judge, et. al., 2011) and 
question the quality of existing institutional measures (Alonso & Garcimartin, 2004). 
A specific focus of a research project would usually determine the choice of an 
appropriate institutional variable. The latter range from income per head, income 
distribution, the efficiency of tax system, population educational level, corruption 
perception (Kwok & Tadesse, 2006; Robertson & Watson, 2004), bureaucracy, 
infrastructure, rule of law, law enforcement and other similar indices countries 
(Bevan, Estrin & Meyer, 2004; Busse & Hefeker, 2007; Daude & Stein, 2007; 
Dunning & Lundan, 2008; Mudambi & Navarra, 2002) to such their cumulative 
counterparts as environmental regulations (Cole, Elliot & Fredriksson, 2006), 
economic transition (Malesky, 2005; Malesky, 2009), governance (Hellman, Jones & 
Kaufmann, 2002) and country risk indicators (Acc-Nikmehr & Beck, 2005).   
For the purpose of this research, due to the data availability and access 
restrictions, Global Insight’s country risk indicators are adopted as the most 
appropriate measure of recipient countries’ institutional capacity and quality.   
Global Insight estimates its risk indicators on the basis of the following criteria: 
 Political Risk (PR): institutional performance, represetativeness, internal 
political consensus, external political consensus; 
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 Economic Risk (ER): degree of market orientation, policy consistency and 
forward planning, diversity and resilience of the economy, macroeconomic 
fundamentals; 
 Legal Risk (LR): legislation, transparency, independence, experience; 
 Tax Risk (TR): coherence, fairness, level, effectiveness; 
 Operational Risk (OR): attitudes to foreign investment, infrastructural 
quality, labour, bureaucracy and corruption; 
 Security Risk (SR): civil unrest, crime, terrorism, external security threat. 
Overall Country Risk (OCR) is calculated as an aggregate of all other risk 














All risks are rated on the scale from 1 to 5 points, where 1 is insignificant risk 
and 5 is extreme risk (Global Insight, 2005). 
Data is collected from Global Insight’s individual annual country reports for the 
entire research period.  
iii. Control variables 
 GDP, export, and trade balance per capita, hosts’ debt as share of GDP, inflation, 
and unemployment are selected as control variable to account for certain country 
specific characteristics. GDP per capita reflects on the standards of living and 
purchasing power in each country (Globerman & Shapiro, 2003; Buckley, et. al., 
2007). Government debt controls for the intensity of the creditors’ pressure (such as 
home countries, private banks, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, etc.) on 
the host state institutions.  The data on government debt and GDP is accessed from 
Global Insight individual country annual reports. The indicator is calculated as a 
share of GDP. Trade balance, exports and imports control for the type of iFDI and 
measure the openness of the economy. The data for all of the above measures was 
obtained from the UNCTAD online database. Inflation reflects on the vulnerability 
of the economy to the deterioration in the real value of income and is measured as an 
annual percentage change in a consumer price index. IMF was the source for this 
index. Finally, the unemployment rate affects an interest of resource-seeking 
investors in entering the countries with large, flexible, high quality, but relatively 
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cheap employees’ pool (Coughlin, et.al., 1991). This along with most of the other 
control variables was obtained from Global Insight individual country reports (See 
Table 3.1). 
Table 3.1. Quantitative study 1: List of variables, measurements, and sources* 
Variable type Variable name Theoretical 
justification 
Measure Source 
Dependent iFDI flows as a 
share of GDP 
 Percentage UNCTAD 
Independent Country risk Institutions Scale from 1 to 5 
points, where 1 is 
insignificant risk and 5 
is extreme risk 
Global 
Insight 
Independent Political risk Institutions Scale from 1 to 5 
points, where 1 is 
insignificant risk and 5 
is extreme risk 
Global 
Insight 
Independent Economic risk Institutions Scale from 1 to 5 
points, where 1 is 
insignificant risk and 5 
is extreme risk 
Global 
Insight 
Independent Legal risk Institutions Scale from 1 to 5 
points, where 1 is 
insignificant risk and 5 
is extreme risk 
Global 
Insight 
Independent Operational risk Institutions Scale from 1 to 5 
points, where 1 is 
insignificant risk and 5 
is extreme risk 
Global 
Insight 
Independent Security risk Institutions Scale from 1 to 5 
points, where 1 is 
insignificant risk and 5 
is extreme risk 
Global 
Insight 
Control GDP per capita Market-
seeking FDI 
$ US Global 
Insight 
Control Government debt 






Control Exports as a 
share of GDP 
Market-
seeking FDI 
Percentage  UNCTAD 
Control Trade balance as 












Control Inflation Transaction 
costs 
Annual percentage 
change in a consumer 
price index 
IMF 
*Independent variable and all control variables are in logarithmic form. 
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3.6.3.3 Empirical Model 
The following analysis draws on the data, which have been arranged in a 
balanced panel format, listing iFDI flows, variable risk scores and other country 
characteristics for 27 post-Soviet and Eastern European countries for the five year 
period, 1998-2002. For this purpose the following equation was estimated: 
Yit = αi + β1 (Risk indicators)it + β2Xit + εit 
where  
i is the country subscript; 
t is the time subscript; 
Yit is the dependent variable for the analysis, iFDIit  flows; 
(Risk indicators)it is an independent variable measuring institutional capacity of a 
country i in a year t measured by Global Insight’s indicators of country risk, 
including overall country risk calculated as an aggregate of political, economic, 
legal, tax, operational and security risks. 
Xit is a matrix of control variables indexed by country and by year. The latter 
includes, GDP per capita, government debt as a share of GDP, exports and trade 
balance as percent of GDP, unemployment, inflation; 
αi, β1, β2 are constants or unknown parameters to be estimated; 
εit is the error term. 
Independent and all control variables are in natural logarithmic form, which 
allows measuring their elasticity and contributes to minimizing skewness caused by 
outliers.  
The Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Least Squares Dummy Variables (LSDV), 
and the General Least Squares Error (GLSE) models were adopted to examine the 
relationship between the quality of iFDI flows and institutional environment in 
recipient countries controlling for some recipient markets’ characteristics.  Of these 
models, the LSDV model can be considered the most reliable since the OLS model is 
likely to produce overinflated t values on account of serial correlation, and the GLSE 
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is likely to underestimate the significance of coefficient (Stimson, 1985).A Hausman 
test was performed to determine the choice of an original model. OLS model was 
selected since the unobserved fixed effects did not bias the results.  
3.6.4 Quantitative study 2: Evidence of ‘malign’ iFDI in former Soviet states 
3.6.4.1 Introduction 
The second quantitative study is stemming from a relatively recently initiated 
debate questioning the direction of the causality between FDI and other variables of 
interest (Apergis, 2008; Balasubramanyam, Salisu, and Sapsford, 1996; Borensztein, 
De Gregorio and Lee, 1998; Carcovic, 2002). Moreover, it further tests a newly 
proposed ‘blind bargaining’ model questioning the dominant orthodoxy of iFDI (See 
Fig. 1.1) which suggests that increased foreign investment will, in virtually all 
instances, benefit the recipient nation (Balasubramanyam, Salisu, and Sapsford, 
1996; Borensztein, De Gregorio and Lee, 1998; De Melo, 1999; Dyker, 1999). Thus, 
this empirical part of the research project consists of an exploratory statistical 
national level data analysis which tests the impact of institutions, as one of the most 
important location-specific advantages of host economies, measured by country risk 
indicators, on a quality of iFDI flows via a pooled regression analysis. 
To test the hypothesis on the effects of the quality of iFDI flows on the recipient 
country’s institutional environment the data for twelve neo-patrimonial post-Soviet 
countries, namely the Central and Eastern European States of Belarus, Moldova, 
Russia, and Ukraine, and the Caucasus and Central Asian Republics of Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan, over a nine years period, 1997-2005, are investigated in terms of three 
models, including OLS, LSDV, and GLSE. To preserve the homogeneity of the 
sample, this analysis deliberately excludes the three Baltic states, whose economic 
development was affected relatively early on by their eventual succession to the 
European Union (Hunya, 2004). 
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3.6.4.2 Variables and measurements 
i. Dependent variable  
As in the previous quantitative study, due to the data availability and access 
restrictions, Global Insight’s country risk indicators are adopted as the most 
appropriate measure of recipient country’s institutional capacity and quality.   
However, for the purpose of this research, these indicators serve as dependent 
variables. Moreover, in the following analysis, tests are conducted only for the 
Global Insight’s variables which produced the strongest results in the previous 
analysis. The latter include overall country risk (OCR), economic risk (ER), and 
legal risk (LR). It should be noted that this analysis has excluded a fourth Global 
Insigiht’s variable, which also produced strong results, namely political risk.  The 
reason for this is that the latter variable shows a strong path dependency in the sense 
that the stability of democratic governance systems has strong historical determinants 
and appears to change only marginally over time.  For the purpose of our argument 
regarding the potentially malign effects of FDI, both economic and legal risks appear 
to be the more suitable variables.   
All risk indicators are estimated, rated and collected as in previous quantitative 
study. 
ii. Independent variable  
The volumes of iFDI flows as a percentage of GDP in 12 post Soviet states for 
the nine years period between 1997 and 2005 is the key causal variable for testing the 
hypothesis on the effect of the quality of iFDI flows on institutional environment in 
the sample countries. As in the first quantitative study, the choice of iFDI flows as 
opposed to iFDI stocks as a causal variable is determined by the ability of the former 
to capture the political-economic effect (Cole, Elliott & Fredriksson, 2006; Malesky, 
2009) of the interactions between the host country’s institutions and the quality of 
new investment flows. This variable was calculated using the UNCTAD data for 
both iFDI flows and GDP in all countries included in the analysis. Even though the 
academics question the accuracy of both measuring and reporting FDI flows and 
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stocks, the uniformity of the data source helps, at least partially, addressing and 
resolving this issue. 
iii. Control variables 
 GDP per capita, trade balance  and hosts’ debt as share of GDP, and 
unemployment are selected as control variable to account for certain country specific 
characteristics. GDP per capita reflects on the standards of living and purchasing 
power in each country (Globerman & Shapiro, 2003; Buckley, et. al., 2007). 
Government debt controls for the intensity of the creditors’ pressure (such as home 
countries, private banks, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, etc.) on the host 
state institutions.  The data on government debt and GDP is accessed from Global 
Insight individual country annual reports. The indicator is calculated as a share of 
GDP. Trade balance control for the type of iFDI and measures the openness of the 
economy. The data for all of the above measures was obtained from the UNCTAD 
online database. Finally, the unemployment rate affects an interest of resource-
seeking investors in entering the countries with large, flexible, high quality, but 
relatively cheap available employees’ pool (Coughlin, et.al., 1991). This along with 
most of the other control variables was obtained from Global Insight individual 
country reports (see Table 3.2). 
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Table 3.2. Quantitative study 2: List of variables, measurements, and sources* 
Variable 
type 
Variable name Theoretical 
justification 
Measure Source 
Dependent Country risk  Institutions Scale from 1 to 5 points, 
where 1 is insignificant risk 
and 5 is extreme risk 
Global 
Insight  
Dependent Legal risk  Institutions Scale from 1 to 5 points, 
where 1 is insignificant risk 
and 5 is extreme risk 
Global 
Insight 
Dependent Economic risk Institutions Scale from 1 to 5 points, 
where 1 is insignificant risk 
and 5 is extreme risk 
Global 
Insight 
Independent iFDI flows as a 
share of GDP 
Institutions Percentage UNCTAD 
Control GDP per capita Market-
seeking FDI 
$ US Global 
Insight 
Control Government debt 






Control Trade balance as 











*Independent variable and all control variables are in logarithmic form. 
3.6.5.3 Empirical Model 
The following analysis draws on the data, which have been arranged in a 
balanced panel format, listing iFDI flows, variable risk scores, and other country 
characteristics for 12 post-Soviet countries for the nine year period, 1997-2005. The 
adopted model examines the impact of the quality of iFDI flows on institutional 
environment in recipient countries controlling for some recipient markets’ 
characteristics. As in the case of the first quantitative study, this analysis includes 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Least Squares Dummy Variables (LSDV) and the 
General Least Squares Error (GLSE) Models. Of these models, the LSDV model can 
be considered the most reliable since the OLS model is likely to produce overinflated 
t values on account of serial correlation, and the GLSE is likely to underestimate the 
significance of coefficient (Stimson, 1985). For this purpose the following equation 
is estimated: 





i is the country subscript; 
t is the time subscript; 
Yit is the dependent variable for the analysis, institutional capacity of country i in 
year t measured by Global Insight’s indicators of country risk, including overall 
country,  economic, and legal risks.  
iFDIit is the key causal independent variable. 
Xit is a matrix of control variables indexed by country and by year. The latter 
includes GDP per capita, government debt as a share of GDP, trade balance as 
percent of GDP, and unemployment. GDP per capita reflects on the standards of 
living in each country. Government debt controls for the intensity of the creditors’ 
pressure (such as home countries, private banks, World Bank, International Monetary 
Fund, etc.) on the host state institutions. Trade balance (exports and imports) control 
for the type of iFDI and measure the openness of the economy. 
αi, β1, β2 are constants or unknown parameters to be estimated; 
εit is the error term. 
All independent and control variables are in logarithmic form, which allows 
measuring their elasticity and contributes to minimizing skewness caused by outliers. 
3.7 Qualitative study: Research design  
3.7.1 Introduction 
Qualitative research is the most appropriate and efficient approach for 
uncovering, exploring and describing of complex multifaceted practices, experiences, 
relationships, and interactions between various entities and their representatives 
within a specific context of certain socio-political-economic realities. A qualitative 
approach allows the researcher to obtain participants’ reflections on the issues under 
investigation, including their attitudes, beliefs, feelings, assumptions, judgments and 
experiences within a particular socio-economic-political context. Moreover, it not 
only gives researchers’ access to the information that cannot be obtained in any other 
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way by non-participants but can also reveal patterns that those taking part in the 
researched activity on a daily basis might not be aware of (Flick et al., 2004). 
As a result, qualitative research works as a unique source of insight into the 
complexity of any social phenomenon accounting for the multiple dimensions of 
interactions of contexts, settings and participants’ frames of references (Marshall & 
Rossman, 1995; Strauss & Corbin, 1990). Hence, this research acknowledges the 
need for more targeted qualitative analysis at higher levels of disaggregation 
emphasizing the complexity and context-specific nature of the political behavior of 
foreign investors and their impact on the host country’s institutional environment, in 
particular, and relationships with host state institutions, in general.  
The quantitative analysis of the impact of FDI on the institutional environment in 
post-Soviet and Central and Eastern European countries presented in Chapters 5 and 
6 allowed us to establish the signs of the impact and strength of the relationships 
between the quantity of FDI and variables used to measure the quality of institutions 
in these countries in general. However, for several reasons, including data 
availability and the nature of the research methods, it did not permit us to reveal and 
look into the unique distinctions in these relationships and their impact in different 
countries and industries. Qualitative analysis will therefore supplement quantitative 
analysis in order to identify and explore specific factors underlying the political 
activity for different types of companies with FDI within and different industries in a 
single country, Ukraine.  
The inclusion of qualitative analysis is essential for the following reasons. First 
of all, qualitative research is inherently flexible (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Such 
flexibility makes it feasible for a researcher to uncover new latent issues and 
information and adjust the course, emphasis and depth of the study of certain focal 
points of a research based on the details detected by a researcher in the process of 
inquiry into the topic. It is particularly important in cases of examining very complex 
phenomenon characterized by multiple, overt and covert, traits and interactions. As a 
result, applying qualitative methodology increases the chances not only of detecting 
previously unknown attributes of a researched matter but also of ability to diagnose, 
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distinguish and pinpoint the core issues, explanations, interpretations and 
implications of analyzed interactions. 
Moreover, for the study of changes in power relationships between business 
actors, various types of companies with FDI, and state institutions, and for the 
detection and assessment of the impact of the former on the later it is also very 
important that contextuality is a guiding principle of qualitative research (Flick et al., 
2004). Even though the qualitative study’s transferability or generalizability to other 
settings sometimes is seen as problematic and considered by traditional canons as a 
weakness in the approach (Marshall & Rossman, 1995), inspecting multiple 
dimensions of both personal and impersonal interactions within a particular socio-
economic-political context (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994) ideally serves the exploratory, 
descriptive and explanatory goals of this research.  
 
3.7.2 Research method  
3.7.2.1 Justification of research method  
The complex nature of the relationships between host country institutional 
environment and companies with foreign direct investment, the multidisciplinary 
character of the questions posed as a result of the definition of the problem, the 
sensitivity of the topic and the suggested research strategy impose special 
requirements and restrictions on the research design of this project.  
The first and one of the most important phases of data collection for this research 
is a critical literature review. An analysis of public documents and information then 
carried out and the conclusions of this analysis are compared with those of the 
literature review. This allows the researcher to appropriately define the issues and 
identify the possible causes of problems. It also serves as means of imposing 
constraints on the choice of research techniques.  
In this particular case because of the complexity, sensitivity and volatility of 
the studied phenomena the adoption of a longitudinal approach to data collection is 
impossible. Conducting case studies or organizing focus group discussions for 
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examining political behavior of companies with FDI and their relationships with 
various host country institutions and their representatives could produce a more 
holistic picture and provide the researcher with extremely important supplementary 
primary information on various companies approaches, strategies, tactics, behaviors 
and assessments of their political activities. According to Herz & Imber (1995) the 
analysis of political and administrative elites’ activities, relationships and 
interactions can be most effectively pursued through employing semi-structures 
interviews as a research method. However, the secretive nature of and taboo attitude 
toward, the relevant aspects of business practices and behavior makes the 
information sought by the researcher highly sensitive, confidential and largely 
inaccessible, and that, in turn, makes it impossible to attempt the use of methods such 
as case studies or focus group discussions.  
Thus, the best feasible research method for this study consists in semi-structured, 
confidential interviews with CEOs, directors, or managers of relevant departments 
within the companies with FDI for the purpose of gaining a historical perspective on 
the development and changes in power relationships between companies with FDI 
and host country institutions. The complex multiple links and relationships in which 
MNEs and companies with FDI engage for the purpose of aligning the host country’s 
institutional environment with their strategic goals.  
3.7.2.2 Interview 
What is an interview? Is it simply a conversation of two equal partners? Kvale 
(1994:  126) asserts that  
The conversation in the research interview is not the reciprocal interaction of 
two equal partners. There is a definite asymmetry of power: the interviewer defines a 
situation, introduces the topics of the conversation, and through further questions 
steers the course of the interview. 
This means that an interviewer is a leader of this deliberate conversation, 
structuring the interviewing procedure and defining the flow and the atmosphere of 
the interview (Kvale, 1994) for the purpose of detecting and exploring interviewees’ 
views, attitudes, ideas, experiences and practices with regard to matters in question 
146 
 
within certain socio-political-economic settings (Kahn & Cannell, 1957; Seidman, 
1998). The interviewer aims to obtain a comprehensive account of the examined 
phenomenon in both factual and meaning spheres of the inquiry (Kvale, 1994). 
The forms of interviews range from highly structured to completely unstructured 
procedures. In order to meet the goals of this research project all interviews were 
semi-structured based on the use of open-ended questions serving as a guiding 
instrument for the steering of a conversation in a desired direction and probing for 
detailed and expanded interviewees’ perceptions and perspectives (Flick, 1998). 
Since the targeted participants of this cycle of interviews were chief executive 
officers (CEOs), directors and managers of companies with FDI or MNEs 
subsidiaries in Ukraine, as well as state officials, journalists, and representative of 
various international organizations, these interviews can also be categorized as elite 
cross-cultural interviews – a method we will now discuss.  
Elite interviews involve parties occupying posts entrusting their holders with 
authority, power, influence and various kinds of specialized knowledge depending on 
the sphere of their expertise (Gubrium & Holstein, 2002; Marshall & Rossman, 
1995). Communication with representatives of the elite stratum of researched 
companies as well as with officials identified with other spheres of business or 
representing public, state and international organization exhibiting interest for this 
research in terms of their mutual interdependencies, impact and interactions 
significantly increases the chances of gaining access to the important facts, news and 
information not available to employees holding a lower-ranking positions. It is 
particularly important in the current research to explore the essence, motivations and 
practices of non-market and, particularly, political activity of companies with FDI 
and their impact on filling the institutional void and causing changes in the 
institutional environment of a host country. 
Cross-cultural interviews are carried out with the representatives of different 
cultures and of various nationalities (Ryan, 2002). Conducting cross-cultural 
interviews generates problems, firstly, with an adequate account of, and reflection 
on, cultural differences in an interviewer’s understanding of the information shared 
by an interviewee, and, secondly, for the ability to detect and understand various 
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linguistic nuances in interviewing non-native speakers. To avoid the former problems 
the researcher must ensure that he or she is acquainted with specific characteristics of 
cultures represented by different participants. The anticipation and elimination of 
linguistic problems requires a forward and back translation of the interview protocol 
into the languages used for interviewing.  
The interviews for the current research were conducted in three languages 
(subject to the interviewee preference), including English, Russian and Ukrainian. To 
ensure the reliability and adequacy of reproducing open-ended research questions 
comprising the framework for the semi-structured interviews in different languages, 
the help of two independent professional interpreters was solicited to undertake the 
forward and back translations of the interview protocol originally designed in 
English into Russian and Ukrainian. 
Another factor that influences the researchers’ capability to obtained detailed 
information about the examined topic is the duration of the interview. Longer 
interviews give more opportunities to probe deeper and more exhaustively into 
various facets and multiple overt and covert features of the studied phenomenon. 
Further, to increase the size of the sample of interviewed companies by meeting 
the convenience demands of some participants as well as to decrease the researcher’s 
travelling time and costs, the researcher used three interview techniques, including 
telephone, face-to-face and Skype interviews. The second and third techniques 
allowed for accounting and assessment of not only contextual and articulate aspects 
but also provided access to the visual aspect of the communication process.  
3.7.2.3 Advantages and disadvantages of semi-structured interviews 
The assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of a data collection method 
employed in the course of this research needs to address two aspects, differences in 
levels of structure and in interviewing techniques. Apart from data availability, the 
investigator’s pursuit of a higher degree of either reliability or validity of the research 
is one of the main rationales governing the choice between structured and semi-
structured interviews, respectively (Langley, 1987).  
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A higher degree of structure ensures internal consistency and comparability of 
the results due to the use of standardized research instrument. As a result, the data is 
viewed as more reliable since it can be quantified and replicated. Moreover, the fact 
that larger samples can be recruited further ensures that the results can be 
generalized. However, such precise and invariable nature of questions, usually limits 
the researcher’s ability to ensure the validity of the analysis, since participants are 
restricted in their options of answers and are deprived of the chance to discuss their 
relevant experiences, ideas and issues not covered by the questionnaire. Besides, the 
authenticity of the suggested questions can also be doubted (Adler & Adler, 2002). 
By contrast, semi-structured interviews can provide a researcher with access to 
the exceptionally detailed and genuine information (McCracken, 1988), made 
available thanks to the researcher’s flexibility in the wording of questions and deeper 
exploration into both predetermined topics and those that are identified 
spontaneously during the course of the interview (Adler & Adler, 2002; Marshall & 
Rossman, 1995; Rubin & Rubin, 1995).  
Nevertheless, this method has its disadvantages. Firstly, it is more expensive and 
time consuming. Secondly, confidentiality concerns are greater in such cases. As a 
result, researchers are restricted by the small sample sizes. The latter condition, in 
turn, imposes limitations on the analyst’s ability to generalize the results of his/her 
study (Adler & Adler, 2002; Marshall & Rossman, 1999; Rubin & Rubin, 1995). The 
diversity in the content of the interviews due to differences in participants’ 
experiences, knowledge and perceptions makes it non-replicable. Semi-structured 
interviews are also more susceptible to an interviewer’s bias through conscious or 
unconscious misinterpretation of the interviewee’s answers. The interviewer may 
also unintentionally influence or distort the respondent’s comments and explanations 
(Adler & Adler, 2002; Marshall & Rossman, 1999; Rubin & Rubin, 1995). 
With regard to the three interview techniques engaged in this study, namely face-
to-face, Skype and phone interviews, the first two have certain advantages over the 
third one. In particular, the first can be characterized as synchronous communication 
both in time and space (Opdenakker, 2006). Such communication allows an 
investigator to both monitor and evaluate such social cues as an interviewee’s 
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nonverbal behavior, including body language, voice, and emotional tone 
(Opdenakker, 2006). A comparative disadvantage of phone interviews is that they 
cannot provide visual access to the respondent. However, a strong advantage of this 
technique as compared to face-to-face interviews is that it ensures an extended 
geographical access to the target audiences (Opdenakker, 2006). It is also must be 
noted here that both of these technique could be relevantly costly. Interesting is the 
fact that Skype interviewing combines the advantages of both the other technique, 
without their disadvantages, making it the most cost-, time-, and spatial access-
efficient interviewing technique. 
3.7.3 Data collection  
3.7.3.1 Sampling design 
Sampling design is a vital element of any research process (Onwuegbuzie & 
Leech, 2007). The researcher’s ability to identify the most appropriate sampling 
scheme and strategy and to solicit agreement for participation from the actors 
representing the field of the researcher’s interest is a principal requirement for the 
completion of any research project. The choice of sample size and of sampling 
procedures depends on the nature and objectives of the research project (Given, 
2008), including sampling scheme, design and strategy (Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 
2007).  
Qualitative research is primarily based on the use of relatively small non-
probability samples, in contrast with the random sampling schemes and larger size 
samples in quantitative research. As a result, both the data analysis techniques and 
approaches to generalization of findings differ significantly in qualitative and 
quantitative research. While quantitative researchers are restricted in their choice to 
one sample-to-population type of statistical generalization, qualitative researchers 
can interpret their findings applying any of the three types of generalization 
techniques, namely statistical, analytical generalization or case-to-case transfer 
(Firestone, 1993; Miles, & Huberman, 1994; Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2007). 
The research objectives, complexity, and sensitive nature of the studied 
phenomenon, namely the power relationship between companies with FDI and 
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institutional environment and the impact of the former on the latter, determined 
decision-making process of a sampling framework for this research project. The 
selection of participating companies was guided by the rules of a purposive sampling 
scheme. Within this scheme a combination of two partially overlapping kinds of 
purposive sampling alternatives were adopted, including criterion and theory-guided 
sampling (Given, 2008; Patton, 1990). So, taking into consideration the 
recommendations of previous theoretical and empirical research, the targeted units of 
analysis were identified based on the following criteria:  the presence of FDI, 
company/subsidiary size (measured by the number of employees), and industry.  
Two additional criteria, the form of ownership and the company’s status in the 
global economy, were taken into account in the process of selecting appropriate 
research strategy. Here, parallel sampling design facilitated and ensured credible 
comparison of findings at both pairwise and subgroup levels (Onwuegbuzie & 
Leech, 2007). Three subgroups were recognized as important for the purpose of this 
research. The sample companies were grouped by industry, by characteristic 
representing companies’ stand based on combination of form of ownership and the 
MNC’s status in the global economy, and by company’s investment decision 
rationale. In accordance with the previous research, the first two grouping criteria are 
believed to determine the bargaining power and political behavior of the companies 
as well as the character of their relationships with various state institutions.  The 
author added the third dimension based on her own analysis and observations. 
In addition, expert and stakeholder purposive samplings (Given, 2008) were 
employed to identify and recruit participants for the strategically important for the 
issue under consideration support or auxiliary interviews series. Thus, representatives 
of such subgroups as state officials, experts, journalists, potential foreign investors, 
domestic companies, including both small and medium sized enterprises and large 
domestic companies, - potential partners of existing foreign investors as well as 
foreign companies – potential investors were selected to increase the probability of 
pinpointing some new issues, discerning new contexts and, as a result, raising the 
potential for reaching more resonant and insightful conclusions. 
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The choice of research strategy imposes certain requirements on the size of a 
sample (Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2007). The latter, in turn, directly determines the 
degree to which generalizations can be made on the basis of this research 
(Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2007). As a result, Onwuegbuzie & Leech (2007) suggest 
that in comparisons of subgroups’ each subgroup should consist of at least three 
cases. Moreover, it should be acknowledged that researchers can stratify the 
subgroups of their choice by more than one attribute, which also would cause further 
changes in the size of the sample (Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2007). Overall, the sample 
size should ensure that data saturation and completeness (Rubin & Rubin, 1995), as 
well as theory saturation and information redundancy requirements are satisfied 
(Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2007). 
Even though a comparison of different subgroups ensures better insight into 
different contexts and expands the researcher’s knowledge of these contexts and of 
their meaning for the understanding of the whole phenomenon, it is important to 
avoid sacrificing ‘thick descriptions’ and to preserve the uniqueness and complexity 
in depiction of each particular case (Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2007). Hence, a 
balanced usage of both research techniques is an imperative for conducting a 
competent and efficient research producing legitimate and representative results valid 
for generalization (Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2007). 
3.7.3.2 Sample companies 
The nature and objective of the research project shaped the requirements to the 
sampling design, scheme, strategy and targeted population. Since the goal of the 
analysis was to explore the major areas and intensity of political interests (such as 
economic, social, legal policies, state building, etc.), as well as impact on changes in 
host country institutional environment of various patterns of political behavior 
including lobbying, firms alliances and associations, public and government 
relations, relationships with media, constitutions building, investors coalitions, 
policy-making, policy learning and international diplomacy, semi-structured 
interviews with chief executive officers (CEOs), directors and managers of different 
departments within  companies with FDI or MNE subsidiaries in Ukraine were held 
between July and November, 2012.  The original contact list for the sample of the 
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companies was identified based on the information contained within the Unified 
State Register of Enterprises and Organizations in Ukraine.  
Consequently, after a review of companies’ web sites the database for the initial 
sample of 269 companies with FDI from both developed and developing countries 
and more than 200 employees, representing both services and the industrial 
production sector, was compiled. All of the selected companies were contacted via e-
mail containing a solicitation letter guaranteeing the confidentiality and compliance 
with the Data Protection Act (see Appendix A). To increase the chances of getting a 
response for an interview request the list of e-mails included all relevant available 
contact points for each company, including administrative company contacts, CEOs, 
general and legal directors, Public Relations, Government Relations, International 
Relations, and Advertizing department managers.  
The first contact round resulted in a positive reply from 17 companies. 
Representatives of 13 of these 17 companies asked for an interview protocol (see 
Appendices C and B for the English and Russian versions of the interview protocol, 
respectively) to gain a better idea about the essence of the research project and to 
prepare for an interview. However, after receiving the interview protocol containing 
a more detailed information on the research questions, 9 company representatives 
refused to participate in the study. Four of them explained that the sensitive nature of 
the research questions and confidentiality of this kind of information were the main 
reasons for their refusal. The other five participants did not provide any explanation 
and declined further communication by ignoring the follow up e-mails. 
Representatives of seven out of the remaining eight companies, who committed to 
their original decision on research participation, agreed to be interviewed only under 
the condition of strictest confidentiality and retention of a right to reject answering 
any question. Remarkable is the fact that by contrast, the director of the last company 
contacted me immediately upon the receipt of my e-mail with an offer to conduct a 
telephone interview right away. 
The rest of the companies’ agreement to participate in the research project was 
solicited through a lengthy process of multiple follow-up e-mail and telephone 
contact points. These efforts eventually culminated in an overall sample of 29 
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companies with FDI representing both the services and production branches of the 
economy in Ukraine.  
Interviews were conducted with one representative from each company. Thus the 
overall number of interviews was equal to the number of companies participating in 
the study. Participating companies selected their representatives themselves. 
However, the nature of the research questions confined the pool of possible 
interviewees to the top level management category. Thus among the participants 
were CEOs, General and Legal Directors, Public Relations, Government Relations, 
International Relations, and Advertizing department managers (see Table 3.3).  
Table 3.3. Summary of interviewee characteristics 
Characteristic Title Quantity 
Position CEO 
General Director 
Legal Director  
Department Managers: 
- Legal 
- International Relations 
- Public Relations 
- Public & Government Relations 

















Total  29 
 
Semi-structured interviews with open-ended questions were designed to last 
approximately one hour. Factually the time of the interviews varied from 48 to 131 
minutes. The average length of the interviews was 68 minutes (see Table 3.4). Since 
among the interviewees were representatives of host and home as well as third 
country nationalities, interviews were conducted in three languages, subject to the 
choice of the respondent, including 6 interviews in English, 15 in Russian and 8 in 
Ukrainian languages (see Table 3.4). Furthermore, 8 interviews were audio-taped 
with the participants consent whereas the remaining 21 participants only agreed to 
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allow recording the interviews by note-taking (See Table 3.4). Finally, it is also 
necessary to report that out of 29 interviews 7 were administered in person, 6 via 
Skype and 16 over the phone (see Table 3.2). 
Table 3.4. Summary of interview characteristics 























Total  29 
 
3.7.3.3 Sample subgroups identification 
To ensure a better insight into different contexts and expand the researcher’s 
knowledge of these contexts and of their meaning for the understanding of the whole 
phenomenon and of their impact on the shifts in tendencies and changes in 
relationships between various elements of the studied relationships, the researcher 
divided a sample into different subgroups by several characteristics. Accordingly all 
companies are classified by economic sector into two groups: services and 
production. Further these groups are broken down into several subgroups by industry 
type. List of industries is based on the aggregation of two-digit International 
Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) divisions. Thus, the service sector cluster 
consists of trade; banking and financial services; construction; and other services 
(including logistics, engineering, etc.) subgroups. The production sector covers 
agriculture; food beverages and tobacco; light; chemical, and metallurgical industries 
(see Table 3.5). 
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To carry out a comprehensive analysis of the problem in question and identify the 
causes of variations in patterns of companies’ political behavior, it is necessary to 
take into consideration whether the investor’s home state is a developed, developing 
or transition country and companies’ investment decision rationale (see Table 3.6). 
Moreover, in the process of splitting sample into groups it is also essential to account 
for unique combinations of such characteristics as investment decision rationale, 
form of ownership, investor-company status in the global economy (see Table 3.6). 
Table 3.5. Sample classification by industry 
Economic 
sector 






Banking and financial 
services 
Construction 
Other services  










ST1, ST2, ST3, ST4 
SBF1, SBF2, SBF3 






Food , beverages and tobacco 
production 
Light industry 



























Table 3.6. Sample classification by investment decision rationale, home 
country’s level of development, foreign direct investor’s status in the global 
economy and form of ownership 
Characteristic Type Number of 
companies 
Home country level of 
development 
Developed countries 














Form of ownership 1. Wholly owned foreign ventures  
2. Joint ventures 




Foreign Direct Investor’s 
status in the global 
economy 
1 Elite MNCs (with an exclusive status in 
the global economy) 
2. Mid-range profile foreign direct 
investor-company  
3. Low-range profile foreign direct 







Total  29 
 
3.7.3.4 Sampling for auxiliary interviews 
Expert and stakeholder purposive samplings (Given, 2008) were employed to 
identify and recruit participants for the support or auxiliary interviews. Thus, 21 
representatives of such subgroups as state officials, experts, journalists, potential 
foreign investors, domestic companies, including both small and medium sized 
enterprises and large domestic companies, - potential partners of existing foreign 
investors as well as foreign companies – potential investors were selected to increase 
the probability of pinpointing some new issues, discerning new contexts and, as a 




Table 3.7. Summary of characteristics of auxiliary interviews’ participants 
Stakeholder 
category 















































-Small & medium size 
businesses  
































Total  21  
 
3.7.3.5 Pilot interviews 
Piloting is an important part of the research process that ensures the overall 
quality of a research project, particularly for multicultural studies such as the present 
one focusing on very sensitive topics. Pilot interviews serve multiple purposes. 
Firstly, they allow the researcher to test the original interview protocol and his or her 
interviewing techniques in a field environment. As a result, an interviewer obtains 
extremely valuable information for improving his/her research instrument and 
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interview technique. Both the interviewee’s feedback and the interviewer’s own 
reflections help identifying possible shortcoming or omissions in the interview 
protocol. The acquired experience and information allow the researcher to correct 
his/her interview style, technique, structure, and vocabulary, improve time 
management in the course of the interviewing process and, most importantly, to 
disclose sensitive issues of the research project, identify interviewees’ attitudes and 
reactions to such issues and adjust the mode used for the discussion and investigation 
of such issues. 
Two pilot interviews were conducted for this research project in June, 2012. 
Since the multicultural nature of the project required conducting interviews in three 
different languages, including English, Russian or Ukrainian, both pilot interviews 
were conducted in different languages. The first interview was undertaken in 
English. The interviewee was an expert in international business from academia. As 
a result of this interview, several terminological corrections and auxiliary themes 
were added to the research instrument. In terms of terminology, the interviewee 
suggested to avoid using such a strong and alarming term as “political behavior”. 
Accordingly, the latter term was substituted with less sensitive phrases such as 
‘nonmarket strategies and behavior’, ‘your company’s relationships with state 
institutions’ and ‘its impact on changes in institutional environment in Ukraine’. The 
expert also suggested examining, during the course of the interview, such questions 
as the role and impact of pseudo-FDI on the activity of real FDI in Ukraine and on 
their relationships with host state institutions. 
The second interview was conducted in Russian. The interviewee was a director 
of a wholly owned subsidiary of a foreign company in Ukraine. The data obtained in 
the course of this interview were included in the analysis since this interview was 
completed in the format of an official interview followed by a discussion of the 
interviewing procedure. The researcher received the participant’s feedback on the 
quality of her conduct during the interview and on the quality of the instrument, 
including such issues as its content, clarity, presence of ambiguities, drawbacks, and 
participant’s recommendations. As a consequence of this interview, the researcher 
singled out a physical threat to assets, particularly the raiding problem, as one of the 
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most important sources of foreign investor’s growing concern with regard to the 
security of their direct investments in Ukraine.  
Moreover, the reflective account of these pilot interviews allowed the author to 
analyze her qualifications as an interviewer to assess some of her strengths and 
amend some of the weak aspects of her interview conduct. 
3.7.3.6 Researcher’s performance as an interviewer 
The performance of the researcher is one of the most important factors defining 
the quality of the interview process. Even though there are no absolute standards for 
interviewer’s qualifications and no recipe for truly effective questions, the primary 
task of the interviewer, guiding his/her behavior is to maintain the ambience of an 
interesting conversation and the friendly and open atmosphere during the interview 
while steering the course of the interview (Kvale, 1994; Seidman, 1998). 
The natural flow of questions from topic to topic, use of terminology and 
language that are familiar to the respondent, and the ability to capture the 
interviewee’s reaction to some of the  questions and to assess how successfully the 
interview is being conducted while it is underway depend on the interviewer’s 
knowledge of the subject as well as his or her ability to listen, to understand the 
received information, to be sensitive to non-verbal cues such as pauses, body 
language and eye movements, to follow up on what the interviewee says and to keep 
him or her focused (Easterby-Smith et al., 1991; Ghauri et al., 2002; Kvale, 1994; 
Oppenheim, 1992).   
Meeting all the above conditions implies that the interviewer should avoid being 
overly authoritative or leading, so as not to influence the direction the participant’s 
responses will take. The interviewer’s style must combine directness and precision 
and at the same time leave room for the respondent’s freedom during the interview 
(Oppenheim, 1992).  Moreover, the interviewer must ensure that the interviewee 
feels secure enough to discuss his/her experiences or feelings (Kvale, 1994).  
It is also very important for the interviewer to refrain from asking multiple 
questions all at once. The practice of asking several questions at a time considerably 
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increases the complexity of respondent’s task. The necessity to concentrate when 
attempting to memorize several questions simultaneously so as to be able to follow 
the flow of an interview significantly decreases the subject’s ability to produce the 
comprehensive response for any of these questions. It simply puzzles the participant 
and draws his/her attention away from concentrating on being as precise and as 
objective as possible. The interviewee starts feeling discomfort because of his/her 
inability to assess all the information. It also brings into the subject’s consciousness 
the fear of missing some information and the fear of being inadequate in his/her 
answers. This, in turn, induces the danger of misinterpreting the questions 
themselves and misrepresenting the participant’s thoughts on the issue (Seidman, 
1998).   
How can the interviewer meet such a variety of sometimes conflicting 
requirements? How can the interviewer remain detached and professional in his/her 
attitude and yet be connected and friendly? What are the instruments and techniques 
that can help to become a good non-biased interviewer? According to Steinar Kvale 
(1994: 147):  
(T)he interviewer is him or herself a research instrument. A good 
interviewer is an expert in the topic of the interview as well as in human 
interaction. The interviewer must continually make quick choices about what 
to ask and how; which aspects of a subject’s answer to follow up – and which 
not; which answers to interpret – and which not. Interviewers must be 
knowledgeable in the topics investigated, master conversational skills, and be 
proficient in language with an ear for their subject’s linguistic style. The 
interviewer should have a sense for good stories and be able to assist the 
subjects in unfolding of their narratives. 
To guarantee the compliance with all the above discussed requirements and 
qualification criteria which interviewer must meet to ensure the quality of 
interviewing procedure and that an interview reflects the respondent’s ideas and 
feelings in the most objective way or, in other words, to endure the most effective 
and competent interviewing possible the following measures were taken. First, as 
mentioned previously, based on the literature and document review the semi-
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structured interview protocol was developed before the interviews and two pilot 
interviews were conducted. This helped the researcher to increase the degree of 
control over the interview process, refine the interview protocol, and increased 
interviewer’s capability to react to unforeseen directions and developments in the 
conversations (Ghauri et al., 2002).  
Secondly, significant effort was invested into the development of the briefing or 
introduction part of the interview since it is the moment when the interviewer 
establishes the first contact with the participant. The quality of this first contact to a 
great extent determines the level of confidence and trust of the subject in the 
interviewer (Kvale, 1994). At this stage the interviewer is responsible for 
establishing of a trustworthy atmosphere and reassuring the informant about his or 
her concerns regarding the confidentiality of information. Successful completion of 
this task is a necessary - but not sufficient - condition for the further success of the 
interview in general (Kvale, 1994). 
An interview starts with the introduction of the interviewer him/herself and of the 
organization or research unit he/she represents. This is followed by the indication of 
the research topic, the explanation of the purpose of the interview and of the 
implications of this research results for the development of business, changes and/or 
improvement of the business environment and policy making process and procedures 
in a particular context settings.  At this point the interviewer must be as precise, 
open, friendly and trustworthy as possible. It is the first moment of grasping the 
prospective interviewee’s attention and earning his confidence. Moreover, at this 
stage to ensure the trust the researcher must also guarantee the participants that all 
their names, associated companies and responses will be treated with strict 
confidentiality and the respondent’s statements will not be associated with their 
companies, unless otherwise agreed. 
Thirdly, all the questions were open-ended to prevent leading questions and bias 
both during the interviewing and interpreting stages of the research process 
(Easterby-Smith et al., 1991). Both ‘grand-‘ and ‘mini-tour’ questions were 
employed to get more details and ideas about interviewee’s perceptions, concerns 
and expectations (Oppenheim, 1992).  The last but not the least important structural 
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unit of the interview is the conclusion or debriefing. At this point it is important to 
provide the interviewee with a chance to express any of his/her ideas and to ask 
him/her if he/she has any other points to raise (Oppenheim, 1992). 
3.7.3.7 Triangulation 
Triangulation is a very important part of social research, particularly when it has 
a qualitative and/or interdisciplinary nature (Olsen, 2004; Yeasmin & Rahman, 
2012). It is a mechanism contributing to the increase in a probability of attaining 
balanced assessments of research findings and objective answers to research 
questions (Ghauri et al., 2002; Olsen, 2004; Yeasmin & Rahman, 2012). The validity 
of research results is thus enhanced due to the employment of multiple research 
approaches and techniques ensuring the availability of various viewpoints, as 
opposed to the reliance on the results acquired through the use of a single source 
(Olsen, 2004; Jakob, 2001).  
Building on the definition of triangulation and the procedures initiated, developed 
and applied by Campbell & Fiskel (1959) and Web (1966) (Yeasmin & Rahman, 
2012), Denzin (1970, 1978) further advances the concept of triangulation. He 
distinguishes four types of triangulation, including data, investigator, theory and 
methods triangulation (Denzin, 1970; 1978). Here, data triangulation involves the use 
of various sources of data, while investigator triangulation requires participation of 
multiple researchers in the work on a given research topic (Denzin, 1970; 1978). 
Analogously, theory and methods triangulations demand that the study be conducted 
applying multiple theoretical perspectives and methods, respectively (Denzin, 1970; 
1978). It is important to note that the main factor in the employment of particular 
types of triangulation is the researcher’s philosophical stance and approach (Yeasmin 
& Rahman, 2012). 
This study makes use of two types of triangulation. At the overall thesis level, 
method triangulation is applied (see Figure 3.2). Both quantitative and qualitative 
methods are utilized for the analysis of the relationships between FDI and host 
countries’ institutions. In addition, the qualitative part of the project makes use of 
data triangulation to ensure the convergence of various perspectives on the same 
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issue, increase the validity of findings and to minimize the impact of bias and 
subjectivity in judgments expressed by the participants. At this stage interviews were 
conducted not only with representatives of various kinds of companies with FDI but 
also with state officials, experts, journalists, potential foreign investors, and 
representatives of domestic companies, including both small and medium sized 
enterprises and large domestic companies, - potential partners of existing foreign 
investors.  
Further, the data sources triangulation helps to reinforce the reliability and 
objectivity of research findings. So, the research included the analysis of six 
important sources of data. The main source of data, interviews, was complemented 
with the analysis of official, private and state documents. These, in accordance with 
John Scott’s  (1990) classification of the documents, of major interest to the 
researcher, can be identified as follows: official state public documents (e.g., the 
Constitution of Ukraine, legislative and normative acts including investment and tax 
legislation, banking law, and others), private sector public documents (annual 
business reports and accounts of MNEs), consultants’ reports on firms’ activities,
 
and 
international organizations’ public documents (International Monetary Fund, World 
Bank annual investment reports). Moreover, data analysis also relied on public 
sources of information including various publications, such as newspapers, analytical 
magazines, etc. as well as company websites.  
Triangulation of both interviewees and written data sources guaranteed a 
thorough verification and cross-checking of research findings, and contributed to the 
minimization of bias and maximization of objectivity in assessments of the data. As a 
result, this comprehensive analysis produced a more complete and holistic picture of 
the phenomenon within a certain social context (Ghauri et al., 2002).  
3.7.4 Data analysis 
Qualitative research produces large amounts of text or narrative data (Schutt, 
2012; Taylor-Powell & Renner, 2003). The form in which these data are offered 
depends on the choice of particular research methods (Taylor-Powell & Renner, 
2003). Thus, data obtained in cases of individual open-ended interviews can be 
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presented mainly in the form of interviews’ notes, summaries or word-to-word 
transcripts (Taylor-Powell & Renner, 2003).  
This focus on text does not mean that qualitative data analysis is simply a 
descriptive representation of the data obtained in the process of research (Wolcott, 
1994). On the contrary, it is a very systematic (Wolcott, 1994) and, what is even 
more importantly, continuous process which is an integral part of all research stages 
(Erlandson et al., 1993; Folkestad, 2008; Schutt, 2012), including the data collection, 
data reduction, data display, and conclusion drawing and verification phases (Miles 
& Hubermann, 1994).  
Since qualitative data analysis is an iterative process, examining each interview 
at the data collection stage allows reflecting on and, as a result, accounting for and 
examining any newly discovered concepts, ideas, relationships and social contexts of 
events in each consecutive interview (Parlett & Hamilton, 1976; Schutt, 2012). This 
progressive focusing approach ensures the continual refinement of the research focus 
at any point and stage of the study (Parlett & Hamilton, 1976).  
The range of research methods applicable for the analysis of text data is very 
wide (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). A list includes such techniques as grounded theory, 
ethnography, phenomenology, netnography, ethnomethdology, conversation, 
narrative, historical, comparative and content analysis (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005; 
Lillis, 1999; Schutt, 2012). The choice of a particular research method is determined, 
primarily, by the nature of the research questions and goals of a particular research 
project. However, the researcher’s preferences, experiences and skills will also 
doubtlessly play an important role in this process (Schutt, 2012). 
This research applies a combination of directed and conventional approaches to 
content analysis (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005) for the study of various aspects of foreign 
investor – host state relationships in Ukraine, focusing on MNEs’ bargaining power 
and nonmarket, particularly political, behavior. While the directed approach is 
characterized by the use of pre-set initial categories based on the review of available 
theory, the conventional approach avoids such preliminary identification of general 
themes or categories. Here, the latter are identified in the course of the interviewing 
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process (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). So, in the case of the present research only several 
principal categories are predetermined and most categories, as well as subcategories 
and codes, are derived directly from the data as a result of multiple in-depth reviews 
of interviews’ records.  Overall, the process of identifying, distinguishing and 
clarifying all of these categories, subcategories and codes is the most important task 
of qualitative research (Schutt, 2012).  
This stage of a research process is referred to as a data reduction stage. It is a 
necessary step in the data processing and analyzing procedures. Here, all the 
interview materials are critically reviewed for the purposes of identifying important 
fragments of information and facts that further need to be grouped, compared and/or 
summarized according to the objectives of the research project (Folkestad, 2008; 
Miles & Huberman, 1994).  
The extreme complexity of the nature of above procedures requires developing a 
coding manual to guarantee the consistency of coding (Zhang & Wildemath, 2005; 
Weber, 1990). Next all interview extracts are organized by topic and interviewee 
groups into tables or text-matrices and, in some cases, diagrams (Folkestad, 2008). It 
assists significantly in facilitating, managing and improving the quality of analytical 
procedures. Appropriately, the quality of data display eventually influences the 
validity and reliability of analysis (Folestad, 2008; Miles & Huberman, 1994). 
Further, taking into account both the sensitivity of research topic and the 
complexity of coding and categorizing procedures, to ensure the validity and 
reliability of an elaborated system of codes and categories, it is advised to involve 
one or two independent experts who develop their own lists of categories. Then, all 
available lists are compared, and following discussion of the similarities and 
differences, adjustments are introduced to the original list of categories (Burnard, 
1991). In this research, the author obtained the assistance of two colleagues with 
research experience. Certain changes were made in the categories after comparing 
and discussing the three lists of categories. 
As discussed earlier, the data gathered in this research examined at both the 
individual participant and group levels. Moreover, not only was the primary sample 
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divided into three groups (by industry, foreign investors’ status in the world 
economy, and level of development of the foreign investor’s home country) but also 
a cluster of experts representing various spheres related to the work of foreign 
investors in a host country. Therefore, the main challenge of such highly complex 
analysis focusing on the investigation of very sensitive issues is accommodating the 
uniqueness of views of each individual participating unit, different groups and 
collective vision across all foreign investors, their groups and experts (Miles & 
Hubermann, 1994; Silverstein). Contrasting and comparing participants’ views at all 
identified levels of data disaggregation enables the researcher to overcome this 
problem (Noblit & Hare, 1988). 
In the final stage of analysis, conclusions are drawn. This entails assessing all 
previously structured information, making decisions regarding its relevance as well 
as the relevance and importance of various relationships between different concepts, 
and eventually drawing inferences and providing credible explanations about 
meanings derived from this analysis (Schutt, 2012; Miles & Huberman, 1994; Zhang 
& Wildermuth, 2008). Therefore a researcher’s reasoning abilities is a critical factor 
determining the quality of analysis (Zhang & Wildermuth, 2008). Moreover, the 
researcher’s analytical competences gain even more significance due to the fact that 
there are no generally agreed upon solid standards for evaluating and verifying the 
validity, reliability and objectivity of inferences in qualitative analysis (Schutt, 
2012). Miles & Huberman (1994) suggest that all the conclusions need to be verified 
directly in the course of analysis. So, it is advised to assess the credibility of 
informants, recall whether the statements were made spontaneously or consideration 
of a particular issue was provoked by a question, test them against the experts’ 
opinions, ensure that all possible aspects of the social contexts’ influence are 
accounted for by comparing, contrasting and linking patterns in the data at various 
levels of disaggregation, and conduct multiple reviews of both interviews and other 
research material to evaluate the extant of consensus or disagreement among 
researchers within related subject areas (Schutt, 2012; Miles & Huberman, 1994). 
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3.7.5 Research protocol 
The research protocol of the qualitative part of the thesis is designed to address 
the complexity of the studied phenomenon to test and refine a newly proposed ‘blind 
bargaining’ model in the context of one country, Ukraine. The proposed outline of a 
semi-structured interview framework consists of four parts. The first part of the 
questionnaire includes the company profile questions developed to insure that all 
foreign investors’ ownership-specific characteristics are accounted for in the research 
process. As a result, this section contains questions on the investment motivation, 
entrance mode, length of operation, specter of activities, form of ownership, 
company existing and prospective growth plans in Ukraine. 
The second section of the questionnaire is designed to answer the first qualitative 
research question probing whether a blind bargaining model applies to companies 
with FDI in Ukraine and whether and how its relevance vary for different groups of 
companies with FDI. For this purpose the following aspects of foreign investors – 
host state bargaining relationships are examined: comparative assessment of foreign 
investors’ and a recipient state’s bargaining strengths and weaknesses; the role of 
pseudo-FDI  and ‘raiding’ in prompting the changes in real FIs’ bargaining power; 
FIs’ concerns with fluctuations of various country risks reflecting on respective 
changes in institutional environment; the main source of pressure or influence on FIs 
and how conflictive the demands issued by different elements of institutional 
structure are in Ukraine; FIs’ assessment of the problem of merging political, 
economic, and criminal powers in Ukraine and of its impact on their bargaining 
power; the role of FIs’ personal relationships with representative of various state 
offices in increasing their bargaining power; and, finally, overall reliability and 
consistency of institutional arrangements in Ukraine, as well as self-assessment of 
changes in the FIs’ bargaining power throughout the entire period of their operation 
in the country. 
The third section is designed to examine second qualitative research question on 
the relationships between FIs’ ownership characteristics and their specific choices of 
nonmarket strategies and political behavior in Ukraine. This goal is pursued by 
exploring various FIs’ organizational structures applied to manage their political 
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activity in Ukraine; choices of cooperation modes, membership in local and 
international professional and business associations; self-assessment of efficiency of 
individual and collective business effort in applying different political strategies and 
promoting pursued institutional changes; intensity of engagement at different levels 
(local, regional, national) and with various branches of power (regulatory, executive, 
judicial); the spheres and types of recipient country policies of greatest interest for 
foreign investors, host authorities’ interest in and responsiveness to FIs’ expert 
opinions; and,  the stages of policy cycle and channels of FIs’ political involvement 
in Ukraine. 
The forth section of the qualitative research instrument seeks to establish, firstly, 
whether and the level of political activity and pro-activeness vary between different 
groups of companies with FDI, and, secondly, how successful and efficient are 
different types of companies with FDI in their efforts to influence institutional 
changes and what causes the differences. For this purpose FIs’ assess their own and 
overall business efficiency of political involvement in institution-building process in 
Ukraine; debate on the issue of potential liabilities for political ties with groups 
estranged from political power; assess overall quality of iFDI and business 
environment in Ukraine compared to other transition countries; and, finally, reveal 
their plans on both potential changes in their political behavior and, overall, in their 
presence in the country based on their assessment of changes in the quality of 
institutional environment in Ukraine as depicted  within a newly-developed ‘blind 




CHAPTER FOUR: DATA CONTEXT 
4.1 Transition economies 
This section entails a brief description of iFDI distribution patterns in transition 
economies. Discussion of the countries’ major characteristics, including strengths 
and weaknesses as a potential investment destination, helps to justify the choice of 
the sample region as a case for the quantitative research and understand an unequal 
regional distribution if iFDI  in post-Soviet countires. 
4.1.1 Foreign direct investment  
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union the FDI performance of its former 
constituents has been patchy. Table 6.3 lists absolute figures for FDI inflows into 
former USSR countries from 1997 to 2005. Perhaps unsurprisingly, this data 
indicates a massive acceleration of FDI inflows into the Baltic countries in the run-up 
to their EU accession. By contrast, a number of former Soviet states with significant 
levels of industrial development, such as Belarus, Moldova and the Ukraine, either 
have experienced no significant increases in FDI inflows, or have received FDI 
inflows which are disproportionately low given their level of industrial development 
and population size; particularly in comparison with the Baltic states. 
The two oil producing Central Asian countries, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, stand 
out in terms of FDI inflows and FDI growth with FDI figures for recent exceeding all 
other former Soviet states, including the Baltics, with the sole of exception of Russia. 
This contrasts dramatically with the other Central Asian countries, Armenia, 
Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, which have 
experienced negligible FDI inflows. 
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Table 4.1. FDI inflows, mil. USD 
 
Country 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
1. Former USSR Countries 
1. 1. Central & Eastern Europe: 
1. Belarus 352 203 444 119 96 247 172 164 305 
2. Moldova 79 76 38 129 156 132 78 154 225 
3. Russia 4865 2761 3309 2714 2469 3461 7958 15444 14600 
4. Ukraine 623 743 496 595 792 693 1424 1715 7808e 
1.2. Central Asia: 
5. Armenia 52 221 122 104 70 144 157 217 220 
6. Azerbaijan 1115 1023 510 129 227 1392 3285 3556 1680 
7. Georgia 243 265 82 131 110 165 340 499 450 
8. Kazakhstan 1321 1152 1472 1283 2823 2590 2092 4113 1738 
9. Kyrgyzstan 84 109 44 -2 5 5 46 175 47 
10. Tajikistan 18 25 21 22 9 36 14 272 54 
11.Turkmenistn 108 62 89 131 150 100 100e -15e 62e 
12. Uzbekistan 167 140 121 73 570 65 70e 1e 45e 
1.3. Baltic Countries/ New EU Countries: 
13. Estonia 267 581 305 387 542 284 919 1049 2853 
14. Latvia 521 357 347 410 164 254 292 699 632 
15. Lithuania 355 926 486 379 446 732 179 773 1009 
 
While it is obvious that in absolute figures, as well as in per capita terms, 
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, vastly outperformed other former Soviet states, it is 
important to note that even these countries have experienced dramatic fluctuations in 
terms of the amounts of FDI they have received during this period. This pronounced 
instability of year-by-year FDI inflows is depicted in Figure 6.4, in which recent 
figures for Russia and Ukraine have been excluded in order to provide a more 
readable scaling of the trend lines. Apparently, in as far as there has been substantial 
investment in former Soviet states, this has centered on a very limited number of 
countries, who themselves could not rely on stable and regular inflows of foreign 
capital. 
Although there is a long history of complaints among potential foreign investors 
about the vagueness of government attitudes to foreign investment, the existing 
differences in FDI inflows can only be insufficiently explained by the attitudes and 
actions of these post-Soviet states. Rather, the unequal regional distribution of FDI in 
the post-soviet territories appears to be primarily determined by the presence, or 
absence, of natural resources. 
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Hitherto, natural resource and food industries have been the most attractive 
targets for foreign investment. In Russia, the fuel and food sectors lead in terms of 
share of total FDI inflows with 23% and 28%, respectively. They are followed by 
trade, transport and telecommunication. The machinery, timber and other sectors, 
meanwhile, have hardly received any investment at all. 



















Large scale investments in the oil and gas sectors have included about 50 joint 
ventures and involved American, British, French, German, Canadian, Japanese and 
other companies. The scale of projects in the food sector is significant as well with 
foreign companies showing an interest in pastries and meat industries as well as the 
production of non-alcohol drinks, beer and tobacco (Yacheistova, 2001). 
As an example of an industrialized state which has attracted only limited amounts 
of FDI, Ukraine had attracted less than 6 billion dollars in FDI by 2004, which 
comprised only about a seventh of the officially estimated 40 billion dollars required 
for restructuring its economy. A detailed analysis of FDI flows indicates that these 
were quite small and often used inefficiently. For example, foreign investment 
inflows in Ukraine during the first half of the year 2001 were 12.4% less than the 
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amount of FDI inflows during the corresponding period of the year 2000. As in 
Russia, foreign investors targeted the Ukrainian food and agricultural processing 
industry. The FDI share into this sector comprised 19.8% of the total investment 
inflows. Wholesale and sale mediation attracted 13.9% of investment. Investment 
into machine-building industry, finance sectors and transport were equal to 8.2%, 
7.9% and 6.8% of total investment inflows, respectively (State Statistics Committee 
of Ukraine, 2002). 
In Azerbaijan the largest share of FDI was received by the country’s main 
industry – oil. The high level of investment in this area, however, has hardly 
benefited other sectors. For instance, amidst complaints about corruption and unfair 
practices by officials, as well as declining traffic volumes, several international 
airlines have abandoned their operations in the country. Specifically, during the 
period of 1999-2000, six different companies, Austrian airlines, Pakistan Air, British 
Airways, KLM, Lufthansa and Emirates have ceased operations in Baku’s Bina 
International Airport (WMRC, 2004a). 
In Kazakhstan, which, by 2004 had received seventeen billion dollars in FDI 
since independence, there is evidence that foreign investment had a de-stabilizing 
effect on the local economy, which has led to increased frictions between the states 
and foreign investors. Thus, a number of high profile international investors, such as 
TengizChevroil, Canada’s Hurricane Hydrocarbons Ltd and the Carachaganak 
Petroleum Operating Company, have faced Environment Ministry accusations of 
opaque sales and environmental breaches. Moreover, a newly enacted Investment 
Law, approved in 2003, stipulates that new contracts negotiated with foreign 
companies will no longer contain a “grandfather clause” that shield the company 
from regulatory and tax changes. The law also prevents companies from resorting to 
international arbitration if the Kazakh government forbids this. Furthermore, the law 
eliminates preferences for foreign investors with a view towards “creating a level 
playing field between domestic and foreign companies” (WMRC, 2004b). 
Both Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, meanwhile, appear to suffer from a rise of 
governmental authoritarianism and are even showing ‘dynastic’ tendencies. In 
October, 2003, for instance, for the first time, the rule of a post-Soviet state was 
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passed from father to son as a result of Azerbaijan’s presidential elections. In 
Kazakhstan, President Nursultan Nazarbayev’s eldest daughter, the country’s biggest 
media baron, is creating a new political party and is believed to be groomed for the 
succession of her father. These, and many other events, such as discussed below 
relationships between iFDI, corruption, and political instability in post-Soviet 
countries, are indicative of the potentially adverse effects of the newly found foreign-
sponsored wealth. 
4.1.2 Foreign investment, corruption, and political instability 
Today, any evidence regarding the link between foreign investment and increases 
in corruption and political instability remains largely anecdotal. Nevertheless, as far 
as former Soviet states other than the Baltics are concerned it is difficult to find 
instances in which foreign investment appears to have had a positive impact on the 
recipient countries political institutions. Put simply, FDI inflows have increased in a 
number of former Soviet states, and where this has been the case, so typically has 
corruption. 
Figures 6.5 to 6.7 depict scatterplots of the Corruption Perception Index rank and 
FDI inflows for the period from 1999 to 2005 (Transparency International, 2006). 
The Corruption Perception Index is collected by the international voluntary 
association Transparency International and ranks countries according to a number of 
criteria, including bond ratings, as those which are internationally perceived as most 
or least corrupt. 
As concerns the scatterplot for Russia, it can be noted that the country 
experienced a small decline in its corruption ranking alongside a decline in FDI. This 
situation, however, changed from 2002, when a massive increase in FDI inflows was 
accompanied by a modest increase in the country’s corruption rank. Between 2004 
and 2005, lastly, a small decline in FDI inflows occurred which was accompanied by 
a pronounced increase in the country’s corruption perception ranking. 
This pattern is closely mirrored by the scatterplot for Azerbaijan. Here too an 
initial decrease in FDI was accompanied by a decline in the country’s corruption 
ranking. From 2001 onwards, however, Azerbaijan experienced both a massive 
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increase in FDI inflows and in its corruption ranking. This situation changed only 
between 2004 and 2005, when the annual FDI more than halved and the country’s 





The scatterplot for Kazakhstan deviates from the previous two patterns in several 
minor respects. Initially, Kazakhstan’s corruption ranking decreased alongside a 
decline in FDI. From 2000 to 2001, both FDI inflows and the country’s corruption 
rank increased. This was followed by a period from 2001 to 2003, when FDI inflows 
decrease while the corruption rank continues to increase. Between 2003 and 2004 a 
massive increase in FDI inflows took place which was again accompanied by an 





The period from 2004 to 2005, lastly, saw a decrease in FDI alongside a continuing 
increase in the corruption index, this time to 107
th
. 
Figure 4.2. Russia: Scatterplot of Corruption Perception Index rank and 





Figure 4.3. Azerbaijan: Scatterplot of Corruption Perception Index rank and 
FDI inflows, 1999-2005 
 
Figure 4.4. Kazakhstan: Scatterplot of Corruption Perception Index rank 




Taken together these brief analyses of the iFDI in transition countries, and its 
links with corruption and political stability in post-Soviet states lend limited support 
to the hypothesis that increased inflows in FDI are likely to be linked to increases in 
corruption and possibly political instability in the recipient country. Needless to say, 
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the simultaneous occurrence of increased FDI inflows together with increased 
corruption, if this is indeed measured by this index, does not in itself imply causality. 
What it does suggest, however, is that FDI has not had, as previously often assumed, 
a corruption-reducing effect on post-Soviet recipient states. Such implications 
provide essential grounds for calling researchers to study the relationships between 
iFDI and institutional environment in recipient transition states. 
4.2 Ukraine 
This section entails a brief description of Ukrainian geopolitics and economy. 
Discussion of the country’s major strengths and weaknesses as a potential investment 
destination helps to understand and justify the choice of Ukraine as a case for the 
qualitative research. 
4.2.1 Geopolitics and economy in Ukraine 
The Ukrainian geopolitical position and economy present several interesting 
features as far as its status both as iFDI host and as a trading partner is concerned.  It 
is physically the second largest country in Europe with a very attractive and 
strategically important geographic position in terms of its access to neighboring 
markets. Ukraine is a critical buffering zone both for the Russian Federation and for 
the West in both political and economic terms. However, the country’s development 
as a sovereign nation since 1991 has been dogged by difficulties, as internal 
dissension has made it impossible to develop a consensus about its geopolitical 
orientation and its place in the global economy, specifically the question of whether 
it should be aligned with Russia or the European Union (Friedman, 2010). 
Ukraine’s economic development potential is illustrated by the following facts: 
As a market, Ukraine has a relatively large, albeit declining, population of 45.7 
million (BMI, 2009). Half of its population is economically active, and the country 
benefits from a well-educated, skilled and low-cost labor force with a 99.7% literacy 
rate (BMI, 2009; PRS Group, 2008). About 70% of Ukrainians hold a secondary or 
higher education diploma and the country’s 80 research institutes employ about 
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70,000 scholars which may give it potential advantages in terms of scientific and 
technological development (PRS Group, 2008).  
In the area of natural resources, the Ukraine is said to possess 25% of the world’s 
black soil and, as a result, has the capacity to produce large both high quality and 
quantities of crops such as grains, roots and flax (PRS Group, 2008).  The country 
also has substantial reserves of oil, gas, coal and iron ore, although it faces 
competition in these areas in terms of the resource endowments of neighboring 
countries (PRS Group, 2008). 
However, the country has not been able to capitalize on this potential. Due to 
relatively slow pace of economic development, many well-educated Ukrainians are 
earning relatively low incomes (PRS Group, 2008). Moreover, the education levels 
and the health of labor force have been deteriorating drastically in recent years due to 
low levels of expenditures on education, lack of specialized training facilities and 
programs, and the emigration of highly skilled professionals (Chobanyan & Leigh, 
2006) as well as the lack of funding for health care services (PRS Group, 2008). 
International observers have also suggested that the Ukraine is poorly endowed in 
terms of capital resources and infrastructure.  Specifically levels of savings have 
remained low, and the country does not appear to have access to sufficient domestic 
capital to support the investment needs of domestic industries and infrastructure 
(PRS Group, 2008).  Foreign investors, though often interested in accessing potential 
Ukrainian markets, appear to have been discouraged by political uncertainty; a lack 
of transparency of regulatory systems; limited confidence in the court system which 
is related to a poorly developed rule of law; corruption; selective enforcement of tax 
policy; over-regulation and excessive government interference; and an 
underdeveloped infrastructure (PRS Group, 2008). Taken together these factors 
appear to have contributed to investment patterns which center on opportunistic 
resource- and market-seeking, lower-quality iFDI.   
Notwithstanding these problems, there is some potential for a future growth of 
demand which rests both on the size of Ukrainian market itself and its close 
proximity to the large markets of Russia and the EU.  Although some market 
segments in the Ukraine are still very immature, brand consciousness among 
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Ukrainian consumers appears to have been increasing (BMI, 2009). Against this 
stands the fact that Ukrainian disposable household income remains low, while trade 
barriers erected by the US and EU to protect their industrial metal and agricultural 
industries continue to adversely affect the Ukrainian economy (BMI, 2010).   
As concerns the internal structure of Ukrainian industry it is notable that 
competition is weak in several areas, while firms often lack access to supporting 
industries. Apart from a lack of strategic outlook, some Ukrainian industries have 
been held back by a combination of a lack of investment in enterprise restructuring 
and technological upgrading, a neglect of research and development capacities, 
inefficient corporate governance and management systems, distorted competition, 
and corruption. All of these elements appear to have been aggravated by the 
vulnerability of the Ukrainian economy to external shock, as has been exemplified in 
2009 by a 14.8% (Global Finance, 2011) or 15.1% drop in GDP (according to 
UNCTAD, 2011).    
In terms of Porter’s diamond model (1990a; 1990b), the Ukrainian economy can, 
by and large, be categorized as being in a factor-driven stage of national competitive 
development path, when it is typically assumed that a government has the greatest 
direct impact on economic  development.  Accordingly, it has been argued that 
government policy should focus on the “need to upgrade basic factors and to create 
advanced factors, particularly through upgrading the country’s infrastructure, 
educational system and the development of technological base, which includes the 
acquisition of contemporary technologies and/or licenses. It has also been argued that 
the government should play an active role in creating developing industrial and 
export clusters, as well as in generating and maintaining domestic rivalry and 
efficient corporate governance” (Chobanyan & Leigh, 2006: 158).   
Sadly, government economic policy in the Ukraine during the past decade 
appears to have been largely politically motivated. Thus several parliamentary 
factions seem to have concentrated on strengthening their own control and influence 
which seems to have undermined the country’s overall policy-making capabilities 
(BMI, 2009).   These developments, in turn have adversely affected the Ukraine’s 
potential as an export-platform iFDI destination, and may have resulted in an overall 
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economic performance which is far below the country’s potential in terms of iFDI 
quality and volume as well as export capacity.   
4.2.2 Structure of inward foreign direct investment in Ukraine  
A surge in the share of iFDI in GDP by 6.4 percentage points took place 
between 2004 and 2005 - a period marked by such key political event as the Orange 
Revolution. These changes had been preceded by a slow increase in the share of iFDI 
from 0.25% in 1992 to 2.6% in 2004 and was consecutively followed by a substantial 
reduction from 9.1% in 2005 to 4.8% in 2009 (see Figure 4.5). Moreover, the share 
of merchandise iFDI stock in the total iFDI stock in Ukraine fell from 55.1% in 2000 
to 22.8% in 2007, signifying the growing importance of the service sector. 
Particularly, iFDI in the financial, trading, real estate and construction sectors 
accounted for 16.3%, 10.4%, 8.7% and 5.5% of total iFDI stock in 2007, 
respectively.  
The principal source country for iFDI in the named above four service industries 
in 2007 was Cyprus and the main target of its iFDI in Ukraine was finances, 
absorbing 25.9% of total iFDI in the service sector. The next largest investment 
destination was real estate, followed by trading and construction economic activities 
with 45.3%, 20.3% and 28.9% of total iFDI in these sectors in 2007, respectively. 
The runners up for the financial sector were France investing 13.8%, followed by the 
Netherlands – 7.2%, Poland – 6.8%, Russia – 6.1%, UK – 4.1%, Sweden – 3.5%, 
Hungary – 3.5%, USA – 2.9% and Luxembourg – providing 2.3% of total iFDI stock 
in this sector in 2007. In the trading sector the biggest investors were British Virgin 
Islands, UK, the Netherlands, USA, Germany and Russia contributing 12.7%, 11.5%, 
9.4%, 9.2%, 4.4% and 3.5% of total iFDI in this sector in 2007, respectively. The 
second largest investor into the real estate sector of the Ukraine is the UK supplying 
11.2% of total iFDI in this sector preceding 8.3%, 5.5%, 5.4% of the British Virgin 
Islands, USA and Russia, respectively. The construction sector was characterized by 
high levels of investment concentration. The total share of the four largest investors 
here equaled to 80.6% of total iFDI stocks 2007. However, in this case Cyprus lost 
the first place to the Netherlands by accounting for 36.4% but still came ahead of the 
UK (8.3%) and Russia (7%) in 2007.  
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The leader in merchandise iFDI stocks and exports was metallurgy and the 
production of finished metal products (see Figures 4.6 and 4.7). The stocks of iFDI in 
this industry grew by 1010% from $166.9 mln. in 2000 to $1685.6 mln. in 2007, 
while exports increased by 639.1% during the period 1995-2008; but fell by 159.5% 
by 2010 as a result of world economic crisis and tightening protectionist measures 
introduced by the US and EU. Thus, the larger share of the increase in both iFDI and 
exports in this industry occurred during the 2004-2008 period.  
Figure 4.5. Structure of merchandise iFDI stock in Ukraine in 2000-2007, US $ 
mln 
 
Source: State Statistics Committee of Ukraine (2008). 
 
The next largest recipients of investment are i) the food, beverages and tobacco 
production and ii) the engineering industry (including production of machinery, 
electric, electronic and optical equipment, transport vehicles and equipment).  These 
sectors experienced a steady and consistent growth in iFDI stocks from $795.7mln. 
and $302.6 mln. in 2000 to $1564 mln. and $1049.6 mln. in 2007, respectively. 
Meanwhile the exports increased, though with less consistency by 425.6% and 
558.7% during the 1995-2008 period, respectively.  
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Source: UNCTAD (2011). 
 
Cyprus tops the list of investors in extractive industry holding 60% of total iFDI 
stock in this sector in 2007, and comes second in metallurgy, third in food and 
production of other non-metallic products and forth in chemical and petrochemical 
industry with shares of 27.1%, 12.9%, 23% and 10.9%, respectively. Sweden, the 
Netherlands and Switzerland control 36.9% out of remaining 40% of total iFDI stock 
in the extractive sector; which suggests a high degree of investment concentration by 
home countries in this sector. Germany comes ahead of Cyprus in metallurgic 
industries with a share of 43.3%. Further, Poland and British Virgin Islands 
contributed 3.5% and 2.6% of total iFDI stock in this sector in 2007. IFDI in the 
food, beverages and tobacco industry is led by the Netherlands with 28.3%, while the 
USA, UK and Sweden account for equal shares of 9% each. IFDI in chemical and 
petrochemical industries are also dominated by a relatively small group of home 
countries, including Germany, USA, Netherlands and Cyprus who together hold 
65.6% of total iFDI stocks in this sector.  The engineering sector is the most 
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diversified one in terms of home countries’ representativeness. Here, the UK, 
Republic of Korea and USA supply 18.7%, 14.3% and 7.6% of total iFDI stock in 
2007 while Switzerland, Italy, Hungary, British Virgin Islands and Canada together 
accommodate another 26.8% of iFDI stocks in this sector.  




Source: UNCTAD (2011). 
 
4.2.3 Institutional environment in Ukraine 
Why, in spite of its great potential (as described in Section 4.2.1) for securing 
success on the path of socio-economic development, has Ukraine failed to achieve 
sustainable economic growth and create a stable efficient political and social 
environment? Experts agree that one of the major reasons of Ukraine’s failure is its 
weak low-quality market-unfriendly institutional base (EBRD, 2009; Jakubow, 2009; 
Tiffin, 2006; van Zon, 2001; Wise & Brown, 1998). The next logical question to ask 
is: “what are the main causes and determinants of the evolvement of such negative 
institutional environment in Ukraine?” 
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The social conflict view on institutional differences in combination with 
neopatrimonialism concept provides the best theoretical framework for explaining 
the evolution of the institutional environment in Ukraine and for the analysis of 
relationships between these institutions and MNCs. In line with this view van Zon 
(2001) avers that the current state of institutional arrangements in Ukraine is 
conditioned by the development of a predatory neo-patrimonial state characterized 
by “the specific model of interaction between state and society blocking social and 
economic development of this state” (van Zon, 2001: 72). The ascent of such a state 
is determined by the legacies of the past (including a preference for one man rule, 
plural elite governance and bureaucratic administrative control) and by the 
combination of dominant belief systems and social practices (van Zon, 2001), which 
were radically challenged as a result of institutional upheaval caused by the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union and the transition from central-planning to the market 
economy (Roth & Kostova, 2003, Tiffin, 2006). 
The emerged institutional vacuum was not filled out efficiently. “No polity has 
been created that is a reflection of society and that could adapt political structures to 
changing social needs, creating preconditions for evolutionary institutional change” 
(van Zon, 2001: 75). Instead, “a grab-and-run process took place in which ruling 
clans appropriated the state and the wealth of the nation” (van Zon, 2001:75). 
Moreover, van Zon (2001) argues that this state, through its practices undermining its 
own infrastructure and governance instruments, can be defined as self destructive. 
Some of the main characteristics of Ukraine in this regard are the following: lack of 
transparency of the state apparatus, political and bureaucratic power used for private 
enrichment rather than for public good, diffusion of power, lack of transparency and 
consistency in the system of laws (laws and decrees are often ill-defined and 
contradictory), weak property rights, underdeveloped and inefficient enforcement 
mechanisms, almost non-existent contract enforcement, dominance of personal 
interests in the decision-making process, corruption, blurred distinction between the 
political and civil service aspects of government administration, overlapping 
competencies within the state apparatus, high discretionary power of bureaucracy, 
lack of trust in the society, lack of accountability (lack of horizontal differentiation 
and concomitant delineation of responsibilities), and corruption (Van Zon, 2001).  
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Collective action potential is very low in Ukraine. As a result, the state is 
governed by the most economically and politically powerful clans choosing sets of 
institutions which are going to contribute to the increase of both their de jure and de 
facto political power regardless of their effect on the general welfare of the nation. 
As mentioned above (in section 3.1), it is a very hard task to assess and measure 
the quality of institutions in a country. One of the most widely available and popular 
instruments evaluating the institutional quality is the World Bank’s indicators 
measuring six dimensions of governance. According to these indicators, quality of 
the institutional environment in Ukraine is very low and, in some cases, even 
deteriorating over time (see Table 3.1). The worst performing Ukrainian indicator is 
‘control of corruption’ (measuring the extent to which public power is exercised for 
private gains and ‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests) with its lowest 
level reaching -1.15 in 1998 and, after a period of improvement lasting until 2005, 
deteriorating to a -0.72 level by 2008. Slightly better - though still persistently poor - 
performance can be observed in case of a ‘rule of law’ indicator. Here, the quality of 
contract enforcement, courts and police improves from -1.01 in 2000 to -0.62 in 
2008.  Government effectiveness, estimating the quality of public and private 
services and their independence from political pressures, as well as the quality of 
policy formulation and implementation and the credibility of the government’s 
commitment to these policies, improved very insignificantly from -0.72 in 1998 to -
0.6 in 2008. Regulatory quality, measuring government’s ability to formulate, 
implement and regulate  private sector development policies, raises from -0.82 in 
1998 to -0.39 in 2008. It is noteworthy that all four of the aforementioned indicators 
reached their best values in 2005, in the year after the Orange Revolution, but were 
unable to maintain this positive trend and deteriorated between 2006 and 2008 
(Kauffman, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2006).   
This downturn in governance indicators, accompanied by the fall of real GDP 
growth from 12.1% in 2004 to 2.7% in 2005 and to 2.4% in 2008 after its recovery to 
7.3% and 7.9% in 2006 and 2007 respectively (PRS, 2008; EIU, 2009), shows that, 
in spite of certain improvements in the institutional environment, Ukraine still was 
not able to create conditions for sustainable economic growth.  
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Moreover, recently some tendencies in reversing the achieved progress were 
noticed. For example, the National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) introduced foreign 
exchange controls in response to tensions in the currency market (EBRD, 2009: 240). 
Elimination of free enterprise zones without accounting for the interests of true cases 
of foreign direct investment was a clear case of contract-enforcement failure in the 
country and contributed to the downgrading of its investment climate (Davis, 2005).  
The property rights regime, the most important economic institution and one of the 
most important determinants of economic growth, is still perceived to be very weak 
in Ukraine. Joint-stock company law, establishing property rights and rights of 
minority shareholders, was approved only in April 2009, almost 18 years after the 
declaration of Ukrainian independence (EBRD, 2009: 240). Competition and 
bankruptcy laws lack effective implementation while the economic and civil codes 
require revisions due to multiple inconsistencies. Reform of the court system is still 
on the emergency agenda of Ukraine; the lack of independent, impartial and efficient 





Table 4.2. Governance indicators, Ukraine 
Governance 
indicators 
(-2.5 to +2.5) 
1996 1998 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Control of 
corruption  
-1.032 -1.155 -1.072 -1.022 -0.855 -0.890 -0.687 -0.679 -0.741 -0.788 -1.007 -0.975 -0.996 -1.028 
Government 
effectiveness  
-0.706 -0.917 -0.749 -0.658 -0.582 -0.538 -0.584 -0.543 -0.666 -0.708 -0.796 -0.747 -0.807 -0.583 
Political 
stability 
-0.267 -0.248 -0.504 -0.381 -0.397 -0.484 -0.274 -0.033 -0.150 0.032 -0.311 -0.024 -0.079 -0.099 
Regulatory 
quality 
-0.316 -.742 -0.523 -0.587 -0.562 -0.391 -0.497 -0.509 -0.429 -0.519 -0.571 -0.516 -0.606 -0.611 
Voice and 
accountability 
-0.499 -0.284 -0.655 -0.549 -0.581 -0.605 -0.206 -0.032 -0.035 0.061 -0.03 -0.1 -0.131 -0.288 
Rule of law -0.935 -1.115 -1.142 -0.866 -0.842 -0.753 -0.790 -0.811 -0.744 -0.693 -0.774 -0.813 -0.828 -0.795 
Source: World Bank. Available at www.worldbank.org 
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Dominant belief systems and social practices also prove to be very important 
determinants of the institutional environment and quality in transitional Ukraine. Van 
Zon (2001) develops and compares general Western and Ukrainian models 
characterizing the functioning of the states, economies and societies in accordance 
with their dominant belief systems (see Table 3.2). The comparison of the elements 
of these two models attests to the validity of the assumption that the country’s failure 
to provide foundations for the sustainable economic growth is primarily determined 
by weak low-quality market-unfriendly institutional base.  
This overview of the institutional environment in Ukraine provides evidence that 
the development of the predatory state, in which choices of the sets of institutions 
belong to the elites possessing political power and in which belief systems and social 
practices are characterized by “disdain for the public good, general passivity and lack 
of initiative, lack of trust, widespread cheating and lack of accountability and 
transparency” (van Zon 2001: 91), resulted in the evolution of a very weak low-
quality market-unfriendly institutional environment. Therefore it is argued that an 
achievement of sustainable economic growth will require not only deep structural 
and institutional reforms but also changing of the belief systems and social practices 
in Ukraine.  
4.2.4 Summary 
The review of geopolitics, economics and institutional environment in Ukraine 
demonstrates that this country presents one of the most illustrative cases of neo-
patrimonial transition states. In spite of its great potential for securing success on the 
path of socio-economic development, Ukraine has failed to achieve sustainable 
economic growth and create a stable and attractive operational environment for 
foreign investors. Thus, the analysis of the main causes and determinants of the 
evolvement of such negative institutional environment in the context of this country 
and its relationships with companies with FDI will be a very important contribution 
to the overall understating of iFDI quality and patterns of foreign investors’ political 
behavior in neo-patrimonial transition countries. 
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Table 4.3. State, Economy and Society: Western and Ukrainian Models 
 Western Model Ukrainian Model 
Economy and 
politics 
Clear distinction between spheres 
of economy and politics. Sphere of 
economy has relative autonomy. 
No distinction between spheres 
of economy and politics. 
Law of value Law of value should be driving 
force in economy (economic 
rationality). 
Law of value rejected. Primacy 
of political rationality over 
economic rationality. 
Administrative decisions should 
govern the economy. 




the issue of 
accountability 
Horizontal differentiation within 
and between organizations, clear 
demarcation of competencies. 
Contractual obligations are 
important. 
 
Hiatus between rules and decisions 
(procedural rationality). 
Opaque borders between and 
within organizations. 
Wheeling and dealing. 
Economic transactions are 
based on personal trust. 
No accountability. 
No hiatus between rules and 
decisions. 
Enterprises The function of an enterprise is 
profit maximization. 
 
Enterprise headed by 
manager/entrepreneur. Networking 
in and between enterprises 
important, social engineering 
through sophisticated management 
methods.  
The function of an enterprise is 
to maximize output and to 
guarantee employment. 
Enterprise headed by 
‘khozyain’ (boss). 
Top-down hierarchical 
management methods.  
Role of state State as facilitator, provider of 
basic public goods such as 
education.  
Soft governance mechanisms are 
important. 
State rules over citizens, with 
mutual rights and obligations. 
State has a role to play in the 
organization of production. 
Where enterprises fail, the state 
should intervene. 
Rule by decree. 




Economic rationality, analytical 
approach, transparency. 
 
Economic calculation is possible. 
Methodical rational acquisition. 
Political rationality. Lack of 
transparency. Economic 
problems ignored.  
Economic calculation very 
difficult. Often, external factors 
blamed for economic problems. 
Aversion against ‘book-
keeper’s mentality’. 
Source: Adopted from van Zon (2001: 84). 
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CHPATER FIVE: FINDINGS FOR QUANTITATIVE STUDY 1: ‘BLIND 
BARGAINING’ AND THE QUALITY OF FOREIGN DIRECT 
INVESTMENT IN POST-SOVIET, CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEN 
COUNTRIES 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the results for an explanatory statistical national data analysis 
that introduces a new ‘blind bargaining’ model and tests it for a sample of 27 Central 
and Eastern European and post-Soviet states (including Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Belarus, 
Moldova, Russia, Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) and several smaller groups set apart from 
the above sample for a five year period between 1998 and 2002. The study provides 
support the hypothesis that the presence of ‘blind bargaining’ in neo-patrimonial 
post-Soviet states results in attracting riskier lower quality iFDI. 
5.2. An empirical analysis 
The analysis was performed applying Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Least 
Squares Dummy Variables (LSDV) and the General Least Squares Error (GLSE) 
models. Of these models, the LSDV model can be considered the most reliable since 
the OLS model is likely to produce overinflated t values on account of serial 
correlation, and the GLSE is likely to underestimate the significance of coefficient 
(Stimson, 1985). 
Column 1 of Table 5.1 lists standardized slope coefficients (with t-value) and 
column 2 the coefficient of determination (R
2
) for the bivariate regressions 
(Unrestricted OLS) of ‘FDI as percent of GDP’ with a series of independent 
variables. Taking into account problems of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, 
significant slope coefficients and substantial coefficients of variation can be detected 
for all of the country risk indicators, in particular, for ‘Overall Country Risk’, 
‘Political Risk’, ‘Economic Risk’, ‘Legal Risk’, ‘Tax Risk’, and ‘Operational Risk’, 
all of which are negatively related to FDI (i. e., the greater these risks the lower is 
relative FDI). Significant slope coefficients (at the 0.10 significance level) can be 
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also detected for ‘Inflation’, which regresses negatively with FDI, and ‘Export per 
Capita’, which regresses positively with FDI. The variable ‘Trade Balance’ also 
produces a significant coefficient which, interestingly, indicates a negative 
relationship between a balance of trade and FDI, as well as ‘Debt per Capita’ does. 
Next, the dependent variable ‘FDI as percent of GDP’ is subjected to a 
multivariate OLS regression, which includes a number of independent variables that 
were selected on the basis of their conceptual relevancy and a desire to avoid 
multicollinearity in the model. Using such constant coefficients (or pooled 
regression) model with panel data has a number of statistical drawbacks. However, 
following Stimson (1985), this model can be used as a computational basis for more 
efficient models such as the General Least Squares Errors (GLSE) model.  Column 3 
of Table 5.1 again lists standardized coefficients (with t values) and the overall 
coefficient of determination (R
2
) for this OLS model. This model yields significant 
negative slopes for the variables ‘Economic Risk’ and ‘GDP per Capita’. Significant 
positive coefficients can be detected for ‘Economic Risk’ (albeit only at the 0.10 
level of significance) and for ‘Export per Capita’ and ‘Unemployment’ (see Column 
3, Table 5.1). Given the limited significance of these variables, the model yields a 
relatively large coefficient of determination with 25.8%. This is likely to be a 
reflection of a violation of statistical assumptions, which arise from the use of panel 
data. 
Next, the same data are subjected to a Fixed Effects (or Least Squares Dummy 
Variable (LSDV)) model. In terms of significance of coefficients, this LSDV 
estimation produces much weaker results than the previous OLS models. Thus, 
significant coefficients can only be detected for ‘GDP per Capita’ which again yields 
a negative coefficient and ‘Export per Capita’, which yields a positive coefficient 
(see Column 4, Table 5.1). Despite this, the LSDV model produces a relatively high 
coefficient of determination with 58.6% of total variation being explained by the 
model. 
Following Stimson (1985), information from the OLS and LSDV models can 
be used to estimate an error parameter which is then used to calculate the much more 
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reliable GLSE model3. Overall, the results of the GLSE model closely mirror the 
results of the LSDV model. Thus, a significant negative relationship can be detected 
for ‘Economic Risk’ and ‘GDP per Capita’, while ‘Export per Capita’ yields a 
positive coefficient (see Column 5, Table 5.1). Explaining 21.3% of the variation, the 
coefficient of determination indicates that the model fits all country samples 
reasonably well, with the possibility of significant heterogeneity existing between 
different groups of countries. 
Table 5.1. Regression models for a sample of 27 countries, 1998-2002 
Dependent Variable: FDI as percent of GDP 
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   0.258 0.586 0.213 
T values are listed in parentheses. 
Unadjusted and adjusted Coefficients of Determination (R
2
) are listed next to slope parameter or at 
bottom of column respectively. 
Source of data: Global Insight. 
                                                          
3
 Stimson (1985) notes that his error components model performs well for “short (in time) and fat (in 





The analysis based on the GLSE model is then repeated for different subgroups 
of countries (see Table 5.2). The first subgroup includes 10 EU Accession countries 
only (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia). Again, the model yields significant negative 
coefficients for ‘Economic Risk’ and ‘GDP per Capita’ and a significant positive 
coefficient for ‘Export per Capita’ (see Column 1, Table 5.2). This indicates that, 
while economic risk does negatively influence investment inflows, foreign investors 
are not keen to target richer, and presumably politically more assertive accession 
states. Analysis of ex-Soviet republics (excluding the Baltics) produces a slightly 
different pattern of relations. Here only the ‘Economic Risk’ variable gives a 
significant, and again, negative slope (see Column 2, Table 5.2). Another potentially 
significant relationship exists with ‘Trade Balance’ which is also negatively 
correlated with FDI. 
For the European ex-Soviet republics (excluding Baltic States): Belarus, 
Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine, the same GLSE model yields an impressive 
coefficient of determination of 46.2%. This, however, is not reflected in terms of 
significant coefficients. Thus, potentially significant coefficients can only be detected 
for ‘Debt per Capita’, which yields a positive slope and ‘Unemployment’, which 
yield a negative slope. The former coefficient is indicative of the assumption on the 
predominance of ‘malign FDI’ inflows to these countries, which is debt increasing 
but not necessarily employment reducing (see Column 3, Table 5.2). 
Lastly, the GLSE model is applied to the subgroup of ex-Soviet Central Asian 
republics. It produces significant negative coefficients for ‘Economic risk’ and 
‘Trade balance’ and a significant positive coefficient for ‘Export per Capita’ (see 
Column 4, Table 5.2). 
Taken together, these subgroup analyses suggest that the prospect of attracting 
‘malign’ FDI is most profound in those post-Soviet European countries which are not 
accessing the EU (Belarus, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine). Meanwhile, among accession 
countries in particular, there is evidence that foreign investors are becoming more 
reluctant to invest into those countries which have achieved certain levels of wealth 
and, presumably, institutional capacity. 
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In this context, it can be observed that the ability to attract FDI and quality of 
the attracted inflows corresponds with indicators of stability in a country. Moreover, 
it was detected that FDI as a percent of GDP, for some groups of countries, is 
negatively related to per capita GDP, which can be seen as an indication that FDI is 
likely to shrink once certain level of prosperity is reached in a country. For certain 
groups of countries, mainly post-Soviet states, significant positive correlations 
between FDI and debt and negative correlations between FDI and trade balance can 
be also observed. The inference that these states mainly attract ‘malign FDI’ can be 
taken to particularly on account of the fact that FDI impact negatively trade balance 
of these recipient states. 
Table 5.2. GLSE Regression for different subgroups of countries, 1998-2002 






























































































T values are listed in parenthesis. 
Unadjusted and adjusted Coefficients of Determination (R
2
) are listed next to slope parameter or at 
bottom of column respectively. 
Source of data: Global Insight. 
1 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia. 
2 
Belarus, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan. 
3 
Belarus, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine.  
4






This chapter argues that the failure of post-Soviet states to attract the required 
amounts of quality FDI can be, first of all, explained by the presence of ‘blind 
bargaining’. The latter is a model depicting the cognitive situation of a foreign 
investor who is lacking the clarity on the situation he is in and, as a result, bound to 
act in conditions of extreme uncertainty due to the high degree of non-transparency 
and instability of the "rules of the game" at any given moment and of their propensity 
for unpredictable change at any time in the future.  originates from the specific state 
and society relationship which can be formed in neo-patrimonial host states where 
economic decisions are often not directed towards serving national interests, but 
towards supporting personal aims of the officials in power. ‘Blind bargaining’, which 
ultimately undermines the relationships between MNEs and such neo-patrimonial 
host states, reflects both the presence of the latent conflict between national and 
personal interests of the state representatives and the inability of the existing political 
system to sanction individual self-enrichment. 
It can be argued that the subordination of state politics to personal economic 
interests of a ruling elite, as a main characteristic underpinning the existence of 
‘blind bargaining’, explains the inability of many post-Soviet states to attract the 
required amounts of quality FDI. It also explains attractiveness of these states to 
riskier investors and consequently the inflows of mostly ‘malign FDI’ into these 
countries. 
Our comparative analysis of the impact of these countries’ risks and economic 
indicators on the quality of interactions between FDI and host states, conducted for 
27 post-Soviet and CEE countries, supports the main argument of this paper in that it 
documents differential relationships between FDI inflows and other variables for 
different groups of countries. These include all post-soviet states except Baltic states, 
Central European accession and non-accession countries and Baltic states, Central 
European post-soviet states (Belarus, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine), and Central 
Asian States. 
The most stable relationship that can be observed for all groupings is the strong 
correlation between FDI levels of economic risks. The significance and strength of 
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this attests to the significance of ‘blind bargaining’ context since one of the main 
criteria upon which Global Insight bases its rating of this type of risk is policy 
consistency and forward planning of the economy. The latter is, first of all, 
dependent on the quality and independence of a state’s economic and political 
system, the lack of which reflects latent conflict between genuine economic goals 
and the private interests of these states’ ruling elite; which, in turn, creates high 
levels of uncertainty and instability with regard to policies. 
Interesting is also, primarily, negative (though not very significant) relationship 
between FDI and ‘GDP per Capita’ and, secondarily, the weak negative relationship 
between FDI and ‘Trade Balance’. The former supports the assumption, made on the 
basis of the previous research that FDI flows to European EU accession countries in 
particular decrease with an increase in welfare levels in these countries.  
Further to this, it can be observed that a negative relation between FDI and 
‘Trade Balance’, which is much stronger for the Central Asian countries, co-exists 
with a positive relationship between FDI and ‘Export per Capita’ for this region. This 
appears to indicate that resource centered FDI is likely to increase per capita export. 
However, these gains are wiped out by excessive public and private spending which 
negatively affects the country’s overall trade balance. 
The relationships between FDI and some other economic indicators provide 
further evidence for the paper’s argument. Thus, EU accession countries are the only 
group for which FDI is negatively correlated with inflation. By contrast, in all post-
Soviet states, FDI inflows are not associated with the reduction of the rates of 
inflation. Moreover, in case of the post-Soviet European states (Belarus, Moldova, 
Russia, and Ukraine) FDI shows a strong positive relationship with ‘Debt per 
Capita’, while for all other groups this relationship is weakly negative. This indicates 
that this region attracts riskier and lower quality debt-increasing investment. 
The opposite situation can be observed for ‘Unemployment’. Here, EU 
accession countries are the only group for which unemployment reveals strong 
enough (in comparison to all other cases) positive relationship with FDI vis-à-vis 
post-Soviet countries where FDI is negatively related with unemployment. These 
finding, though contradictory to the original argument on lower FDI quality in neo-
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patrimonial post-Soviet states, indicates that EU accession countries are now 
attracting FDI which is not contributing to the increase of employment in the region. 
The inference can be made that, after reaching a certain level of development by 
transition countries, FDI changes its quality from being unemployment reducing to 
not contributing to the increase in employment. Negative relationship between 
unemployment and FDI in case of post-Soviet European countries, in turn, can be 
explained by the high levels of underreporting figures on unemployment in these 
states. 
In general, it can be concluded that this study provides quantitative evidence 
for the tested  hypothesis on the presence of ‘blind bargaining’ in neo-patrimonial 
post-Soviet states resulting in attracting riskier lower quality iFDI flows. However, it 
is emphasized that further country and industry specific analyses are required to 
ascertain variations in relationships between countries, industries, and companies 
characteristics and the nature of FDI inflows. Moreover, it is also suggested that the 
quality of iFDI flows is associated with the quality of institutional changes in neo-
patrimonial transition states. Another qualitative macro-level region-specific and 
qualitative micro-level country-specific study are undertaken to address these issues. 




CHAPTER SIX: FINDINGS FOR QUANTITATIVE STUDY 2: IS THERE 
EVIDENCE OF ‘MALIGN’ FDI IN FORMER SOVIET STATES 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the results for an exploratory statistical national level data 
analysis that  tested the impact of iFDI on institutional capacities, as one of the most 
important location-specific advantages of host economies in twelve post-Soviet 
transition countries, namely the Central and Eastern European States of Belarus, 
Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine, and the Central Asian Republics of Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and 
Uzbekistan and nine years (1997-2005) are investigated in terms of three models. 
This analysis deliberately excludes the three Baltic states, whose economic 
development was affected relatively early on by their eventual succession to the 
European Union (Hunya, 2004). The relationship between country risk indicators as 
reported by Global Insight country reports, iFDI flows, and control variables for the 
above listed countries are examined.  
6.2 An empirical analysis 
Similarly to the previous quantitative study, this analysis was performed applying 
OLS, LSDV, and GLSE models. In this analysis the LSDV model can be also 
considered the most reliable of these models since the OLS model is likely to 
produce overinflated t values on account of serial correlation, and the GLSE is likely 
to underestimate the significance of coefficient (Stimson, 1985). 
The first part of the analysis utilizes Global Insight’s score for ‘Overall Country 
Risk’ (OCR) as dependent variable (Table 6.1). Overall this analysis performs well 
for both the LSDV and the GLSE variant. For the more reliable LSDV variant, 
53.1% of the total variation is explained by the five independent variables, ‘FDI as % 
of GDP’, ‘Government Debt as % of GDP’, ‘GDP per capita’, ‘Unemployment rate’ 
and ‘Trade Balance as % GDP’. Of the independent variables both ‘Government 
debt’ and the ‘Unemployment rate’ have a significant, risk increasing, effect on 
overall country risk at the .05 level of significance or above. ‘FDI as % of GDP’ also 
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has a risk increasing effect, but here the significance is more marginal (.12 level of 
significance). 
While it is probably not surprising that government debt and unemployment 
would increase the overall riskiness or decrease its overall stability, it is interesting to 
note that, contrary to the assumptions of the benign model of FDI, the variable ‘FDI 
as % of GDP’ also exerts a negative influence on ‘Overall Country Risk’. 
This pattern of a risk increasing role of FDI is confirmed for the dependent 
variable ‘Economic Risk’ which is examined in the next set of models (Table 6.2). 
Again this analysis performs well for the LSDV model which yields an adjusted R 
Square value of 46.4%. In this model, ‘Government debt’ and the ‘Unemployment 
rate’ have again a significant, risk increasing, effect ‘Economic Risk’ at the .05 level 
of significance or above. ‘FDI as % of GDP’, meanwhile also has a significant risk 
increasing effects, however, at the lower .01 level of significance. 
Perhaps the most interesting results are gained by re-examining this model with 
the third dependent variable of ‘Legal Risk’ (Table 6.3). This variable, which 
assesses a country’s system of legal and commercial governance, probably most 
strongly supports the assumptions of the previously discussed opposing models of 
‘benign’ versus ‘malign’ foreign investment, as it focuses on country-specific 
governance competencies in terms of transparency, independence, and quality of 
legislation.  
Again the result of these models closely mirrors those of the previous analysis, with 
the LSDV model performing well and yielding an adjusted R square value of 48.9%. 
However, in case of the dependent variable ‘Legal Risk’, the independent variables 
‘Government debt’, the ‘Unemployment rate’ and ‘FDI as % of GDP’ have a 
significant risk increasing effect at the .05 level of significance. The significance of 
the ‘FDI as % GDP’ risk increasing effect particularly in this model lends strong 
support to the previously discussed hypothesis of an institution-eroding effect of 
‘malign’ iFDI flows in terms of political stability in the context of post-Soviet states.
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Table 6.1. Overall Country Risk (OCR) 
Model  OLS LSDV GLSE  
Indep Variables     
FDI as % of GDP .  0295 .0249  .0065  
 (1.915) (1.544) (.858)  
Gov Debt as % GDP . 0106 .0197 .0048 
 (4.160) (5.281) (2.885)  
GDP per capita . 0003 .0002 .0001  
 (3.275) (1.119) (0.644)  
Unemployment rate . 0185 .0665 .0387  
 (1.279) (2.058) (3.249)  
Trade Balance/% GDP -.  0065 -.0019  -.0021  
 (-.965) (-.0168) (-.512)  
R square adjusted 28.9 28.9 53.1 21.5  
 
Table 6.2. Economic Risk (ER) 
Model OLS LSDV GLSE  
Indep Variables    
FDI as % of GDP  .0169  .0314  .0068 
 (1.060) (1.744) (.915)  
Gov Debt as % GDP  .0109 .0191 .0027 
 (4.150) (4.597) (1.592)  
GDP per capita  .0003 .0001 -.0001  
 (2.717) (1.080) (-1.729)  
Unemployment rate  .0300 .0768 .0530  
 (1.999) (2.1297) (4.175)  
Trade Balance/% GDP - . 0112 -.0037  -.0023  
 (-1.596) (-.301) (-.558) 
R square adjusted  30.0 46.4 21.6  
 
Table 6.3. Legal Risk (LR) 
Model  OLS LSDV GLSE  
Indep Variables     
FDI as % of GDP  .0263 .0337  .0126 
 (1.494) (1.916) (1.552)  
Gov Debt as % of GDP . 0070 .0197 .0031  
 (2.408) (4.7064) (1.540)  
GDP per capita  .0004 .0012 .0001  
 (3.587) (1.494) (1.316)  
Unemployment rate  .0070 .0363 .0250  
 (.419) (1.003) (1.822)  
Trade Balance/% GDP-  .0054 -.0047  .0002  
 (-.694) (-.037)  (0.033)  





Despite the lack of more detailed data and the fact that these risk variables are 
based on a number of assumptions, the relationship between these variables 
reflecting on the changes in the quality of institutions in the country and iFDI flows 
is remarkably stable; with FDI having a significant positive (risk increasing) 
coefficient for most of the relevant LSDV model outputs. 
6.4 Conclusion 
The chapter has sought to question the conventional assumption of a ‘benign’ 
role of foreign investment and examine an opposing hypothesis of institution-eroding 
effect of lower quality ‘malign’ iFDI flows in the context of neo-patrimonial post-
Soviet states. Although the regression analyses are inevitably affected by weaknesses 
in the underlying data, they strongly point to the possibility that, at least for the 
period during which these countries were examined, FDI was having an overall 
destabilizing effect on domestic institutional competencies and capacities. While this 
analysis does not necessarily confirm the hypothesis of a ‘malign’ effect of foreign 
investment, it certainly contests the conventional assumption that iFDI will positively 
impact the institutional structures and the stability of recipient countries. 
Although our results point to the possibility that, on the whole, foreign 
investment may have had negative effects on the institutional environment in the 
region, this analysis must necessarily be interpreted with caution. Specifically some 
of the factors which limit the generalisability of these findings include the fact that 
the regression analysis covers a limited time frame during which some parts of the 
region, such as Georgia and Azerbaijan were, ab initio, characterized by involvement 
in conflict and instability. Secondly, during the period examined here a very large 
amount of foreign investment was concentrated on a small number of natural 
resource-endowed states, which could have a distorting effect on the overall data 
analysis. Thirdly, the model does not account for the endogeneity of iFDI as an 
independent variable. 
Despite these caveats it is probably valid to note that this analysis throws doubt 
on the, often politically motivated, advocacy of iFDI which presupposes that the 
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interests of foreign investors are identical with those of recipient states. Without 
more concrete evidence in its support, the assumption of a ‘benign’ effect of foreign 
investment is no more than speculation, irrespective of how many international 
organizations pay lip service to this; and what is more, it is an assumption that needs 
to be very carefully and critically examined.  
The micro-level qualitative study of foreign investors’ performance and behavior 
in one neo-patrimonial country, namely Ukraine, was undertaken to further refine 
and test a newly-introduced ‘blind bargaining’ model and address the issues of 







CHAPTER SEVEN: QUALITATIVE RESEARCH FINDINGS 
7.1 Introduction 
The complex and very sensitive nature of both the studied phenomenon and 
research questions in this study determined the necessity for the analytic framework 
to take into account multiple aspects of working environment and characteristics of 
the participating companies with FDI. As a result, foreign investors’ activity in 
Ukraine is examined by concurrent comparing, contrasting and linking patterns of 
their behavior in terms of their association with different contextual segments. The 
latter are identified based on these companies’ affiliation by their status in the world 
economy, the home country’s level of development (developed, developing, 
emerging or transition group), and industry. 
Distinctive in case of this study is the fact that breaking the analysis into 
independent units focusing on isolated within- and cross-group investigations would 
deprive the researcher of ability to trace and show important links between various 
companies with FDI characteristics, their strategic choices and performance. Such 
limitation, in turn, would have a negative effect on the quality and, as a result, 
reliability and validity of both the analytic reasoning and conclusions. 
Moreover, a better elucidation, interpretation and justification of various 
companies with FDI behavioral patterns is further achieved through broadening the 
analytical perspectives by acknowledging the value and scrutinizing the viewpoint, 
judgments and facts shared by various experts and potential foreign direct investors 
in Ukraine.  
The findings based on the synthesis of data provided by the representatives of all 
of the above specified groups are exhibited at a cross group level and structured in 
accordance with the themes identified in the course of this research project to . These 
are outlined below. 
1. Changes in foreign investor – host state bargaining relationships and their 
bargaining power in Ukraine; development of a new bargaining model. 
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This part of the presentation of findings includes questions on the quality of iFDI, 
bargaining power, and constraints for FIs’ in Ukraine. It identifies the prevalent types 
of various companies with FDI activity in Ukraine. The discussion of the main 
bargaining strengths and weaknesses of both the host country’s (location specific 
advantages) and foreign investor’s (ownership specific advantages) serves as a 
foundation for the analysis of the changes in their bargaining power used to develop 
a new bargaining model specific to Ukraine and other neo-patrimonial transition and 
developing countries.  
2. Patterns of foreign investors’ nonmarket strategies, in general, and political 
behavior, in particular, in Ukraine.  
This section addresses the issues of FI’s existing and potential capacities and interest 
in prompting institutional changes in Ukraine. It explores various aspects of 
nonmarket, with the special focus on political, behavior of different companies with 
FDI in Ukraine. The discussion covers the following issues:  its organizational 
fundamental, particularly its management structure at both company and subsidiary 
levels; the choices and efficiency of cooperation modes at different participation 
levels, made of individual motions and several alternatives for collective alliances; 
the determinants of political strategies (distinguishing bridging and buffering 
mechanisms); the intensity of engagement at different levels (local, regional, 
national) and with various branches of power (regulatory, executive, judicial); the 
spheres and types of host country policies of greatest interest for foreign investors, 
and the stages of policy cycle and channels of foreign investors’ political 
involvement. 
3. The role of different groups of foreign investors in shaping the institutional 
environment in Ukraine and the self-assessment of their efficiency. 
This part of the research probes the nature and quality of political bargaining 
between different groups of foreign investors and Ukraine. It examines the host 
state’s dedication to an encouragement of sustainable open dialog and of the active 
participation of foreign investors in endeavors expected to assist in modifying the 
institutional environment in Ukraine. It also investigates such issues as the 
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efficiency, degree of pro-activity and intensity of foreign investors’ political 
involvement and, where appropriate, changes in these. The discussion of the 
problems of merging political, economic and criminal powers and of the estranged 
(from the groups representing such powers) party’s potential liabilities for political 
ties closes the inquiry of this section. Overall, this section is seeking for evidence 
supporting the proposition that bargaining in Ukraine has a dual nature. In other 
words, FIs need to distinguish between formal and informal bargaining in Ukraine. 
4. The quality of foreign direct investment in Ukraine. 
The final section is dedicated to the outcomes of the FIs – host states bargaining 
relationships in Ukraine. It briefly relates participants’ reflections on the quality of 
iFDI in Ukraine and its determinants. For better understanding of the sources of 
business environment characteristics’ negative impact on changes in the quality of 
foreign direct investment inflows in Ukraine, it also includes a summary of 
interviewees’ assessment of their working experiences in Ukraine comparing to other 
post-Soviet and Central and Eastern European countries. Finally, the debate on 
necessary changes in the Ukrainian political system are needed closes this chapter. 
Overall, combining the findings from all qualitative research sections designed to 
answer specific questions on the goals, resources, constraints, strategies and 
outcomes of FIs – host states bargaining relationships allows testing, refining, and 
further developing a ‘blind bargaining’ model for the case of Ukraine. 
7.2 Bargaining power and changes in foreign investors – host state bargaining 
relationships 
7.2.1 Company profile 
The analysis of the data obtained in the course of this research project shows that 
company characteristics such as whether the investor’s home state is a developed 
country or a developing or transition country, the motivation for the investment 
decision, the form of ownership and the foreign investor’s status in the global 
economy play a major role in determining investors’ pattern of behavior, bargaining 
power, and the degree of success of their performance.  
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However, this research also reveals that an important additional cluster of 
characteristics specific to Ukraine and some other former post-Soviet countries is 
hidden within this traditional set of company profile features. Both experts and 
foreign investors unanimously identify presence of round tripping or pseudo-FDI, the 
status of such companies’ owners in the local economy and politics, problem of 
merging political, economic and criminal powers and growing raiding problem as the 
most crucial factors preventing an FDI inflow and even causing an outflow of higher 
quality ‘benign’ FDI from Ukraine. 
As a result, the following analysis provides evidence that real foreign investors 
currently present or pursuing access to Ukrainian market are predominantly guided 
by resource- and market-seeking motivation in the industries least often targeted by 
pseudo-investors, which are, as a result, reasonably competitive markets. Notably, 
resource-seeking companies are primarily interested in physical resources while the 
main attractions for market-seeking companies are market size and prospects of 
market growth.  
It is worth noting that there is a certain group of potential investors, including IT 
and R&D companies, interested in exploitation of Ukrainian high quality 
professional labor resources, and that they found a way to simultaneously avoid and, 
what is more important, even benefit from the inefficiencies of the Ukrainian market 
and institutional environment through contracting out Ukrainian professionals 
without actually entering the Ukrainian market.  
7.2.2 Foreign investor’s ownership-specific advantages 
Financial resources are the main ownership-specific advantage of foreign 
investors in Ukraine. However, all interviewees, regardless of the industry in which 
they operate, claimed that by itself this tangible asset cannot ensure the security of 
their businesses in the Ukrainian market. The latter can be achieved only in cases if 
the tangible financial resources are supported by the intangible relational resources 
component. That is why the status of foreign investors in the world economy, 
determined, first of all, by their exclusive access to, favored relations with and 
support from home and host countries’ governments and supranational organizations 
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and institutions is the crucial asset for efficient operation and even survival of foreign 
investors in Ukraine. However, these relational resources are a privilege of the elite 
MNEs. All low- and mid-profile investors admitted that:  
Any foreign business would feel much less vulnerable and insecure in 
Ukraine have it had guarantees of the support from its home country and 
international organizations (from an interview with SE1). 
Elite MNEs identified advantages of common governance (Dunning & Lundan, 
2008) as the second group of their ownership-specific advantages in Ukraine. The 
most important asset within this group of advantages for them is their exclusive 
access to product markets and to better quality inputs, including labor, natural 
resources, information, finance, and semi manufactured goods. It followed by a set of 
advantages arising from MNEs’ multinationality, namely operational flexibility and 
ability to diversify and reduce risks. 
Elite MNEs also considered a valuable asset their managerial, technical-
technological, marketing and institution-building expertise, in general, and legal 
expertise, in particular. Though ST3, PFBT1, PFBT4, SBF2 emphasized that the 
value a host country place on various expert qualities of MNEs can change over time. 
A good example here is the deterioration of the Ukrainian authorities’ interest in 
MNEs legal expertise. PFBT1 informed that, since his company was one of the first 
foreign investors which entered the Ukrainian market after the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union, during the first 10 years of the Ukrainian independence, the state 
authorities heavily relied on his MNEs’ legal expertise in developing new Ukrainian 
laws. However, over the last 10 years this interest has significantly decreased. 
It is noteworthy that low- and mid-profile investors do not perceive any of their 
ownership-specific assets as advantages for their operation in the Ukrainian market. 
They consider the positioning and operation of their companies in Ukraine extremely 
vulnerable. Further analysis of the foreign investors – host state relationships in 
Ukraine will provide evidence on the sources of such attitudes and help better 
understanding and developing several elements of a ‘blind bargaining’ model, 
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including goals, resources, and constraints determining FIs’ bargaining power and 
relationships in Ukraine. 
7.2.3 Ukraine’s location-specific advantages and disadvantages 
7.2.3.1 Location-specific advantages 
i. Market-seeking iFDI 
All representatives of the food, beverages and tobacco industry have the market-
seeking motives and emphasized that the most attractive Ukrainian location-specific 
advantage is the great potential of the Ukrainian consumers’ market growth. They 
claimed that Ukrainian market, if compared to Western markets, has a very low 
degree of saturation. Moreover, an interviewee representing PFBT1 noted that in 
Ukraine consumption per person is much lower even in comparison with other post-
Soviet countries including Russia. As a result, foreign investors in this industry see 
the development of their business in Ukraine as induced not only by the growth of 
demand and consumption but also by growth of the market itself. 
 The public relations director at PFBT1 also said that for that company: 
Ukraine is one of the ten priority emerging and quickly developing 
and growing markets in the world along with India, China, Russia, 
Mexico, and Brazil. In Western Europe our market growth is minimal. It 
does not exceed 1-2% a year. In contrast, in Ukraine and some other post-
Soviet countries our business growth rate is a two-digit number ranging 
from 15% - 20% to even 30% a year. 
Likewise, all representatives of companies belonging to the trade sector (ST1, 
ST2, ST3 and ST4) identified the Ukrainian market capacity as a primary driving 
force of their investment decisions. Also, the Head of Corporate Affairs Department 
at ST3 recognized that sufficiently active population is another very important 
advantage for the successful growth of their business in the country. He also 
emphasized the critical role of the existing trend of development in Ukraine towards 
European integration.  
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ii. Resource-seeking iFDI 
Similarly, all interviewed representatives of the agricultural business community 
were driven into the country by its high potential and name Ukraine among the four 
countries possessing the highest agricultural potential, together with Brazil, 
Argentina and Russia.  
 For this reason, these companies, whose activity is directly dependent on their 
physical presence in the Ukrainian market, are ready to deal with imperfections of 
the institutional, business and investment environment in the country.  
Thus, a directors at  PA1 says that: 
Our company has been consistently growing in Ukraine since 1991 
despite political and economic instability and crisis in the country.  
However, if there were a possibility to use Ukrainian resources without being 
physically present in the country, that would be the preferred option formany 
investors. For example, potential foreign investor PIFC1, representing the 
construction industry revealed that many foreign construction companies, including 
his business unit, agree to work in Ukraine, first of all, only as contractors and, 
second of all, only under the condition that their work is insured against nonpayment 
and other risks by international financial institutions.  
7.2.3.2 Location-specific disadvantages 
Most of the location-specific disadvantages in Ukraine are similar for all types of 
iFDI, including market-, resource-, efficiency- and strategic-asset seeking inflows. 
They originate from the imperfections of institutional environment in Ukraine. All 
foreign investors’ complaints are perfectly reflected in PA1 ranking of the major 
impediments for a safe and efficient operation of businesses in the country.  The 
interviewee asserted that: 
There are a lot of disadvantages for business in this ‘funny country’: 
1. state banditism, which is driven by ruling elite, headed [at the time of 
the interview] by President Yanukovich and his gang; 
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2. endemic corruption, which is getting worse, worse and worse over the 
years; 
3. bureaucracy; 
4. discretionary law enforcement.  
For example, EA1 suggested that Ukraine is potentially one of the most attractive 
countries for iFDI in the world because it possesses an abundance of the major factor 
of production, namely land resources. However, the problem is that this main 
strategic good is not actually a good in Ukraine. In other words, he explains that 
Ukraine and Belarus are the only two European countries that do not allow the free 
sale and purchase of agricultural land by foreigners and stateless persons. It could 
only be transferred to their temporary possession, i.e., leased - for not longer than 50 
years in accordance with the decision of local or regional authorities (Land Code of 
Ukraine, Article 22).  
Under such circumstances the success of foreign investors in obtaining a permit 
for use of certain land resources was completely dependent on their ability to come 
to an agreement with respective representatives of local or regional authorities. 
However, both experts and foreign investors emphasize here that any such decisions 
and agreements are subjective. Moreover, in the event of a change of power, foreign 
investors will have to renegotiate their deals with the new authorities and will be at 
risk of losing their investments.  
It must be admitted that there are also multiple illegal schemes for purchase of 
agricultural land by foreign ventures and stateless persons in Ukraine. For example, 
interviewed experts ELA2, ELA3, EA2, EJ2 explained that since the Land Code of 
Ukraine allows non-citizens to buy non-agricultural land plots within the city limits 
on the stipulation that the real estate is located on the acquired lots, some foreign 
investors are seeking opportunities to purchase agricultural land as non-agricultural 
by the means of direct corrupt relationships with state officials or using intermediary 
entities, such as consultancy organizations, dominated by legal consultants, 
established for this purpose in Ukraine.  
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All interviewees emphasized that whether by legal lease or illegal purchase 
contract, a foreign company acquiring access to Ukrainian land will be taking on an 
extremely high risk due to political uncertainty, instability and corruption, all of 
which, according to the results of this research, head the list of most important 
deterrents for iFDI flows into Ukraine.  
How do both experts and foreign investors explain the pertinence and 
sustainability of such an unattractive corrupt relationship-based business 
environment in Ukraine? 
Experts assert that multiple institutional voids, most of which are deliberately 
preserved to serve the interests of power elites, in all spheres of Ukrainian 
institutional environment are definitely the main location-specific disadvantage and a 
vital determinant of foreign investors’ decision to enter, operate or exit the country. 
A fundamental flaw of the Ukrainian state administrative framework is a systemic 
deliberate failure of all branches of power to fulfill their functional responsibilities. 
EINGO1 declares that overall assessment of response mechanisms to the 
requirements of legislative framework in the country attests to the view that:  
Ukrainian legislation is prepared only for fools. In reality officials at any 
level are just openly and shamelessly ignoring the existing laws and courts 
are not taking any actions to prevent, control and bring to an end such 
flagrant abuses of power. To be more precise the basic guiding principle of 
Ukrainian officials is a selective application of impracticable laws. In other 
words, state representatives in Ukraine live by the rule proclaimed by the 
famous Spanish dictator Franco: “To friends – everything, to enemies – the 
law”. 
Naturally this very often leads to discrimination against foreign investors unless 
they choose to follow the existing informal rules of business conduct in Ukraine or 
are able to resist and overcome all unfair and illegitimate demands due to their 
privileged status in the world economy. However, on a general scale, it can be 
inferred that this lack of transparency and the prevalence of illegitimate forms of 
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regulating business operations prevent a predominant portion of quality iFDI from 
entering the Ukrainian market. 
In support of this conclusion approximately 75% of our participants, equally 
representing all industries, single out the unlimited power of bureaucracy and 
frequent unpredictable and ungrounded changes of legislation as major disadvantages 
deterring foreign investors from entering the Ukrainian market. 
As EINGO1 stated: 
State officials’ actions are directed not by the official formal rules but by 
orders to persecute a certain company or its representatives. Such orders can 
contain a requirement for an official to initiate a criminal case, jail and torture 
a manager or an owner of a certain company or simply close down this 
business altogether. By contrast, if an enterprise belongs to somebody who 
has close relationships with the ruling elite, then an agent of that business can 
commit any kinds of crimes ignoring all existing rules and laws absolutely 
without any fear of being punished for their misconduct.  
Furthermore, several of the interviewed experts (EINGO1, EJ2, ELA2 and 
ELA3) stated that every state official in Ukraine is accountable not only to his/her 
official supervisor but also, more importantly, to an unofficial boss appointed by the 
ruling elite. The latter represents the interests of a criminal unofficial hierarchy co-
existing with and dominating the official state hierarchy. These experts also believe 
that this specially-built criminal unofficial hierarchy is the main decision-making 
body in Ukraine, meaning that any state official or bureaucrat is predominantly 
concerned about meeting the demands of representatives of this ruling criminal 
structure rather than about the legitimacy of their requests and such abstract notions 
as integrity, honesty and justice.  
Besides, all experts who participated in this research project also unanimously 
claimed that court system is absolutely rotten in Ukraine. They emphasized that the 
judicial branch is completely dependent on and under the influence of the executive 
branch of power in Ukraine. The consensus of interviewed experts attests to the fact 
that there is no separation of powers in the country.  
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Additionally, all experts and company representatives interviewed stated that the 
attitudes of general population towards business in the country are still very negative 
and even hostile. All company representatives also unanimously referred to the 
negative impact of the lack of business culture in Ukraine on the development of 
their businesses.  
Foreign investors characterized Ukrainian market as much less competitive in 
comparison with the markets of Central and Eastern European (CEE) and South 
Eastern European (SEE) countries and developed countries, including labor market 
competitiveness.  
This lack of competitiveness to a certain degree also determines the quality of 
labor force in Ukraine. Here the most important issue is the problem of the work 
ethic. Most company representatives interviewed claimed that a significant share of 
workers in Ukraine, even though highly qualified, tend to put very little effort into 
their work, perform poorly and deceive their employers. However, approximately 
25% of the interviewees disagreed with this statement. They insist that their 
Ukrainian staff is meeting and even exceeding all their expectations and 
requirements to their employees. In support of the latter statement BPFBT1 indicated 
that in their company a Ukrainian subsidiary had been made the regional 
headquarters for all their subsidiaries in the post-Soviet states and Mongolia. 
Moreover, the Ukrainian team was also responsible for the development of business 
in the CEE and SEE regions. 
Market-seeking investors, particularly in the food industry, indicated that at the 
moment people are not willing to spend money on consumer products and food, 
causing the stagnation of consumption growth in Ukraine. They suggested that this 
tendency was a consequence of a decline in the population’s real income levels. On 
the other hand, both experts and interviewees representing various business sectors 
said that information on the extremely high and consistently increasing volumes of 
foreign currency exchange operations shows that people in Ukraine have money but 
prefer to save it in foreign currency.  
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The interviewees assumed that this decline of the population’s confidence in the 
future is not an effect brought about by the economic crisis but rather a by-product of 
the instability and growing uncertainty about the direction of future political and 
economic trends and developments in the country.  
7.2.4 Risks in Ukraine 
7.2.4.1. Risks as a disadvantage 
Attitudes towards various risks in Ukraine have been found to differ significantly 
depending on the industry, target markets of the final product and investment status 
of the company. 
Overall both experts and representatives of companies with FDI working in 
Ukraine agree that country risks, in particular political, operational and legislative 
risks linked to the instability and unpredictability of policies and corruption of both 
the decision-making process and law-enforcement mechanism, are major causes for 
concern of businesses in Ukraine. For example, PA1 disclosed that his company 
developed a very large project and is ready to invest any time. However, the project 
is on hold because of the highly unstable and unpredictable political situation in 
Ukraine. The interviewee explained that:  
As soon as politics change we will immediately go. However, as long as 
the politics stays the same the project is going to be frozen. 
All foreign investors interviewed also identify financial risks, specifically 
spotlighting exchange rate and liquidity risks, as the second most important group of 
risks in the country. Grivna’s devaluation by 60% and banks rejection to lend money 
to some of the most prospective businesses in Ukraine, respectively, are just several 
examples of the above mentioned risks. There are also industry specific risks such as, 






7.2.4.2 Risk as an advantage 
However, a certain group of potential investors who abandoned the idea of 
investing in Ukraine learned to exploit the main pitfalls in this country, namely 
institutional voids and growing risks.  
Four potential foreign investors active in the IT and R&D industries, hailing from 
developed countries, and producing their products for the same (developed) group of 
countries were interviewed. They opt to recruit Ukrainian specialists on a private 
agreement or contract basis. Three of the four interviewed managers of such 
companies (identified in our research as potential investors PISIT1, PISIT3 and 
PPR&D1) revealed that their initial attempts to establish fully functional offices in 
the country failed as a consequence of multiple systemic drawbacks and regulatory 
pressures.  
The director at PISIT1 confirms that: 
 Originally we were eager to explore the opportunities of physical 
presence in Ukraine. However, in no time, we realized that the costs of 
dealing with a broad range of regulatory authorites in Ukraine would 
completely undermine our competitiveness and damage our reputation. At 
this point, we decided to search for alternative models of working in 
Ukrainian market.  
As a result of their search for alternative cooperation models which would relieve 
them from any necessity to deal with or report to any state agency in Ukraine, all of 
these businessmen recognized the advantages of absolutely non-obligatory 
cooperative relationships with independent individuals in the country. The latter 
could either be registered as independent entrepreneurs in Ukraine and pay taxes on 
their salaries or contract payments received from their foreign ‘employers’ or not. All 
of the interviewees admit that under this collaboration model they do not take any 
responsibility for their Ukrainian ‘partners’ behavior as taxpayers.  
It is noteworthy that they acknowledge the positive impact of the economic crisis 
and political uncertainty (and associated economic, political and operational risk 
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factors) on their businesses. They admit that their labor expenses usually decline, or, 
at least, do not increase, in cases of recession, crisis and political instability. In 
particular, they do not need to raise salaries or the costs of any related social 
packages, if any are provided, and can increase the work load demands on their 
employees without fear of losing them. 
7.2.5 Main sources of pressure on foreign investors in Ukraine 
7.2.5.1 Corruption and regulatory authorities 
There is almost unanimous agreement among all foreign investors, domestic 
companies and experts about the main sources of pressure on businesses in Ukraine. 
Representatives of both the main foreign investors and auxiliary experts, with the 
exception of four out of 12 representatives of the elite group of investors, claim and 
provide descriptive evidence that omnipresent corruption and regulatory authorities 
at all levels and law enforcement agencies in Ukraine hamper their operations on a 
constant basis. ST1 pointed out that: 
At any point of time their company is facing and must respond to the 
demands of at least thirty control functions imposed on them by various 
public authorities. 
The representative of ST3 explained that regulatory authorities like ministries can 
impact the functioning of all businesses through initiation of multiple unpredictable 
and ungrounded changes in existing Ukrainian legislation. The demands of local 
regulatory authorities are driven by the pursuit of their official representatives’ 
corrupt interests. PA1 emphasized that: 
Corruption was at the kindergarten level during the first Ukrainian 
President’s, Mr. Kuchma’s, reign in comparison to its current scale and 
scope. It is getting worse, worse and worse with every coming day.  
Such pursuit of private corrupt interests, in turn, is possible due to the 
imperfections of both legislative and judicial systems’ chaos that according to the 
interviewees, in most cases, amounts to a complete absence of any control over 
and/or accountability of such officials. 
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Local tax authorities are the primary and most frequently cited source of such 
pressures in Ukraine independent of industry and type of activity of the business 
interviewed. These allegations are further reinforced by legal advisors ELA1, ELA2, 
and ELA3, who also claim that the main sources of pressure on companies in 
Ukraine are both tax and law enforcement agencies. 
Representatives of fire authorities are also frequent visitors to businesses in 
Ukraine. Since there are no regulations as to the limits on the number of inspections, 
their representatives can drop by practically on a daily basis with checkups and leave 
recommendations and directions for improving the fire safety of the inspected unit 
and/or territory, according to representatives of both the production (PO1, PO2) and 
service (ST1, SB3, SC1) sectors. Such recommendations include issues ranging from 
the fire alarm devices to the increase of the hydrant tube sizes. They explain, for 
example, that even if the tube diameter is in compliance with all current standards 
and requirements, the officials can still demand that they be replaced them with tubes 
of a bigger diameter. Providing the representatives of fire authorities with an 
approved plan according to which your enterprise is entirely compliant with all fire 
safety requirements is not sufficient either. Representatives of such authorities have 
the power to claim that three-, two- even one- year old plans need to be upgraded and 
modernized. Similar renewal requirements are also very often generated with regard 
to fireproofed varnishes and paints, and any other flammable substances.  
Almost no business unit, except for representatives of the elite group, has any 
power to resist these authorities and protect itself from arbitrary regulatory meddling 
and interference. Some of the interviewed companies (ST1, SBF2, SE1, PLI2, and 
POM2) admitted that they had tried to protect their rights through courts but had all 
failed to prove their innocence in spite of the availability of all required evidence, 
had lost their cases and had to pay bribes to prevent being closed down.  
For example, trading company ST1 was involved in a case in which the inspector 
claimed that two substances cannot be kept next to each other in their warehouse 
because they would create a fire hazard. Even though the company obtained several 
independent experts’ conclusions that both substances were not flammable by their 
nature and were safe to be kept next to each other, they were still found guilty and 
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had either to pay bribes to the inspector to close the case or to deal initially with 
more follow up inspections and eventually with danger of being closed down due to 
non-compliance with fire safety requirements. 
Generally, such corruption-related pressure cases consist of the following stages. 
Firstly, as a result of inspection, the representative of a tax, fire, health and safety or 
any other kind of regulatory authority delivers a protocol of inspection containing 
detailed information on multiple non-compliances issues requiring corrections. If a 
company cooperates and pays bribes, an inspector withdraws all unsubstantiated 
highly resource-consuming claims from the protocol and leaves just a couple 
insignificant demands for correction. If a company decides to be uncooperative, 
disagree with the inspector’s claims and not pay a bribe, then a representative of the 
respective local or district regulatory authority the company is dealing with comes 
back at the end of a set term for corrections and modifications and orders the 
business to be closed down. 
If a company further decides to appeal to the next higher authority (city 
inspections), the latter send their own inspectors, who are as corrupt as the previous 
ones. Their visit will result in even more demands for upgrades and correction of 
non-compliance issues. If company management chooses to continue their pursuit of 
justice, they move up to the regional and national level authorities. Eventually, the 
final level of their communication with inspection authorities will be determined by 
the availability of both tangible and intangible assets.  
Due to a highly systemic organizational approach, effective management, risk 
distribution, and strong financial and relational resources, elite foreign investors 
claimed that their style and modes of operations in Ukraine are similar to those 
applied by other subsidiaries operating in any other country of the world. They 
declared that they never pay bribes and resolve all issues of this character directly at 
the highest (national) administrative levels. This access to the highest administrative 
resource ensures that they do not have problems with any agencies or authorities at 
local or regional levels and/or are perfectly equipped to resolve all of the issues 
generated by multiple institutional voids.  
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Both experts and elite companies’ representatives themselves suggest that the 
latter is the only group of investors actually feeling comfortable operating in 
Ukraine. PFBT1 explains: 
We are a very big global company with a well established reputation and 
a strong name. These are the major factors that determine our ability to 
protect our interests and operations from corruption pressures in Ukraine. 
By contrast, mid- and low-range profile foreign investors who either do not 
possess enough resources to meet all the demands of corrupted regulatory authorities 
or simply want to preserve their right to keep their business clean and conduct it in a 
legitimate manner find themselves in a very vulnerable position. They become 
targets of constant pressure from various regulatory agencies mostly at local and 
regional levels. As a result, in most cases such foreign investors are left with no other 
choice but to exit the country.  
ELA1 provides a very representative example of such a situation. The Director of 
Business Development of one of his client companies with foreign investments, a 
wholly-owned subsidiary of a mid-range profile company from the Netherlands 
working in the transportation and logistics sector, decided to exit the Ukrainian 
market after approximately four to five years of work there in it due to of its inability 
to attain operating efficiency in the local business environment. The most striking 
here is the fact that the company was present in several Community of Independent 
States (CIS), SEC and CEE markets, initially starting in Russia, expanding into 
Ukraine, and then moving into Romania, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and some 
other post-Soviet states. Overall he managed offices in 17 transition and developing 
economies. Of all of them Ukraine offered the most unacceptable and unproductive 
environment for conducting business and was the only country he decided to exit.   
The Business Development Director’s main arguments concerned the low quality 
of business environment and the tax regime. He could not understand why he had to 
have extended meetings with his accountant every day. Additionally, he said that 
constant bribery and corruption claims were doubtlessly potentially harmful for 
company’s reputation. The Director acknowledged that, even though it was large, the 
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company still did not possess sufficient resources to resolve the issues emerging at 
the highest regulatory levels. He insisted that as an open transparent company they 
could not afford to put up with this sort of pressure and assume this kind of risks. 
Moreover, according to his calculations, he had to devote 32% of his work time 
to management of one Ukrainian business while having only the remaining 68% of 
his day for the other 16 offices combined. Nonetheless, he admitted that if the 
Ukrainian unit produced 32% of the company profits he would consider staying in 
the market and looking for various strategies to overcome all institutional 
deficiencies. However, he was absolutely confident that all the talk about the 
potential of the Ukrainian market was not substantiated with any realistic prospects 
for positive changes. In reality, he said there was a total mismatch between overall 
effort and outcome.  
A representative of a developing country foreign contractor company, PIFC1, 
working in a construction industry provided further evidence of extremely 
unacceptable operational conditions in Ukraine for low- and mid-range profile 
foreign investors from developed countries which, due to their lower profile cannot 
count on active support and protection of their interests by their home countries 
and/or international organizations. He and PA1 representative explained that 
following the non-corrupt compliance mode of operation in Ukraine can result either 
in a very slow and long-lasting process of resolving any operational issues, the best 
case scenario, or in a complete failure of all attempts to reach authorities, get answers 
for their questions and resolve their problems, worst case scenario. As a result, such 
procrastinations and failures cause companies that do not want to put at risk their 
reputation eventually make a decision to withdraw their investment from Ukraine. 
On the contrary, more flexible companies from developing countries, like PIFC1, 
which do not have access to the developed markets, have no other choice but accept 
‘the rules of the game’ in Ukraine to maintain their competitiveness. Thus, even 
though trying to stick to highly responsible corporate behavior and shocked by the 
scale of corruption in Ukraine at the beginning, they end up adjusting their 
operational modes to local conditions and learn to cope with corruptive pressures.  
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The PIFC1 interviewee reveals that his company worked at the key state project 
in Ukraine. The conduct of a major international event in the country depended upon 
the completion of this project.  However, he emphasized that even the fact that the 
failure to finish their work on time could result in a major international scandal and 
transfer of the event to a different country, which would irreparably damage already 
faulted Ukrainian reputation, was not helping in overcoming corruption pressures 
from state officials.  
He stressed that on many occasions his attempts to resolve problems with 
representatives of various regulatory authorities, such as, for example, obtaining 
different permits and dealing with delays in their issuance, without resorting to 
corruption were unsuccessful. The most shocking for him was the fact that his 
explanations of the nationwide consequences, in case of the project failure, had 
absolutely no effect. None of the state officials cared about the country’s 
international profile and reputation. Bribes were the only means to resolve any 
problem intentionally created by the state officials. 
Moreover, PIFC1 further implied that the Ukrainian legal system itself prompts 
corruption in the country. He explains that: 
The law is somehow based on this. It embeds the windows of 
opportunities for corrupt demands. If you try to fully (100%) obey the 
existing laws, your company loses any chances to progress in its work. So, 
anyone (I particularly emphasize - ANYONE) who makes a business in 
Ukraine ought to in some ways disobey the laws because the laws are serving 
as a source for corruption. 
7.2.5.2 Other sources of pressure 
Only representatives of the elite MNEs group identified their stockholders as 
important sources of pressure whose demands they are consistently accounting for in 
the course of their decision making process. Also, interviewees working for trade 
sector companies using direct sales operational modes identified accounting for the 
interests of all independent entrepreneurs working with them as one of their 
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priorities. Moreover, a representative of ST3 asserted that these entrepreneurs’ needs 
are fundamental determinants of their decision-making. 
Overall, experts deny that companies’ employees, trade unions (except for one 
developed country elite MNE with partial state ownership, SC1) or any other public 
organizations have any influence over foreign or domestic businesses in Ukraine. 
They explain that the reason for this is the growing passivity of the population in the 
country over the more than twenty years of independence. Further, they elaborate 
that though, in general, Ukrainian people are not used to stand up for and protect 
their rights, this upsurge in passivity has its roots in the failure of the 2004 Orange 
Revolution leaders to fulfill to their promises. ELA2 explained that:  
The ‘Orange’ political elite betrayed their people by continuing to focus 
on meeting the demands and orders of business elites rather than building a 
fair civil society in Ukraine. 
7.2.6 Behavioral inconsistency and conflict between demands of different state 
authorities 
Half of the respondents state that there is no problem with laws in Ukraine. They 
suggest that almost every single law in itself meets basic legislative standards and 
requirements. ELA1, ELA2 and ST2 specifically point out that the key words here 
are “in itself”. They assert that the major problem of Ukrainian legislation is that 
very often the content of different laws is contradictory. Moreover, even when this is 
not the case, disputes arise due to a lack of co-operation between the legislative and 
executive branches of power.  
To this we need to add the absolutely dysfunctional law enforcement mechanism. 
For example, according to the Law on FDI in Ukraine the company with FDI does 
not need any licenses to export its products. However, when PM1, one of the low-
range profile metallurgical companies with foreign investment participating in this 
research project, tried to export without a license it was not allowed. Any attempts to 
prove their right given them by the law were useless. The authorities’ answer was: 
“Who cares about this law?! We are the only ones who can tell you which law 
applies in your case! We command that according to a different law you need a 
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license and you have to get it. Otherwise you cannot export!”  The fact that 
companies with FDI are exempt from that law on the basis of their status and need to 
be treated in accordance with the law on FDI in this case was meaningless for the 
authorities. Apparently, the latter have an infinite right to decide what laws to apply 
to any company in Ukraine.  
Both the PM1 director and foreign investor did not want to accept such treatment 
and decided to defend their company’s interests by pursuing a law suit. They tried to 
resolve the issue at all three levels of the judicial system (local, regional and 
national) and finally when they got to Kiev the decision was against the company. 
They lost their legitimate law suit. Thus, in the end they still had to apply for a 
license to be able to export. As a result, both the investor and the management of the 
company were completely disappointed in the system. Moreover, the investor started 
seriously thinking about withdrawing his investments.  
Similar regulatory inefficiencies, mistreatment of foreign investors and the poor-
functioning of law enforcement can be observed in interactions with officials 
responsible for customs, nontariff trade restrictions, taxes and other regulatory issues. 
The law does not exist for them. No matter what relevant legislation states, they can 
ignore it because there is always another law or normative act they can apply in a 
given situation. 
Contradictions between laws and the impossibility of defending one’s rights due 
to pervasive corruption are among the main problems hampering the work of both 
domestic and foreign enterprises in Ukraine. Moreover, most of the new rules are 
designed in a way that definitely creates more opportunities for corruption and deters 
real investors from entering Ukraine. All respondents unanimously affirm that 
corruption is rapidly and significantly growing and becoming more and more of a 
problem for the operation of businesses in Ukraine. 
Elite MNEs with a strong status in the global economy, feeling secure in their 
access to high- level authorities and protected by the power of head offices and home 
countries, are not afraid of the pressure of corruption. They admit that they face 
constant demands for monetary contributions from representatives of various 
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regulatory authorities, but say they do not give in to those demands. There were 
cases when these companies succeeded in requests for the dismissal of corrupt 
bureaucrats from office. However, other companies - predominantly representing 
developed countries - which do not have such strong support and do not want to give 
in their corporate rules and ethics to these pressures eventually have to exit the 
market under the growing burden of corruption. By contrast, companies less 
concerned with corporate conduct and business ethics continue to enter the Ukrainian 
market. This situation, on one hand, leads to the deterioration of the overall quality of 
iFDI and, on the other hand, exacerbates the problem of the monopolistic 
predominance of large companies in Ukrainian economy.  
There is also a pressure of a different kind. For example, the aforementioned 
PM1 director, representing metallurgical industry, disclosed that he was getting calls 
from the Presidential Administration regarding the purchase of tickets for a 
forthcoming concert of a famous foreign singer in the capital of Ukraine, Kiev. The 
Presidential Administration demanded that his company purchase a certain number 
(in this particular case seven) of tickets for this concert for the unimaginably high 
price of 30,000 grivnas which was almost an equivalent of $4,000 per ticket at the 
time. The chance to socialize with famous Ukrainian oligarchs and government 
representatives was offered as the main incentive for the purchase of these tickets. 
When the director refused to buy the tickets the person representing the Presidential 
Administration threatened that his company would be closed down. 
In response to the question about the extent of pressure on his company the same 
director said he felt that bigger companies that attract the higher degree of attention 
of powerful people are under much stronger and more contradictory pressure and 
admitted that: 
 The pressure is there but my company is just a relatively small one and 
there is not much that could be taken from it. 
The most vivid example of the lack of not only consistency but also absence of 
any common sense in the activity and actions of the Ukrainian legislative authorities 
and the Presidential Administration is the recent discussion of the need to decrease 
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several different tax rates in Ukraine, in particularly to reduce the value-added tax to 
12%. Nonetheless, at the same time the president signed the Law on Advance 
Corporation Tax. In other words, the president assured the public of his intention to 
cut taxes but at the same time decided to apply advanced corporation tax to 
companies paying dividends. Taking two such contradictory actions approved and 
executed by the same branch of government definitely does not add to the credibility 
of the Ukrainian authorities in the eyes of foreign investors. 
Similar state authorities’ behavioral inconsistency can be observed in a case of 
changes in value-added tax (VAT) in Ukraine. According to the Tax Law working in 
the country initially, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, all the companies had 
to pay a 20% VAT which was refundable at the end of each report period. The new 
Tax Code abolished VAT. After a short while state authorities revealed their plans on 
the VAT restoration. However, in reality under the VAT disguise they introduced a 
new non-refundable 20% tax. 
PA1 representative also revealed that, in spite of the state persistent attempts to 
attract his company to invest into Ukraine, the operations of the latter have been 
continually hindered by the same state officials at all phases of its existence. 
Problems with issuing and delays with obtaining of various permits, rejection to issue 
import licenses in time are just some of the bureaucrats’ corrupt pressure on foreign 
investors in Ukraine. 
Under these conditions of external pressure, inconsistencies and contradictions, 
experts suggest that, in spite of all instruments for attracting iFDI formally existing 
in Ukraine, foreign investors are at a disadvantage in comparison to domestic 
companies. The latter are much more knowledgeable about country-specific corrupt 
practices. This expertise is a necessary condition for successfully navigating the 
business environment in Ukraine. All the experts and low- and mid-range profile 
investors interviewed asserted that the foreign investors who feel most comfortable 
in Ukraine are those originating from countries with similar patterns of business – 




7.2.7 Pseudo-FDI in Ukraine 
7.2.7.1 Incentives for and impact of pseudo-FDI on real iFDI in Ukraine 
Pseudo-FDI or round tripping FDI are defined here as investments originated by 
offshore companies owned by Ukrainian elites. Experts EJ1, EJ2, EA1 and EA2 
acknowledge that, on one hand, it is good for the Ukrainian economy that money is 
coming back to the country of its origin but also argue that, on the other hand, the 
presence of this kind of investment plays a crucial role in sustaining the highly 
corrupt institutional order and environment in Ukraine.  
The prevalence and monopolistic behavior of pseudo-FDI in the country 
representing the interests of powerful domestic unified political and economic elite 
groups to a great extent explains the Ukrainian failure to create an attractive 
investment climate in the country and the reluctance of real foreign investors to 
enter, work and stay in this market.  
This phenomenon was initially triggered by the provisions of the first Law on 
FDI in Ukraine. This law gave FDI a more privileged status in comparison to 
domestic investment. This created an incentive for local investors and especially 
local elites to seek the ways of registering their investments as FDI. Consequently, 
most domestic investments were awarded FDI status either as a result of their inflow 
to the country from offshore zones or based on fake contracts with nonexistent 




Table 7.1. iFDI by country in Ukraine (at the beginning of the year), mln USD 
# Country 1996 2001 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
 Total 896.9 3875 6794.4 9047 16890 21607.3 29542.7 35616.4 40053 44708 
1 Cyprus 51.5 377.7 901.9 1101.4 1635.9 3187.5 5946.4 7646.2 9005.3 9914.6 
2 Germany 156.9 240.9 451.6 653.7 5503.7 5578.1 5918.3 6393 6601.9 7076.9 
3 Netherlands 46.5 362.2 459.9 637.2 919.5 1533.8 2508.8 3197.4 3954.5 4707.8 
4 Russia 50 286.6 388.6 720.8 835.8 1002.1 1462.4 1847.2 2566.4 3402.8 
5 Austria 16.4 124,5 252.4 361.1 1439.5 1633.8 2067.4 2443.8 2605.2 2658.2 
6 France 11.3 39.9 59.2 79 87.9 830.3 1044.8 1231.2 1630.8 2367.1 
7 UK 53.9 312 701.2 955.4 1174.8 1563.4 1975.5 2249.8 2307.5 2298.8 
8 Sweden 19.1 77.1 103.1 120.3 134.1 137.3 986.7 1262.8 1275.8 1729.9 
9 British Virgin Islands 5 192.8 367.5 582.2 736.5 806.2 1066.7 1294 1342.7 1460.8 
10 USA 183.3 639.5 1060.2 1190.6 1387.4 1396.8 1430.1 1464.6 1309.1 1192.4 
11 Italy 19.2 72.2 94.9 103.1 117.4 132.9 150.4 914.2 982 982.4 
12 Poland 20.5 62.8 152.7 194.7 225.5 394.6 672.1 690.1 866.7 935.8 
13 Switzerland 38.4 163.3 321.6 442.3 456.4 566.5 648 718 796.4 859.4 
14 Hungary 20 51.9 128.7 177.3 191 370.9 411.2 595.4 711.5 723.6 
15 Luxembourg 1 9.7 40.9 58.1 77.8 93.4 210.7 214.2 265.1 443.2 
16 Other countries 203.9 861.9 1310 1669.8 1966.8 2379.7 3043.2 3454.5 3832.1 3954.3 
Source: State Statistics Committee of Ukraine (2011). 
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Table 7.2. oFDI by country from Ukraine (at the beginning of the year), mln USD 
# Country 1996 2001 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
 Total 84.1 170.3 166 198.6 219.5 243.3 6196.6 6203.1 6226.3 6871.1 
1 Cyprus …* …* 1.9 2 2.1 10.3 5825.5 5826.1 5778.5 6342.5 
2 Russia 52.1 68.1 88 97.3 102.9 104 148.6 99.9 166.1 194.3 
3 Latvia …* …* …* …* …* 3.5 30.7 31.6 31.9 87.9 
4 Poland 0.3 0.3 0.4 21.1 21.3 24.2 30.1 46.9 49.4 49.1 




__ __ __ __ __ 0.1 10.9 14.3 20.8 25.8 
7 Kazakhstan __ …* 0 0 0 0.2 0.8 26.8 27.1 25.2 
8 Panama …* …* …* …* …* …* …* …* …* …* 
9 Spain __ …* …* …* …* …* …* …* …* …* 
10 Moldova 0 …* …* 0 0.9 1.3 26.7 26.6 15.2 15.2 
11 Switzerland 8.1 6.5 4.2 4.7 4 4.3 4.6 5 5.1 9.3 
12 Germany 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4 2.5 2.6 5.2 9.2 
13 Lithuania …* 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 2.9 4 …* ...* …* 
14 Armenia …* __ __ __ __ …* 12.8 13.5 …* …* 
15 USA 1.4 0.7 5.4 5.7 5.6 5.7 5.9 5.9 5.8 5.8 
16 Other 
countries 
11.5 30.2 30.4 32 47.1 45.3 32.3 35.7 39.5 22.7 
*In accordance with the Law of Ukraine “On State Statistics” this information is confidential. 
Source: State Statistics Committee of Ukraine (2011). 
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All three interviewed legal advisors suggested that another not less important 
motive for pseudo-FDI is the search for efficient forms of investment protection. 
They argued that the flaws of the judicial system in Ukraine lead more and more 
investors to seek a legal shelter for their investment overseas in offshore zones. Since 
the domestic judicial system does not provide equal access to justice and is not 
guided by the rule of law, more and more even small and medium size firm owners 
opt to operate in the Ukrainian market as foreign investors protected by the laws of 
various offshore states. This partially explains the consistent growth (especially 
during the last 3 years) of volumes of oFDI and iFDI to and from such countries as 
Cyprus, UK, the Virgin Islands, Panama, Netherlands and others (see Table 7.1 and 
Table 7.2). The interviewed experts insisted that even iFDI from Germany, Austria, 
the Netherlands and UK comes predominantly from holdings whose origins are 
impossible to trace. 
7.2.7.2 Distinctive characteristic nurturing growth of pseudo-FDI in Ukraine 
Interviewed experts argued that a certain amount of round tripping FDI is present 
in any developed, developing or transition country and, in spite of that, many such 
countries are extremely successful in terms of both creating an attractive investment 
climate and attracting high quality FDI. It can be explained by the fact that according 
to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) experts’ estimates offshore companies 
either do not appear in the top five major investors or they account for no more than 
5% of iFDI (Pryadko, 2013). However, EJ1 suggests that in the case of Ukraine there 
is an additional important element exacerbates the existing institutional voids, 
inefficiencies and corruption further preventing the country from realizing its 
theoretical ambitions. This element is the system of power established by the first 
Ukrainian president, Leonid Kuchma.  
EJ1 identifies the Ukrainian system of power as comparable to the system of 
power in Muscovy, which is referred to as the ‘feeding system’. He describes the 
functioning of this system in the following way:  
The tsar assigns his boyars [vassals] certain territories to manage. The 
boyars, in their turn, reassign parts of these territories to their own 
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vassals, and so on. Each of them is feeding from his/her territory. As a 
result, the ‘feeding system’, which can be compared to centralization of 
power, emerges. However, the main difference between centralization of 
power and the ‘feeding system’ is that in the case of the latter the Tsar or 
the President does not have any control over the territories assigned to the 
boyars or regional authorities.  
The Tsar’s and his boyars’ main concerns are receipt of money and 
obtaining other important preferential treatments. Nothing else is 
important for them. That is why when the President encourages foreign 
investors to invest into certain regions and promises them his and regional 
authorities’ support he cannot actually guarantee the support of the latter. 
Even though officially it would look like that regional authorities are 
assisting investors, in reality, unless representatives of regional agencies 
directly control the incoming foreign business and, as a result, have their 
own interest in supporting its development, in most cases their help and 
services would actually be unproductive. 
The analysis of the literature on Russian history (Ignatov, 2002; Lyubavskiy, 
2000; Lyubavskiy, 2012; Granovskiy, 1868) confirms the above statement and 
provides evidence that the Grand Prince, later Tsar, shared his power with feudal 
princes, later boyars/ vassals, who had significant sovereign rights on their territories. 
They judged the land and "robbery" disputes, collected taxes, custom duties, tributes 
and other exactions, had their own Chancellery, the Boyar Duma. In general, feudal 
princes independently controlled all the internal affairs of their designated territories. 
The basic administrative units were regions that were further divided into smaller 
territorial units, each of which were ruled by appointed governors pursuing their own 
interests.  Thus, administrative-territorial division lacked standardization and, due to 
the lack of centralization of government and control over the regions, resulted in 
highly diversified and archaic rent-seeking governance (Ignatov, 2002; Lyubavskiy, 
2000; Lyubavskiy, 2012; Granovskiy, 1868).  
Similarly, nowadays as a result of the strong pressure of regional authorities real 
foreign investors, even large investors and MNEs, are disappearing in many 
231 
 
Ukrainian regions (Korrespondent, 2013). Pojansky (2013) also specifically stresses 
that due to the lack of central authorities’ intelligence on and control over the 
Ukrainian regions, the latter cultivate an environment encouraging corruptive 
behavior among the representatives of all dispute-resolution state authorities, namely 
courts, law-enforcement agencies and local administrative organs. The interviewed 
experts claim that the environment is a little bit more favorable in the capital due to 
the multiple centers of power. 
7.2.7.1 Crisis and pseudo-FDI 
Interestingly, experts note that due to the pseudo-FDI nature the 2008 crisis made 
pseudo-FDI a much popular business operation model in Ukraine. Moreover, the 
crisis strengthened pseudo-FDI’s competitiveness and bargaining power in Ukrainian 
markets.  
7.2.8 Raiding in Ukraine 
In general, the majority of smaller joint ventures and foreign investors in the 
sample were thinking about either withdrawing their investments or had already lost 
their foreign partners due to the deterioration of the institutional environment in 
Ukraine and/or raiding attempts. Due to the latter the company in a chemical 
industry, PCP1, lost its foreign partners. After three to four years of fighting and 
litigation the company survived the attack owing to its impeccable business conduct 
and absolute transparency. However, its foreign investors, despite having a high 
profile and status in the world economy as well as home state support, as a result, 
strong bargaining power, refused to renew their partnership with the company. They 
explained that, they prefer to invest into countries with lower rates of political, 
operational and legislative risks (India in this particular case), despite the lower 
expertise level of skills there. 
Experts indicated that some sectors are less likely to become a target of a raiding 
attack. For example, companies working in information technology (IT) sector 
usually do not have many assets. Their main asset is their employees. The risks of 
loosing employees as a result of an illegal forced changed of ownership prevent 
raiders from pursuing such companies (Pojansky, 2013). Weather risks, capital, 
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experience and expertise intensity makes agricultural businesses much less attractive 
for raiders as well (Pojansky, 2014). Thus, raiders prefer to focus on companies 
controlling valuable physical assets (Pojansky, 2014). 
The legal advisors interviewed suggested that a sophisticated enterprise security 
scheme is one of the corner-stones ensuring the successful protection of any business 
in Ukraine. Such a scheme would need to include internal regulations, instructions, 
employee contracts, separation of the terms of their authority, etc. However, these 
experts admitted that unfortunately most businesses do not have one while the 
representatives of low- and mid-range profile companies with FDI insist that the 
chances that such sophisticated enterprise security would really help to protect their 
assets from illegal seizure are very slim.  They believe that it would only work for 
companies possessing strong intangible assets, such as close relationships with power 
elites. As a result, they argued that the case of surviving a raiding attempt described 
above is an isolated one, the exception rather than the rule. There is a great deal of 
evidence of much less successful outcomes. 
Berezhna (2008) reported that $2 bln. out of the $3 bln. annual volume of 
mergers and acquisitions (M&A) were actually raiding takeovers. Moreover, the rate 
of success of corporate raiding attacks in Ukraine is shockingly high. In nine out of 
ten cases legitimate business owners lose their Ukrainian operations due to legally 
backed raiders’ criminal activity (Berezhna, 2008).  Moreover, experts emphasize 
that raiders’ attacks on companies with FDI have increased significantly over the 
time (Berezhna, 2008; Frishberg & Partners, 2012), especially after the President’s 
Yanukovich commencement to power in 2010 (Danilova, 2012; Rojansky, 2013).  
Very representative are the cases of large companies with FDI raiding attacks and 
takeovers, such as MNE Bunge owning 94% of  the Dnipropetrovsk Oil-Extracting 
Factory (Berezhna, 2008), 95% US owned the Zhytomir Sweets Factory (Danilova, 
2012), a wholly owned foreign enterprises Aypronimpeks – Ukraine working in a 
service industry in Ukraine (Zaxvat.net; 2013). Four large food and beverages 
industry companies, namely Khlibzavod, Nemiroff Holdings, Lesnoy Kiev, and 
Kirsanovskiy Sugar Factory were raided were raided in one month (Frishberg & 
Partners, 2012). EU diplomats revealed names of three Polish companies, Gorkis 
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Granit, Organika and Kievmetalprom, struggling to preserve their ownership rights. 
Moreover, they also disclosed that at the same time more than fifty other EU foreign 
investors reported attempts of raiding their companies in Ukraine (Rettman, 2011). 
Even such world number one steel titan as Arcelor Mittal had been striving with 
Ukrainian oligarchs over its major steel production facility in Ukraine, the 
Krivorozhstal (Rettman, 2001). 
Such a persistent increase in deterioration of an already weak property rights 
regime in Ukraine is, first of all, nurtured by omnipresent corruption, mutual 
dependence and cooperation of administrative, judicial, economic and political elites 
directed by their personal financial interests, raiders’ connectedness to oligarchs 
representing a new power elite - a product of merging political, economic and 
criminal powers, and, as a result, complete disregard of  legitimacy of claims and 
state interests. An unsuccessful dispute of a large US company Vanco over its deep 
oil drilling project in Ukrainian courts due to its non-compliance with the interests of 
powerful oligarchic elite group represented by high-rank state official, in this 
particular case Yulia Tymoshenko (Frishberg & Partners, 2012), provides vivid 
evidence on insecurity of even large elite MNEs from the developed countries. 
Obviously, under such conditions both existing and potential foreign investors will 
be reluctant to associate their future business plans with this country.  
7.2.9 Merging of political, economic and criminal powers in Ukraine 
The problem of the merging of political, economic and criminal powers in 
Ukraine is very acute. EJ1, EJ2, EA1, EA2, ELA1 and ELA3 alleged that currently 
politics is a business project. Any decisions about introduction of new reforms in all 
spheres of state activity or attracting new foreign investment to the country are 
controlled by financial industrial groups (FIGs). In other words, foreign investors’ 
ability to enter and safely operate in the Ukrainian market, for at least certain period 
of time, is completely dependent on and determined by the interests of the major 
groups controlling all domains of power in the country. 
The most vivid example of such circumstances is an investment project in the 
Ukrainian port industry, SL1. The analysis of this case shows that the attraction of a 
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major foreign direct investor was a by-product of a growing Ukrainian FIG’s export 
appetites and, consequent need to increase their competitiveness, accompanied by 
their fear and, what is even more important, reluctance to make long-term investment 
commitments to any development projects, including improvement and renovation of 
port facilities in Ukraine.  
Having considered all the available options based on the needs of their own 
businesses, representatives of FIGs came to the conclusion that they needed to 
change the existing legislation on the port industry.  
However, apart from several singular cases of large real foreign investment 
projects nourished by the private interests of large businesses having strong 
representation in politics, experts stated that since 2010 they have observed almost 
no low- or mid-range profile foreign investors in Ukraine. In support of the above 
statement ELA1 specified that his firm registered on average 20-30 companies with 
FDI a year in one industry in one region between 2000 and 2010. Starting in 2010 
(when Viktor Yanukovich succeeded Viktor Yushchenko as president of the country) 
the situation drastically deteriorated. Only one company a year was registered during 
the last four years. 
In explaining the reasons for the decline in foreign investors’ interest in the 
Ukrainian market all experts emphasized that the growing investment activity of 
FIGs, which are not interested in allowing and supporting the development of healthy 
competition in the Ukrainian market. Moreover, they asserted that these business 
groups feel very confident and secure because they have extremely strong leverage 
on the political sphere in the country which they successfully lobby to prevent all 
institutional reforms that might threaten their businesses interests. 
Also, in contrast to the previous example both FIGs and other local Ukrainian 
businesses are, in most cases, interested in preventing foreign investors’ entry into 
the Ukrainian market which they see as undermining their competitive advantage. 
Interviewees representing the service sector, including ST2, ST3, SBF1, SBF2, SC2, 
SC3, point out that: 
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Every single Ukrainian politician owns a business and, as a result, in one 
way or another represents his/ her own interests. Thus, the primary goal of 
such politicians is to provide the most favorable conditions for their own 
businesses. That is why all their legislative activity is not focused on the 
search for solutions which would contribute to the improvement of 
operational conditions for all businesses in industries of their particular 
interest. Ultimately the success in promoting the politician-businessman’s 
personal interests depends on the support of his/ her colleagues (from an 
interview with SBF1). 
Personal connections and relations with representatives of various relevant 
authorities or state officials are an important means of hindering the entry of foreign 
investors. Good example of this includes the failure of real foreign investors to 
secure participation in such projects as the reconstruction of the Odessa airport and 
the privatization of Odessa Portside Plant. In both cases some unknown offshore 
companies from Cyprus won the tenders.  
Therefore, respondents said that it is not a secret that if a company has 
connections with powerful oligarchs and representatives of authorities, the business 
is going to be more or less secure; otherwise it could be in great danger.  
In general, all experts unanimously agreed that politics is a business project in 
Ukraine; the primary motivating factor underlying all political decisions is the 
accommodation of the business interests of deputies and various state officials who 
own or act on behalf of a significant share of businesses in Ukraine. 
Subsequently, ELA1 stated that in his opinion, though capable causing 
significant changes in individual characteristics of institutional environment, even 
elite group of MNEs cannot and are not really interested in politically influencing 
any systemic changes in Ukraine.  
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7.2.10 Scope of corruption accompanying and supporting the process of 
merging political, economic and criminal powers in Ukraine 
To demonstrate the scope of merging powers and corruption in Ukraine and what 
foreign investors are facing upon entering the Ukrainian market, we present a 
detailed account of a case of corruption provided by the executive director of a small 
domestic construction firm (PPSB2), a representative of the auxiliary group of our 
research sample. 
All interviewed experts unanimously agreed that redistribution of the land titles is 
one of the most corrupted spheres in Ukraine. Moreover, even though the major 
phase of land redistribution, which started in 1991, was over by the 2000s, today it 
remains the most attractive domain for disputes of corrupted officials over their 
influence and ownership rights of certain territories. In this process the largest share 
of state land was divided between high ranking state officials practically free of 
charge. The following case is a vivid example of this. 
A high ranking local-level state official decided to divide in to smaller pieces and 
cell his misappropriated 35-hectare or 35000 square meters piece of land that had 
previously belonged to a large industrial plant which lost its rights to it without any 
compensation in the mid 1990s due to high corruptive pressure on local authorities 
from its powerful prospective owner. Obviously it was not the only lot under the 
ownership of this particular boss. Other powerful persons, including local, regional 
and state officials, had also similarly gained control over the plots of land formerly 
belonging to the state. What is distinctive in this case is the fact that no titles had 
been officially transferred to the persons who had gained control over this land. 
Instead, either the plots were tacitly acknowledged as their respective possessions, or 
the deeds were transferred to third parties or companies based on rental agreements. 
In any event, the official in question decided to divide his 35-hectare plot into 
smaller plots and sell them. 
He transferred the land into the possession of a small construction company 
PPSB2, in which he unofficially owned 90% of the shares. PPSB2 then divided the 
land into approximately 900 small lots of 32 square meters each and rented them for 
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$1,500 per lot to interested parties under the provision that they acquire it for the 
construction of small summer houses.  In reality both parties secretly agreed that this 
rental contract was actually a sale contract. At the time of transaction PPBS2 had no 
legal ownership rights to the land and could not sell it. So, the actual buyers had no 
ownership rights to their lots in accordance with their official rental agreements. In 
other words, they consciously became accessories to corruption and assumed very 
high risks by investing in this illegal project.  
 
At this point more than 900 people were involved in this corrupt project managed 
by the top local state official.  
After this state of affairs had persisted for several years almost all available lots 
had been ‘sold’ and the PPBS2 began the official process of land registration. To 
complete this process the company needed to obtain the legal permit for the 
allotment of land meaning its official transfer from the state to the company. The 
State Agency on Land Resources in Kiev, capital of Ukraine, is the institution 
responsible for the oversight of such activities. The PPBS2 representative had to pay 
a $25,000 bribe to someone at this agency to issue the official transfer and 
entitlement document. Additionally, a further $15,000 of bribes was distributed 
between other state agencies and authorities in the following proportion: 
- $7,000 paid to someone from the Health and Safety Agency in return for a 
permit attesting that the state of the acquired land satisfied all the 
requirements for the construction of small summer houses. 
- $3,000 was paid to representative(s) of the Fire Inspection Agency for a 
document confirming that the company territory development plan met all the 
standards stipulated by fire safety rules and regulations such as, for example, 
availability of driveways of the appropriate size, fire hydrants, etc. It is worth 
noting that in fact none of these conditions had been fulfilled up to the time of 
the interview. 
- the last $5,000 was paid to the Electric Agency for the allocation of a kilowatt 
limit and permission to install transformers  and electric cables. 
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In sum the representative of PPBS2 paid $40,000 in bribes. All the bribe money 
was collected from the owners of the lots. Moreover, each of the small lots’ owners 
spent another $10,000 on the registration of their ownership of the land. Thus, 
approximately $9 mln. were distributed among various state officials as bribes. The 
state official who owned the land did not spend a penny out of his pocket but made 
approximately $1,350,000 (900 lots x $1500 each) of pure profit out of this illegal 
endeavor. Of course neither the state officials – bribes recipients nor the owner of the 
land declared their income and paid any taxes on it to the state. 
This case is indicative of the scope and the scale of corruption in Ukraine. It 
provides evidence of a strong network of corruption including state official at all 
levels. Moreover, it demonstrates that numerous employees of various state agencies 
and organizations can benefit substantially from even the sale of such small plots of 
land. Based on this evidence it can be deduced that Ukrainian state officials are 
absolutely uninterested in fighting corruption in the country. 
7.2.10 Bargaining power 
The findings from this research provide evidence for a ‘blind bargaining’ 
hypothesis in the case of all industries and for the relevance of the political 
bargaining thesis in transition countries. The respondents representing industries that 
are strategically important for the ruling elite indicate that their bargaining power 
increased in proportion to these elites’ reliance on their services.  
All but one large MNEs with an exclusive status in the global economy declared 
that their bargaining power did not change or decreased slightly due to a natural 
course of development. Under certain circumstances, their bargaining power can 
increase as witnessed by SL1, one of the partially state owned MNEs belonging to 
the elite group in our research sample. This is usually the case when the progress of 
certain state policies and programs or prosperity of businesses with strong political 
connections is dependent on or benefits from the presence of such companies. 
For example, the above mentioned transport and logistics company SL1 revealed 
that powerful financial industrial groups in Ukraine were interested in their presence 
due to their lack of relevant expertise and reluctance to risk the investment of large 
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amounts into projects necessary for the development of their business and the growth 
of their competitiveness in the world market. Here, the danger exists that upon the 
completion of such a project the relevant MNE can lose at least part of its bargaining 
power. The extent of this fall in bargaining power will depend on the company’s 
status in the global economy and its ability to protect its rights and interests. In this 
particular case the subsidiary under consideration most probably will be able to 
secure its bargaining position due to the privileged status resulting from its partial 
home-state ownership, reputation and its origination from a very strong and reputable 
developed country actively protecting the interests of its businesses around the 
world. 
Overall, the experts interviewed suggested that by their nature such companies 
possess substantial resources, international expertise and well established 
mechanisms of interaction with and influence on various state institutions and power. 
While most of the interviewees from this group of companies indicated their 
dissatisfaction with multiple elements of the Ukrainian business, economic and 
political environment in contrast to other groups of foreign investors they actually 
have the capacity to protect their interests.  
One of the main sources of sustainable bargaining power for large-scale joint 
ventures and MNEs, especially from developed countries, is the support of their 
home state governments and embassies. An ideal example of the importance of such 
support can be found in the attempt to force ArcelorMittal to sell its business in 
Ukraine for a pittance. In spite of the company’s status in the world economy it was 
harassed with numerous inspections. The tax authorities rejected the company’s 
absolutely legitimate request for refund of its value-added tax. Experts are convinced 
that without vigorous backing of the MNE by the French government even such an 
industrial giant as ArcelorMittal would have to give in to the illegitimate pressure 
from Ukrainian authorities and sell the company on unfavorable terms. 
Both experts and representatives of the companies with iFDI claimed in the 
interviewes that the foreign investors’ pro-activeness, changes in the strength of their 
bargaining power and effectiveness in defending their interests to a great extent 
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depend on the status, experience, personality, reputation, relational resources and 
other characteristics of the manager or CEO.  
Low- and mid-range profile foreign investors, including less developed 
countries’ joint ventures and companies with private investors, agree that they have 
never possessed any bargaining power in Ukraine. The majority of such companies 
believe that their bargaining power was significantly higher in the 1990’s as 
compared to the present time and point to the skyrocketing corruption and 
deterioration of the rule of laws as some of the main causes of these changes. It is 
noteworthy that the latter statement is not supported by the official data on corruption 
provided by Transparancy International (2014). According to their assessment 
corruption perception index was quite stable over the discussed period. Further more 
detailed both qualitative and quantitative studies of such sensitive topic as corruption 
could help explaining this controversy. 
Overall it can be inferred that elite MNEs are the only group of foreign investors’ 
that can claim to possess a certain degree of bargaining power in Ukraine. All the 
rest of the foreign investors insist that they do not have any bargaining power in 
Ukraine.  
7.2.12 Summary 
This section of the qualitative study addressed the first research question on the 
applicability of existing bargaining frameworks, including obsolescing, political and 
‘blind bargaining’ models, to various groups of companies with FDI in Ukraine. This 
analysis shows that obsolescing and political bargaining models are not sufficient for 
explaining and understanding FIs – host state bargaining relationships in transition 
countries. First of all, both models focus only on the analysis of MNEs’ 
charactersitcis and bargaining behavior in recipient states. Neglecting or failing to 
account for other groups of FIs significantly decreases explanatory power of both 
tools in neo-patrimonial states. Development of a “blind barganing’ model, 
acknowledging that host country decisions are driven by the interests of the ruling 
political-economic clans for increasing their businesses’ comeptitiveness and 
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distinguishing two types of FIs, such as real and pseudo-FIs, allows capturing 
differences in their respective goals, resources, and constraints.  
This part of the study provides evidence that real iFDI, particularly middle and 
low-profile FIs, face multiple additional pressures and constraints in neo-patrimonial 
states. Primary sources of FIs’ concerns in such countries include loss of 
competitiveness to and pressure from pseudo FIs due to their stronger tacit relational 
resources, local experience, and knowledge; merging political, economic, and 
criminal powers; behavioral inconsistency and conflict between demands of different 
state authorities; corruption; raiding. 
7.3 Foreign investors’ political behavior and patterns of interaction with 
institutional environment in Ukraine 
7.3.1 Foreign investors’ organizational structure of relations with host state 
institutions 
7.3.1.1 Low- and mid-range profile foreign investors – in-house organization 
This research revealed several patterns with regards to various categories of 
foreign investors’ perceptions and approaches to the management of their relations 
with host state institutions. Very distinctive are the facts that no low-profile investors 
and only half of mid-range profile foreign investors have a systemic vision of 
company government relations or perceive a potential benefit from establishing 
specialized units responsible for strategic interactions with Ukrainian institutions 
(such as, departments for corporate government relations or affairs, corporate public 
affairs or lobbying).  
The primary reasons for this stance are a lack of financial and relational resources 
and the predominantly illegitimate nature of claims which representatives of state 
authorities impose on companies. As a result, low- and mid-range companies with 
FDI opt for low-profile behavior. Staying out of the spotlight of corrupt state 
officials helps them to protect their operations and increase the chances of their 
businesses’ survival in Ukraine. 
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 However, no matter how much these companies try to escape excessive 
intervention by the Ukrainian state authorities, as legal business entities they still 
have to report to multiple, predominantly regulatory, bodies on various issues. These 
interactions are handled by specific functional field specialists; for example, manager 
and certain specialists of tax departments deal with all tax-related inquiries, legal 
consultants are in charge of all legal and court matters, executive directors and 
employees of health and safety departments deal with fire, sanitary, and health and 
safety inspections, etc. The directors or CEOs are responsible for all general 
government relations issues and unresolved functional problems that are passed on to 
them by various departments. 
7.3.1.2 Elite MNEs and the higher middle-range profile foreign investors – in-
house organization 
A half of the mid-profile foreign investors’ and elite MNEs’ organizational 
structure of relationship with regulatory state authorities on routine functional issues 
is similar to the one adopted by low- and the other half of mid-range profile foreign 
investors. However, in contrast to the latter group, all the interviewed elite MNEs 
had public, international or government affairs or relations specialist positions or 
specialized public relations, international relations, corporate affairs and/ or 
government relations departments (further referred to hereinafter as government 
relations departments). 
Government relations departments’ main objective is to ensure a favorable 
climate for successful development of their businesses. Respondents report that 
accomplishment of this goal requires performing most of the activities comprising 
the full cycle of issue management analysis and policy-making. The former includes 
environmental scanning, issues identification, issues monitoring and/ or strategy 
formulation, strategy implementation, and evaluation.  
All interviewees declared that primary concern of their work in this domain is 
legislation and decisions of various state authorities that could have a negative 
impact on the operations of their businesses in the country. They said that the success 
of their mission consisted in achieving the most favorable outcome for the qualitative 
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growth of their businesses depends upon their efficient consolidation of two mutually 
supportive lines of work in reshaping institutional environment, namely persistent 
continuous analysis of existing and forthcoming legislation and normative acts and 
cultivation of trusting reputable relationships with decision-making state officials. 
These relationships are a critical source of MNEs’ bargaining power in the process of 
their negotiations with state officials. 
7.3.1.3 Subsidiary - head office interactions on the subject of relationships with 
Ukrainian institutions 
All respondents representing elite MNEs’ subsidiaries in Ukraine claimed that 
they are not dependent on head office directives in their interactions with Ukrainian 
public institutions saying that they are only required to inform their colleagues in 
head offices about the results of their issue management analysis, their planned 
responses to any identified problems and their proactive strategic initiatives with 
regard to the institutional landscape in Ukraine. Their relationships with the head 
office and other subsidiaries’ departments are of a strictly consultative nature. 
Moreover, 40% of these research participants emphasized that they are competent to 
manage not only all Ukrainian institutional dilemmas but also wider post-Soviet, 
CEE and SEE regional issues of this nature without referring them to head offices. 
Low- and mid-range profile foreign investors, by contrast, admit that they are 
much more dependent on their headquarters in their host-country institution-building 
strategic decision-making and activities. 
7.3.2 Branches of power and levels of foreign investor – state interactions 
A clear distinction can be seen in the patterns of low- and mid-range profile 
investors’ and elite MNEs’ involvement in relationships with various branches of 
power at different levels. All elite MNEs representatives declared that they are highly 
involved in and constantly seeking dialog with both the Ukrainian population and the 
authorities.   
Naturally, elite MNEs are very actively building their relationships with local 
authorities and communities in regions where their production facilities or offices are 
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located. These are primarily local regulatory bodies responsible for, e.g., tax, health 
and safety, fire departments, and customs.  
These foreign investors said that they also work a lot with local communities by 
investing significant resources into various projects based on the principles of 
corporate social responsibility. For example, PFBT1, as a leader in its sector, 
supports programs on healthy eating and healthy life style. In pursuit of these goals 
the company has built various sport facilities for the public. Additionally, to 
encourage the adoption of this new culture by the general population, the firm’s 
government and public relations staff work persistently with local district, city and 
regional authorities. PA1 was an organizer and sponsor of book fairs and public 
educational lectures on various pressing and general issues. 
At the national level, elite MNEs have access to, and actively cooperate directly 
with, cabinet of ministers, the Presidential Administration, and the parliament 
(Ukrainian: Verkhovna Rada). Interviewees emphasized that direct access to these 
critical decision-making centers provides them with a certain bargaining leverage 
and advantage over their competitors. 
Public Relations Director at PFBT3 explains that: 
Strong global players like our company feels much more secure in 
Ukrainian and similar markets due to its access to high level host, home, and 
international authorities. 
As mentioned above, both low- and mid-range profile investors prefer avoiding 
any unnecessary contacts with any authorities at all levels due to a lack of resources 
and a fear of being noticed and, as a result, becoming victims of extortion by corrupt 
authorities.  
7.3.3 Foreign investors’ impact on institutional environment in Ukraine 
EJ1 suggested that to identify the impact of foreign investors on institutions in 
Ukraine, first of all, it is necessary to categorize investments by their status, 
relational resources, and scope of operations.  
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Three representatives of the elite group, large MNEs from developed countries 
that were pioneers among foreign investors in Ukraine (starting their operations there 
in the very beginning of the 1990s), claimed that they were very active in their 
attempts to contribute to the establishment of high quality institutions in the country, 
in general, and all rules directly affecting the activity of MNEs in the industry, in 
particular.  
PFBT1 stated that from the very first day of the company’s operations in Ukraine 
in the beginning of the 1990s, the company management was involved in attempts to 
actively influence the country’s leadership through various channels and by different 
means including but not limited to participation in foreign investment forums, 
presidential foreign investment councils and boards, and collaborating and 
maintaining constant dialog with all authorities and officials offering various options 
for future development in the field.  
Interestingly, the same interviewee called special attention to the fact that even 
though his company is still very successful in its ability to influence and reach the 
desired results even on extremely complex issues; recently this has required much 
more effort and become more difficult than was the case in the past.  
All interviewees unanimously agreed that pseudo-FDI undoubtedly has a 
negative impact on the institutional environment in Ukraine. 
Additionally, expert EJ1 insisted that foreign investment whose inflow is 
supported by different state institutions has a neutral or even negative impact on 
institutional arrangements in Ukraine because inherently such FDI cannot change the 
existing system of the corruption of power in the country. Due to the fact that these 
investors directly negotiate with the authorities whose representatives are motivated, 
first of all, by their personal private interests in attracting particular investors, the 
latter are actually becoming a part of a state protection racket system and, as a result, 
can be considered as an integral component of the existing corrupt system. 
As a result, it can be inferred that presence of both of the last two discussed iFDI 
types do not improve either investment climate or institutional environment in the 
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country because inherently they are not real iFDI but one of the elements of existing 
shadow economic and political market system in Ukraine. 
7.3.4 Channels and instruments of influence 
Expert EINGO1 said that at the time of the interview (August 2012) the 
identification of the channels and means by which companies with FDI attempt to 
initiate some changes in the institutional environment and to fill multiple existing 
institutional voids in Ukraine was a very challenging task. He said that either the 
state system as a whole was going through a major crisis, or a crisis of the ruling elite 
at the time (under the presidency of both Vikto Yushchenko and Viktor Yanukovich) 
was underway, or Ukraine was even experiencing a crisis regarding its very 
nationhood originated in the failed promises of the Orange revolution in 2004. This 
crisis, he said, had let to a loss of responsibility for, and consistency in, decision 
making, resulting in a radical deterioration of trust in public officials at all levels.  
These remarks have at least to some extent been borne out by the events that led 
to the collapse of Yanukovich’s presidency in February 2014 (one and a half years 
after the interview), followed by the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation 
and the rise of separatist movements in eastern Ukraine. 
7.3.4.1 Relationships with authorities and corruption 
EINGO1 asserted that 10 years previously to reach a certain goal it was enough 
for both domestic companies and foreign investors to lobby their interests using 
economic, political, administrative, relational and corrupt channels. The choice of 
certain combinations of channels and relevant instruments depended on the issues, 
the company’s ethical principles and the strength of its bargaining power determined 
by the company’s status in the world economy.  
For example, in September 1997, the large Korean automotive industry MNE 
Daewoo, using economic, relational and corrupt channels, was able to lobby for the 
passage of the law “on promotion of automobile production in Ukraine”, which 
significantly improved its competitiveness and increased its profitability in Ukrainian 
market. The outcome of this company’s effort was legislation remaining in force for 
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a long period (until now), which, not only made it unprofitable to bring used cars into 
the country, but also to establish favorable conditions for the lobbying company by – 
among other things - significantly increasing duties for its competitors.  
It is noteworthy that in this case decision makers were committed to their 
agreements. The law remained in power even after the Korean investor left the 
Ukrainian market.  
Nowadays, by contrast, this stability, security and long-term commitment to 
decisions - even those secured by corrupting state officials – have almost completely 
eroded. Any company, either domestic or with foreign investments, can still 
successfully lobby its interests. However, in contrast with practices prevailing earlier, 
officials receiving a better offer or an order from their official supervisors and/or 
unofficial bosses can override their previous decisions or issue new laws, decrees or 
court rulings which, though they do not annul the benefits created by the previous 
law provide better working conditions and leverage for competitors.  
The most vivid illustration is the case of ‘Livella’, a pseudo-FDI company with 
FDI in oil and gas industry. This company was somehow able to obtain a court ruling 
that allowed it to import its products into Ukraine without import duty, excise tax and 
value-added tax. As a result, this company became an industry leader in Ukraine and, 
according to different sources, controlled approximately 40 - 50% (Auto-consulting, 
2011) or even 80% (News oilru.com, 2011) of the oil market in Ukraine.  
Based on this evidence seventeen out of twenty one interviewed experts conclude 
that at present in Ukraine personal relations and friendship with members of the 
ruling elite and representatives of the parallel criminal hierarchy are the most 
efficient channels for companies to exercise influence on the institutional 
environment. Respectively, this dependence on incumbents’ perception and almost 
absolute absence of fair mechanisms controlling the changes in institutional 
environment greatly decreases the confidence of all businesses, including foreign 
investors’, in the security of their future operations and even continued existence in 
the country. This, in turn, partially explains the reluctance of new foreign investors to 
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enter, and the growing tendency of existing foreign investors to exit, the Ukrainian 
market. 
Under such circumstances it is also not surprising that the fear to become public 
and to reveal any information about them grow into the most important problem for 
low and mid-range profile foreign investors. Three quarters of these companies 
explained that very often they just literally hide from any public involvement, 
assuming a very passive position and, as a result, avoiding any attention. Therefore 
they usually do not participate in any forums, round tables and any other activities 
through which they could contribute to filling the existing institutional voids and to 
initiating changes in the institutional environment. 
7.3.4.2 Other channels 
The huge chasm between elite MNEs on one hand and low- and mid-range 
profile foreign investors on the other with respect to their ability to protect their 
businesses in Ukraine leads to significant differences in means at their disposal for 
voicing their concerns and opinions and for providing advice to officials on various 
institutional issues. 
All elite MNEs, half of the mid-range profile foreign investors and foreign 
contractors working in Ukraine also identified international arbitration as an efficient 
means of protecting their companies’ interests in Ukraine. For example, PIFC1 
disclosed that at the time the interview was conducted his company was involved in 
international arbitration case with a state of Ukraine regarding the collection of their 
receivables. The company representative clarifies that initially the company tried to 
resolve the issue locally but due to the lack of success of such attempts and 
approaching a three-year term limitation to claiming the rights they had to initiate 
and international arbitration case. 
Moreover, Director of PIFC1 reveals that: 
It is not the first time we have to turn to international arbitration to 
receive full compensation for our work in Ukraine. We have already 
249 
 
completed several large state projects in the country and in approximately 
half of the cases we had to take the same route.  
All representatives of elite MNEs also declared that their primary channel of 
communicating both with authorities and the public was domestic and international 
mass media. They stressed that their close cooperation with various media outlets 
enables them to reach out to very wide audiences and, as a result, ensured that their 
thoughts are conveyed to both authorities and the public. By contrast, due to the 
vulnerability of their position in Ukraine and fear to become public (as discussed 
above) mid- and low-range profile foreign investors completely reject mass media as 
an instrument for protecting and promoting their interests. 
Elite MNEs representatives also pointed out the role of various international and 
domestic business and professional organizations including the European Business 
Association, American Chamber of Commerce, European Trade Chamber, 
Ukrainian-American Business Council, and multiple domestic industrial business 
associations. Foreign investors spoke in varying degrees about their confidence in the 
ability of representatives of such organizations to promote their members’ collective 
interests due to collectively invested into them authority and resources have better 
chances.  
Every foreign investor, regardless of status, country of origin, form of ownership 
and investment decision rationale, acknowledged the significance of informal 
connections as one of the most efficient means and channels for promoting its 
interests and resolving its problems. It is through this channel that they are able to 
secure the access to officials that enabled them to directly communicate their ideas 
and concerns in personal meetings. 
Elite MNEs also identified regular communication and cooperation with officials 
at all levels as a very efficient instrument for strengthening the company’s position in 
the market, reinforcing its reputation, and forming and developing a company culture 
of interactions with and impact on the Ukrainian institutional environment, and in 
particular the cultivation of relationships with state officials at all levels. 
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7.3.5 Relationships between a level of the institutional framework’s 
development, operation and cooperation modes 
Interestingly, experts emphasized that the choice of channels, instruments and 
cooperation modes of companies with FDI in undertaking their political activities 
depends on their choice of an operation mode in Ukraine. Here foreign investors 
should be automatically divided into two categories: those businesses which adopt a 
Ukrainian operation mode and those which prefer to preserve their reputation and 
maintain their transparency.  
The Ukrainian mode of operation in business allows businesses to minimize their 
costs and expenses, since in Ukraine each business has an option to decide either to 
pay taxes or not. In the latter case, companies do not register their real profits 
officially; instead, they unofficially pay a certain percentage to state officials (usually 
it is approximately 8-10% of company turnover) and pay very low official salaries 
making up the difference to their employees in envelopes distributed to them 
unofficially. Transparent businesses, of course, truthfully report all their transactions 
and profits. 
Both fully and partially foreign owned companies choosing the first mode have 
no recourse to official legal mechanisms such as involvement of public, various 
media resources, investors’ coalitions, home country embassies, international 
diplomacy, and some other resources because they are afraid of publicity, public 
investigations and ensuing punishments. In most cases, to achieve their goals they 
either work independently or organize small special interest groups by cooperating 
with similar domestic businesses, resorting to such unofficial means as relational 
resources, ‘speed money’, corruption, etc. 
Elite MNEs admitted that even their mode of cooperation with state institutions 
had changed significantly in the last 7-10 years. The Head of the Public and 
Government Relations Department at PFBT1 said that in the 1990s most elite MNEs 
contributed to the improvement of the institutional environment in Ukraine through 
independent efforts. Foreign investors had required expertise and resources to fill the 
omnipresent institutional voids in the country. 
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However, in the mid 2000s the situation changed. Thanks largely to foreign 
investors’ efforts, a Ukrainian institutional framework, though still highly 
underdeveloped, had been established. At this point independent efforts to bring 
about desired modifications of its elements became inefficient.  Even though in 
certain cases the elite MNEs’ status, transparent operation mode, and tangible and 
intangible resources would still allow them to independently address specific urgent 
and pivotal issues directly affecting the development of their businesses in Ukraine, 
in general interactions between foreign investors and the public sector regarding 
institutional issues transitioned from the individual to the collective domain. 
According to the Head of Corporate Affairs Department at ST3, the fact that, in 
spite of all the available resources, most of the elite MNEs and mid-range profile 
foreign investors opt for collective models of promoting their interests and 
negotiating changes in various spheres of their operational environment in Ukraine is 
due to the systemic nature of the current problems that foreign investors, in 
particular, and all business entities, in general, face in the country. For example, he 
pointed out that tax reform is a systemic issue which could never be effectively 
addressed by the uncoordinated independent actions of individual entrepreneurs or 
companies.  
7.3.6 Professional and business associations 
7.3.6.1 International professional and business associations 
Mechanisms of interaction and communication between state and business are in 
place. However, the only efficient entities in this field are the European Business 
Association (EBA) and American Chamber of Commerce (ACC). These two 
organizations are very actively engaged in ‘civilized’ lobbying at the state level on a 
constant basis. Their work is characterized by systemic approach. The involvement 
of specialists from these international associations in the development of the Tax 
Code is a very good piece of evidence that even though high quality mechanisms of 
interaction between state and business such as ACC and EBA are in place they are 
viewed as a pure formality by Ukrainian authorities and overall, with rare exceptions, 
do not work. 
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The first draft of the Tax Code was a product of joint efforts of the Ministry of 
Finance and Tax Administration (Governmental Portal of Ukraine, 2009). The 
representatives of PFBT1, PFBT3, ST2, ST4 and SBF3 reported that the quality of 
the output was so low that even representatives of pro-government businesses stood 
up against it. In response the government formed a second committee which included 
representatives of pro-government large business and EBA and ACC specialists 
representing foreign investors’ interests. This committee produced the new improved 
version of the Tax Code written in accordance with the international norms and 
standards accepted in developed countries, which seemed to satisfy all parties. 
However, as soon as it was adopted and came into force, an EBA poll showed that 
37% of EBA members, including both foreign investors and domestic companies, 
were not satisfied with its quality. Only a minimal percentage of businesses were 
satisfied (EBA, 2012). 
The reason for dissatisfaction did not lie in the content of the Tax Code itself.  
The problem lay rather in the fundamental institutional voids related to law 
enforcement in Ukraine, giving rise to omnipresent informal relations that 
circumvent official regulation. The effect of the Tax Code in this environment was to 
create more opportunities for inspections by the tax authorities, which was exactly 
what tax officials were looking for. Since the Tax Code was introduced they have 
been allowed to intrude into any company at any time at their wish and convenience 
without any restrictions on the number of inspections. Moreover, during their official 
investigations tax inspectors are not guided by formal rules. In fact, according to all 
low- and mid-range profile foreign investors and three forth of experts interviewed, 
they completely ignore them and terrorize businesses extorting taxes from them in 
amounts necessary to meet both their formal officially assigned norms on tax 
volumes, and their informal personal corrupt needs.  
One of many examples is the way in which the guidelines for calculating income 
tax are completely disregarded on purpose. According to the Tax Code enterprises 
can carry their losses forward consolidating their losses from previous years and 
current profit and pay the income tax on this difference. Nevertheless, all low- and 
mid-range profile companies with FDI testified that tax inspectors simply overlook 
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this rule and do not allow enterprises and businesses to apply it unless they make it 
worth the inspections’ while. The latter is just one out of multiple examples exposing 
shameless tax officials’ behavior which is in direct contradiction with established 
norms, rules and laws. 
Overall the analysis of interaction between the state and such business 
associations as EBA, ACC, US – Ukraine Business Council, which allows 
membership only for American companies, and other similar organizations reveals 
double standards and double-cross approach of Ukrainian authorities to their 
cooperation. On one hand, Ukraine plays by the rules of the developed world and 
satisfies the requirements with regard to the norms of civilized lobbying through 
allowing participation in and certain degree of influence by international professional 
and business associations on the law-making process. On the other hand, when it 
comes to the final law-enforcement phase of this cycle respective authorities just 
cross out all the rules formalized at the previous stages and continue to play by their 
own informal illegal rules, for example, through discretionary law enforcement. 
7.3.6.2 Domestic professional and business associations 
Whereas international professional and business associations actively try to fill 
existing institutional voids and bring about some positive changes in the Ukrainian 
institutional environment, domestic industrial and professional associations are not 
effective in Ukraine at all in this regards. Experts stated that, first of all, policy 
makers pay no attention to public opinion in Ukraine even when it is expressed by 
legitimate public organizations. Accordingly, professional and business associations 
are not viewed as powerful entities capable of promoting and protecting the interests 
of their members.  
Overall, both experts and foreign investors interviewed characterized them as 
passive ‘pocket organizations’ which are only created for show and most of which do 
not even try to represent business interests, especially those of smaller producers. 
Both FIs and experts almost unanimously claimed that: 
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 Domestic professional and industrial organizations are highly efficient 
only in cases when they serve as a vehicle for achieving certain goals of 
powerful FIGs representing the interests of political elites.  
Second, interviewed experts said these domestic organizations do not have a 
systemic approach to their work. Their inconsistency and absence of persistence in 
pursuit of their members’ interests demonstrate their lack of lobbying culture. ELA1 
provided an example:  
In the port industry industrial associations exist but they are very passive. 
They do not understand that promotion of their industrial interests requires a 
systemic approach and work. In general, they just simply do not believe in 
their ability to affect any changes. 
However, in line with the previous statement it must be noted that opinions of the 
interviewees differ depending on the industry and status of their company. The 
stronger MNEs are much more optimistic in their judgments of various business 
associations. While all elite MNEs, all mid- and half of low-range profile foreign 
investors named American Chamber of Commerce (ACC) and European Business 
Association (EBA), the most efficient organizations promoting industry and business 
interests, the other half of low-range profile foreign investors and all domestic actors 
do not believe in the operational efficiency and usefulness of any kind of 
associations, including the international ones. 
Only representatives of the banking and financial services sector and the trade 
sector consider their domestic Association of Banks of Ukraine and Ukrainian 
Association of Direct Sales, respectively, to be efficient and helpful. All 
representatives of both economic sectors referred to the pro-activeness, efficiency 
and positive impact of the work of these professional associations on their operations 
in Ukraine. Meanwhile, representatives of agricultural industry insist that even 
though that had some minor influence on institution-building process in Ukraine the 
situation changed in 2010. They affirm that at the moment they have absolutely no 
either individual or collective power over the institutional changes in the country. 
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The same can be said about state investment agencies in Ukraine. Interviewed 
experts claimed that state investment agencies set up conferences and round tables 
with the purpose of attracting investors but the treatment of companies with real 
foreign direct investment is deteriorating in Ukraine. Only elite companies which 
have connections with representatives in government get preferential treatment and 
flourish monopolizing local markets and obstructing competitiveness of low- and 
middle-range profile foreign and domestic companies.  
7.3.7 Open dialog and programs for attracting foreign investors in discussions 
on problems of institutional environment in Ukraine 
ELA1 asserts that mechanisms of influence and interaction between various 
business representatives, experts and state authorities are in place. For example, 
representatives of ST1, ST3, PFBT1, and PFBT2 informed that Ukrainian Custom 
Services were very pro-active in initiating a constructive dialog with business. The 
top managers were invited to participate in discussions on the changes in the 
Customs Code of Ukraine. All interviewees from the trade, food, beverages and 
tobacco, and chemical industries also reported that Ministry of Economic 
Development and Trade continuously encourages their participation in specialized 
working groups analyzing various topical issues of their concern. 
However, in spite of evidence provided by these foreign investors, experts insist 
that in most cases business state cooperation mechanisms are pure formality. 
According to the Director at ST2:  
The authorities rarely have intentions to take into consideration or follow 
recommendations developed in the course of events or programs they 
organized unless such recommendations, laws or any other outcomes serve 
their interests. Usually, for them it is just an activity to mark off their 
calendars. 
An example of this attitude can be found in the drafting and passage of 
legislation serving the business interests of one of the largest and most powerful 
vertically integrated holdings in Ukraine. In accordance with its business 
development strategy this FIG was planning to undertake a certain investment 
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project. However, for that purpose they first needed to develop and pass a law. As a 
result, they addressed ELA1 as an expert in this field with a proposition to work on 
this law. Our interviewee agreed to participate in this project and explained that the 
company would need approximately a year to analyze the existing situation and 
legislature in this segment, work out a thorough strategy, select tactics on realization 
of this strategy and write up the law.  
However, the client-company wanted this law to be ready within less than a 
month. ELA1 refused to participate in this project under such conditions because it 
was not feasible to produce a good quality legislative document within such a narrow 
time frame. Ironically, the FIG found someone else who prepared the draft 
legislation within a month. However, due to its overall weakness and multiple flaws 
this piece of legislation was passed only after one year and three months. And even 
then, given its very low quality, determined by the lack of thought and crudity, it 
could not efficiently serve even the original FIG’s investment initiative. 
According to legal and academic experts and journalists this state of affairs is the 
norm rather than the exception in most Ukrainian legislative, regulatory and 
administrative projects. Even all representatives of the elite MNEs group admit that, 
even though there is an open dialog and multiple programs for attracting companies 
with FDI in discussions of the problems of the institutional environment in Ukraine, 
the ability of such companies to gain a hearing for their concerns is weakening. They 
acknowledged that Ukrainian authorities and officials pay less and less attention to 
their recommendations and approve and implement fewer and fewer of them. 
7.3.8 Foreign investors’ participation and interests in the institutional reform 
process in Ukraine 
Nevertheless, all legal experts and representatives of elite MNEs interviewed 
declared that they are actively and continuously involved in the policy making 
process in all spheres related to their operations in Ukraine. Due to the omnipresence 
of institutional voids in the country foreign investors of this caliber are seeking to 
contribute to establishing new or improving existing rules and norms in domains 
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accommodating political, economic, social, environmental, distributive, regulatory, 
constituent and other miscellaneous issues.  
To ensure the desired quality of outcomes of their efforts, elite MNEs cooperate 
with all branches of government at all levels and at all stages of policy cycle 
including issue identification, policy analysis, policy instrument development, 
consultations, coordination, decision-making, legislative, implementation and 
evaluation. Representatives of this group stated that they are working with in-line 
legislation on a constant basis. They are also independently and as members of 
various interest groups, business and industrial associations continually assessing the 
quality of new legislation and normative acts, analyzing proposals for new laws, and 
submitting their own proposals with accompanying documentation and analysis to 
the relevant parliament committees. The latter, in turn, consider these proposals and 
transfer them with their recommendations and corrections to the Verkhovna Rada 
which makes the final decision either to pass or reject them. 
It is noteworthy that 5 out of 12 elite MNE subsidiaries disclosed that their 
market position, status in the global economy and relational resources secure them 
enough power to be able to influence the destiny of the legislation even at the stage 
of its signing by the President. In cases when the Verkhovna Rada’s 
recommendations contradict these companies’ or industry’s interests, they ask for a 
personal meeting with the President. During such meeting they report to him the 
results of their analysis, their arguments and all possible negative effects on and 
consequences for businesses, industries and the state such as, for example, lower 
investment and tax revenues.  
Based on the evidence presented by MNEs the President further decides whether 
to veto the law completely, return it to the Verkhovna Rada with his comments and 
recommendation for revision or approve it as is. Sometimes the outcome of these 
legislative negotiations both at the Presidential and Verkhovna Rada levels will 
depend on the presence and bargaining power of other vested interests such as 
political elites representing their businesses (including multiple pseudo-FDI holdings 
and various large domestic FIGs). 
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One of the most scandalous examples of this was a government attempt to 
monopolize the grain market by enforcing quotas on grain export. Initially there was 
just an informal ban on shipping the grain to all the companies except one owned by 
the President’s friend. Later, the Ukrainian government formalized this in the form of 
quotas all of which were allotted to the aforementioned privileged company. In 
response to this discrimination on the side of foreign investors protested and 
eventually, after a long negotiation the quotas were annulled. Unfortunately, justice 
had been restored too late. By that time all the foreign investors and local business 
that had suffered as a result of this discrimination had lost their money (Polovec & 
Xeruvimova, 2011).  
In contrast to the practices of the elite MNEs, interviewed representatives of the 
more active two low- and  three mid-range profile foreign investors stated that their 
involvement in the policy making process is restricted to round-table consultations 
and the evaluation stages of the policy cycle due to their lack of resources and 
expertise. Meanwhile the rest nine and three passive representatives of these groups, 
respectively, admit that in addition to those factors, their lack of any initiative - 
indeed in all cases complete self-exclusion from the institution building process in 
Ukraine - is primarily motivated by their self-preservation instinct. As discussed 
above, they prefer to stay out of the spotlight to avoid the undesired attention of state 
officials and of politically connected businessmen. 
In general, all interviewed experts pointed out that the successful involvement of 
foreign investors in creating a more favorable working environment through their 
attempts to initiate and influence institutional changes is feasible under certain 
conditions. First of all, it is necessary to cultivate informal relationships and making 
informal agreements with state officials. Second of all, if foreign investors want to 
preserve their reputation and sustain transparency of their business operations they 
need to concentrate on staying out of sight of influential and powerful figures. 





7.3.9 Legislative changes supported by individual and collective actions of 
foreign investors in Ukraine 
7.3.9.1 Successes and positive outcomes for businesses 
Interviewees representing elite MNEs provided evidence of their active 
engagement in and contribution to the filling of institutional voids and changing of 
inefficient elements in the institutional environment in Ukraine.  
The Head of Corporate Affairs Department at ST3, for example, declared that his 
company along with other independent business representatives, members of various 
business associations, of Ukrainian Antimonopoly Committee was invited to 
participate in an effort on the development of an absolutely new Law on Domestic 
trade in Ukraine sponsored by one of the Ministry of Economics’ working groups. 
He emphasizes that very distinctive in this particular case was the group organizer’s 
positive attitude towards, attention and responsiveness to the input and advice of 
business representatives. 
Among other successfully altered laws relevant to the work of elite MNEs 
operating in services representative of the relevant companies named the Customs 
Code, various technical regulations, and the Tax Code. In the latter case they 
emphasized their role in dissuading law-makers from increasing taxes for small and 
medium size enterprises (SMEs) and persuading them to actually reduce the tax 
burden on this group of businesses.  
All interviewees representing agricultural industry, namely PA1, PA2, and PA3, 
disclose the success of their collective action supported by ACC and EBA in a 
removal of an export ban and protesting discretionary export licenses issuance to 
only special elite group of politically connected companies. However, they admit that 
their past experience taught them to distrust the promises made by Ukrainian 
politicians. PA1 confesses that: 
Even though everything was running smooth at that moment and 
Ukrainian Prime Minister, Mr. Azarov, promised that the government had no 
intensions to reinstate export ban once again, business representative cannot 
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rely on his words. Unfortunately, in the past Mr. Azarov said many things 
which never came true. Moreover, they actually came out quite differently in 
reality. 
7.3.9.2 Failures and negative outcomes for businesses 
Among the laws which were adopted without consulting with businesses and 
taking into account their opinions and positions; the Law on the Fundamentals of 
Language Policy stands out. Contrary to business interests this law included a clause 
which obliged companies to label their products both in state and regional languages. 
The first major problem was that large entrepreneurs practice pre-ordering their 
labels and packaging a year ahead and the law did not include any provisions 
determining regulations for this transitional period. The second not less significant 
concern for investors was that Ukraine has 18 regional languages, which meant to 
comply with this requirement foreign investors would have had to reissue new labels 
and packages in 18 languages, which would have been highly impractical and 
infeasible. Moreover, the need to constantly match the label languages with the 
respective regions to which deliveries were being made would have created 
enormous logistical difficulties. ST3 noted that:  
The regulatory authorities did not lose any time in issuing claims for non-
compliance with this law against both producers and sellers. 
Another bill which passed its first reading without consultation with business was 
the Law on Increase of Customs Duties which proposed the increase of duties on raw 
materials and/or component parts not produced in Ukraine but crucial for the 
functioning of their businesses. Both foreign and domestic companies will be 
negatively affected by the resulting escalation of prices and eventually will suffer 
from the loss of their products’ competitiveness. 
7.3.10 Law on Lobbying 
All the legal experts and most of the business representatives interviewed 
expressed confidence that the adoption of the new Law on Lobbying (registered in 
the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on October 20, 2010) will not lead to any changes in 
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the relationships between business and state institutions in Ukraine. They asserted 
that the change of business culture in the country is the condition qua non for any 
new laws, no matter how perfect, to become effective. 
Backing the above statement, all of the elite MNEs’ representatives explained 
that their political behavior and lobbying practices are identical in all host countries 
of their operations and do not differ from their conduct in relevant domains in their 
home countries. They said, moreover, that the patterns of their relationships with host 
countries’ governments and other state officials are not affected by the imperfect 
lobbying laws of these developing and transition states. Even in the absence of local 
lobbying laws the behavior of the subsidiaries of elite MNEs is in line with their 
home countries’ laws and corporate conduct requirements. 
Interestingly, only one of the fifty experts and business representatives 
interviewed was actually familiar with the new Law on Lobbying and was able to 
provide a detailed analysis of its advantages and disadvantages and its conformity 
with European standards.  
Emphasizing that on this particular issue he was articulating his personal view 
rather than a company position the Head of the Corporate Affairs Department at ST3, 
one of elite MNEs working in the direct sales industry, explained that the Ukrainian 
version of the Law on Lobbying contains several clauses which drastically 
distinguish it from the European and American regulatory rules on lobbying. First, it 
sets up a very complicated framework for the mandatory annual registering and 
accrediting of lobbyists with the Department of Justice and ministries of their 
specialization, respectively. As ST 3 said,  
Given the ‘high quality and efficiency’ of Ukrainian bureaucracy, such 
complex and frequently repetitive procedures are deadly for any regular 
organized groups of lobbyists. 
This interviewee further explains that this process is very lengthy and highly 
complicated in comparison to the respective regulations in developed countries. For 
example, in the EU any lobbyist group can simply register online by openly 
providing required information about a newly founded organization.  
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The second alarming issue is that the law does not make it clear who exactly is 
allowed to undertake lobbying activities. In accordance with this law, representatives 
of companies, particularly those with FDI, are barred from directly engaging in 
lobbying activities. The law introduces an intermediary institution between 
companies and state authorities (representative of ST3, 2012; Law of Ukraine “On 
regulations of Lobbying activities in Ukraine”, 2010). ST3 emphasized that, given 
the complexity of all registration procedures, setting up such intermediaries can be 
expected to be very time-consuming and until this done, businesses in Ukraine will 
be left with no other option but either to break the law and illegally contact 
government authorities directly or to fold their hands and wait for the intermediaries 
to be set up. 
Moreover, the representative of ST3 explained that, accounting for all 
specificities of a Ukrainian institutional setup, especially the strength of informal 
institutions, merging of political, economic and criminal powers and corruption, an 
analyst with a good imagination can assume that the new Ukrainian Law on 
Lobbying establishes a legal framework for overtaking lobbying activities through 
formalizing corruption through the provision of intermediary institutions. 
EINGO1 reinforces the above discussed accounts by claiming that both 
Ukrainian ruling elite and those who referred to as opposition are not interested in 
adoption of ‘civilized’ Law on Lobbying. That is why there are very low chances that 
a ‘civilized’ version will be endorsed. Even if it happens it will not affect and change 
in any way the existing informal mechanisms of business – officials’ relations.  
All interviewed experts assert that the only way to resolve this problem is to try 
to overcome the existent systemic conflict of interests. 
7.3.11 Summary 
This section explores the second and third research questions on the relationships 
between the FIs characteristics and their choices of political strategies and intensity 
of political activity in Ukraine. Developing on the findings from the previous section, 
it uncovers several new elements of a ’blind barganing’ model.  
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In particular, it provides further evidence that FIs’ access to various authorities 
and ability to protect their interests in the coutry primarily depends on their status 
and personal relations with state representatives. Thus, it shows that, while elite 
companies with iFDI have higher capacities to protect their assets and interests and 
officially enforce any negotiation outcomes, mid- and low-profile FIs are more 
susceptible to unrealiability and volatility of any host country decisions due to 
heterogeneity of bargaining interests of governemtns actors.  
The results of this analysis lead to unveiling two new elements of a ‘blind 
barganing’ model: the need to distinguish between formal and informal bargaining 
processes and between formal and actual outcomes of such bargaining. A success in 
formal negotiations over various public policies in industry-specific or any other 
issues of foreign investors’ interest does not guaranteed their application to every 
business actor in Ukrainian market. Personal relationships with authorities and 
corruption are two the most important FIs’ political strategies in Urkaine. As a result, 
informal bargaining over the safety of FIs’ assets and fair law enforcement is a 
crucial element of a bargaining process between FIs and host state in neo-patrimonial 
states. 
7.4 Efficiency self-assessment of the foreign investors’ political activity in 
Ukraine 
An assessment of the efficiency of the foreign investors’ political activity is a 
very complex task, especially in the case of a very specific system of power relations 
that exists in Ukraine.  ELA1 stated: 
Executive branch of power is a parallel world which has nothing in 
common with the reality. To be more precise the Viktor Yanukovich’s 
government, in comparison with the previous Viktor Yushchenko’s 
representatives of this branch of power, these appointees at least behave as 
one expects from those in power to behave, but from the efficiency point of 
view there is no change. All their work and decisions are completely 
separated from reality. They exist in a parallel world. 
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In this light we suggest to review several aspects of foreign investors’ self-
reflection on the effectiveness of their political activity. 
7.4.1 Degree of foreign investors’ pro-activeness and success in anticipating 
unfavorable institutional changes  
With regard to the pro-activeness and success with which companies anticipate 
unfavorable institutional changes, once again we observe the behavioral patterns of 
the representatives of elite MNEs to be completely different from those of low- and 
mid-range profile foreign investors. 
All representatives of elite MNEs unanimously stated that they were very 
consistent in their routine in-depth analysis of the overall business environment, in 
general, and its institutional component, in particular. They insisted that this 
proactive approach ensures that they can anticipate possible arising problems, 
decisions and events that might have an adverse impact on the operations of their 
businesses in Ukraine. PFBT1 explains: 
We very clearly analyze, anticipate and estimate the likelihood of all 
possible institutional scenarios’ occurrence. On a constant basis we monitor 
all actions of all groups whose interests are strongly represented in 
government. We are try to prevent approval of decisions that can either 
hinder our business operations or do not make any sense from the point of 
view of either businesses or of the state. In most cases such decisions are 
promoted by certain members of political elites seeking to protect and 
promote the interests of their businesses. 
The same interviewees pointed out that various business, professional and 
industrial associations also try to monitor and influence all relevant institutional 
processes and changes with varying degrees of success. 
By contrast, low-and mid-range profile foreign investors are much less optimistic 
about the business associations’ (particularly domestic industrial associations’) 
willingness and ability to limit the political power of vested interests and prevent 
ratification of decisions giving unfair competitive advantages to those interests. 
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Moreover, they emphasized that institutional voids in Ukraine are backed and 
nurtured by co-existent dominating informal institutional mechanisms and 
arrangements. As a result, all members of low-range profile and two thirds of mid-
range profile foreign investors themselves are very passive both in terms of their 
analytical and operational conduct, due to their fear of retaliation for their actions 
and to their lack of resources and faith in their ability to cause any positive changes 
in the existing institutional order in Ukraine.  
7.4.2 Buffering mechanisms 
When asked about their buffering mechanisms and strategies 90% of 
interviewees representing low- and mid-range profile companies with FDI 
acknowledged that they are just learning to adapt to the system to survive. Moreover, 
they admitted that they had lost any hope in their ability to cause an improvement in 
the existing business environment in Ukraine.  
Interestingly, all interviewed state officials representing the Departments of 
International Economic Activity in various regions that have been successful in 
attracting foreign investment noted that in the course of their work they had observed 
evidence of different foreign investors’ action modes. Academic experts EA1, EA2 
and state officials ESO1, ESO2, ESO3 revealed that beginning two to three years 
after the “Orange Revolution” many low- and mid-range profile real foreign 
investors had been frequently trying to conceal their FDI by registering their 
businesses as domestic ones. For that purpose they enter into agreements with small 
and medium size Ukrainian businesses. As a result, a mirror image of round tripping 
FDI is created: real iFDI masking itself as domestic investment.  
The same group of interviewed experts explained that foreign investors who 
prefer to disguise their FDI in such ways explained that by doing so they are trying to 
minimize their costs and expenses and, more importantly, to avoid excessive 
attention and attempts by various Ukrainian regulatory authorities and state officials 
to extort bribes.  
This mechanism allows foreign investors who choose an illegal Ukrainian 
business mode of operation to preserve both their businesses in Ukraine and their 
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reputations in their home and other developed countries. Experts explain that since 
officially they do not have businesses in Ukraine it becomes much more difficult to 
trace their affiliation with illegal conduct, such as tax evasion, dual salary payments 
(combining officially paid low salaries and unofficially distributed salaries in 
envelopes), corruption and other. 
Another very important reason for hiding iFDI from authorities is foreign 
investors’ strong desire to protect their facilities from illegal physical intrusion and 
their assets from illegal seizure. Experts EJ2, EJ3 and ELA3 observed that arousing 
the interest of the various state officials can result in raiding attempts and loss of 
their companies for business owners. That is why, admitting their weakness in 
comparison with elite MNEs, low- and mid-range profile companies with FDI 
become very attractive targets for raiders and, as a result, some of them decide to 
operate through local businesses without registering their FDI.  
It should be noted that almost all interviewed representatives of low- and mid-
range profile companies (both domestic and with FDI) when asked about buffering 
mechanisms first of all named physical protection of their assets. It is clear that the 
real threat of raiding attacks forces those foreign investors who legally operate in 
Ukrainian market, as well as domestic business owners, to literally fortify their 
business by improving their security systems and increasing the number of their 
security personnel.  
Overall, representatives of both the experts and foreign investors interviewed 
emphasized that the main reasons for deciding to operate illegally (either disguising 
their investments as a local businesses or choosing Ukrainian mode of operation) are 
multiple institutional voids including, among others, the underdeveloped and corrupt 
regulatory and judicial systems and ineffective contract-enforcement mechanisms. In 
particular, they called attention to the complete absence of a system of control over 
personal and business expenses. This means that it is legal in Ukraine, for example, 
for the director of a large multibillion dollar business to officially receive a minimal 
salary of $125 and at the same time live a luxurious life spending millions on cars, 
yachts, and real estate, and this will not raise any public concerns or questions. Under 
such circumstances any person or legal entity can report a minimal income or profits 
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but at the same time spend millions in any currency, and nobody is going to 
prosecute them for fraud. The interviewed experts noted that this is practically an 
open invitation to operate in the shadow economy. 
Moreover, interviewed experts also agreed that any other country, even 
developed, if adopted Ukrainian taxation system and system of control over personal 
and business expenses, would observe the same percentage of businesses moving 
into the operational bounds of shadow economy already in one year. 
Experts also suggested that the use of mass media can be another effective 
defense mechanism for foreign investors. However, its use is only efficient and, as a 
result, feasible in cases when the company with FDI is transparent and ready to 
become the center of intense public attention. Almost all the experts and company 
representatives interviewed agreed that these defense mechanisms can be effectively 
employed virtually exclusively by the elite foreign investors possessing strong 
relational resources. 
A legal consultant to companies with FDI, ELA1, disclosed that he advises all of 
his clients that there are two possible ways of managing their business in Ukraine. 
The first one is to hire various experts, including lawyers, auditors, accountants, and 
other consultants, maintain transparency, completely refrain from any transactions 
involving corruption and act strictly only within the legal framework. The second 
one is just to go with the flow and see where you end up. 
He emphasized that all large MNEs representing the elite group of investors 
choose the first path independent of the specificities of the host country’s business 
environment while most of mid- and low-range profile foreign investors do not 
consider themselves to be strong enough to fight with the existing corrupt system in 
Ukraine. However, according to this expert’s observations, almost every company 
that chose the second path regretted their decision. With time all of them realized that 
by committing to the prevailing Ukrainian business mode of operation they trapped 
themselves and, as a result, deprived themselves of opportunities to use publicity and 
to appeal to domestic and international mass media, the international community and 
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organizations, their home country embassies and other public sources with requests 
for help.  
However, it is worth noting that some contradictory evidence provided by one of 
the interviewees working at one of the Regional Department of International 
Economic Activity in Ukraine. ESO1 informed that she was aware of mid- and low-
range profile foreign investors who, as a result of operating their businesses in 
Ukraine not only adopted the Ukrainian mode of operating their businesses in 
Ukraine but also, consequently, started applying either this mode of operation, in 
general, or some of its elements, in particular, in other countries of their operations, 
particularly CEE and SEE states.  
Both experts foreign investors interviewed also suggested that one of the 
principal buffering mechanisms for companies with FDI in Ukraine, especially elite 
MNEs, is national embassies. Ukrainian political elites and their businesses are 
highly dependent on the USA and EU countries because such a large share of their 
savings, business assets and real estate are held and registered in those and other 
developed countries. EJ2 explained that 
Therefore, the threat of sanctions analogous to the ones applied in Belarus 
or to the Magnitsky list in Russia is extremely intimidating for Ukrainian 
elites.  
Thus, if an ambassador from one of these countries contacts a Ukrainian official 
in response to the raising of concerns by a business from the country that ambassador 
represents, the matter will be given the immediate full attention of the authorities. 
The fear is, of Ukrainian elites are largely due to the fact that according to the EU 
countries’ legislation most of their businesses are criminal. All their companies 
registered as offshores in Cyprus, Austria, Netherlands, UK, USA and other 
developed countries conduct their business in Ukraine and not in the countries where 
they are registered. Taking advantage of treaties on double taxation, they do not pay 
taxes in Ukraine; neither do they pay them in the countries where they are registered, 
as their business activity is not carried out there. Of course, this is highly illegal, 
since tax exemptions under double taxation treaties apply to those companies in 
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Ukraine only if they are paying their taxes in their home countries, which they are 
not and this makes them vulnerable to prosecution. The Lazarenko’s case 
demonstrated home countries’ power (in this particular case, that of the USA) and 
resulted in the conviction of a Ukrainian high-ranking politician and businessman for 
committing the same crime which resulted in long-term imprisonment and a loss of 
approximately 90% of his fortune.  
All three interviewed legal advisors insisted that it is because of these leverage 
members of the Ukrainian political elites are reluctant to get involved in conflicts 
with the US or EU embassies and are always very flexible in their negotiations over 
sensitive issues involving foreign investors’ complaints. 
Overall, all interviewed company representatives agree that comparing to the 
beginning of the 1990s their companies need to spend much more time and 
significantly increase the intensity of their effort in protecting interests of their 
businesses in Ukraine. Moreover, they further clarify that, if ten years ago it was 
making up approximately 5% of involved employees’ work load, nowadays coping 
with issues related to their companies’ protection went up to 20% - 40%, depending 
on the issue and company characteristics, primarily such as status and industry of 
operation.  
7.4.3 Businesses’ informal relations with state officials 
In general, participation of businesses in politics can be of two kinds: direct and 
indirect. In case of direct participation business representatives are elected as 
members of parliament (MPs) or Verkhovna Rada in Ukraine at the national level or 
as the deputies at the regional and local levels. However, this participation model is 
more inherent to and popular among domestic businesses. At least, foreign investors 
are reluctant to disclose any information about their employees’ engagement in 
politics. 
Indirect participation includes purchase of MPs’, deputies’ and/or other state 
officials’ services and political investment. All interviewed foreign investors 
unanimously rejected their involvement in financing political parties’ or individual 
deputies’ election campaigns in Ukraine. However, all low- and two thirds of mid-
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range profile companies with FDI admit that they are forced to intentionally foster 
personal relationships with various state officials to secure acceptable operational 
conditions for the survival of their businesses in the Ukrainian market. As a result, 
they contribute to growth of both economic and political shadow markets in the 
country. 
Interviewed experts emphasize that in Ukraine all the relationships with state 
officials are cultivated in the informal operational space. As in most transition and 
developing countries, foreign investors in Ukraine focus their lobbying efforts on the 
representatives of the executive branch of power. This choice is determined primarily 
by the fact that law enforcement is much more important in these countries than the 
law itself. Moreover, the law itself has multiple referential norms for executives. In 
other words, after the law is adopted the Cabinet of Ministers or respective Ministries 
and Departments have to develop additional numerous regulations and norms. As a 
result, the executives have power either to further improve and support existing 
legislation or completely or partially distort it. In this way, in corrupt countries even 
a very good law becomes useless by the end of this process. Moreover, even if the 
quality of the law itself is preserved and complies with the existing western 
standards, the discretionary approach to law enforcement allows unfair treatment of 
less powerful foreign investors by state officials in Ukraine (Interviews, 2012; 
Pryadko, 2013) 
That is why those foreign investors and domestic entrepreneurs emphasized that 
those who want to be successful seek close ties and nourish relations with executives 
at various levels and/or with ‘siloviki’, representatives of security and military 
services. The latter group often has influence over both executives and legislators. 
They represent purely informal structures which very often merge with criminal 
structures. Therefore, in general, it is very hard to figure out if a certain security or 
military officer is working for himself or for his criminal boss. 
LA1 described that the relationships between legitimate business and officialdom 
/ ‘siloviki’ generally operates as follows: 
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As a rule, representatives of the latter groups have their businesses 
(referred to as ‘purses’), which are usually registered to third persons and to 
which the parties involved in the relationships transfer their bribes in 
accordance with existing agreements.  
Most of the positions within the executive and security sectors can be sold. The 
buyer of a position within an authority first pays his supervisor a onetime lump sum 
bribe and then makes certain monthly or any other term payments depending on and 
according to their agreement.  The omnipresence of such practices confirms that the 
conflict of interests is a systemic phenomenon in Ukraine. Experts speculate that 
there are no honest high ranks officials in Ukraine with the exception of may be just 
a few isolated cases. 
7.4.4 Problem of potential liabilities for political ties for foreign investors in 
Ukraine 
Our interviewees unanimously insist that their businesses are apolitical. Without 
any hesitation all categories of our interviewees also agreed that businesses’ liability 
for political ties is very high in Ukraine. The historical review of post-electoral 
events in the country provides very strong evidence in support of this argument. 
Every change of political power, both peaceful and revolutionary, including the most 
recent coup, was followed by a very active purge of all politically involved 
businessmen from power. Moreover, their entire businesses either endured raiding 
attempts or were simply expropriates with the help of law enforcement agencies and 
transferred to the members of new political, and, respectively, economic, elite 
groups. 
Moreover, EA1 claimed that  
The risk of potential liabilities for political ties is much higher for low- 
and mid-range profile foreign investors than for the same group of domestic 
businesses.  
He explained that the representatives of the latter group usually support all 
leading political forces in Ukraine, securing the backing and protection for their less 
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competitive businesses in the case of a power change. At the same time due to higher 
competitiveness of their business the former group is usually a more attractive target 
for changing political elites which might control businesses directly competing with 
those foreign investors. As a result, new state officials will be interested in imposing 
various sanctions and fines on foreign investors to reduce their competitive abilities. 
In general, all interviewed experts suggested that low- and mid-range profile 
foreign investors in Ukraine predominantly occupied those niches which, for one or 
another reason, did not represent interest for domestic businesses and were not 
monopolized by large domestic investors. So, overall, it can be concluded that if 
foreign investors suggest a project that does not represent a competitive danger for 
domestic businesses controlled by power elites, local and regional authorities 
approve such iFDI.  
Such mode of business – political power relationships definitely explains 
passiveness and desperate attempts of all low- and middle-range profile foreign 
investors to hide and stay out of sight of newly elected political businessmen. 
7.4.5 Quality of iFDI 
All experts unanimously characterize the quality of FDI in Ukraine as very low. In 
particular, EA1 explains that:  
In Ukraine two thirds of all industrial enterprises are under the control 
of foreign investors. This could be a great advantage for the Ukrainian 
economy if it were not for one minor detail. The main problem here is 
that almost all of these companies with FDI are holdings which are 
registered in EU countries but like companies with offshore jurisdiction. 
For example, a lot of such companies are registered in Cyprus, Austria 
and other EU countries. However, they are registered as companies which 
are not working in those countries to minimize their taxes almost to zero 
level. So, the main goal of such holdings is to reduce their tax base in 
Ukraine via transfer prices.  
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The most crucial characteristic of such companies is that all of them 
are controlled by Ukrainian businesses that trafficked their capital abroad; 
they establish holdings there and then bring this money as iFDI back into 
Ukraine. That is why the biggest foreign investor in Ukraine is Cyprus. 
Overall, all experts agree that with one exception (the food, beverages and 
tobacco industry) all iFDI in Ukraine is of very poor quality due to its pseudo nature. 
Moreover, they emphasize that the major foreign investors in the above mentioned 
food industry who managed to establish successful businesses are predominantly 
large elite MNEs that entered Ukraine in the beginning of the 1990s. Latecomers and 
smaller foreign investors were not as fortunate or successful.  
In general, lately the number of real foreign investors in Ukraine drastically 
decreased. Moreover, a lot of real better quality investors are leaving the country due 
to the growing power of informal institutional influence, contributing to even further 
deterioration of the already extremely unattractive institutional environment in the 
country (Research Interviews, 2012; Pryadko, 2013; LB.ua, 2013). An ideal 
illustration in support of this statement is situation in banking industry.   
Online newspaper Focus.ua (2011; 2012) reported that independent experts 
explained the escape of Banks from Ukraine not only by a slowdown of the 
economic growth in the country and the world crisis  but also by the negative impact 
of shadow economy and political risks, in general, and corruption, in particular. Only 
during 2011 - 2012 more than ten foreign banks closed down or sold their 
subsidiaries in Ukraine. Among these banks were Swedish Group Skandinaviska 
Enskilda Banken or SEB bank, Swedbank and “East” Platinum Bank; Netherlands-
Israeli TBIF Financial Services; German Dresdner Bank, Bayerisch Landesbank, 
Societe Generale Group and Commerzbank; British HSBS; Polish Bank Pekao; 
Check Home Credit bank; South Korean Kookmin Bank; Bank of Georgia and 
Russian Radabank and “Renaissance Capital” banks (Focus.ua, 2011; 2012).  
It is noteworthy that, for example, the British company HSBS unsuccessfully 
disputed over obtaining permits for work in Ukraine with various state authorities for 
11 months and eventually withdrew from the market (Korrespondent, 2013). The 
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Swedish giant IKEA had a similar experience. The company had been trying to 
obtain land in Kiev and Odessa for opening a hypermarket since the mid-2000s. 
After the years of efforts to acquire a permit without resorting to corruption this 
MNE decided to sell its furniture and woodworking factories in Western Ukraine and 
left the country in 2010-2011 (Korrespondent, 2013). The list of other large foreign 
investors which also could not survive in the country includes, for example, 
insurance companies Belgian Dutch Ageas and Italian Assicurazioni Generali, Polish 
distributor of consumer electronics Action S.A., British Peacocks, American Steve 
Madden, clothing brand Seppdld, Finish company Stockman and even Russian 
industrial giant Mechel (Korrepondent, 2013; LB.ua, 2013). 
Overall, since the beginning of the Viktor Yanukovich’s presidency in 2010, 
more than thirty large investors left the Ukrainian market. Moreover, during the same 
period no single large foreign investor entered the country (Korrespondent, 2013).  
The FDI inflow into Ukraine fell from $142 to $132 per person between 2010 and 
2012 (State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, 2013). Besides, experts insist that this 
investment can hardly qualify as real FDI since two thirds of them originated from 
Cyprus (Korrespondent, 2013; State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, 2013). Thus, 
the sum of real iFDI in Ukraine after the deduction of round tripping or pseudo-FDI 
equals no more than $40 per person, which is 14 times lower than the average of 
$550 in Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries. 
Experts claim that the absence of guaranties for business protection, raider 
attacks, bureaucratic pressure and omnipresent corruption are the main concerns for 
existing and potential foreign investors in Ukraine (Research Interviews, 2012; 
Korrespondent, 2013; LB.ua, 2013). Pryadko (2013), in line with these research 
findings, stated that foreign investors are leaving Ukraine under the pressure of their 
fears of local courts, corruption and strengthening of the pro-government business 
clans and poverty of the population. 
7.4.6 Changing political system in Ukraine 
Thus, as a primary condition for improving political system in Ukraine 
respondents point to the need in a systemic change. Deregulation must be a priority 
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for reformists. Then secure the functional legal and regulatory environments. 
Decrease of bureaucracy and westernalization of all procedures in terms of open 
constructive compliance thinking are the next steps on the way of improving the 
functionality of political system in Ukraine. 
Realization of all of the above requires a team of strong dedicated uncorrupted 
political leaders capable to develop a strategy. 
Interviewed legal advisors insist that MNE politically cannot influence any 
changes in our political system. 
7.4.7 Attempts to change political, economic and business culture in Ukraine 
Both experts and foreign investors attested that no attempts are being undertaken 
to change political, economic and business culture in Ukraine. According to them, it 
is obvious that the ruling elites and incumbents at all levels are not interested in any 
revolutionary developments of this kind, because this would most probably result in 
their loss of office and power. Moreover, inaction of the prevalent share of both 
foreign and domestic business elites and their compliance with the unfair and, in 
most cases, unlawful treatment of their companies reinforces and contributes to the 
further worsening of the existing problems in Ukraine.  
ELA1 provides the following example to support the above statement. His 
company, being a very active member of a society and trying to contribute to 
understanding and initiate actions necessary to commence systemic changes in the 
country, often organizes country-wide round tables to discuss sensitive issues and 
existing problems interfering with and impeding the work of most businesses in 
Ukraine. Each such event focuses on a certain clear-cut issue. Based on a discussion 
and analysis of the issue under consideration, participants produce recommendations 
for action which are submitted to the relevant authority.  
However, there is only a very small group of genuine activists who participate in 
each of such events eagerly trying to improve the operational environment in 
Ukraine. Most business executives, in spite of their constant complaints about the 
multiple obstacles, deficiencies and general problems for their business operations in 
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Ukraine, refrain from participation. Such inaction definitely contributes to further 
rooting of inadequate principles continuing to destroy the remnants of the business 
environment in Ukraine. 
7.4.8 Potential solutions for the problem of merging political, economic and 
criminal powers 
For the solution of the problem of merging political and economic powers in 
Ukraine experts suggest two possible scenarios. Firstly, it could be a result of a 
natural development of events. EA1 proposes a practically unrealistic scenario 
according to which: 
Aat certain point the Ukrainian population can undergo the change of 
mentality, finally, overcome its passivity, take up an active position and 
decide not to vote for the rich businessmen-politicians and prevent them from 
forming their ‘pocket’ government.   
Second scenario, however, implies that the existing set up could be changed 
much faster under external influence. Experts insist that in this case the feasibility of 
transition from absolutely corrupted to civilized state is completely dependent on the 
pro-activeness and rigidity of USA and EU countries. The latter should commit to 
legal pursuit and prosecution of all representatives of Ukrainian political elites 
without any exceptions. Experts claim that if all Ukrainian high-rank businessmen-
politicians, such as above mentioned Lazarenko, will see the real threat of being 
imprisoned for their economic crimes in these developed countries and of their 
property being arrested, then to preserve their freedom and assets these business 
political elites will be left with no choice but immediately react by changing their 
attitude to the Ukrainian state and to the compliance with its laws. Otherwise, they 
will not be able to retain all those resources which they have been acquiring and 
transferring to developed countries starting from the day of declaration of Ukrainian 
independence. 
Unfortunately, developed countries do not seem to be willing to engage in and 
initiate any such activities to change the existing corrupted order and system in 
Ukraine. Experts assume that the main reason of their inaction is their fears that 
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under their strong pressure Ukrainian elites might choose to seek protection in Russia 
as it happened with Belarus before. 
7.4.9 Summary 
This section of the thesis adresses the last research questions on self-assessment 
of different groups of FIs’ success and efficiency in prompting institutional changes 
in Ukraine and overall iFDI and institutional environment quality in Ukraine. FIs 
evaluation of institutional environment provides more evidence for supporting a 
‘blind bargaining’ model. All investors admit their highly limited and significantly 
decreased within the last 20 years bargaining power due to institutional voids backed 
and nurtured by co-existent dominating informal institutional mechanisms and 
arrangements.  
The awareness on the selective application and enforcement of regulations in line 
with the personal interests of government actors representing ruling elite clans leads 
to various behavioral patterns and level of confidence of elite, low-, and mid-profile 
FIs. The largest share of the interviewees representing the latter two groups admits 
they are very passive, particularly in terms of their operational conduct, due to their 
fear of retaliation for their actions and to their lack of resources and faith in their 
ability to cause any positive changes in the existing institutional order in Ukraine.  
Moreover, low- and mid-profile FIs reveal two new types of their buffering 
strategies for protecting their interests and assets in Ukraine, namely increasing 
physical protection of their assets and masking their investments as domestic ones to 
avoid undesirable attention of powerful Ukrainian business eiltes and raiders .  
Overall, both FIs and experts identify a quality of iFDI in Ukraine as very low. 
They acknowledge that merging of political, economic, and criminal powers and 
inaction of the prevalent share of both foreign and domestic business elites and their 
compliance with the unfair and, in most cases, unlawful treatment of their companies 
reinforces and contributes to the further worsening of the existing problems in 
Ukraine.  At this point they can only see two potential unrealistic ways to change 
thes situation: voting for the rich businessmen-politicians who will prevent them 
from forming their ‘pocket’ government and legal pursuit and prosecution of all 
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representatives of Ukrainian political elites without any exceptions by international 
community. 
 Overall, the findings of the qualitative part of this thesis reveal and provide 
detailed evidence for multiple elements of a newly-developed ‘blind bargaining’ 
model. The next chapter will combine the findings of all three studies to answer  the 
research questions and finalize  a ‘blind’barganing’ model. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter focuses on answering the research questions on the quality of iFDI 
and FIs’ relations with host state institutions to develop a new model of bargaining in 
neo-patrimonail transition states proposed in this study. Combining the results of the 
two macro-level quantitative and one micro-level qualitative parts of this research 
project we review all the elements relevant to the quality of iFDI and their impact on 
changes in institutional environment in transition economies, in general, and in 
Ukraine, in particular. Initially, the fisrt part of this chapter based on the findings of 
the two quantitative studies reviews the relationships between the presence of ‘blind 
bargaining’ and the quality of iFDI in the sample group of post-Soviet countries. The 
analysis in the rest of this chapter is based on the results of the micro-level 
qualitative research of foreign investors’ political behavior in Ukraine. It examines 
how the relationships between the levels of political activity and pro-activeness, 
choices of political strategies, and success and efficiency in efforts to influence 
institutional changes in Ukraine vary between different groups of companies with 
iFDI to determine and refine all elements of a newly-proposed ‘blind barganing’ 
model. 
Such combination of both method and data triangulation serves the main goal of 
this project to identify which of the existing or proposed by this research bargaining 
models is the most appropriate for transition economies. Based on the evidence 
obtained in the course of both qualitative and quantitative analyses, this study argues 
that the newly developed ‘blind bargaining’ model provides the best framework for 
explaining the patterns of foreign investors – host states’ government relationships in 
case of post-Soviet neo-patrimonial transition economies.  
8.2 The quality of foreign direct investment 
8.2.1 Definition 
The study of various aspects of iFDI in transition economies has been a very 
popular topic since the dissolution of the Soviet Union (Akinlo, 2004; Alfaro & 
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Charlton, 2007; Basu & Guariglia, 2007; Bengoa & Sanches-Robles, 2003; Bevan, 
Estrin & Meyer, 2004; Borensztein, De Gregorio & Lee, 1998; Chowdury & 
Mavrotas, 2006; Durham, 2004;  Hansen & Rand, 2006;  Lee, Baimukhamedova, 
Akhmetova, 2010; Li & Liu, 2005; Vu & Noy, 2008; etc.). However, fairly small 
amount of attention has so far been devoted to the analysis of the quality of iFDI in 
terms of its impact on institutional environment, especially in transition countries 
(Cole, Elliot & Fredriksson, 2006; Kwok & Tadesse, 2006; Malesky, 2005; Malesky, 
2009; Robertson & Watson, 2004). Moreover, all of the existing studies employed 
quantitative techniques to analyze this relationship.  
This study presents a very comprehensive mixed-method approach attempt to 
review various aspects of the problem of quality of iFDI with the focus on FIs’ 
political behavior and develop a new ‘blind bargaining’ model of relationships 
between FIs and institutions in neopatrimonial transition states. First of all, it 
includes two quantitative inquiries into the bilateral and interdependent nature of the 
relationships between the quality of iFDI and the quality of institutional environment 
in post-Socialist transition economies. Second of all, to our knowledge it is the first 
study that is seeking to look for further interpretations, clarifications and 
explanations of identified relationships within the context of one country applying 
qualitative research methods.  
The operationalization of such complex phenomenon as the quality of FDI is a 
very challenging task. For the purpose of this analysis, following the trend observed 
in previous research on this subject (See Chapter 1, Section 1.2), this study suggests 
to determine the quality of iFDI in terms of an impact of a unit of iFDI on 
institutional environment measured by country risk indicators. Further, following 
Moran (1998) it is suggested to label iFDI as ‘malign’ or ‘benign’ depending on the 
direction of their impact on the host country’s institutional environment. As a result, 
if iFDI has a destabilizing impact on institutional competencies of a host country, we 





8.2.2 Quantitative analyses of iFDI quality 
The results of of both quantitative studies on the iFDI quality partially support 
‘malign’ iFDI hypothesis. Initially, the first quantitative analysis supports the 
hypothesis that presence of ‘blind barganing’ in neo-patrimonial states results in 
attracting riskier lower quality iFDI. Further, the second quantitative study provides 
evidence of a risk increasing role of such lower quality iFDI in twelve post-Soviet 
transition countries, including the Central and Eastern European States of Belarus, 
Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine, and the Central Asian Republics of Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan.  
Test of the impact of iFDI on the changes in host country risks in the sample 
countries proves that iFDI has a marginally risk increasing effect on overall country 
risks and a strong effect on economic and legal risks. In the case of the latter the 
observed relationships are the most significant. Contrary to the Malesky’s (2006) 
findings that FDI has a significant positive effect on economic reforms in the region 
supporting the traditionl view of iFDI, the results of this research provide evidence 
for an alternative iFDI hypothesis (Hausmann & Fernandez-Arias, 2000; Moran, 
1998). It shows that the growth of iFDI is related to the deterioration of an economic 
and, to a greater extent, legal component of institutional environment in sample 
countries, in terms of a degree of market orientation, policy consistency and forward 
planning, diversity and resilience of the economy in the former case and quality of 
legislation, its transparency, independence and experience in the latter case.  
However, it is necessary to emphasize here that the results of this quantitative 
analysis should be interpreted with caution. Potential problems with the quality of 
dataset, including limited time frame (Greene, 2008), measurement problems 
(Beugelsdijk et al., 2010; UNCTAD, 2002), ignoring the presence and impact of 
pseudo-FDI, and not accounting for iFDI endogeneity (Li & Liu, 2004; ) as well as 
for the industry- and country-concentration effects (Hunya, 2006), limit the 
generalizability of these findings.  
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As a result, even though this analysis partially undermines the prevailing in the 
international business literature positive orthodoxy view of iFDI impact on recipient 
economies (Balasubramanyam, Salisu, and Sapsford, 1996; Borensztein, De 
Gregorio and Lee, 1998; De Melo, 1999; Dyker, 1999), further more focused micro-
level country- and industry-specific analysis is required to identify and support the 
hypothesis on the quality of iFDI in transition economies.   
The qualitative part of this research is making an attempt to fill this gap by 
examining multiple aspects of iFDI quality in post-Soviet transition states. Adopting 
a primary step in achieving more objectivity in this analysis is to distinguish between 
the genuine and pseudo-FDI and separately account for their effect on institutional 
changes and quality of iFDI in Ukraine. 
8.2.3 Pseudo-FDI 
In contrast to the previous research on transition economies with only several 
exceptions such as in cases of China (Boisot & Meyer, 2008; Fung, Yau & Zhang, 
2011; Morck, Yeung & Zhao, 2008; Sutherland et al., 2010; Xiao, 2004) and Russia 
(Abalkin & Whalley, 1999; Buiter & Szegvari, 2002; Ledyaeva, Karhunen & 
Whalley, 2013; Loungani & Mauro, 2001; Mulino, 2002), this study emphasizes the 
need to distinguish between genuine and pseudo-FDI.  
Unfortunately, the quantitative analysis does not allow singling out the effect of 
pseudo-FDI on institutional environment in transition economies due to the data 
availability and measurement problems (Beugelsdijk et al., 2010; UNCTAD, 2002). 
However, the results of the qualitative analysis of foreign investors’ political 
behavior in Ukraine provide initial evidence supporting our suggestion that 
accounting for the role of pseudo-FDI and/or even the study of the relationship 
between pseudo-FDI and the quality of host countries’ formal and informal 
institutional environment is crucial for the advancement of our knowledge on both 
extent and directions of real and pseudo-iFDI impact on all aspects of development, 
particularly institutional  changes, in transition countries, and, as a result for the 
development of a ‘blind barganing’ model. 
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Our findings demonstrate that the domineering presence of pseudo foreign 
investors representing the interests of powerful domestic political-economic elites in 
the Ukrainian market discourages ‘benign’ investors from entering the country and 
causes deterioration of its institutional environment. The most recent scandalous 
exposure of information on active Ukrainian President’s, Petro Poroshenko, 
ownership of offshore businesses and assets serves as the best evidence for the 
domineering of powerful pseudo FIs in Ukraine (OCCRP, 2016; TSN, 2016). 
All experts, low- and mid-profile investors and a half of the elite MNEs’ 
representatives suggest that, in addition to several common advantages inherent to 
the status of ordinary pseudo foreign investors such as access to additional resources 
(Ledyaeva, Karhunen & Whalley, 2013; Sutherland et al., 2012), increase in 
bargaining power (Boisot & Meyer, 2008), superior organization capabilities and 
higher security of their assets (Ledyaeva, Karhunen & Whalley, 2013), avoidance of 
liability of foreignness (Ledyaeva, Karhunen & Whalley, 2013; Zaheer, 1995), 
monopolistic behavior of pseudo-FDI representing the interests of merging political, 
economic and criminal elites nourishes a sustainment of a specific system of power 
in Ukraine characterized by the lack of centralization of government and the lack of 
control over regions, resulting in a highly diversified and archaic rent-seeking 
governance (Ignatov, 2002; Lyubavskiy, 2000; Lyubavskiy, 2012; Granovskiy, 
1868). Moreover, as a result, such pseudo investors also play a crucial role in 
sustaining the highly corrupt institutional order and environment in Ukraine.  
Thus, these findings not only to a great extent explain the Ukrainian failure to 
create an attractive investment climate in the country and the reluctance of real good 
quality ‘benign’ foreign investors to enter, work and stay in this market but also 
substantiate our proposition that negative impact of iFDI on the quality of 
institutional environment in post-Soviet transition states can be, at least partcially, 
explained by the predominance of pseudo-FDI. The latter becomes an important 
element of a ‘blind bargaining’ model as personal interests of ruling elite in such 
neo-patrimonial states as Ukraine significantly undermine real FIs’ bargaining 
capacities by creating multiple constraints for their operations in such host markets.  
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In this light, further both qualitative and quantitative research effort focusing on 
the study of various aspects of pseudo-foreign investors’ behavior in transition 
countries is required to find evidence and support for existing theoretical 
assumptions and identify new important elements of this phenomenon in different 
contexts. 
8.2.4 Raiding 
Very important contribution of this research to international business, in general, 
and FDI literature, in particular, is an introduction of a raiding problem as an 
important element affecting and determining the quality of iFDI in transition 
countries, with the focus on Ukraine.  Overall under researched and poorly 
understood (Osipyan, 2010; Pojansky, 2013; Pojansky, 2014; Zimmerer & Khmara, 
2012) the raiding problem has never been examined in terms of its relationships and 
impact on the quality of iFDI in transition countries.  
The results of the qualitative part of this research provide evidence that even high 
profile elite MNEs characterized by a strong support of their developed home 
countries and, as a result, possessing significant bargaining power, refuse to renew 
their partnerships or enter the Ukrainian market due to the persistent growth in 
deterioration of institutional environment in the country. These investors testify that 
they prefer to invest less attractive, in terms of the quality of its location specific 
advantages, countries with lower risk than in transition countries like Ukraine where 
raiders, representing the interests of economic, political and criminal power elites, 
exploiting the existing institutional voids, use various criminal, legal, administrative 
and regulatory tools to achieve their treacherous goals.   
The PCP1 director reveals that: 
As a result of a failed raiding attack on our company, our high profile 
foreign partners from a developed country decided to move to other 
developing countries, such as India, characterized by lower levels of political, 
operational and legislative risks. The FI’s management specifically 
emphasized that unreliability, inconsistency, and volatility of local 
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authrotities’ decisions outweighs even much lower levels of skill and 
expertise in a new host markets.  
The choice of the tools is, at least partially, determined by the evolutionary 
phases of raiding (Gabor & Khmara, 2012; Osipyan, 2010; Pojansky, 2013; 
Pojansky, 2014) which can be identified with the evolutionary phases in the 
emergence and consolidation of the economic and, consequently, political elites in 
transition countries. 
As a result, this research shows that interviewed foreign investors operating in 
the Ukrainian market reject legal advisors’ suggestions that a sophisticated enterprise 
security scheme can ensure the successful protection of foreign businesses in 
Ukraine. These investors insist that only the possession of such critical intangible 
assets as close relationships with power elites can safeguard businesses operating in 
Ukraine from raiding attacks. Moreover, in line with existing research on raiding 
(Pojansky, 2013; Pojansky, 2014), all but one FIs also are very skeptical with regard 
to a proposition that an immunity of businesses to raiding attacks can be secured by 
their impeccable operational conduct and flawless reputations due to its practical 
unattainability in realities of post-Soviet transition.  
Similarly to the case of pseudo-FDI, such allegations provide additional evidence 
for the hypothesis on the quality of institutional environment in Ukraine and lay a 
foundation for several other very important building blocks of a ‘blind bargaining’ 
model, namely tacit relational resources and informal element of a bargaining 
process in such neo-patrimonial states as Ukraine. 
8.3 ‘Blind bargaining’ model 
The most important finding and contribution of this research to international 
business literature is the development and test of a new model of bargaining 
relationships between foreign investors in neo-patrimonial transition host countries. 
The ‘blind bargaining’ is built upon the elements of the obsolescing bargain model 
originally determined and utilized by Vernon (1971) in his analysis of the stability of 
MNE – host state government relationships and Eden, Lenway & Schuler’s (2004; 
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2005) political bargaining model. Similarly to the obsolescing bargain model, ‘blind 
bargaining’ model is proposed as a special case of the political bargaining model. 
‘Blind bargaining’ model is build upon the obsolescing bargain (Brewer, 1992; 
Fagre & Wells, 1982; Grosse, 1996; Grosse & Behrman, 1992; Kobrin, 1987; Moran, 
1974; Moran, 1985; Stopford & Strange, 1991; Vachani, 1995; Vernon, 1971; 
Vernon, 1977) and political bargaining models (Eden, Lenway & Schuler’s, 2004; 
2005) by incorporating and combining insights from neopatrimonialism (Eisenstadt, 
1973; Zon, 2001); neo institutionalism (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Henisz, 2000; Henisz 
& Zelner, 2005; Mantzavinos, North & Sahriq, 2003; North, 1981; North, 1990; 
North, 1995; North, 2003; Persson, & Sjostedt, 2009; Rodrik, 2002; Rodrik, 
Subramanian, & Trebbi, 2002), particularly social conflict view (Acemoglu, Johnson 
& Robinson, 2004), institutional voids (Doh et. al., 2014; Khanna & Palepu, 1997; 
Khanna & Palepu, 2013; Palepu & Khanna, 1998; Prokopovych, 2011; Pufffer, 
McCarthy & Boisot, 2010) and institutional change (Kingston & Caballero, 2009; 
Libecap, 1989; North, 1981; North, 1990; Ostrom, 2005); bargaining power theories 
(Bacharach & Lawler, 1981; Bachrach & Baratz, 1970; Hay, 1997; Lukes, 1980; 
Oppenheim, 1972); political strategies (Baron, 1993; Baron, 2006; Getz, 1993; 
Hillmann & Hitt, 1999; Hillmann & Hitt, 2004; Keim & Zeitaml, 1986; Lawton, 
McGuire, Rajwani, 2012); and the existing research on iFDI quality (Cole, Elliot & 
Fredriksson, 2006; Kwok & Tadesse, 2006; Malesky, 2005; Malesky, 2009; 
Robertson & Watson, 2004; etc.) amended by accounting for the impact of pseudo-
FDI (Boisot & Meyer, 2008; Fung, Yau & Zhang, 2011; Morck, Yeung & Zhao, 
2008; Sutherland et al., 2010; Xiao, 2004; Abalkin & Whalley, 1999; Buiter & 
Szegvari, 2002; Ledyaeva, Karhunen & Whalley, 2013; Loungani & Mauro, 2001; 
Mulino, 2002) and raiding (Gabor & Khmara, 2012; Osipyan, 2010; Pojansky, 2013; 
Pojansky, 2014; Zimmerer & Khmara, 2012).  
Apart from and in addition to the theoretical core the elements of this model are 
developed, refined and backed by the results of qualitative analysis of foreign 
investors’ political behavior in Ukraine and quantitative tests of iFDI quality and its 
relationships with institutional environment in post-Socialist transition countries. 
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‘Blind barganing’ is a model depicting the cognitive situation of a foreign 
investor who is lacking the clarity on the situation he is in and, as a result, bound to 
act in conditions of extreme uncertainty due to the high degree of intransparency and 
instability of the "rules of the game" at any given moment and of their propensity for 
unpredictable change at any time in the future. It is argued that ‘blind bargaining’ 
originates from the specific state and society relationship which can be formed in 
neo-patrimonial host states where economic decisions are often not directed towards 
serving national interests, but towards supporting personal aims of the officials in 
power. ‘Blind bargaining’, which ultimately undermines the relationships between 
foreign investors and such neo-patrimonial host states, reflects both the presence of 
the latent conflict between national and personal interests of the state representatives 
and the inability of the existing political system to sanction individual self-
enrichment. 
Following the approach adopted by Eden, Lenway & Schuler (2004; 2005), we 
compare the three models along six different dimensions characterizing foreign 
investors – host state bargaining relationships. These elements constituting the base 
for comparison are both parties’ goals, resources, constraints, bargaining issues, 
outcomes and foreign investors’ strategies. 
First of all, in the light of the changes introduced by the political bargaining 
model and goals pursued by the ‘blind bargaining’ model, we point out that 
restricting the business participants’ category of the bargaining process just to the 
MMEs’ population, as in obsolescing bargain (Vernon, 1971) and political 
bargaining models (Eden, Lenway & Schuler 2004; 2005), will eventually impose 
empirical and theoretical limitations on the existing bargaining models. Thus, our 
‘blind bargaining’ model attempts to provide a framework which includes and allows 
accounting for the interests of the whole class of foreign investors (FIs), including 
MNEs, in their bargaining relationships with host states. 
Further, we identify and provide a detailed account of differences between ‘blind 
bargaining’ and the other two models (see Table 8.1). Our model is in partial 
agreement with the political bargaining model in terms of the character of FI-host 
states bargaining relationships. Moving away from conflictual nature of such 
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relationships suggested by Vernon (1971), Eden, Lenway& Schuler (2004; 2005) 
argue that even though MNE - host country goals are different they are typically 
becoming more cooperative nowadays. ‘Blind bargaining’ model, however, indicates 
that in case of neopatrimonial states FIs can expect to built cooperative relationships 
with host countries only in those cases when their interests coincide or do not 
interfere with personal economic and political interests of ruling elite. 
Specific host countries’ and FIs’ goals vary significantly between all three 
models. Obsolescing bargain model focuses on the analysis of market and resources 
seeking MNEs entering the countries pursuing to improve their national welfare by 
adjusting their economic, social and political goals. Political bargaining model, 
pointing to the value of access to host countries’ location specific advantages and 
building upon the liability of foreignness, transaction cost economics and the 
resource based view, particularly emphasizes the growing importance of obtaining 
organizational legitimacy relative to efficiency and market power goals.  
‘Blind bargaining’ model establishes the necessity to distinguish between 
different types of investors. It argues that goals of different types of FIs vary 
significantly depending on their nature. Thus, in case of neopatrimonial transition 
states it is suggested to separately consider the motives of two types of FI, namely 
real or genuine iFDI and pseudo-FDI. The first group consists of market- and 
resource-seeking FIs. The second group includes domestic businessmen who returns 
as foreign investors to their home countries from offshore zones searching for 
efficient forms of investment protection (increased security of assets, equal access to 
justice, secrecy of investors’ identity), increase of bargaining power and/or 
competitiveness due to the combination of exploitation of their privileges of foreign 
investors’ status (access to value added services, lower taxes, government incentives 
for FDI) and of local experience and knowledge (avoiding a liability of foreignness), 
money laundering and others.  
It is obvious that the goals of such polar groups of FI will vary significantly and, 
as a result, require exceptional individual examination. The latter statement gains 
even more value in the light of the analysis of host countries’ goals. In 
neopatrimonial transition states the latter goals reflect the interests of ruling political-
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economic clans which want access to FIs’ non-location bound FSAs. Moreover, the 
largest share of pseudo-FDI belongs to the representatives of these ruling political-
economic clans. Thus, all decisions are guided by the pursuit for the increase of 
personal ruling elite businesses’ competitiveness. 
All three models acknowledge the importance of location-specific and 
ownership-specific resources for foreign investors and host countries, respectively. 
However, political and blind bargaining model also point to the growing role of tacit 
relational-based resources. Moreover, blind bargaining model additionally points out 
to the fact that pseudo foreign investors do not possess any managerial, technological 
or any other of this sort ownership-specific resources comparable to the ones 
transferred with real iFDI. However, they are still able significantly increase their 
competitive advantage due to higher tacit relation-based resources which allow them 
to capitalize on local experience and knowledge. 
All three models admit the importance of both domestic and international 
economic and political constraints effecting the changes in potential bargaining 
power of both parties. Political bargaining model expands this variable by adding up 
the institutional element and pointing to the role of international institutions and 
home country governments in determining the course of bargaining process and its 
results. Eden, Lenway & Schuler (2004; 2005) also emphasize the governance 
inseparability can also restrict foreign investors in their negotiations due to their 
inability to change or differentiate governance modes. 
‘Blind bargaining’ model spotlights several more factors creating additional 
constraints for the negotiating parties in the bargaining process. Firstly, it is 
unreliability and volatility of any host country decisions due to heterogeneity of 
bargaining interests of government actors and incentive incompatibilities faced by 
them. Secondly, based on the findings of the qualitative part of this research project 
this model identifies pseudo investors and state officials’ fear for personal assets’ 
safety abroad as important factors affecting bargaining outcomes. 
In obsolescing bargain model bargaining is restricted to the agreements on MNE 
entry conditions and subsequent negotiations regarding the access to host country 
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resources and the ability to repatriate profits. Political bargaining model argues that 
MNEs and governments engage in repetitive bargaining over various public policies 
concerning their industrial interests. Blind bargaining model advances the ideas 
proposed in its predecessors by pointing to the need to distinguish between formal 
and informal elements of the bargaining process. Within its framework it is 
specifically indicates that bargaining of companies with FDI in neopatrimonial 
transition countries is not restricted to only formal negotiations over public policies 
in industry-specific issues. Informal bargaining over the safety of their assets and fair 
law enforcement is a crucial element for foreign investors’ operational sustenance in 
this group of countries. 
The range of FIs’ strategies is, first of all, determined by their goals. In case of 
obsolescing bargain MNEs are seeking for strategies effective in preventing host 
governments’ opportunistic behavior. Political bargaining model moves ahead and 
distinguishes between economic and political strategies employed by MNEs to 
overcome their liability of foreignness and to strengthen their relationships with host 
countries by increasing organizational legitimacy, political accommodation and 
resource complementarity between them, and building personal relations with state 
officials.  
‘Blind bargaining’ model extends the range of applicable strategies by insisting 
on applicability of all market and nonmarket strategies. Moreover, based on 
combination of the theoretical insights (Collins, Ulluenbruck & Rodriguez, 2009; 
Lawton, McGuire, Rajwani, 2012; Venard, 2009) and results of the qualitative 
analysis of FIs’ political behavior in Ukraine corruption, rejected as one of political 
strategy in developed countries, is added as one of the most important political 
strategies for low- and mid-profile foreign investors in neo-patrimonial transition 
states. Also, in neopatrimonial transition states the efficiency of FIs’ relational 
resources is not simply determined by their relationships with any state officials but 
depends upon their ability to access and built personal relations with representatives 
of ruling elite clans. 
Finally, all three models present different approaches to measuring and 
evaluating bargaining outcomes. Obsolescing bargain model suggest that bargaining 
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outcomes are not stable and obsolesce over time. They depend on the relative goals, 
resources and constraints possessed by both parties and are measured in terms of the 
percentage of ownership retained by the MNE as a result of the bargaining. 
According to political bargaining model the winner is the party which managed to 
attain its goals to a greater extent. Within this framework additional important 
moderating variables include governance inseparability, firm rivalry, liability of 
foreignness, other governments and international institutions. 
‘Blind bargaining’ model insists that in neopatrimonial transition states outcome 
evaluation requires distinguishing between its two components including official 
approval of negotiated government policies and actual enforcement of approved 
government policies. Due to the specific nature of the state and society relationships 
key variable affecting bargaining outcomes in such countries is personal interests of 
government actors representing ruling elite clans. Moreover, the selective application 
and enforcement of laws does not guarantee realization of FIs’ expectations and in 
many cases even prevent them from getting a legitimate pay off on their effort. The 
results of the qualitative analysis show that FIs’ ability to achieve a fair enforcement 
of laws is determined by their status in the world economy. 
Overall it can be concluded that ‘blind bargaining’ model, developed as a special 
case of political bargaining model, provides a comprehensive framework for 
explaining FI – host state bargaining relationships in neopatrimonial transition 
economies. This model was tested both quantitatively for the sample of 27 post-
Socialist countries, including its various sub-groups, and qualitatively for the case of 
Ukraine within this research project. The results of both analyses provide evidence in 
support of this model. Further country-specific tests are necessary to test its 




Table 8.1. Obsolescing bargain, political bargaining and ‘blind bargaining’ models: comparative analysis 
 Obsolescing bargain model Political bargaining model Blind bargaining model 





MNE-HC goals are conflictual but 
the bargain is potentially positive 
sum (both parties can gain). 
MNE-HC goals are different and 
typically cooperative, there is 
positive sum bargaining. 
Foreign investors (FI) -HC goals are different and 
cooperative only in those cases when their interests 
coincide or do not interfere with personal economic and 






























Two types of FDI: 
1. Real FDI 
Predominantly market and/or 
resource seeking goals. 
2. Pseudo-FDI 
Search for efficient forms of 
investment protection (increased 
security of assets, equal access to 
justice, secrecy of investors’ 
identity), increase of bargaining 
power and/or competitiveness due 
to the combination of exploitation 
of their privileges of foreign 
investors’ status (access to value 
added services, lower taxes, 
government incentives for FDI) 
and of local experience and 




interests of ruling 
political-economic 
clans which want 
access to FIs’ non-
location bound 
FSAs. Importance of 





 Obsolescing bargain model Political bargaining model Blind bargaining model 








FSAs of the 
MNE. FDI is a 























1. Real FDI  
Transferring non-location-bound 
resources that are property-based 
and tacit/relational based. 
2. Pseudo-FDI 
Tacit/ relational based: capitalizing 













Economic and political constraints, 
both domestic and international. 
Economic, political and institutional 
constraints. Governance 
inseparability constraints outcomes. 
International institutions and home 
country governments can affect 
outcomes. 
Economic, political and institutional constraints. 
Unreliability and volatility of any host country decisions 
due to heterogeneity of bargaining interests of government 
actors and incentive incompatibilities faced by them. 
Governance inseparability constraints outcomes. 
International institutions, home country governments, 
pseudo-investors, state officials’ fear for personal assets’ 








 Bargain over MNE entry. Subsequent 
bargains with same firm(s) over 
access to HC and ability to repatriate 
profits. 
MNEs and governments bargain over 
public policies in industry-specific 
issue areas. 
Need to distinguish between formal and informal 
bargaining. 
Bargaining of companies with FDI not restricted to formal 
negotiation only over public policies in industry-specific 
issues. Informal bargaining over the safety of their assets 
and fair law enforcement is a crucial element. 
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 Obsolescing bargain model Political bargaining model Blind bargaining model 











s MNEs focus on preventing 
opportunistic behavior by the host 
government. 
MNEs use economic and political 
strategies, lobbying for legitimacy in 
order to overcome liability of 
foreignness. MNE-HC relations can 
be strengthened through 
organizational legitimacy, political 
accommodation, resource 
complementarity and personal 
relations. 
Companies with FDI use various market and nonmarket 
strategies. Corruption is added as one of the most 
important political strategies for low- and mid-profile 
foreign investors in neo-patrimonial transition states. FIs’ 
resources-HC relations depend on political 
accommodation, resource complementarity and personal 








Outcomes measured by percentage of 
ownership retained by the MNE. 
Outcome depends on relative goals, 
resources and constraints. Initial 
bargains favor MNE and then 
obsolesce over time. 
Outcomes measured by which party 
most closely achieves its goals. 
Outcome depends on the parties’ 
relative goals, resources and 
constraints. Governance 
inseparability, firm rivalry and 
liability of foreignness are key 
variables affecting bargaining 
outcomes. Other governments and 
international institutions are 
important moderating variables. 
Outcome evaluation requires distinguishing between its 
two components or stages: 
1. Official approval of negotiated government 
policies. 
Outcome depends on the parties’ relative goals, resources 
and constraints. Here, key variable is personal interests of 
government actors representing ruling elite clans. Other 
(especially developed home states) governments and 
international institutions are important intervening 
variables.  
2. Actual enforcement of approved government 
policies. 
Selective application and enforcement of laws: depends on 
the status of foreign investor in the world economy. 
Table, including the parts on obsolescing bargain and political bargaining models, adapted from Eden, Lenway & Schuler (2004; 2005). The part on ‘blind bargaining’ 
model is developed in the course of this research. 
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8.3.1 Quantitative test of the ‘blind bargaining’ hypothesis 
Our comparative analysis of the impact of country risks and economic indicators 
on the quality of interactions between FDI and host states, conducted for 27 post-
Soviet and CEE countries, supports the ‘blind bargaining’ hypothesis and the main 
argument of this paper in that it documents differential relationships between FDI 
inflows and other variables for different groups of countries. The latter include all 
post-soviet states except Baltic states, Central European accession and non-accession 
countries and Baltic states, Central European post-soviet states (Belarus, Moldova, 
Russia and Ukraine), and Central Asian States. To preserve the homogeneity of the 
sample, this analysis deliberately excludes the three Baltic states, whose economic 
development was affected relatively early on by their eventual succession to the 
European Union (Hunya, 2004). 
Questioning the dominant orthodoxy of iFDI that increased foreign investment 
will, in virtually all instances, benefit the recipient nation (Aitkin, Harrison and 
Lipsey, 1996; Balasubramanyam, Salisu, & Sapsford, 1996; Borensztein, De 
Gregorio & Lee, 1998; De Melo, 1999; Dyker, 1999; Rodrik, 2003; Sachs & 
Warners, 1995), this analysis argues that iFDI differs by its quality and, following 
Moran (1998), and suggests distinguishing between ‘malign’ and ‘benign’ iFDI. 
Combining this classification with neo-patrimonial (Zon, 2001), neo-institutional 
(North, 1990; Rodrick, 2003; Rodrik, Subramian and Trebbi, 2001; Williamson, 
1975; 1985), and alternative theories of FDI, trade, and development (Hausmann & 
Fernandez-Arias, 2000; Moran, 1998), it further proposes that the failure of post-
Soviet states to attract the required amounts of quality FDI can be, first of all, 
explained by the presence of ‘blind bargaining’.  
The most stable relationship that can be observed for all groupings is the strong 
correlation between FDI levels of economic risks. The significance and strength of 
this attests to the significance of ‘blind bargaining’ context since one of the main 
criteria upon which Global Insight bases its rating of this type of risk is policy 
consistency and forward planning of the economy. The latter is, first of all, 
dependent on the quality and independence of a state’s economic and political 
system, the lack of which reflects latent conflict between genuine economic goals 
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and the private interests of these states’ ruling elite; which, in turn, creates high 
levels of uncertainty and instability with regard to policies. 
This analysis provides support for an alternative hypothesis of iFDI quality 
(Hausmann & Fernandez-Arias, 2000; Moran, 1998). Based on its results it can be 
concluded that there is quantitative evidence for lower quality iFDI in neo-
patrimonial post-Soviet states. Moreover, it can be further argued that the 
subordination of state politics to personal economic interests of ruling elite, as a main 
characteristic underpinning the existence of ‘blind bargaining’, explains the inability 
of many such states to attract the required amounts of quality iFDI. It also explains 
attractiveness of these states to riskier investors and consequently the inflows of 
mostly ‘malign FDI’ into these countries. 
However, similarly to the previous quantitative inquiry undertaken in this study, 
it is emphasized that the result of this analysis should be also interpreted with caution 
due to the same data quality reasons (see section 8.2.2). 
8.3.2 Qualitative test of the ‘blind bargaining’ model 
Qualitative analysis of foreign investors’ political behavior in Ukraine provides 
evidence and support for each element of a ‘blind bargaining’ model. The results of 
this inquiry show that host goals of Ukraine as a host country in any negotiations are 
determined by the interests or ruling political-economic clans. Overall, all 
respondents agree that politics is a business project in Ukraine. For example, 
representatives of elite MNEs report that:  
Even at the Presidential Administration level the outcome of any 
legislative negotiations depends on the presence and bargaining power of 
powerful and influential vested interests such as political elites representing 
their business, including various large domestic FIGs and multiple pseudo-
FDI holdings.  
Combined with a unanimous agreement about the crucial role of pseudo foreign 
investors in inducing adverse institutional changes and in undermining real foreign 
investors’ competitiveness, this testimony and evidence prove and substantiate the 
need for the distinction between real and pseudo-FDI.  
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The interviewees also explain that at present in Ukraine such tacit relational 
based resources as personal relations and friendship with state officials, members of 
the ruling elite and representatives of the parallel criminal hierarchy are the most 
efficient channels for companies to exercise influence on the institutional 
environment. Moreover, at the same time these resources turn into constraints for 
foreign investors due to all businesses’, including foreign investors’, high degree of 
dependence on the diverging demands of the state officials representing bargaining 
political and economic interests of these ruling elites.  
The results of this study, in line with social conflict view (Acemoglu, 2006; 
Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006; Persson, & Sjostedt, 2009), also confirm that the high 
degree of power personalization and the inability of the existing political system to 
sanction individual self-enrichment lead to the latent conflict between national and 
personal interests of the state representatives and encourage treacherous and even 
criminal behavior of state officials threatening foreign investors’ security in the 
country. As a result, companies with iFDI are forced to engage in two different types 
of bargaining: formal over various public policies and informal over the safety of 
their assets and fair law enforcement.  
Such pressing need for businesses’ participation in informal bargaining 
practically leads to legalization of corruption. As a result, following Lawton, 
McGuire & Rajwani (2012) the latter is added to the list and acknowledged as one of 
the most important political strategies for low- and mid-profile foreign investors in 
neo-patrimonial transition states, particularly Ukraine. 
The interviewed representatives of companies with iFDI and experts provide 
evidence for the ‘blind bargaining’ model’s assumptions on the need to account for 
the duality of bargaining outcomes. They report about double standards and double-
cross approach of Ukrainian authorities to the fulfillment of their responsibilities. 
For, example, on one hand, Ukraine plays by the rules of the developed world and 
satisfies the requirements with regard to the norms of civilized lobbying through 
allowing participation in and certain degree of influence by international professional 
and business associations on the law-making process and meeting their demands. On 
the other hand, when it comes to the final law-enforcement phase of this cycle 
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respective authorities just cross out all the rules formalized at the previous stages and 
continue to play by their own informal illegal rules, for example, through 
discretionary law enforcement. 
It is also acknowledged in the ‘blind bargaining’ model that the applicability of 
some of its components differs depending on certain foreign investors’ 
characteristics determining their affiliation with a particular group. Even though the 
qualitative study successfully tests the ‘blind bargaining’ model and provides 
evidence and support for its each element for low- and mid-profile foreign investors, 
it can be argued that some foreign investors claim that they do not engage in any 
informal activities and use the same operational mode in Ukraine as in any developed 
country. Thus, it is noteworthy, that elite MNEs with a high profile status in the 
world economy, claim their capacity to protect themselves from institutional 
deficiencies of Ukrainian market. Further analysis of findings from the qualitative 
study on foreign investors’ political behavior in Ukraine will focus on providing 
evidence of variations in political bargaining behavioral patterns of different groups 
of companies with iFDI. 
8.4 Political strategies of foreign investors in Ukraine 
The analysis of empirical findings obtained in the course of this qualitative 
inquiry provides evidence of different patterns of political behavior and use of 
different political strategies by various groups of companies following the 
classification suggested for the purpose of this study (see Chapter 2, Section 2.6). 
Clearly, elite MNEs, on one hand, and low- and mid-profile foreign investors, on the 
other hand, choose distinct models of their relationships with a host state’s 
institutional environment both in terms of applied political strategies, persistence in 
time and participation model. The only exception is rare occasional deviations from 
the group’s options of upper rank mid-profile foreign investors. 
The review of foreign investors’ political behavior supports Hillmann & Hitt’s 
(1999) proposition that the respective companies’ with FDI choices are determined 
by combinations of company ownership-specific and host country location-specific 
characteristics and the nature of the disputed or proposed issues. The status of a 
299 
 
company with iFDI in a world economy determined by the prominence of its 
international profile based on such characteristics as visibility, reputation, level of 
home country’s development, relational resources in terms of strong connections 
with and support of a home state and various supranational institutions is identified 
as the most important ownership specific characteristic.  
Thus, elite MNEs operating in Ukraine follow the relational approach. They 
prefer to rely on long-term relationships and strategies (Hillmann & Hitt, 1999). In 
contrast, low-and mid-profile foreign investors resort to transactional approach. Their 
use of political strategies is short-term and issue-based (Hillmann & Hitt, 1999), first 
of all due to their lack of both financial and, as a result, relational resources.  
Moreover, this research identifies another very important reason for the lack of 
low- and mid-profile foreign investors’ enthusiasm for engaging in political 
activities. Both interviewed experts and company representatives claim that these 
companies prefer staying out of spotlight of corrupt state officials to avoid attention 
and excessive pressure on their side.  
Form of foreign investors’ participation in political activities is determined by the 
same factors. Very often the choice of political strategies depends on the form of 
investors’ participation. All low- and lower rank mid-profile foreign investors 
undertake individual attempts to protect their interests by the means of corruption. 
Due to the discussed above lack of resources combined with the characteristics of 
Ukrainian institutional environment, in most cases corruption becomes the only and 
the most efficient instrument for protecting companies’ interests.  
Scholars focusing on the study of political activities of businesses in emerging, 
developing and transition economies (Collins, Ulluenbruck & Rodriguez, 2009; 
Khatri, Tsang & Begley’s, 2006; Venard, 2009) argue that corruption, cronyism and 
extensive use of connections should be also classified as political strategies (Lawton, 
McGuire, Rajwani, 2012). The findings of this research provide empirical evidence 
for supporting the proposition. In countries like Ukraine low- and lower rank mid-
profile foreign investors rarely employ any other bargaining instruments but 
corruption. As a result, the list of political strategies is expanded by introducing 
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corruption as one of the most popular and efficient instruments for resolving 
institutional problems in transition countries. This finding is applied within the ‘blind 
bargaining’ model framework. 
Moreover, the results of this research also show that the combination of 
omnipresent corruption and selective or discriminative enforcement of laws partially 
resolves the free-riding problem (Olson, 1965) in Ukraine and other countries with 
the same institutional environment. Accroding to Olson (2002: 15) “the very fact that 
a goal or purpose is common to a group means that no one in the group is excluded 
from the benefit or satisfaction brought about by its achievement”. However, in neo-
patrimonial states, in contrast to developed less corrupt societies, low- and mid-
profile companies with FDI not participating in collective bargaining over relevant to 
their businesses policy issues cannot benefit from value-creating outcomes of such 
policies free of charge. Since most of high rank mid-profile foreign investors and all 
of the elite MNEs pay for the beneficial outcomes through active participation in 
collective bargaining process and underdeveloped law enforcement mechanism 
ensures that every non-participating company, except for the companies possessing 
tacit relational resources such as pseudo-FDI belonging to ruling political–economic 
clans, will have to pay a bribe to persuade corrupt state officials for applying the 
desired law in their case, it resolves the free-riding problem.  
Thus, the analysis of a ‘blind bargaing’ model sets a framework for new research 
on the free riding problem in neopatrimonial states. Several important elements, 
inlcuindg tacit relational resoures, such as close ties with or belonging to ruling 
political-economic elite clans, informal bargaining process, and actual selective 
application and enforcement of laws, determine the potential for resolvoing  the free-
riding probelm for different groups and types of FIs, were identified in the course of 
testing and refining a ‘blind barganing’ model. 
This research also provides evidence that the elite MNEs’ choice of political 
strategies depends on the form of their participation in the bargaining process 
(Hillman, Keim & Schuler, 2004). Both individual and collective participation 
usually involves information strategies, including direct lobbying (Hillman, Keim & 
Schuler, 2004; Johnson, 1992; Katzenstein, 1985; Murtha & Lenway, 1994a), 
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company led research projects and reporting research results, testifying as expert 
witnesses in hearings and/ before other government bodies, and providing decision 
makers with position papers and/or technical reports (Buchanan & Tullock, 1962; 
Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Lord, 2000a; Schuler, 1996; Rehbein & Schuler, 1999) and 
most of the constituency building strategies namely coalition building (Getz, 1997; 
Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Keim & Zeithaml, 1986).  and advocacy advertizing (Hillman 
& Hitt, 1999; Keim & Zeithaml, 1986; Keim, Zeitmal & Baysinger, 1984; Sethi, 
1979; Sethi, 1987) and denying application of grassroot mobilization techniques 
(Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Sholzman & Tierney, 1886; Wilcox et al., 2003). It is 
noteworthy that all elite MNEs in Ukraine reject employing any financial incentive 
strategies (Hillman & Hitt, 1999) explaining this by their disengagement from 
politics in Ukraine. 
8.5 Political activity and pro-activeness of foreign investors in Ukraine 
A clear distinction in the patterns of low- and mid-profile investors’ and elite 
MNEs’ involvement in relationships with various branches of power at different 
levels also can be observed in terms of their pro-activeness. The results of this study, 
in line with the existing literature, show that elite MNEs very actively employ a wide 
range of buffering strategies to protect their interests in the Ukrainian market 
(Hillman, Keim & Schuler, 2004; Meznar & Nigh, 1995).  
All elite MNEs representatives declared that they are highly involved in and 
constantly seeking dialog with both the Ukrainian population and the authorities.  
Naturally, elite MNEs are very actively building their relationships with local 
authorities and communities in regions where their production facilities or offices are 
located. These foreign investors said that they also work a lot with local communities 
by investing significant resources into various projects based on the principles of 
corporate social responsibility. 
At the national level, elite MNEs have access to, and actively cooperate directly 
with, cabinet of ministers, the Presidential Administration, and the parliament 
(Ukrainian: Verkhovna Rada). Interviewees emphasized that direct access to these 
302 
 
critical decision-making centers provides them with a certain bargaining leverage 
and advantage over their competitors. 
In contrast, both low- and mid-range profile investors prefer avoiding any 
unnecessary contacts with any authorities at all levels due to a lack of resources and a 
fear of being noticed and, as a result, becoming victims of extortion by corrupt 
authorities.  
The interviewees explain that at present in Ukraine personal relations and 
friendship with members of the ruling elite and representatives of the parallel 
criminal hierarchy are the most efficient channels for companies to exercise 
influence on the institutional environment. Respectively, this dependence on 
incumbents’ perception and almost absolute absence of fair mechanisms controlling 
the changes in institutional environment greatly decreases the confidence of all 
businesses, including foreign investors’, in the security of their future operations and 
even continued existence in the country. This, in turn, partially explains the 
reluctance of new foreign investors to enter, and the growing tendency of existing 
foreign investors to exit, the Ukrainian market. 
Under such circumstances it is also not surprising that the fear to become public 
and to reveal any information about them grow into the most important problem for 
low- and mid-range profile foreign investors. Three quarters of these companies 
explained that very often they just literally hide from any public involvement, 
assuming a very passive position and, as a result, avoiding any attention. Therefore 
they usually do not participate in any forums, round tables and any other activities 
through which they could contribute to filling the existing institutional voids and to 
initiating changes in the institutional environment. 
Overall, low-and mid-profile foreign investors admit that they just learn to adapt 
to all formal and informal requirements of Ukrainian institutional environment. Thus, 
it can be concluded that these two groups of foreign investors primarily rely on 
bridging strategies to ensure the persistence of their operations in the country 
(Hillman, Keim & Schuler, 2004; Meznar & Nigh, 1995). 
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However, it is also noteworthy that all low- and mid-profile foreign investors 
when asked about buffering mechanisms (Hillman, Keim & Schuler, 2004; Meznar 
& Nigh, 1995) first of all named physical protection of their assets. It is clear that a 
real threat of raiding attacks forces the representatives of these two groups of foreign 
investors to literally fortify their business by improving their security systems and 
increasing the number of their security personnel. Moreover, these investors also 
admit that some of them to avoid both physical threats and excessive regulatory and 
administrative pressure on their businesses also choose to conceal their FDI by 
registering their businesses as domestic; thus representing an opposite of pseudo-FDI 
that could be referred to as pseudo-domestic companies. 
As a result, the findings of this qualitative inquiry allow suggesting the extension 
of an existing classification of buffering strategies (Hillman, Keim & Schuler, 2004; 
Meznar & Nigh, 1995). Thus, in the context of transition countries we propose 
adding two evolving buffering techniques namely improvement of physical security 
and pseudo-domestic business operation mode. 
8.6 Foreign investors’ success and efficiency in securing positive institutional 
change in Ukraine 
The results of this qualitative analysis both confirm and question the existing 
theoretical insights on the effectiveness of corporate political activity. On one hand, 
in compliance with Oliver & Holzinger’s (2008) view interviewed representatives of 
companies with FDI, primarily elite MNEs, testified that their success and efficiency 
in achieving desirable policy outcomes is determined by their firms’ exogenous and 
endogenous dynamic capabilities, specifically emphasizing the value of their status 
in the world economy and relational resources. They also emphasized the advantages 
of diversification and dynamic adjustments of their political strategies in promoting 
their position on specific policy issues (Oliver & Holzinger’s, 2008). Low-and mid-
profile foreign investors admitted to the crucial nature of the same instruments by 
acknowledging their lack of capacity of influencing any desirable institutional 
changes due to their lack of these required resources. 
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On the other hand, in contrast to Kudina & Collinson (2009) assumption it is 
argued that in the context of neopatrimonial transition states like Ukraine the pursuit 
and consecutive approval of a certain desirable policy does not guarantee its positive 
effect on the corporate performance of the entire population of foreign investors.  
We argue that the assessment of the effectiveness of corporate political activity 
and bargaining should include two components of a ‘blind barganing’ model. Firstly, 
the evaluation of the officially approved policies is required to assess the 
effectiveness of the overall foreign investors’ effort in terms of achieving their 
desirable objectives. However, their success in supporting the approval of any 
legislative act does not pass automatically to the success of its enforcement. 
Unfortunately, in case of neopatrimonial transition countries, particularly Ukraine, 
selective application and enforcement of laws determines the need for the efficiency 
evaluation of the second component such as actual enforcement of approved 
government policies. This study confirms that the degree of success in both 
components varies significantly for different types of companies: being higher for 
elite MNEs and lower for low- and mid-profile foreign investors. 
8.7 Summary 
This research has developed and tested a new ‘blind barganing’ model of 
relationships between FIs and institutions in neo-patrimonial states. The model was 
build based on the analysis of several very important elements relevant to the quality 
of iFDI and their impact on institutional changes in transition neo-patrimonial states. 
Two research hypothesis and four research questions were suggested and addressed 
to identify all components which combined determine ‘blind bargaining’model.  
First of all, even though quantitative analysis produced strong significant 
evidence of iFDI risk-increasing effect, the results of the qualitative analysis point to 
the need of differentiating between real and pseudo-FDI. Raiding problem, 
corruption, personal interests of government actors representing ruling elite clans, 
including pseudo foreign investors, merging economic, political and criminal 
powers, selective application and enforcement of laws are among other very 
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important factors that drive quality iFDI out of transition countries and cause further 
deterioration of institutional environment.  
This study also reveals that various aspects of foreign investors’ political 
behavior are determined by ownership-specific advantages. Thus, evidence is 
provided that choices of political strategies, level of pro-activeness and efficiency of 
different groups of investors varies significantly with the foreign investors’ status in 
the world economy. Elite MNEs claim their bargaining positioning to be relatively 
strong and low- and mid-profile foreign investors admitting the vulnerability and 
insecurity of their businesses in Ukraine. 
Finally, based on the combination of empirical and theoretical insights discussed 
above, a ‘blind bargaining’ model was developed as a special case of political 
bargaining model. It provides a comprehensive framework for explaining foreign 
investor – host state bargaining relationships in neopatrimonial transition economies 
and reveals several distinctive characteristics of both parties’ behavior in terms of 
their goals, resources, constraints, nature of bargaining process, strategies and 
outcomes. This model was tested both quantitatively for the sample of 27 and 12 
post-Socialist countries and qualitatively for the case of Ukraine within this research 
project. The results of both types of analyses provide evidence in support of this 
model. However, it is suggested that further country-specific tests are necessary to 








CHAPTER NINE: CONCLUSION 
9.1 Introduction 
The overall goal of this thesis was to develop a new ‘blind bargaining’ model of 
relationships between FIs and neo-patrimonial recepeint states. This objective was 
pursued by analyzing the quality of iFDI in transition economies with special focus 
on post-Soviet countries and by examining the relationships between iFDI and 
institutional environment in host countries at both macro- and micro-levels. It is 
argued that certain combinations of patterns of quality of iFDI and host-country 
institutional variables determine foreign investors’ political influence and political 
behavior and further allow them to pursue their economic goals through 
manipulation of political regimes and consequently reshaping the host country’s 
institutions in accordance with their strategic goals. 
The combination of findings from both qualitative and quantitative analyses 
allows identifying, first of all, important characteristics determining the iFDI quality 
and causing deterioration of institutional environment in transition countries and, 
second of all,  patterns of political behavior performed by different groups of foreign 
investors. Moreover, combined with theoretical insights these empirical findings 
contribute to the development of a ‘blind bargaining’ model as a special case of 
political bargaining model for transition economies. 
This chapter has the following structure. Firstly, the review of contributions and 
implications of the results of this study for the literature is provided. Secondly, we 
discuss the applicability of both theoretical and empirical findings of this research for 
businesses and education. Thirdly, the discussion of implications and 
recommendations for public sector is suggested. And finally, the review of 
limitations and future research directions complete this study. 
9.2 Implications for the literature 
The two most important contributions of this study to the international business 
literature, particularly in the field of bargaining power, FDI theories and nonmarket, 
specifically political, strategies and behavior research, are the development of a 
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‘blind bargaining’ model and the first qualitative analysis of foreign investors’ 
political behavior in transition post-Soviet country, Ukraine. Moreover, other 
important elements specific to foreign investors’ relationships with host states and 
their political activities in transition post-Socialist countries were revealed and, as a 
result, allowed adjusting the existing theoretical and empirical studies, pointing to the 
research gaps and suggesting new research directions. 
‘Blind bargaining’ model provides a framework for analyzing foreign investors – 
host states relationships in the context of transition economies. It is a result of 
multidisciplinary approach. Combining insights from international business, political 
science, sociology, economics and transition economics literature eventually led to 
filling the gap in international business literature on bargaining, FDI, foreign 
investors political behavior, MNEs – state relationships, institutional quality and 
institutional change, to mention just a few. Moreover, several very important 
elements introduced within this model also represent contributions to the existing 
literature independently by itself. 
‘Blind bargaining is defined as a model depicting the cognitive situation of a 
foreign investor who is lacking the clarity on the situation he is in and, as a result, 
bound to act in conditions of extreme uncertainty due to the high degree of 
intransparency and instability of the "rules of the game" at any given moment and of 
their propensity for unpredictable change at any time in the future.  It is argued that 
‘blind bargaining’ originates from the specific state and society relationship which 
can be formed in neo-patrimonial host states where economic decisions are often not 
directed towards serving national interests, but towards supporting personal aims of 
the officials in power. ‘Blind bargaining’, which ultimately undermines the 
relationships between foreign investors and such neo-patrimonial host states, reflects 
both the presence of the latent conflict between national and personal interests of the 
state representatives and the inability of the existing political system to sanction 
individual self-enrichment. 
Following the approach adopted by Eden, Lenway & Schuler (2004; 2005), the 
‘blind bargaining’ model is characterizing six different dimensions of foreign 
investors – host state bargaining relationships. These elements include both parties’ 
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goals, resources, constraints, bargaining issues, outcomes and foreign investors’ 
strategies. 
The first contribution to the bargaining literature and difference between blind 
bargaining and obsolescing bargain (Brewer, 1992; Fagre & Wells, 1982; Grosse, 
1996; Grosse & Behrman, 1992; Kobrin, 1987; Moran, 1974; Moran, 1985; Stopford 
& Strange, 1991; Vachani, 1995; Vernon, 1971; Vernon, 1977) and political 
bargaining (Eden, Lenway & Schuler 2004; 2005) models is the extension of the 
analysis to the entirely populations of foreign investors as opposed to restricting it to 
MNEs only.  
‘Blind bargaining’ model is a result of a multidisciplinary effort building on a 
combinations of various international business, political science, sociology, and 
economics theories, including theory of neopatrimonialism (Eisenstadt, 1973; Zon, 
2001) and social conflict view (Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson, 2004). It  argues 
that in case of neopatrimonial states FI can expect to built cooperative relationships 
with host countries only in those cases when their interests coincide or do not 
interfere with personal economic and political interests of ruling elite. 
Further, ‘blind bargaining’ model establishes the necessity to distinguish between 
different types of investors. It argues that goals of different types of FIs vary 
significantly depending on their nature. Thus, it suggests considering separately the 
motives of two types of FI, namely real or genuine iFDI and pseudo-FDI.  
Combining the multiple bodies of literature and indicating the need to 
differentiate between real and pseudo-FDI in studies on FDI relationships with and 
their impact on various host state characteristics is an important contribution to the 
literature on FDI. Pointing to the role and focusing on segregating the impact of 
pseudo-FDI in any previously examined FDI relationships creates a strong case for 
questioning the results and reviewing the existing scholarly work in this field.  It is 
obvious that the goals of such polar groups of FI will vary significantly and, as a 
result, require exceptional individual examination.  
The latter statement gains even more value in the light of the analysis of host 
countries’ goals. In neopatrimonial transition states the latter goals reflect the 
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interests of ruling political-economic clans which want access to FIs’ non-location 
bound FSAs. Moreover, the largest share of pseudo-FDI belongs to the 
representatives of these ruling political-economic clans. Thus, all decisions are 
guided by the pursuit for the increase of personal ruling elite businesses’ 
competitiveness. 
‘Blind bargaining’ model spotlights several more factors creating additional 
constraints for the negotiating parties in the bargaining process. Firstly, it is 
unreliability and volatility of any host country decisions due to heterogeneity of 
bargaining interests of government actors and incentive incompatibilities faced by 
them. Secondly, based on the findings of the qualitative part of this research project 
this model identifies pseudo investors and state officials’ fear for personal assets’ 
safety abroad as important factors affecting bargaining outcomes. 
Another very important element of the ‘blind bargaining’ model, which 
constitutes an independent contribution to the bargaining and institutional literature 
is the proposition to distinguish between formal and informal elements of the 
bargaining process. Within its framework it is specifically indicates that bargaining 
of companies with FDI in neopatrimonial transition countries is not restricted to only 
formal negotiations over public policies in industry-specific issues. Informal 
bargaining over the safety of their assets and fair law enforcement is a crucial 
element for foreign investors’ operational sustenance in this group of countries. 
The next findings within this research project constituting an independent 
contribution to the literature on foreign investors’ political strategies and applied 
within the ‘blind bargaining’ model is an addition of corruption as one of the most 
important political strategies for low- and mid-profile foreign investors in neo-
patrimonial transition states. This suggestion is based on combination of the 
theoretical insights (Collins, Ulluenbruck & Rodriguez, 2009; Lawton, McGuire, 
Rajwani, 2012; Venard, 2009) and results of the qualitative analysis of FIs’ political 
behavior.  
Also, the results of the qualitative analysis provide evidence that in 
neopatrimonial transition states the efficiency of FIs’ relational resources is not 
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simply determined by their relationships with any state officials but depends upon 
their ability to access and built personal relations with representatives of ruling elite 
clans. 
The proposition regarding the last element of the ‘blind bargaining’ model, 
assessment of outcomes evaluation and their efficiency constitutes a very important 
contribution to the literature on the effectiveness of corporate political strategies 
(Baysinger, 1984; Keim & Baysinger, 1988; Kudina & Collinson, 2009; Oliver & 
Holzinger, 2008). It is argued that in neopatrimonial transition states outcome 
evaluation requires distinguishing between and separate evaluation of its two 
components including official approval of negotiated government policies and actual 
enforcement of approved government policies. The discriminative application and 
enforcement of laws does not guarantee realization of FIs’ expectations and in many 
cases even prevent them from getting a legitimate pay off on their effort.  
Overall it can be concluded that ‘blind bargaining’ model, developed as a special 
case of political bargaining model, provides a comprehensive framework for 
explaining FIs – host state bargaining relationships in neopatrimonial transition 
economies. This model was tested both quantitatively for the sample of 27 post-
Socialist countries and qualitatively for the case of Ukraine within this research 
project. The results of both analyses provide evidence in support of this model. 
Further country-specific tests are necessary to test its applicability beyond the 
transition countries, particularly emerging and developing countries. 
There are also several more findings which were not directly discussed within the 
framework of the ‘blind bargaining’ model but which constitute important 
contributions to the literature. First of all, the qualitative analysis of foreign 
investors’ political behavior in Ukraine identifies a gap in international business 
literature on FDI. Recognizing raiding problem as an important element affecting 
and determining the quality of iFDI in transition economies, based on the results of 
this analysis, it establishes the need for combining FDI and raiding literature 
(Osipyan, 2010; Pojansky, 2013; Pojansky, 2014; Zimmerer & Khmara, 2012) and 
for reconsidering previously produced results. 
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The qualitative analysis shows that the degree of a company’s involvement in a 
public decision-making and its political pro-activeness as well as the choice of 
particular political strategies and tactics is determined by numerous combinations of 
various company and host-country specific characteristics. It is established that a 
company’s elite status in the world economy to a great extent determines its 
bargaining power and security of its assets in Ukraine. 
 Thus, a clear distinction in the behavioral patterns of low- and mid-profile 
investors, on one hand, and elite MNEs, on the other hand, can be observed in terms 
of their choice of political strategies, levels of political activity and pro-activeness, 
and degrees of success and efficiency in their efforts to influence institutional 
changes. For example, it is established that elite MNEs choose relational approach to 
their political strategies and pursue long-term relationship and apply predominantly 
buffering strategies. In contrast, the first two groups of foreign investors stick to 
transactional approach and adapt to the realities of Ukrainian business environment, 
including both its formal and informal components.  
It is noteworthy that the findings of this qualitative inquiry also allow suggesting 
the extension of an existing classification of buffering strategies (Hillman, Keim & 
Schuler, 2004; Meznar & Nigh, 1995). All low- and mid-profile foreign investors 
identify as their buffering strategies physical protection of their assets and 
concealment of their FDI by registering their businesses as domestic, thus 
representing an opposite of pseudo-FDI that could be referred to as pseudo-domestic 
companies. As a result, in the context of transition countries we propose adding two 
evolving buffering techniques namely improvement of physical security and pseudo-
domestic business operation mode. 
The last but not the least important contribution of this research pertains to the 
collective action literature (Olson, 1965). This analysis establishes and explains the 
reasons for irrelevance of free-riding problem for almost all business actors in 
Ukraine, except for those possessing significant tacit relational resources and/ or 
representing personal interests of ruling political-economic clans. The results of this 
research show that it is the combination of omnipresent corruption and discriminative 
enforcement of laws resolve the free-riding problem (Olson, 1965) in Ukraine and 
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other countries with the same institutional environment. Here, in contrast to 
developed less corrupt societies, low- and mid-profile companies not participating in 
collective bargaining over relevant to their businesses policy issues cannot benefit 
from value-creating outcomes ensured by the approval of such policies free of 
charge. It is explained by the fact that literally under no circumstances corrupt state 
officials in Ukraine will apply the desired law in any case without receiving a bribe, 
which resolves the free-riding problem.  
Overall, this discussion reveals several very important contributions on the 
quality of iFDI, foreign investors’ impact on institutional change, political behavior 
and relationships with host states in transition economies. Some of the findings were 
tested only in the context of one country, Ukraine. Thus, in order to take the 
literature forward, the test of the ‘blind bargaining’ model and other findings is 
required in the context of other transition countries. Moreover, it is also advised to 
examine their applicability for other emerging and developing countries. 
9.3 Implications for business practice and education 
The value and relevance of providing a better contextual insight into the 
dynamics of the relationships between institutional environment and foreign 
investors’ non-market strategies, particularly their political behavior and activities, 
cannot be overemphasized. In spite of the recent upsurge of research efforts in this 
area, more context-specific studies are encouraged under the conditions of 
perpetually changing global and country-specific characteristics of business 
environments and their relationships. Under such circumstances, the findings of such 
inquiries would have important implications and reveal information and evidence 
invaluable for keeping abreast education, business practice and management (Nartey, 
2013).  The use of multidisciplinary approach, upgrading of existing theories and 
inclusion of new theoretical and practical materials and courses at all levels of both 
academic and executive education will equip practitioners with the knowledge and 
tools necessary for improving their operational performance in various institutional 
environments (Nartey, 2013).   
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Thus, the potential advancement in the quality of relationships between 
companies with FDI and institutions and of institutional environment in Ukraine, in 
particular, and in transition countries, in general, is dependent on several factors. 
First of all, in accordance with the findings of this research it is suggested that 
companies entering or working in the markets characterized by extremely complex 
and imperfect nature of institutional environment should seek external advice and 
consult experts in different operational spheres, including legal, tax, government 
relations and other specialists. This requirement is specifically applicable for smaller 
foreign investors which do not possess adequate internal resources for undertaking 
independent expert assessment of irregularities and deviations in business conduct 
and environment in the countries of their existing or prospective investments. 
Secondly, it is crucial for the companies, particularly smaller investors and joint 
ventures, to overcome their inertia and take a more proactive and, what is more 
important, less self-interests centered and more holistic, contributing to the aggregate 
development of institutions and improvement of institutional environment, position 
with regard to their participation in all stages of policy cycle. The latter include issue 
identification, policy analysis, policy instrument development, consultations, 
coordination, decision-making, implementation and evaluation activities. 
Finally, the principal and imperative conditions for the successful reform of 
institutional environment in Ukraine and other transition and developing countries 
are  companies’ adherence to active citizenship position and, as a result, to corporate 
socially responsible practices without any exclusions. Particular emphasis is placed 
here on corporate behavior concerning corruption. This research provides proof that 
in surviving transition countries’ style raiding attacks only those companies 
succeeded that sustained a completely legal and transparent pattern of conducting 
business in Ukraine. On the other side, there is also evidence that many of the 
companies impaired their status and bargaining position by embarking into path of 
corruptive practices. Representatives of many such companies admitted that this 
decision led to their eventual withdrawal from the market. 
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9.4 Implications for public policy 
Reform of institutional environment in Ukraine requires commitment and 
cooperation of both business and public sectors. Representatives of both sectors must 
realize that building and maintaining strong, productive, and efficient cooperative 
relationship is a principal condition for the development and improvement of 
institutions in transition and developing countries. By its nature public sector should 
take a leading part in establishing, reinforcing and promoting of such joint effort. 
Public sector should be actively seeking to set up and maintain various 
communication channels with members of business community. The most important 
requirement here is that these activities were not treated just like a simple formality. 
This research demonstrated that relatively numerous currently existing channels 
of cooperation such as various agencies, round tables, etc. do not really fulfill their 
mission. For example, respondents pointed to the lack of publicity with regard to 
information about events putting on a stage for a dialogue and debate on abolition, 
modification or introduction of new policies, legislation and regulatory procedures. 
Moreover, the respondents indicated that in most of the cases their recommendations 
were ignored and, as a result, their participation in such events did not generate an 
adequate reaction from public authorities. 
Thus, public sector, in general, and policy makers, in particular, are called for 
changing their demeanor on the subject of its communication and cooperation with 
business sector. It is possible to accomplish by ensuring the availability of efficient 
system which would ensure availability of timely information and of uncorrupted 
insightful, responsive to the external critique and recommendations, specialists with 
appropriate skills, experience and knowledge to originate and enact necessary 
changes in the area of their expertise.  
9.5 Limitations of the study 
Sample and nature of the researched phenomenon are the main sources of this 
project’s limitations. One of the major obstructions for this study is the inequality 
and, in some cases, lack of representation of companies within different groups 
distinguished in accordance to a number of important characteristics identified as 
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determinants of companies with FDI status and behavioral patterns in their 
relationships with host countries’ institutions. Moreover, self-selection of 
participating companies, some companies’ rejection to participate in this research 
after their better acquaintance with the topic, as well as some of the participating 
companies’ conditioning their participation in this research through securing their 
right to discretely answer the questions of their choice, all signify that this analysis 
could be a subject to several types of bias.  
Firstly, it is likely that self-selection of companies within the originally 
constructed sample and optional disclosure of facts by some of the participating 
companies could generate a bias resulting from omission of data that could be 
otherwise obtained from informants representing the companies which rejected their 
participation and in a case of absolute transparency in revealing details of their 
political behavior by some of the participating companies. Secondly, the reliance on 
informal content analysis and the self-reported data obtained in the process of 
interviewing of a small sample of top-ranking companies’ representatives on such 
sensitive issues as their companies’ political behavior is a limitation in itself. 
Another very important limitation is a failure to gain access to representatives of 
legislative and policy-making branch of power in host country to unfold their 
perspectives on the issue under consideration and assessment of the companies’ with 
FDI impact on their activity and its outcomes. The cross-examinations and cross-test 
of the both sides’ perceptions and positions on the subject matter would produce a 
more accurate picture and contribute to better understanding and to possibility of 
reaching more objective answers to the research questions. 
7.6 Future research directions 
On the basis of our analysis we can conclude that empirical evidence obtained 
has provided inconsistent and often conflicting results. This lack of strong evidence 
can be first of all explained by the complexity and sensitivity of the examined 
phenomenon, by the dynamically  changing nature of both global and local business 
environment, including its both market and non-market components, by the 
imperfection of research methods, and also data availability, reliability and 
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measurement problems. Moreover, our qualitative analysis shows that the 
relationships between companies with FDI and institutional environment of host 
countries are extremely context specific. They depend on the variety of numerous 
combinations of company-, industry-, and country-specific characteristics, 
particularly the degree of uncertainty and lack of stability in the host country’s 
political, social and economic domains.  
For obtaining stronger and more consistent evidence future research effort should 
be focused on qualitative country- and industry-specific comparative studies 
examining the relationships between companies with FDI and host countries’ 
institutions, particularly in terms of different types of both individual 
MNEs/companies with FDI and their groups’ political behavior and their  impact on 
various host-country policies, as well as on other non-market environment targets, 
such as public opinion, media, industry associations and NGOs, etc. 
Thus, further research should involve more projects looking into the findings 
pointing out to the differences in behavioral and impact patterns between and 
matching patterns across various groups of companies with FDI. Besides, 
particularly interesting and contributory for gaining a better insight into the 
relationships between MNEs and host countries’ institutions would be to fill out the 
gap in literature and counteract the findings of existing qualitative and quantitative 
research on MNEs behavior with qualitative studies focusing on the analysis of 
activity and opinions of representatives of various branches of power, specifically 
executive branch in case of transition countries.  
Moreover, ‘blind bargaining’ model, developed as a special case of political 
bargaining model, provides a comprehensive framework for explaining FI – host 
state bargaining relationships in neopatrimonial transition economies. This model 
was tested both quantitatively for the sample of 27 post-Socialist countries and 
qualitatively for the case of Ukraine within this research project. The results of both 
analyses provide evidence in support of this model. Further country-specific tests are 
necessary to test its applicability beyond the transition countries, particularly 
emerging and developing countries. 
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In addition, several supplementary contributions to the existing international 
business and political science literature identified as a result of developing a ‘bilnd 
bargaining’ model, including findings on corruption as a one of the most important 
political strategies and a solution of a free riding problem for almost all business 
actors in neo-patrimonial states, open absolutely new and very challenging prospects 
for future research effort in this field. 
Finally, all the suggestions on the directions for future research assume that 
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A1. SOLICITATION LETTER: ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
 
 
Dear Sir/ Madam 
As a PhD student in Strategy & International Business, the University of Edinburgh I 
am undertaking a survey looking into the relationship between companies with 
foreign direct investment (FDI) activity and quality of institutional environment in 
host countries. As a result, I would greatly appreciate it if you or your colleague with 
an interest in or responsible for your enterprises’ government relations, public 
relations, and other activities related to the relationships with community, mass 
media, other enterprises and various state institutions could spare a few minutes for a 
research interview with me (face-to-face, phone or Skype). 
I am aware that your time is precious but by participating in this research you will be 
helping us to draw up a comprehensive picture of companies’ interactions with 
various market and non-market actors with the purpose of changing institutional 
environment in a host country and foreign investors’ role in this process.  
The information is been sought purely for educational and academic purposes. I hope 
that you will be interested in issues raised by the questionnaire, and I would be more 
than willing to send you an executive summary of my findings at your request. 
All responses to this research project will be handled in the strictest confidence and 
in compliance with Data Protection Act 1998. All companies and individuals 
contributing to the survey will do so anonymously. 
Many thanks for considering this request.  
Look forward to hearing from you. 
Yours sincerely, 
Nataliya Acc-Nikmehr 
PhD candidate in Strategy & International Business 
Business School, The University of Edinburgh 
e-mail: :  N.Acc-Nikmehr@sms.ed.ac.uk 
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Будучи аспирантом Университета Эдинбурга по специальности Стратегия и 
Международный Бизнес, я изучаю проблему взаимодейиствия и 
взаимоотношений международных компаний (МНК) с иностранными 
инвестициями (связи с общественностью, государственными структурами, 
лоббизм и т. д.) и изменениями институциональной среды в Украине. Я была 
бы весьма признательна, если бы Вы согласились на интервью со мной (лично, 
по телефону или в Skype). 
Ваше согласие дать интервью поможет мне составить полную картину влияния 
МНК, отечественных предприятий,  компаний специализирупюихся на 
лоббировании и других бизнес групп на различные рыночные и внерыночные 
субъекты с целью улучшения институциональной среды в Украине. 
Вся информация будет использована исключительно в научных целях. Я 
надеюсь, что Вас  заинтересуют вопросы затронутые в интервью, и я с 
готовностью предоставлю Вам результаты моих исследований по Вашему 
желанию. 
Всем компаниям и частным лицам принимающим участие в моём 
исследовании гарантируется  анонимность и строгая конфиденциальность. 
Большое спасибо за ваше внимание к моей просьбе. 




Стратегия и Международный Бизнес 
Бизнес-школа 
Эдинбургский Университет 
e-mail: :  N.Acc-Nikmehr@sms.ed.ac.uk 
356 
 








З’являючись аспірантом Університета Едінбурга за фахом Стратегія та 
Міжнародний Бізнес, я вивчаю проблему взаємодії та взаємовідносин 
міжнародних компаній з іноземними інвестиціями (зв"зки с суспільством, 
державними структурами, лобізм і т. п.) та зі змінами інституціонального  
середовища в Україні. Була б Вам дуже вдячна, якщо б Ви згодились дати мені 
інтерв’ю (особисто, у телефонній розмові, або у Skype (моє Skype  
ім’я: Nataliya Acc-Nikmehr). 
 
Інтерв’ю з Вами допоможе мені скласти повну картину впливу  компаній з 
іноземними інвестиціями, вітчизняних підприємств, компаній, які 
спеціалізуються на лобіюванні, та інших бізнес угруповань на різні ринкові та 
позаринкові суб’екти з метою покращання інституціонального середовища в 
Україні. 
 
Уся інформація буде використованна виключно у наукових цілях. Сподіваюсь 
що Вас зацікавлять запитання затронуті у інтерв’ю і з радістю додам Вам 
результати моїх досліджень за Вашим бажанням. 
 
Усім компаніям та приватним особам приймаючим участь у моєму 
дослідженні, гарантується анонимність та сувора конфіденційність. 
 
Дякую Вам за увагу до мого прохання. 
 
З нетерпінням чекаю Вашої відповіді. 
 














B1. SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW PROTOCOL: ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
 
COMPANIES WITH FDI CHANGE IN BARGANING POWER, NONMARKET 
STRATEGIES, POLITICAL BEHAVIOUR AND IMPACT ON INSTITUTIONAL 
ENVIRONMENT 
 
SECTION 1: COMPANY PROFILE 
1. How long have your company been working in Ukraine? 
 
2. What are the company’s/subsidiary’s main activities and what are the sectors/ 
industries of your company’s/subsidiary’s operation in Ukraine? 
 
3. What form of ownership does your company/subsidiary have in Ukraine?  
 
4. How was this company/subsidiary established? 
 
5. What is the main reason for your investment in Ukraine?  
 
6. How many full-time employees has your company/subsidiary been employing in 
Ukraine? 
 Starting year of company’s work  Present time 
Number of employees   
 
SECTION 2: BARGAINING POWER 
7. What are Ukraine’s main bargaining strengths and weaknesses as a host country for 
your company/ subsidiary?  
 
8. How important are the fluctuations in host country risks for your company? Why? 
Examples.  
 
9. Does your company try to cause the changes, particularly decrease, of country risks 
in Ukraine? By what means? How successful are these attempts? Examples. 
 
10. What are the main bargaining strengths and how important are these characteristics 
of your company/ subsidiary for its work in Ukraine?  
 
11. What are the main sources of pressure/ influence on your company in Ukraine?  
 
12. Respond to the pressures of which of the above mentioned groups is the primary task 
for your company/ subsidiary? Why?  
 




14. How substantive is the problem of presence and influence of pseudo-FDI (also 
referred to as round tripping FDI: Ukrainian domestic companies’ FDI from offshore 
zones) for your company as well as for realizing full working potential of real 
investors in general and for attracting new FDI?  
 
15. What are the directions and essence of pseudo-FDI influence on FDI in Ukraine? 
 
16. What is the impact of pseudo-FDI on the changes in real foreign investors’ 
bargaining power? 
 
17. How substantive is the ‘raiding’ problem for companies with FDI in Ukraine? Why? 
Examples. 
 
18. Does the presence of ‘raiding’ problem influences foreign investor’s bargaining 
power? How? 
 
19. How substantive is the problem of merging political, economic and criminal powers 
for businesses, in general, and for foreign investors, in particular, in Ukraine in your 
opinion?  
 
20. Do you think that personal relationships with representatives of various state offices 
increase the bargaining power of your company in Ukraine? If YES, to what extent it 
does so? 
 
21. How do you consider your company’s relative bargaining power have changed at 
present as compared to the time of entering the Ukrainian market & to what degree? 
Why? Examples.  
 
SECTION 3: POLITICAL BEHAVIOUR/ NONMARKET STRATEGIES/ 
INTERACTIONS WITH INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT 
22. How is functional field of interactions with nonmarket environment, including 
political activity, organized in your company?  
 
23. Part of what departments (if any) is nonmarket, in general, and political activity, in 
particular, in your company?  
 
24. What are the participants of the bargaining process with Ukraine on the part of your 
company/subsidiary?  
 
25. How dependent is your subsidiary on the head office directives in terms of choice, 
formulation and implementation of political strategies and political activities? 
 
26. What channels does your company/subsidiary use to cause the changes in the host 




27. What are the means used by your company for the interaction with non-market 
environment actors & to what degree? Why? Examples.  
 
28. How does your company/subsidiary assess the effectiveness of undertaking its 
political activities through various means?  
 
29. What do the choices of cooperation modes of your company’s/subsidiary’s political 
activity depend on? Why? Examples.  
 
30. What professional and business associations your company/subsidiary is a member 
of?  
 
31. How do you assess the efficiency and degree of success of companies and 
professional and business associations in Ukraine in terms of their input and 
influence on the changes in/ improvement of institutional environment in the 
country? Why? Examples. 
 
32. At what levels and with what branches of government does your company/subsidiary 
interact in the process of its work and to what degree? 
 
33. Is there an open dialog and programs for active attraction of companies with FDI and 
various professional and business associations into a discussion of problems on 
improvement of existing & development of new laws, policies and regulatory 
mechanism which would contribute to the improvement of institutional environment 
in Ukraine? Examples. 
 
34. How actively do state authorities attract experts (including companies with FDI, 
MNEs, other professional and business association) for the participation in such 
programs? Why? Examples. 
 
35. How actively do these experts, particularly your company/subsidiary, seek for such 
participation? Why? Explain activeness or passiveness. 
 
36. What spheres and types of policies are the focus of your company’s/subsidiary’s 
interest & influence and to what degree? Why? Examples. 
 
37. At what stages of policy cycle and how actively is your company/ subsidiary 
involved in host countries, particularly Ukraine? Examples.  
 
38. How responsive are government authorities to experts’ (particularly your 




39. What particular laws, policies, decrees, permits and other kinds of institutional 
changes have your company/subsidiary been pursuing and lobbying for in Ukraine 
and its degree of success? 
 Successfully implemented 
____________________________________________________________________ 
Failed to implement (Why?) 
____________________________________________________________________ 
In process of negotiation 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
40. Will introduction of a new Law on Lobbying in Ukraine facilitate the process of 
political bargaining for your company/subsidiary in Ukraine and to what degree? 
 
SECTION 4: SELF-ASSESSMENT OF THE FOREIGN INVESTORS’ DEGREE OF 
PRO-ACTIVITY AND EFFICIENCY IN TERMS OF THEIR INTERACTIONS 
WITH INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT IN UKRAINE 
41. How would you assess the input of your company in terms of its contribution to the 
changes, in particular improvement, of an institutional environment in Ukraine?  
 
42. How would you assess you company’s/ subsidiary’s Corporate Social Responsibility 
practices? 
  
43. How effectively does your company/ subsidiary manage its relationship with various 
government authorities with the purpose of improving institutional environment in 
Ukraine? Why? Examples. 
 
44. How pro-active and successful is your company in envisioning and preventing 
forthcoming legal, regulatory and other institutional changes which could have 
negative impact on the work of company/ subsidiary with FDI in Ukraine? Why? 
Examples. 
 
45. What kind of buffering mechanisms does your company/subsidiary use to protect 
itself from the deficiencies of institutional environment in Ukraine and excessive 
government interference?  
 
46. How do you assess the effectiveness of your company’s selected nonmarket 
strategies, in general, and political strategies, in particular? 
 
47. How is your company/subsidiary planning to change the intensity of its political 
involvement in Ukraine? Why?  
 
48. Do you think that personal relationships with representatives of various state offices 




49. How substantive is the problem of potential liabilities for political ties for businesses 
in Ukraine in your opinion? Why? 
 
50. How would you assess the quality of existing FDI in Ukraine? Why? 
 
51. What is the role of your company, other companies with FDI and various 
professional and business associations in fighting corruption in Ukraine? 
 
52. How do you assess the quality and efficiency of work of legislative, executive and 
judicial branches of power in Ukraine? Why? Examples. 
 
53. How would you assess the quality of business environment and efficiency of your 
subsidiary’s work in Ukraine as compared to your company’s other Central and 
Eastern European subsidiaries? Why? Examples. 
 
54. What would you like to change in Ukraine’s political system if you could? 
 
 
Any other comments and recommendations 
_________________________________________________  
 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION 
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B2. SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW PROTOCOL: RUSSIAN LANGUAGE 
 
РАЗДЕЛ 1: О КОМПАНИИ 
1. Как давно Ваша компания/ дочернее предпиятие работает в Украине? 
 
2. Каковы основные направления деятельности и в какой отрасли промышленности 
работает Ваша компания/дочернее предпиятие в Украине? 
 
3. Какова форма собственности у Вашей компании/ дочернего предприятия в 
Украине? 
 
4. Как Ваша компания / дочернее предприятие было создано? 
 
5. Что является основной причиной Ваших инвестиций в Украину?  
 
6. Сколько штатных сотрудников в Вашей компании/ дочернем предприятии в 
Украине? 
 Год начала работы 
компании 
Настоящее время 
Количество сотрудников   
 
РАЗДЕЛ 2: РЫНОЧНАЯ ВЛАСТь 
? 7. Каковы наиболее популярные и наиболее перспективные с точки зрения развития 
экономики  отрасли промышленности для привлечения иностранных инвестиций в 
Украине? 
8. Какие из характеристик Украины на сегодняшний день являются наиболее 
благоприятными факторами для привлечения инвестиций и развития бизнеса в стране, 
а какие наоборот способствуют отчуждению инвестиций?  
9. Насколько важны колебания рисков в стране для Вашей компании? Почему? 
Примеры. 
10.  Предпинимает ли Ваша компания попытки повлиять на изменения, в частности  в 
направлении сокращения рисков в Украине? Какими средствами? Насколько успешны 
эти попытки? Примеры. 
11. Каковы основные преимущественные характеристики Вашей компании, 
способствующие укреплению её рыночных позиций в Украине?  
 
12. Каковы основные источники давления на Вашу компанию в Украине?  
 
13. Удовлетворение требований каких из вышеуказанных Вами источников давления 
является первостепенной задачей для Вашей компании / дочернего предприятия?  
 
14. Насколько конфликтны направления давления вышеуказанных Вами источников 




15. Насколько существенна проблема присутствия и влияния псевдо-ПИИ (прямых 
иностранных инвестиций украинскими отечественных компаниями  из оффшорных 
зон) для Вашей компании, а также для реализации полного рабочего потенциала 
реальных инвесторов и для привлечения новых ПИИ? 
 
16. Каковы направления и сущность влияния псевдо-ПИИ на качество и количество 
реальных ПИИ в Украине? 
 
17. Как псевдо-ПИИ влияют на изменение рыночной власти настоящих иностранных 
инвесторов в Украине? 
 
18. Насколько существенна проблема рейдерства для компаний с иностранными 
инвестициями в Украине? 
 
19. Влияет ли присутствие проблемы рейдерства на изменения рыночной власти 
иностранных инвесторов в Украине? Если ДА, то какова сила и направление этого 
влияния? 
 
20. Насколько актуальна и существенна проблема слияния политических, 
экономических и криминальных сил для бизнеса в целом и иностранных инвесторов в 
частности в Украине по Вашему мнению? 
 
21. Думаете ли Вы, что личные отношения с представителыми власти и различных 
государственных структур и организаций способствует росту рыночной власти Вашей 
компании в Украине? Если да, то в какой степени? 
 
22. Кто является участниками переговорного процесса с Украиной со стороны Вашей 
компании / дочернего предприятия? 
 
23. Как  и в какой степени по Вашему мнению изменилась относительная рыночноя 
власть/ переговорная сила Вашей компании в настоящее время по сравнению со 
временем начала её работы в Украине? Почему? Примеры. 
РАЗДЕЛ 3: ВЗАИМОДЕЙСТВИЕ С ИНСТИТУЦИОНАЛьНОЙ СРЕДОЙ: 
ВНЕРЫНОЧНЫЕ И ПОЛИТИЧЕСТКИЕ СТРАТЕГИИ (связи с 
общественностью, государственными структурами, средствами массовой 
информации, лоббизм и т. д.). 
24. Каким образом организована функциональноая область взаимодеиствия с 
внерыночной средой, в целом, и с институциональной средой, в частности, в Вашей 
компании?  
 
25. Частью какого отдела (если таковой имеется) является деятельность по данному 
направлению в Вашей компании? 
 
26. Насколько зависим Ваш филиал/ дочернее предпиятие от директив головного 
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офиса в вопросах выбора, разработки и реализации инициатив по изменению 
институциональной среды в Украине? 
 
27. Какие каналы и в какой степени Ваша компания наиболее эффективно использует 
с целью влияния на изменения в институциональной среде Украины? Почему? 
Примеры. 
 
28. Какие инструменты и в какой степени Ваша компания использует при 
взаимодействии с различными внерыночными структурами и организациями? 
Почему? Примеры. 
 
29. Насколько эффективна деятельность Вашей компании по изменению 
институциональной среды в Украине при её проведении следующими способами? 
 
30. От чего и насколько зависит выбор Вашей компанией вышеперечисленныx 
режимов сотрудничества по ворпосам влияния на изменения в институциональной 
среде Украины? Почему? Примеры. 
 
31. Членом каких профессиональных и бизнес ассоциаций является Ваша компания/ 
дочернее предпиятие? Перечислите их. 
 
32. Как Вы оцениваете эффективность и успешность компаний с иностранными 
инвестициями и профессиональных и бизнес ассоциаций в плане их вклада и влияния 
на изменения институциальной среды в в Украине? 
 
33. На каких уровнях, с какими ветвями власти и в какой степени  Ваша компания/ 
сотрудничает по ворпорсам улучшения институциональной среды в Украине?  
 
34. Существует ли открытый диалог и програмы по привлечение иностранных 
инвесторов и различных профессиональных и бизнес организаций к обсуждению 
проблем по улучшению функционирующих и созданию новых законов, политик и 
регулятивных механизмов, которые способствовали бы улучшению 
институциональной среды в Украине? Примеры. 
 
35. Насколько активно государственные организации различного уровня пытаются 
привлечь экспертов (включая представителей компаний с иностранными 
инвестициями, транснациональных корпораций, профессиональных и бизнес 
ассоциаций и др.) к участию в таких програмах? Примеры. 
 
36. Насколько активно сами эксперты, в частности Ваша компания, стремятся к 
такому участию? 
 
37. Какие сферы экономики и политики,  на каких стадиях и в какой степени 




38. В каких стадиях цикла по разработке политики и насколько активно принимает 
участие Ваша компания/ дочерняя компания?  
 
39. Насколько серьёзно представители государственных структур относятся к мнению, 
советам и рекомендациям экспертов, в особенности представителей Вашей компании? 
 
40. Какие конкретные законы, политики, постановления, разрешения и другие виды 





Не удалось реализовать 
__________________________________________________________________________
В процессе переговоров 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
 
41. Упростятся ли и в какой степени процессы и процедуры переговоров Вашей 
компании с государственными структурами  в ресультате введения нового Закона о 
Лоббировании в Украине ? 
 
РАЗДЕЛ 4: ОЦЕНКА АКТИВНОСТИ И ЭФФЕКТИВНОСТИ ДЕЙСТВИЙ 
КОМПАНИИ ПО ВОПРОСАМ ВЗАИМОДЕЙСТВИЯ С 
ИНСТИТУЦИОНАЛьНОЙ СРЕДОЙ В УКРАИНЕ. 
 
42. Каков, по Вашему мнению, вклад Вашей компании с точки зрения её влияния на 
изменения институциональной среды в Украине? 
 
43. Насколько эффецктивны взаимоотношения Вашей компании с различными 
государственными структурами по вопросам влияния на изменения 
институциональной среды в Украине? Почему? Примеры. 
 
44. Насколько про-активна и успешна Ваша компания в вопросах предвидения и 
предотвращения возможных предстоящих правовых, нормативных и других 
институциональных перемен, введение которых оказало отрицателное влияние на 
работу Вашей компании в Украине? Почему? Примеры. 
 
45. Какие механизмы защиты Ваша компания использует для того, чтобы оградить 
себя от неполноценности институциональной среды и чрезмерного государственног 
вмешательства в её работу в Украине? 
 
46. Как Вы оцениваете эффективность внерыночных стратегий Вашей компании в 




47. Как Ваша компания планирует изменять интенсивность своей вовлечённости по 
вопросам улучшения институциональной среды в Украине?  
 
48. Являются ли личные связи с сотрудниками государственных структур, народными 
депутатами и т. п. важным фактором для функционирования различных компаний в 
Украине? 
Если ДА, то в какой степени ето упрощает процессы и процедуры переговоров 
компаний в Украине с различными государственными структурами? 
 
50.  По Вашему мнению насколько существенна для бизнеса в Украине, особенно для 
компаний с иностранными инвестициями, проблема потенциальной ответственности 
за политические связи? Почему? 
 
51. Как Вы оцениваете качество целевых иностранных инвестиций в Украине? 
Почему? 
 
52. Какова роль непосредственно Вашей компании, других компаний с иностранными 
инвестициями и различных профессиональных и бизнес ассоциаций в борьбе с 
коррупцией на Украине? 
 
53. Как Вы оцениваете качество и эффецтивность работы правовых, исполнительных и 
судебных ветвей власти в Украине? Почему? Примеры. 
 
54. Как Вы оцениваете качество бизнес среды и эффективность работы Вашей 
компании в Украине по сравнению работой дочерних предприятий в странах 
Центральной и Восточной Европы? Почему? Примеры. 
 
55. Что бы вы хотели изменить в политической системе Украины, если бы могли? 
 
56. Предпринимали ли Вы какие либо попытки по  осуществлению перемен 
предложенных Вами в предыдущем вопросе? Какие? 
 




B3. SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW PROTOCOL: UKRAINIAN LANGUAGE 
 
РОЗДІЛ 1: ПРО КОМПАНІЮ. 
1. Як довго Ваша компанія/дочірне підприємство працює в Україні? 
 
2. Які основні напрямки діяльності та у якій галузі промисловості працює 
Ваша компанія/дочірне підприємство в Україні? 
 
3. Яка форма власності Вашої компанії/дочірнього підприємства в Україні? 
 
4. Як Ваша компанія/дочірне підприємство було створено? 
 
5. Яка головна причина Ваших інвестицій в Україну? 
 
6. Кількість штатних співробітників у Вашій компанії в Україні 
 Рік початку роботи 
компанії 
Нинішній час 
Кількість співробітників   
 
 
РОЗДІЛ 2: РИНКОВА ВЛАДА 
7. Які найбільш популярні та найбільш перспективні, з точки зору розвитку  
економіки, галузі промисловості для прилучення іноземних інвестицій в 
Україні? 
 
8. Які з характеристик України, на нинішній час, з"являються найбіль 
сприятливими факторами для прилучення інвестицій та розвитку бізнесу у 
країні, а які навпаки сприяють відчудженню інвестицій? 
 
9. Наскільки важливі коливання ризиків у країні для Вашої компанії? Чому? 
Приклади. 
 
10. Чи застосовує Ваша компанія спроби впливу на зміни зокрема у напрямку 
скорочення ризиків в Україні? Якими засобами? Наскільки успішні ці 
спроби? Приклади.  
 
11. Які основні переважливі характеристикі Вашої компанії сприяють 
укріпленню її ринкових позицій в Україні? 
 
12. Які головні джерела тиску на Вашу компанію в Україні? 
 
13. Задоволення яких вимог, з вищевказанних Вами джерел тиску, з’являеться 
першорядним завданням для Вашої компанії/дочірнього підприємства? 
 





15. Наскільки суттєва проблема присутності та впливу псевдо-ПІІ (прямих 
іноземних інвестицій українськими вітчизняними компаніями з офшорних 
зон) для Вашої компанії, а також для реалізації повного робочого 
потенціалу реальних інвесторів та для приваблення нових ПІІ? 
 
16. Які напрямки та сутність впливу псевдо-ПІІ на якість та кількість реальних 
ПІІ в Україні? 
 
17. Як псевдо ПІІ впливають на зміни ринкової влади справжніх інвесторів в 
Україні? 
 
18. Наскільки суттєва проблема рейдерства для компаній з іноземними 
інвестиціями в Україні? 
 
19. Чи впливає присутність проблеми рейдерства на зміни ринкової влади 
іноземних інвесторів в Україні? Якщо так, то яка сила та напрямок цього 
впливу? 
 
20. Наскільки актуальна та суттєва проблема злиття політичних, економічних 
та кримінальних сил для бізнесу у цілому та частково для іноземних 
інвесторів в Україні, на Ваш погляд? 
 
21. Чи гадаєте Ви що приватні відношення з представниками влади та різних 
державних структур та організацій сприяють зросту ринкової влади Вашої 
компанії в Україні? Якщо так, то у якій мірі? 
 
22. Хто з"являеться учасниками перемовного процесу з Україною з боку Вашої 
компанії/дочірнього підприемства? 
 
23. Як та у якій мірі, на ваш погляд, змінилась відносна ринкова влада/ 
перемовна міцність Вашої компанії у нинішньому часі в порівнянні з часом 
початку її роботи в Україні? Чому? Приклади. 
 
РОЗДІЛ 3: ВЗАЄМОДІЯ З ІНСТИТУЦІОНАЛЬНИМ СЕРЕДОВИЩЕМ: 
ПОЗАРИНКОВІ ТА ПОЛІТИЧНІ СТРАТЕГІЇ . (зв"зки з 
суспільством,державними структурами, засобами масової інформації, лобізм та 
т. д.) 
24. Яким чином организована функціональна область взаємодії з позаринковим 
середовищем у цілому, та з інституціональним середовищем, частково, у 
Вашій компанії? 
 
25. Частиною якого відділу (якщо такий є) з"являеться діяльність у даному 
напрямку у Вашій компанії? 
 
26. Наскільки залежить Ваш філіал/дочірнє підприємство від директив 
головного офісу у питаннях вибіру, розробки та реалізації ініциатив з 




27. Які канали та у якій мірі Ваша компанія найбільш ефективно використовує 
з метою впливу на зміни у інституціональному середовищі в Україні? 
Чому? Приклади. 
 
28. Які інструменти та у якій мірі Ваша компанія використовує у взаємодії з 
відмінними позаринковими структурами та організаціями? Чому? 
Приклади. 
29. Наскільки ефективна діяльність Вашої компанії зі  змінювання 
інституціонального середовища в Україні при її проведенні слідуючими 
засобами? 
 
30. Від чого та наскільки залежить вибір Вашої компанії вищепереліченних 
режимів співробітництва у питаннях впливу на зміни у інституціональному  
середовищі України? Чому? Приклади. 
 
31. Членом яких професійних та бізнес асоціацій з"являеться Ваша компанія/ 
дочірнє підприємство? Перелікуйте їх. 
 
32. Як Ви оцінюєте ефективність та успішність компаній з іноземними 
інвестиціями та професійних та бізнес асоціацій у плані їх вкладу та впливу 
на зміни інституціонального середовища в Україні? 
 
33. На яких рівнях, та з якими гілками влади та у якій мірі Ваша компанія 
співробітничає у питаннях покращання інституціонального середовища в 
Україні? Приклади. 
 
34. Чи існує відкритий диалог та програми по залученню іноземних інвесторів 
та відмінних професійних та бізнес організацій до обговорювання проблем 
покращання функціонуючих та створенню нових законів, політик та 
регулятивних механізмів, котрі сприяли б покращанню інституціонального 
середовища в Україні? Приклади. 
 
35. Наскільки активно державні організації відмінного рівня намагаються 
залучити експертів (включаючи представників компаній з іноземними 
інвестиціями, транснаціональних корпорацій, професійних та бізнес 
асоціацій та ін.) до участі у таких програмах? Приклади. 
 
36. Наскільки активно самі експерти, частково Ваша компанія,  прагнуть до 
такої участі? 
 
37. Які сфери економикі та політики, на яких стадіях та у якій мірі знаходяться 
у центрі уваги та впливу Вашої компанії? 
 
38. У яких стадіях циклу з розробки політики та наскільки активно приймає 




39. Наскільки серйозно представники державних структур відносяться до 
думок, порад та рекомендацій експертів, особливо представників Вашої 
компанії? 
 
40. Які конкретні закони політики, постанови, дозволи та інші види 
інституціональних змін Ваша компанія лобірує в Україні та ступінь її 
успіху? (Перелікуйте все, будь ласка.) 
  
__________________________________________________________ 
Не вдалось реалізувати 
__________________________________________________________ 
У процесі перемовин 
  
41. Чи спростяться та у якій мірі процеси та процедури перемовин Вашої 
компанії з державними структурами, у результаті введення нового Закону 
про Лобіювання в Україні? 
 
РОЗДІЛ 4: ОЦІНКА АКТИВНОСТІ ТА ЕФЕКТИВНОСТІ ДІЙ 
КОМПАНІЇ З ПИТАНЬ ВЗАЄМОДІЇ З ІНСТИТУЦІОНАЛЬНИМ 
СЕРЕДОВИЩЕМ В УКРАЇНІ. 
42. Який, на Вашу думку, вклад Вашої компанії з точки зору її впливу на зміни 
інституціонального середовища в Україні? 
 
43. Наскільки ефективні взаємини Вашої компанії з відмінними державними 
структурами з питань впливу на зміни інституціонального середовища в 
Україні? Чому? Приклад. 
 
44. Наскільки про-активна та успішна Ваша компанія з питань передбачення та 
запобігання можливих наступних правових, нормативних та інших 
інституціональних змін, введення яких виявило б негативний вплив на 
роботу Вашої компанії в Україні? Чому? Приклади. 
 
45. Які механізми захисту Ваша компанія використовує для того, щоб 
обгородити себе від неповноцінності інституціонального середовища та 
надмірного державного умішування в її роботу в Україні? 
 
46. Як Ви оцінюете ефективність позаринкових стратегій Вашої компанії у 
цілому та політичних стратегій частково? 
 
47. Як Ваша компанія планує змінювати інтенсивність своєї участі з питань 
покращання інституціонального середовища в Україні? 
 
48. Чи з"являються приватні зв"язки з співробітниками державних структур, 
народними депутатами та т. п. важливим фактором для функціонування 
відмінних компаній в Україні? Якщо ТАК, то у якій мірі це спрощує 




49. Наскільки, на Ваш погляд, суттєва для бізнесу в Україні, особливо для 
компаній з іноземними інвестиціями, проблема потенційної 
відповідальності  за політичні зв"язки? Чому? 
 
50. Як Ви оцінюєте якість цілевих іноземних інвестицій в Україні? Чому? 
 
51. Яка роль безпосередньо Вашої компанії, інших компаній з іноземними  
інвестиціями та відмінних професійних та бізнес асоціацій у боротьбі з 
корупцією в Україні? 
 
52. Як Ви оцінюєте якість та ефективність роботи правових, виконавчих та 
судових гілок влади в Україні? Чому? Приклади. 
 
54. Як Ви оцінюєте якість бізнес середовища та ефективність роботи Вашої 
компанії в Україні в порівнянні з роботою дочірніх підприємств у країнах 
Центральної та Східної Європи? Чому? Приклади. 
 
55. Щоб Ви бажали змінити у політичній системі України, якщо б були 
спроможні? 
 
56. Чи здійснювали Ви якісь спроби з виконання змін, пропонованних Вами у 
попередньому питанні? Які? 
  
ЩИРО ДЯКУЮ ВАМ ЗА УЧАСТЬ У ПРОЕКТІ. 
 
